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I would like to dedicate this work to all those people, who lost their lives in
search of a safe home. Even one life missed is too many for humanity. This
reminds me of a poem entitled ‘Bani-Adam’ – meaning ‘the Humankind’ – by
Saadi Shirazi, the Persian poet of the thirteenth century:
‘Human beings are members of a whole,
in creation of one essence and soul.
If one member is afflicted with pain,
other members uneasy will remain.
If you have no sympathy for human pain,
the name of human you may not retain.’1
1 Shaykh Mushrifuddin Sa’di of Shiraz, The Gulistan, Rose Garden of Sa’di: Bilingual English and
Persian Edition with Vocabulary (translated by Wheeler M. Thackston, Maryland: Ibex Publishers,
2008), pp. 21 and 22. In this regard, also see: Homa Katouzian, Sa’di: The Poet of Life, Love and
Compassion (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006), p. 31.
ABSTRACT
In this doctoral dissertation, I study the tense relationship between the obligations to
protect human rights of immigrants, on the one hand, and the need to safeguard the
internal security of the European Union (EU), on the other. Although a considerable
amount of research is available on the link between immigration and security, there is
a clear lack of understanding of what this tension actually means for the right to seek
asylum in the EU as a fundamental right. The aim is thus to fill this knowledge gap by
analysing the possible impacts of EU security narratives on the human rights
discourse, particularly on the right to seek asylum as a fundamental right protected
under Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Being a fundamental right implies that there is an inviolable essence that may not be
limited or balanced against in anyway – even if the security concerns of the EU or its
Member States are allegedly at stake. The inviolable essence of the right to seek asylum
includes two core elements: (1) that asylum seekers should be allowed to enter the
territory of the EU in order to submit claims for asylum; and (2) that they should not
be returned to places where their lives are clearly at risk (the principle of non-
refoulement). However, portraying immigrants, especially those arriving from the
Global South, as potential threats to EU internal security and the national security of
its Member States, has led to restrictive immigration policies and practices, which
affect the inviolable essence of this right. Accordingly, the main research question
addressed here is what the implications are of the securitisation of immigration in the
EU upon the right to seek asylum as a fundamental right.
Studying the concept of security and its different aspects lies beyond the field of
jurisprudence. Therefore, to answer the main research question, an interdisciplinary
approach combining the methods of law and social sciences is to be adopted. To be
precise, the method applied here is critical discourse analysis – an analytical tool
available to both critical legal studies and critical security studies. To address the
possible results of securitising immigration on the right to seek asylum as a
fundamental right in the EU, I critically analyse the practices of EU Member States,
the content of EU laws, and the jurisprudences of the Court of Justice of the European
Union and the European Court of Human Rights in relevant immigration cases.
In conclusion, I show that the official narrative of fear, anxiety, and emergency – that
immigration poses existential threats to EU internal security and the national security
of its Member States – is eroding the status of the right to seek asylum to less than that
of a fundamental right. The significance of the findings of this research is that if the
right to seek asylum is to remain a real and effective right, rather than only a theoretical
or illusionary one, we should take this right seriously by protecting its essence.
TIIVISTELMÄ
Väitöskirjassani tutkin, mikä on pakolaisten ihmisoikeuksien suojan ja Euroopan
unionin (EU) alueellisen turvallisuuden suhde. Aiheesta on olemassa lukuisia
tutkimuksia, mutta missään niistä ei keskitytä tarkastelemaan, miten näiden välinen
jännite vaikuttaa turvapaikkaoikeuteen EU:n takaamana perusoikeutena. Koska
oikeus turvapaikkaan on taattu EU:n perusoikeuskirjan 18 artiklassa, sillä voidaan
katsoa olevan loukkaamaton ydinalue, jota ei voida rajoittaa mahdollisten
turvallisuussyiden perusteellakaan.
Turvapaikkaoikeuden ydinalueeseen kuuluu ensinnäkin se, että
turvapaikanhakijoiden tulee olla mahdollista saapua EU:n alueelle hakemustensa
jättämiseksi. Toiseksi turvapaikanhakijoita ei tule palauttaa paikkoihin, joissa heitä
uhkaisi hengenvaara (palautuskiellon periaate, non-refoulement). Etenkin globaalista
etelästä EU-maihin saapuvia turvapaikanhakijoita on kuitenkin enenevässä määrin
luokiteltu turvallisuusriskiksi, joka on johtanut kumpaakin ydinalueen osatekijää
rajoittaviin käytäntöihin. Keskeinen tutkimuskysymykseni on, miten maahanmuuton
turvallistaminen (securitisation) EU:ssa vaikuttaa perusoikeutena turvattuun
oikeuteen hakea turvapaikkaa.
Turvallistamisen käsite on lähtöisin yhteiskuntatieteestä eikä sitä voi tarkastella
pelkästään oikeustieteen menetelmin. Tutkimusmetodini on siten tieteidenvälinen.
Esimerkiksi käyttämääni kriittistä diskurssianalyysia, hyödynnetään sekä
oikeustutkimuksessa ja turvallisuustutkimuksessa. Maahanmuuton turvallistamisen
perusoikeusvaikutusten selvittämiseksi analysoin EU:n jäsenmaiden käytäntöjä ja
unionin lainsäädäntöä yhdessä keskeisten EU:n tuomioistuimen ja Euroopan
ihmisoikeustuomioistuimen ratkaisujen kanssa.
Osoitan väitöskirjassani, että EU:n virallislähteissä turvapaikanhakijoihin liitetään
usein pelon, ahdistuksen ja hätätilan narratiiveja. Turvapaikanhakijoiden pitäminen
uhkana EU:n ja sen jäsenmaiden sisäiselle turvallisuudelle heikentää
turvapaikkaoikeuden asemaa perusoikeutena. Jotta oikeus turvapaikkaan säilyisi
tehokkaana eikä muuttuisi pelkästään teoreettiseksi, se tulisi ottaa vakavammin ja
suojata tehokkaasti sen ydinalueen osatekijöitä.
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The freedom of movement of persons is an internationally recognised human
right. Amongst many other human rights instruments,2 the normative
foundations of this right include the following: Article 13 of the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),3 Article 12 of the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),4 Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 of
the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),5 and Article 45 of the 2000 European Charter
of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter).6 However, this right is a derogable human
right, as the above-mentioned legal sources allow some limitations or
restrictions in situations of public emergency and under certain conditions by
exercising a ‘balancing act.’7 This balancing act encompasses the tests of
legitimacy (pursuing a legitimate aim), necessity, and proportionality, while
taking into consideration the principles of legality, equality, and non-
discrimination.8
2 More legal sources on the right to freedom of movement of persons are the following: Article 5 of the
1969 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Article 15 of the
1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Article
10 of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Article 3(2) of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU), Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
Article 12 of the 1981 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter), Article
22 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), and Article 20 of the Arab Charter on
Human Rights.
3 The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly
Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948.
4 The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for signature,
ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered
into force on 23 March 1976, U.N.T.S. Vol. 999, p. 171.
5 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols
Nos 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5.
6 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, published in the Official Journal of the
European Communities on 18 December 2000 (2000/C 364/01) and on 26 October 2012 (2012/c
326/02).
7 Derogable rights are those human rights, which could be limited or restricted in emergencies. In this
regard, see: Bernadette Rainey, Pamela McCormick, and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White, and Ovey: the
European Convention on Human Rights (8th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 114-123.
8 Cees Flinterman, ‘Derogation from the Rights and Freedoms in Time of Emergency’, in Pieter van Dijk,
Fried van Hoof, Arjen van Rijn, and Leo Zwaak (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention
on Human Rights (5th edn, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2018), pp. 1053-1075, pp. 1053-1068. Also, see:
Samantha Besson, ‘Human Rights in Relation: A Critical Reading of the ECtHR’s Approach to Conflicts
of Rights’, in Stijn Smet and Eva Brems (eds), When Human Rights Clash at the European Court of
Human Rights: Conflict or Harmony? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 23-37. For
information on derogation of human rights under other international human rights treaties besides the
2
Since early 2020, the Member States of the European Union (EU) have been
restricting people’s liberty of movement or the right to freedom of movement in
their attempts to control the spread of the global pandemic of coronavirus
disease (COVID-19). These restrictions have become the subject of serious
political and legal debates as European governments seek to balance public
health concerns against the obligation not to restrict the freedom of movement
of individuals.9 Since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in
the early 1990s, this is the first time that such drastic measures have been
imposed against the people’s freedom of movement in Europe. Hence, it must
be unprecedented for many European citizens to experience such restrictions.
While the COVID-19 pandemic has confined people to their homes, the focus of
this doctoral dissertation is the movement of immigrants across EU external
borders.10 Events such as the so-called ‘refugee crisis of 2015-2016’11 together
with terrorist attacks in various European countries since 2000, have led to the
tightening of EU external border control. Therefore, the topic of my doctoral
dissertation is part of the ongoing discussion on the tension between protecting
the human rights of immigrants, on the one hand, as opposed to safeguarding
the national security of host states, on the other.12 My focus in this research is
ECHR, see: Diane A. Desierto, Necessity and National Emergency Clauses: Sovereignty in Modern
Treaty Interpretation (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) pp. 241-253.
9 European Commission, ‘Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control’, <ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control_en>. See
also: Human Rights Watch, ‘Human Rights Dimensions of COVID-19 Response’,
<www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/19/human-rights-dimensions-covid-19-response#>. Also, see: The
United Nations Secretary-General, ‘COVID-19 and Human Rights: We are all in this Together’,
<www.un.org/victimsofterrorism/sites/www.un.org.victimsofterrorism/files/un_-
_human_rights_and_covid_april_2020.pdf>. With regard to the constitutional and parliamentary
debates in Finland on taking emergency measures on restricting freedom of movement, see: Päivi
Johanna Neuvonen, ‘The COVID‐19 Policymaking under the Auspices of Parliamentary Constitutional
Review: The Case of Finland and its Implications’ (2020) 6(2) European Policy Analysis, pp. 226-237.
10 The discussion on the implications of a health emergency like COVID-19 deserves its own independent
research, which is beyond the scope of this work.
11 The terminology is a subject of debate. Drago Župarić-Iljić and Marko Valenta, ‘“Refugee Crisis” in the
Southeastern European Countries: The Rise and Fall of the Balkan Corridor’, in Cecilia Menjívar, Marie
Ruiz, and Immanuel Ness (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Migration Crises (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2019), pp. 367-388. Also, see: Domenico Maddaloni and Grazia Moffa, ‘Migration
Flows and Migration Crisis in Southern Europe’, in Cecilia Menjívar, Marie Ruiz, and Immanuel Ness
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Migration Crises (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 603-
618. See: The European Commission, ‘Statistics on Migration to Europe’,
<ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-
migration-europe_en#overall-figures-of-immigrants-in-european-society>.
12 Valeria Bello, International Migration and International Security: Why Prejudice Is a Global
Security Threat (New York; Oxford: Routledge, 2017), pp. 51-69. Also, see: Philip Alston and Ryan
Goodman, International Human Rights: The Successor to International Human Rights in Context:
Law, Politics and Morals: Text and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 383-486.
Also, see: Philippe Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order (New
York; Oxford: Routledge, 2011), pp. 11-48. Also, see: Edward Newman, ‘Refugees, International
Security, and Human Vulnerability: Introduction and Survey’, in Edward Newman and Joanne Van
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exclusively on limiting the right to seek asylum for reasons of national security
and public safety. The security concerns of host states are included as valid
grounds for restricting the freedom of movement contained within the legal
sources mentioned above. It is also feasible to argue that such restrictions are
necessary measures to protect the rights and freedoms of others, including the
right to life (under Article 2 of the ECHR), as in the case of the threats of terrorist
attacks.
Since the early 2000s, immigration to the EU has been increasingly discussed
in public debate in terms of national security, the theorisation of which within
the fields of social sciences is known as the theory of securitisation in general
and the securitisation of immigration, specifically.13 The securitisation of
immigration in the EU perceives the governance of immigration as a case of
management of anxiety and unease, which results in a specific form of
governmentality based on narratives and routines.14 This conceptualisation
focuses on the analysis of public discourses on immigration, which I will explain
in further details in the current chapter and in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
Nevertheless, we need to keep in mind that this conceptualisation is inherently
incapable of analysing the normative developments and the implications of the
securitisation of immigration upon the enjoyment of the right to seek asylum.
The reason for this limitation in analysis is that the theory of the securitisation
of immigration only stays at the ‘speech-act’ level of portraying or conveying an
issue as a matter of security.15 Therefore, the study of the implications of this
Selm (eds), Refugees and Forced Displacement: International Security, Human Vulnerability, and the
State (Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, 2003), pp. 3-30.
13 Jef Huysmans and Vicki Squire, ‘Migration and Security’, in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry
Balzacq (eds), Routledge Handbook of Security Studies (2nd edn, Oxford; New York: Routledge 2017),
pp. 161-171, pp. 161-164. Also, see: Anastassia Tsoukala, ‘Defining the Terrorist Threat in the Post-
September 11 Era’, in Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala (eds), Terror, Insecurity and Liberty:
Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11 (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 49-99, pp.
65-69. Also, see: Elspeth Guild, ‘Protection, Threat and Movement of Persons: Examining the
Relationship of Terrorism and Migration in EU Law after 11 September 2001’, in Francois Crepeau,
Delphine Nakache, Michael Collyer, Nathaniel H. Goetz, and Art Hansen (eds), Forced Migration and
Global Processes: A View from Forced Migration Studies (Lanham, Maryland; Oxford: Lexington
Books, 2006), pp. 295-317, p. 295.
14 Didier Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease’ (2002)
27 Alternatives, pp. 63-92. Also, see: Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild, ‘Policing at a Distance: Schengen
Visa Policies’, in Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (eds), Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and
Within Europe (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 233-263. Also, see: C.A.S.E. COLLECTIVE,
‘Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto’ (2006) 37(4) Security Dialogue, pp.
443-487.
15 Didier Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease’ (2002)
27 Alternatives, pp. 63-92. Also, see: Anastassia Tsoukala, ‘Defining the Terrorist Threat in the Post-
September 11 Era’, in Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala (eds), Terror, Insecurity and Liberty:
Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11 (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 49-99. Also,
see: Jef Huysmans and Vicki Squire, ‘Migration and Security’, in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry
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conceptualisation upon the right to seek asylum requires theoretical approaches
beyond merely securitisation, especially considering the fact that this right is a
fundamental right protected, inter alia, under Article 18 of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, according to which:
The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva
Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the
status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
Treaties’).
The nature and the precise content of the right to seek asylum are discussed
below in Chapter 2. For now, it is important to point out that asylum seekers,
amongst all categories of immigrants, fall in an especially disadvantaged
position if their right to access a fair and effective asylum procedure is denied.16
In such cases, a proper assessment of their individual situation in terms of
refugee status is denied. Tighter border control may easily bring negative
implications upon the right to seek asylum. Positioning immigration as a matter
of EU internal security or as the national security of individual EU Member
States may justify imposing tighter control measures on the external borders of
the EU and further expanding this control to territories physically located
outside the EU.17 This phenomenon, known as the externalisation of European
border control, takes various forms such as agreements or deals with third
countries (non-EU countries) on not allowing immigrants to embark on
journeys for destinations in the EU,18 or the interception of boats carrying
immigrants on the high seas.19
Balzacq (eds), Routledge Handbook of Security Studies (2nd edn, Oxford; New York: Routledge 2017),
pp. 161-171.
16 Ibid.
17 On the expansion of the EU surveillance of asylum seekers as sources of insecurity, see:  Elspeth Guild,
‘Conflicting Identities and Securitisation in Refugee Law: Lessons from the EU’, in Susan Kneebone,
Dallal Stevens, and Loretta Baldassar (eds), Refugee Protection and the Role of Law: Conflicting
Identities (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 151-173.
18 Anna Liguori, Migration Law and the Externalization of Border Controls: European State
Responsibility (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2019). Also, see: Violeta Moreno-Lax, Accessing Asylum
in Europe: Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under EU Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017), pp. 173-178.
19 Marie-Laure Basilien-Gainche, ‘Leave and Let Die: The EU Banopticon Approach to Migrants at Sea’,
in Violeta Moreno-Lax and Efthymios Papastavridis (eds), ‘Boat Refugees’ and Migrants at Sea: A
Comprehensive Approach: Integrating Maritime Security with Human Rights (Leiden; Boston: Brill,
2016), pp. 327-352. Also, see: Violeta Moreno-Lax, Accessing Asylum in Europe: Extraterritorial
Border Controls and Refugee Rights under EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 188-
199. Also, see: Jasmine Coppens, ‘Interception of Migrant Boats at Sea’, in Violeta Moreno-Lax and
Efthymios Papastavridis (eds), ‘Boat Refugees’ and Migrants at Sea: A Comprehensive Approach:
Integrating Maritime Security with Human Rights (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2016), pp. 200-221. For
latest news on this practice, see: The Guardian, ‘We were left in the sea’: asylum seekers forced off
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In addition to the externalisation of European border control, other measures
are employed, in practice, to prevent asylum seekers from enjoying the right to
seek asylum in the EU. In this regard, I could name: (1) limiting the legal
channels for accessing the territory of the EU in the forms of denying
humanitarian visas,20 (2) using diplomatic assurances in torture or ill-treatment
expulsion cases,21 and; (3) the collective expulsion of immigrants.22 While the
number of legal routes available to asylum seekers for arriving in the EU remains
limited and even reduces further with time, the human smugglers and those
with related clandestine businesses get to benefit the most from this situation
by putting the lives of people at risk.23
Although less than ten percent of the total number of immigrants in the EU are
asylum seekers,24 the impact of the ongoing securitisation discourse is the most
serious upon this category. The reason is that asylum seekers, who lack any legal
immigration status, would not be deemed eligible for the protection of law
afforded to legal immigrants. However, asylum seekers could and should, in
fact, be legally protected under various human rights frameworks. In this
regard, I could name the availability of the following human rights standards to
asylum seekers:
· The protection of the right to seek asylum as a recognised fundamental
right in the EU and under the constitutions and national legislation of
many EU Member States;
· The prohibition of refoulement as a customary norm of international law;
· The absolute and non-derogable prohibition of refoulement to torture and
other forms of ill-treatment as a jus cogens norm, which is the crown of
the legal protection available to asylum seekers;
· The prohibition of the collective expulsion of immigrants under both EU
law and the law of the Council of Europe.
However, the securitisation of immigration in the EU can be seen to have had
negative impacts on these legal norms and standards. Their scope and
implementation have been limited to some degree with the support of the
Lesbos, <www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/mar/19/asylum-seekers-forced-off-lesbos-
pushback-crisis-europe-borders>.
20 The denial of humanitarian visas to the EU is the topic of Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
21 The use of diplomatic assurances in torture-expulsion cases is the subject of Chapter 5.
22 The collective expulsion of immigrants is the subject of analysis in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.
23 Ruben Andersson, Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe
(Oakland: University of California Press, 2014).




European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU). These are some of the negative impacts of the
discourse surrounding the securitisation of immigration. Such impacts upon the
enjoyment of human rights have been studied critically under a school of
thought known as critical security studies. 25
The concept of security is at the core of the right to seek asylum. This is because
refugee status – as I will explain in details in Chapter 2 – fundamentally is linked
to a person’s individual safety and security. In other words, a refugee is someone
whose individual security and physical safety is at risk in the respective country
of origin. By contrast, national security, as a form of collective security, may be
a legally valid reason for restricting immigration and the right to seek asylum.
In an age of securitisation, it is suggested that there is a tension between the
individual security needs of asylum seekers and refugees and the wider concerns
about public security.26
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS
Based on the background information provided above, the main research
question in this doctoral dissertation is what the implications of the
securitisation of immigration in the EU upon the right to seek asylum are.
Therefore, the main goal of this research is to analyse critically the implications
of securitising immigration on the right to seek asylum in the EU. To be more
precise, in this research, I will demonstrate, highlight, and analyse the negative
impacts that this ongoing phenomenon has been imposing on the enjoyment of
right to seek asylum. In order to provide possible answers to the main research
question, I will first discuss and explain the nature and content of the right to
seek asylum, on the one hand, and the theory of securitisation, on the other.
After this, I will focus on various aspects of the right to seek asylum and the
frameworks protecting its effectivity within the context of a highly securitised
environment, especially with regard to immigration to the EU.
My hypothesis is that the securitisation of immigration at legislation and
practice levels is having a negative or an eroding effect on the right to seek
asylum as a fundamental right in the EU. This is not to say that securitisation
25 David Mutimer, ‘Critical Security Studies: A Schismatic History’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary
Security Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 91-110. In this regard, also see:
Thierry Balzacq, ‘A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants’, in Thierry
Balzacq (ed.), Securitisation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London; New
York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 1-30. Elspeth Guild, Security and Migration in the 21st Century (Cambridge;
Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2009), pp. 6-10.
26 Elspeth Guild, Security and Migration in the 21st Century (Cambridge; Malden, Massachusetts: Polity
Press, 2009), pp. 6 and 7. In this regard, also see: Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear,
Migration and Asylum in the EU (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 45-62.
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would be the only factor explaining normative developments in the field. It is,
however, a significant one. A key concern here is that the dominant security
narratives of the EU, in practice, will render the right to seek asylum and Article
18 of the EU Charter less effective or even meaningless through denial of access
to asylum protection procedures. It is even more worrying if such concerns are
merely a façade to prevent ‘unwanted’ or ‘undesirable’ groups of immigrants
from entering the EU.
By taking a critical approach to the concept of security throughout this research,
I demonstrate that resulting from the securitisation of immigration, the right to
seek asylum in the EU has become to some extent ineffective; hence, Article 18
of the EU Charter may be losing its real meaning and legal position as a
fundamental right. In addition, I argue that if the existing practice of the
European Courts (particularly the ECtHR under Article 3 and Article 4 of
Protocol No. 4 of the ECHR) continues, the principle of non-refoulement,
especially in the context of expulsion to torture and ill-treatments, will lose its
high legal status, i.e. the jus cogens norm of international law.
1.3. RESEARCH SCOPE
In this section, I will sketch the conceptual and geographical limits of this
research based on the key words of the main research question. Subsection 1.3.1
contains the definition of terms that are the subject of study in this dissertation.
Then, in Subsection 1.3.2, I elaborate on the geographical scope of this research.
1.3.1. THE DELIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH SUBJECT MATTER
This dissertation addresses the link between migration and security. To narrow
the focus even further, what I study here is the nexus between migration law and
security. This research work is a part of the ongoing debates on protecting the
human rights of immigrants, on the one hand, as opposed to safeguarding the
national security of hosting states, on the other. However, the aim is precisely to
discover the negative consequences or the adverse impacts of securitising
immigration in the EU upon the right to seek asylum as a fundamental right.
Every day in the news, we hear about ‘asylum,’ ‘asylum seekers,’ ‘refugees,’
‘immigrants,’ and associated vocabularies multiple times. However, we hardly
contemplate what exactly these words mean and what the implications of these
differences could be on the lives and rights of people. For this research (studying
the implications of the securitisation of immigration), I have chosen only a
specific and limited category of immigrants, namely asylum seekers. This
choice is a purposeful and completely deliberate one, because asylum seekers
are in a state of limbo when it comes to their legal status in the host state and
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for establishing an attachment to the protective legal mechanisms available to
immigrants. Another reason to choose only the category of asylum seekers as
the main subject matter of this study is to diagnose the effect of the
securitisation of immigration on the right to seek asylum in the EU. Therefore,
the scope of the subject of study in this research is limited to asylum seekers as
one category of immigrants, namely that of forced immigrants.
Within the rights related to asylum seekers, I will focus only on the right to
seek asylum. Therefore, the other relevant rights to asylum such as the right
to enjoy asylum, lies outside this study. What this research addresses is merely
the right to seek asylum and its main composing elements including first, the
right to enter the territory of host states for submitting asylum claims, and
second, the prohibition of refoulement. As mentioned in the research question,
my main concern is to analyse the possible implications of the securitisation of
immigration in the EU, particularly on the right to seek asylum.
The point of departure in this dissertation is addressing the nature of the right
to seek asylum. The main premise, upon which I build all the arguments, is that
the nature of the right to seek asylum is a fundamental right. The reason is that
Article 18 of the EU Charter guarantees the right to asylum with due respect for
the rules of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and in
accordance with the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Throughout this research,
depending on the context within which the right to seek asylum is analysed the
terms may vary. The right to seek asylum under the 1948 UDHR is a basic
human right, a right without which other human rights could not exist.
Nevertheless, when addressing this right within the context of the national law
of EU Member States, the right to asylum is a constitutional right for the reason
that some EU Member States have included this right in the text of their
constitutions. EU primary law, however, considers the right to seek asylum as a
fundamental right, because the EU Charter protects this right under Article
18.
Once settled that the right to seek asylum is a fundamental right in EU law, we
should discover the essence or the inviolable elements existing at the very core
of this right. These elements may not be restricted, limited, or balanced against
even if the security concerns of the EU or its Member States are supposedly at
stake. This dissertation focuses specifically on the essence or inviolable elements
existing at the core of the right to seek asylum, which are, first, that asylum
seekers should be allowed to enter the territory of EU to submit their claims for
asylum. Secondly, asylum seekers should not be returned to places where their
lives are at risk (the principle of non-refoulement). Therefore, the case law
analysis undertaken in this research covers the jurisprudences of the European
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Courts concerning the two essential elements of the right to seek asylum. When
it comes to the first element of allowing asylum seekers to enter the territory of
the EU for submitting their asylum claims, the issuance of humanitarian visas
requires closer investigation. For the reason that the denial of a humanitarian
visa is in direct violation of the first essential element of the right to seek asylum,
one full chapter (Chapter 4) has been devoted to this subject.
Article 18 of the EU Charter has explicitly recognised the right to seek asylum as
a fundamental right. However, in practice, the realisation of this right is the
subject of secondary sources of EU law. In this regard, Article 25(1) of the EU
Visa Code27 has regulated the matter. However, portraying immigrants,
especially those arriving from the Global South, as potential threats to the
security of EU has led to restrictive non-entrée measures, policies, and practices,
including those against the issuing of humanitarian visas. The most relevant
case on Article 18 of the EU Charter and the issuance of humanitarian visas – to
my knowledge – is the case of X and X v. Belgium (2017) from the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU).28 A more detailed, critical analysis of
this case, therefore, is indispensable to the subject of this dissertation to answer
the main research question.
Nevertheless, I should remind here that the jurisprudence of the CJEU includes
other cases challenging the alleged violation of Article 18 of the EU Charter.
However, these cases do not directly concern accessing or entering the EU
territory for seeking asylum. Rather, they deal with other asylum-related issues
such as the right to an effective remedy in refoulement cases,29 the suspensive
effect of Article 18 in appeals against rejection decisions,30 and the concept and
meaning of a ‘safe third country.’31 Therefore, these cases substantially fall
outside the scope of the subject matter of this research.
27 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009
establishing a Community Code on Visas (EU Visa Code), published in Official Journal of the European
Union on 15 September 2009 (L 243/1).
28 Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge (Belgium), Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Decision of 7 March 2017 (referred to as the case of ‘X and X
v. Belgium’).
29 Case C-181/16, Sadikou Gnandi v. État belge (Belgium), Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU), Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Decision of 19 June 2018. Also, see: Joined Cases C-
924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU, FMS and Others v. Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-
alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság and Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság (Hungary), Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Decision of 14 May
2020 (referred to as ‘FMS and Others v. Hungary’).
30 Case C-181/16, Sadikou Gnandi v. État belge (Belgium), Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU), Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Decision of 19 June 2018.
31 Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, Joined cases of N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department (United Kingdom) and M.E. et al. v. Refugee applications Commissioner et al. (Ireland),
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Decision of
21 December 2011 (referred to as ‘N.S. v. UK and M.E. and Others v. Ireland’).
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Considering immigrants as potential threats to the internal security of EU and
the national security of its Member States has led to some non-entrée policies
and outlaw practices. These policies and practices may include, but not limited
to (1) denying humanitarian visas, (2) the use of diplomatic assurances in the
cases of expulsion to torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and (3) the
collective expulsion of immigrants. Such practices and policies allegedly violate
the norms of both international and EU human rights law; therefore, they are
carefully under scrutiny in this dissertation. The most prominent norm, in this
regard, is the principle of non-refoulement, a customary rule of international
law, which constitutes the second essential element of the right to seek asylum
as a fundamental right. Therefore, the study of this principle and non-entrée
policies and practices that have emerged against the principle of non-
refoulement because of the securitisation of immigration in the EU, is another
subject covered in this dissertation.
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article
19(1) of the EU Charter formulate the prohibition of refoulement. For two
reasons, however, I will study the jurisprudence of merely the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR). The first reason is that the prohibition of
refoulement, according to the EU Charter, is a codification of the ECtHR’s case
law under Article 3 of the Convention. The CJEU in all cases related to Article
19(1) of the EU Charter has emphasised that all legislation in this regard must
be interpreted and applied in harmony with the ECtHR’s substantive and
procedural standards.32 Secondly, the alleged tension between immigration and
security is most vivid in the use of diplomatic assurances in ill-treatment or
torture-expulsion cases. The ECtHR by far has established the authoritative
precedent in this regard. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the EU Member States
have been more than ever employing diplomatic assurances in ill-treatment and
torture-expulsion cases, which have become the subject of adjudication by the
ECtHR.
1.3.2. THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF RESEARCH
With regard to the geographical scope of this research, as the title and research
question both indicate, I study the European Union (EU). The EU is more than
merely a geographical landscape; it is a political, economic, and social unit with
its particular values, ideals, and identities.33 Therefore, the laws, policies, and
32 Steven Greer, Janneke Gerards, and Rose Slowe, Human Rights in the Council of Europe and the
European Union: Achievements, Trends and Challenges (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2018), pp. 343 and 344.
33 The European Union, ‘Goals and values of the EU’, <europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-
brief_en>.
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practices related to the right to seek asylum within the EU are of direct relevance
to this research. In this regard, EU law on asylum and the jurisprudence of EU
Courts, i.e. the ECtHR and CJEU, on the right to seek asylum are primary
subjects of study in this research. The critical case law analysis conducted in this
dissertation include cases from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, even though the
territorial jurisdiction of this court covers a geographical area beyond the
borders of the EU, meaning the Contracting States to the Council of Europe. The
inclusion of ECtHR cases is because the European Convention and the case law
produced within the jurisprudence of the court are an integral part of EU law.
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in Article 52(3) has assigned that the
scope and meaning of Charter rights, which correspond to the rights guaranteed
by the ECHR, shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This
provision, however, shall not prevent EU law from providing protection that is
more extensive.
The EU Charter is a broad catalogue of fundamental rights, which is based on
the rights, guaranteed in other human rights instruments adopted under the
frameworks of the United Nations and the Council of Europe. Hence, in this
research, I will take into account relevant international human rights treaties
and the interpretive practices of their monitoring bodies per need of the study.
To provide an example, Article 18 of the EU Charter builds upon the 1951
Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.34 Therefore, the obligations
formulated in the Refugee Convention are binding upon the EU Member States
– even when the actions of States fall within the scope of the application of EU
law. Therefore, even if the geographical focus of this research is the EU and its
law, I will analyse the jurisprudences and practices of the ECtHR, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Human Rights
Committee (HRC), and the UN Committee against Torture (CAT Commit.)
together with the interpretation of relevant provisions in respective legal
instruments.
1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The goal of any field of science, or any academic discipline, is ultimately to
produce some knowledge about the subjects under study. An integral and,
indeed, the most serious part of knowledge production process is the research
34 The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by the UN General Assembly on
28 July 1951, United Nations Treaty Series Vol. 189, p. 137 (referred to as the ‘1951 Refugee Convention’
or the ‘1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol’).
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method.35 If we agree that the research method is a collection of ‘rules,
procedures and practices for addressing and solving analytical problems,’ we
could claim that no research method is inherently ‘better’ than any other is.36
After all, the determining factor for assigning the methods in a piece of research,
or in a scientific investigation, and thereafter, for choosing our sources and
materials, is the main research question.37
Based on the main research question posed in this doctoral dissertation, I apply
an interdisciplinary legal analysis, combining research methods from both law
and social sciences. The reason for this methodological choice is that the concept
of security and the theory of securitisation is not, in itself, a creation of
jurisprudence, but rather the social sciences (as explained above in Section 1.1).
The research question addresses a problem with a multidisciplinary nature,
which I would not be able to discuss solely in terms of a traditional approach to
law, i.e. the doctrinal legal research method or the so-called ‘black-letter law’ or
a ‘dogmatic’ approach to law.38
One common line of division in legal methodology is distinguishing between a
doctrinal or dogmatic, on the one hand, as opposed to a non-doctrinal method,
35 Geoffrey Samuel, ‘Is Law Really a Social Science? A View from Comparative Law’ (2008) 67(2) The
Cambridge Law Journal, pp. 288-321, pp. 289-292.
36 Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto Sano, and Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, ‘Human Rights Research
Method’, in Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto Sano, and Siobhán McInerney-Lankford (eds), Research
Methods in Human Rights: A Handbook (Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2017), pp. 1-13. Also, see: Mathias M. Siems, ‘The Taxonomy of Interdisciplinary Legal
Research: Finding the Way out of the Desert’ (2009) 7(1) Journal of Commonwealth Law and Legal
Education, pp. 5-17.
37 Wendy Schrama, ‘How to Carry out Interdisciplinary Legal Research: Some Experiences with an
Interdisciplinary Research Method’ (2011) 7(1) Utrecht Law Review, pp. 147-162, pp. 148 and 149. In
this regard, also see: Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’,
in Mark Van Hoecke (ed.), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of
Discipline? (Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011), pp. 1-18, pp. 12-14. Also, see: Jaap Hage, ‘The Method
of a Truly Normative Legal Science’, in Mark Van Hoecke (ed.), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which
Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011), pp. 19-44, pp. 22-24.
On the importance of a well-defined and precise research question in directing the research and its
methods, see: Jan Vranken, ‘Methodology of Legal Doctrinal Research: A Comment on Westerman’, in
Mark Van Hoecke (ed.), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of
Discipline? (Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011), pp. 111-121, pp. 120 and 121. Also, see: Maurice Adams,
‘Doing What Doesn’t Come Naturally. On the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’, in Mark Van Hoecke
(ed.), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Oxford:
Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011), pp. 229-240, p. 236.
38 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, ‘Introduction and Overview’, in Mike McConville and Wing
Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017),
pp. 1-17, pp. 3 and 4. Also, see: Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal research’, in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock
(eds), Advanced Research Methods in the Built Environment (Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), pp.
28-38. Also, see: Tony Becher, ‘Towards a Definition of Disciplinary Cultures’ (1981) 6(2) Studies in
Higher Education, pp. 109-122, p. 117. In addition, see: Terry Hutchinson, ‘The Doctrinal Method:
Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming the Law’ (2015) 8(3) Erasmus Law Review, pp.
130-138.
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on the other.39 With regard to the method of doctrinal legal research, Dobinson
and Johns assert that with this method, the researcher is only concerned to
answer the question of ‘what the law is’ in a given and particular subject area.40
Similarly, Smits, in his definition of legal method, suggests that the doctrinal
research ‘aims to give a systematic exposition of the principles, rules and
concepts governing a particular legal field or institution and analyses the
relationship between these principles, rules and concepts with a view to solving
un-clarities and gaps in the existing law.’41 Based on these two definitions, it
would be accurate to claim that the principal aim of doctrinal legal research is
to ‘describe a body of law’ and to demonstrate ‘how the law applies.’42
To explain further, the doctrinal legal research method systematises, rectifies,
and clarifies ‘the law on any particular topic by a distinctive mode of analysis of
authoritative texts that consist of primary and secondary sources.’43 The
methods or tools of enquiry and analysis in doctrinal legal research is
hermeneutic or interpretive. This means that dogmatic legal scholars collect
legal sources (mainly legislation and cases), analyse, and interpret them, while
addressing apparent contradictions and gaps for the ultimate purpose of
constructing or creating a coherent legal doctrine.44 Additionally, doctrinal
researchers may also attempt to demonstrate how the law has developed in
terms of judicial reasoning and legislative enactment.45 Such research,
39 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, ‘Introduction and Overview’, in Mike McConville and Wing
Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017),
pp. 1-17, pp. 1-7. In this regard, also see: Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Legal Research as Qualitative
Research’, in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (2nd edn,
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), pp. 18-47, p. 19.
40 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Legal Research as Qualitative Research’, in Mike McConville and
Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2017), pp. 18-47, pp. 20 and 21.
41 Jan M. Smits, ‘What Is Legal Doctrine?: On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Dogmatic Research’, in
Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz, and Edward L. Rubin (eds), Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A
Transatlantic Dialogue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 207-228, p. 210.
42 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Legal Research as Qualitative Research’, in Mike McConville and
Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2017), pp. 18-47, p. 21. In this regard, also see: Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal research’, in Andrew Knight and
Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research Methods in the Built Environment (Oxford: John Wiley & Sons,
2008), pp. 28-38.
43 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, ‘Introduction and Overview’, in Mike McConville and Wing
Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017),
pp. 1-17, p. 4.
44 Hester Sanne Taekema and Wibren van der Burg, ‘The Incorporation Problem in Interdisciplinary
Legal Research’ (2015) 8(2) Erasmus Law Review, pp. 39-42.
45 Jan M. Smits, ‘What Is Legal Doctrine?: On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Dogmatic Research’, in
Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz, and Edward L. Rubin (eds), Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A
Transatlantic Dialogue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 207-228, pp. 219-227.
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therefore, has been characterised as ‘normative or purely theoretical.’46 The
reason for this particularly narrow scholarly function of doctrinal legal research
is that this method builds upon a traditional assumption that the character of
legal scholarship is derived only and only from the law itself.47
Notwithstanding the long tradition and practical importance of doctrinal legal
research,48 a positivistic or ‘black-letter’ approach to law is no longer the only or
even the dominant paradigm of legal education, legal research, and legal
scholarship.49 In the early 1960s, some American legal scholars and educators
who created the ‘Law and Society Association,’50 challenged the ‘self-sufficiency’
character of legal scholarship and criticised the knowledge produced merely
through the doctrinal legal research method.51 This criticism has shown itself in
the form of legal scholars engaging actively in empirical research and initiating
dialogues with scholars from different branches of social sciences to address the
complex problems of societies.52 The result of these intellectual dialogues has
46 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Legal Research as Qualitative Research’, in Mike McConville and
Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2017), pp. 18-47, pp. 20-22.
47 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, ‘Introduction and Overview’, in Mike McConville and Wing
Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017),
pp. 1-17, p. 4. In this regard, also see: Edward L. Rubin, ‘The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship’
(1988) 86(8) Michigan Law Review, pp. 1835-1905, pp. 1859-1873. Also, see: Lydia A. Nkansah and
Victor Chimbwanda, ‘Interdisciplinary Approach to Legal Scholarship: A Blend from the Qualitative
Paradigm’ (2016) 3(1) Asian Journal of Legal Education, pp. 55-71, pp. 55 and 56.
48 Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’, in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton
(eds), Research Methods in Law (2nd edn, Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 8-39. In this regard,
also see: Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal research’, in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced
Research Methods in the Built Environment (Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), pp. 28-38, pp. 31-34.
49 Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie, ‘Socio-Legal Theory and Methods:
Introduction’, in Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie (eds), Routledge
Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory and Methods (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 3-8. Naomi
Creutzfeldt, ‘Traditions of Studying the Social and the Legal: A Short Introduction to the Institutional
and Intellectual Development of Socio-Legal Studies’, in Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten
McConnachie (eds), Routledge Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory and Methods (Oxford; New York:
Routledge, 2020), pp. 9-34.
50 Law and Society Association (LSA), ‘Connecting socio-legal scholars from around the world’,
<www.lawandsociety.org/>.
51 Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie, ‘Socio-Legal Theory and Methods:
Introduction’, in Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie (eds), Routledge
Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory and Methods (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 3-8, p. 3. In
this regard, also see: Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz, and Edward L. Rubin, ‘Introduction’, in Rob
van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz, and Edward L. Rubin (eds), Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A
Transatlantic Dialogue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 1-27, pp. 1-3.
52 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Legal Research as Qualitative Research’, in Mike McConville and
Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2017), pp. 18-47, pp. 22 and 23.
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been the creation of a non-doctrinal method of legal research, better known as
the ‘socio-legal’ approach to law or ‘law-in-context.’53
The main input of the socio-legal approach is that future legal and political
practitioners, policymakers, legislators, law researchers, and educators – in
addition to doctrinal reasoning – need a more comprehensive thinking toolbox,
which includes broader theoretical and methodological skills in order to enable
them to understand better, how the complex modern World around them
operates.54 A socio-legal approach to legal studies and legal research aims to fill
in the gaps between the ‘law on paper’ and the ‘law in action.’55 Due to its close
engagement with society, non-doctrinal research has a strong history of
involvement in civil and political activism, together with an enthusiastic
advocacy for progressive societal changes such as vouching for civil rights
movements and anti-war campaigns.56 Accordingly, some critics have attacked
the academic seriousness or the intellectual sharpness of socio-legal research
precisely because of its deep involvement with social and political activism.57 In
response to this criticism, the mere fact that some lawyers or legal scholars
involve in social activism and make a bridge between legal practitioners and the
members of public does not, in itself, degrade either the lawyers’ intellectual
validity or the academic credibility of their research. In fact, nowadays, we could
easily track the impacts of socio-legal research in guiding social and public
policies through offering a new understanding of the ways that law interacts and
53 Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie, ‘Socio-Legal Theory and Methods:
Introduction’, in Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie (eds), Routledge
Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory and Methods (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 3-8. In this
regard, also see: Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Uses and Abuses of Socio-Legal Studies’, in Naomi
Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie (eds), Routledge Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory
and Methods (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 35-57.
54 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, ‘Introduction and Overview’, in Mike McConville and Wing
Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017),
pp. 1-17, pp. 5-7. In this regard, also see: Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie,
‘Socio-Legal Theory and Methods: Introduction’, in Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten
McConnachie (eds), Routledge Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory and Methods (Oxford; New York:
Routledge, 2020), pp. 3-8.
55 Naomi Creutzfeldt, ‘Traditions of Studying the Social and the Legal: A Short Introduction to the
Institutional and Intellectual Development of Socio-Legal Studies’, in Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason,
and Kirsten McConnachie (eds), Routledge Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory and Methods (Oxford;
New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 9-34.
56 Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie, ‘Socio-Legal Theory and Methods:
Introduction’, in Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie (eds), Routledge
Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory and Methods (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 3-8.
57 Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz, and Edward L. Rubin, ‘Introduction’, in Rob van Gestel, Hans-W.
Micklitz, and Edward L. Rubin (eds), Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A Transatlantic Dialogue (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 1-27, pp. 1-3. In this regard, also see: Naomi Creutzfeldt,
Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie, ‘Socio-Legal Theory and Methods: Introduction’, in Naomi
Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie (eds), Routledge Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory
and Methods (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 3-8.
16
engages with its social environment, and eventually exposing the flaws and
limitations of the law in practice.58 In addition, since the 1970s, the critical and
analytical character of socio-legal approach has provided suitable intellectual
grounds for a new approach to legal studies – known better as the school of
‘critical legal studies.’59
One of the areas of law, the comprehensive study of which does not easily fit into
the box of legal dogmatism or doctrinal research, is the field of public
international law and particularly its branch of international human rights
law.60 The reason for this particularity is that – as some scholars of international
law have acknowledged – while the origins of the sources of international law
differ significantly from the domestic sources of law, they also lack a clear-cut
hierarchy amongst them.61 International law consists of customary law,
supplemented by rules and principles agreed upon in the treaties and signed by
nation-states and other international actors such as organisations.62 One could
58 Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie, ‘Socio-Legal Theory and Methods:
Introduction’, in Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie (eds), Routledge
Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory and Methods (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 3-8. In this
regard, also see: Naomi Creutzfeldt, ‘Traditions of Studying the Social and the Legal: A Short
Introduction to the Institutional and Intellectual Development of Socio-Legal Studies’, in Naomi
Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie (eds), Routledge Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory
and Methods (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 9-34, pp. 20-32. In this regard, also see: Reza
Banakar and Max Travers, ‘Law, Sociology and Method’, in Reza Banakar and Max Travers (eds), Theory
and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Oxford; Portland: Hart Publishing, 2005), pp. 17-37.
59 Dennis M. Davis and Karl Klare, ‘Critical Legal Realism in a Nutshell’, in Emilios Christodoulidis, Ruth
Dukes, and Marco Goldoni (eds), Research Handbook on Critical Legal Theory (Cheltenham;
Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019) , pp. 27-43, pp. 27 and 28.
60 Rossana Deplano, ‘Introduction’, in Rossana Deplano, Giulia Gentile, and Luigi Lonardo (eds),
Pluralising International Legal Scholarship: The Promise and Perils of Non-Doctrinal Research
Methods (Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), pp. 1-17. Also,
see: Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, ‘Introduction and Overview’, in Mike McConville and Wing
Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017),
pp. 1-17, p. 7. Also, see: Damian A. Gonzalez-Salzberg and Loveday Hodson, ‘Introduction: Human
Rights Research beyond the Doctrinal Approach’, in Damian Gonzalez-Salzberg and Loveday Hodson
(eds), Research Methods for International Human Rights Law: Beyond the Traditional Paradigm
(Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 1-12. Also, see: Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto Sano, and
Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, ‘Human Rights Research Method’, in Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto
Sano, and Siobhán McInerney-Lankford (eds), Research Methods in Human Rights: A Handbook
(Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), pp. 1-13.
61 Samantha Besson and Jean D’Aspremont, ‘The Sources of International Law: An Introduction’, in
Samantha Besson, Jean D’Aspremont, and Sévrine Knuchel (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the Sources
of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 1-39. In this regard, also see: Mario
Prost, ‘Sources and the Hierarchy of International Law: Source Preferences and Scales of Values’, in
Samantha Besson, Jean D’Aspremont, and Sévrine Knuchel (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the Sources
of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 640-657. Also, see: Martti
Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 70(1)
Modern Law Review, pp. 1-30. Moreover, see: Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Hierarchy in International Law: A
Sketch’ (1997) 8 European Journal of International Law, pp. 566-582.
62 Erika De Wet, ‘Sources and the Hierarchy of International Law: The Place of Peremptory Norms and
Article 103 of the UN Charter within the Sources of International Law’, in Samantha Besson, Jean
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often refer to the decisions of international and national courts to ascertain the
content of such international norms.63 Therefore, the international legal system
is characterised as being de-centralised and consensual, which, in turn, has
profound consequences for conducting research in this field.64 The combination
of these characteristics calls for approaches that are scientifically different in
many ways from the traditional doctrinal methods employed in national or
domestic legal research.65 This is why methods beyond the purely doctrinal
approach are needed for conducting research on human rights law as a branch
of public international law.
As Andreassen and his colleagues have stated, the departure point in research
on topics related to human rights law is the international legal framework of
human rights protection.66 They have also observed that this starting point
draws some backlashes by limiting the scope of research to promoting human
rights and not criticising the system. This is not to say that human rights
research should not aim for the promotion of human rights. However, by taking
a more critical approach to the ‘institutional’ and ‘political’ foundations of
human rights, the research would be able to offer more effective tools for
D’Aspremont, and Sévrine Knuchel (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 625-639, pp. 625-630.
63 Erika De Wet, ‘Sources and the Hierarchy of International Law: The Place of Peremptory Norms and
Article 103 of the UN Charter within the Sources of International Law’, in Samantha Besson, Jean
D’Aspremont, and Sévrine Knuchel (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 625-639, pp. 625-630.
64 Rossana Deplano, ‘Introduction’, in Rossana Deplano, Giulia Gentile, and Luigi Lonardo (eds),
Pluralising International Legal Scholarship: The Promise and Perils of Non-Doctrinal Research
Methods (Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), pp. 1-17.
65 Marija Đorđeska, ‘General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations: Method, Inductive-
Empirical Analysis and (More) ‘Scientific’ Results’, in Rossana Deplano, Giulia Gentile, and Luigi
Lonardo (eds), Pluralising International Legal Scholarship: The Promise and Perils of Non-Doctrinal
Research Methods (Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), pp.
18-44. In this regard, also see: Sarina Landefeld, ‘The Evolution of Norms and Concepts in International
Law: A Social Constructivist Approach’, in Rossana Deplano, Giulia Gentile, and Luigi Lonardo (eds),
Pluralising International Legal Scholarship: The Promise and Perils of Non-Doctrinal Research
Methods (Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), pp. 45-63. Also,
see: Malcolm Langford, ‘Interdisciplinarity and Multimethod Research’, in Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-
Otto Sano, and Siobhán McInerney-Lankford (eds), Research Methods in Human Rights: A Handbook
(Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), pp. 161-191.
66 Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto Sano, and Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, ‘Human Rights Research
Method’, in Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto Sano, and Siobhán McInerney-Lankford (eds), Research
Methods in Human Rights: A Handbook (Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2017), pp. 1-13. In this regard, also see: Martin Scheinin, ‘The Art and Science of
Interpretation in Human Rights Law’, in Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto Sano, and Siobhán McInerney-
Lankford (eds), Research Methods in Human Rights: A Handbook (Cheltenham; Northampton,
Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), pp. 17-37. Also, see: Siobhán McInerney-Lankford,
‘Legal Methodologies and Human Rights Research: Challenges and Opportunities’, in Bård A.
Andreassen, Hans-Otto Sano, and Siobhán McInerney-Lankford (eds), Research Methods in Human
Rights: A Handbook (Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), pp.
38-67.
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promoting human rights in a given situation. After all, human rights are not only
the subjects of legal obligations; simultaneously, they are ‘moral norms’ and
‘values’ to which a community has obliged itself.67 Therefore, addressing human
rights violations, and how to stop them, could highly benefit from the inputs of
political and historical contexts, within which the violation is happening. In
addition, the observations offered by social, cultural, anthropological, and
economic analyses could offer some pragmatic ways on how to promote human
right norms in a given situation.68 As a result, the interdisciplinary nature of
human rights calls for applying mixed methods in addressing and analysing
research problems in the field of human rights law.69
Conducting research on the right to seek asylum, as a subject studied within
international human rights law, follows the same logic as conducting research
in the field of public international law. What we said above about the special
characteristics of studying and researching human rights law applies to all topics
falling under human rights law – including the right to seek asylum. Keeping in
mind the special character of international law and its sources, a purely
doctrinal method – to a certain extent – could be useful in studying the right to
seek asylum. This research method is suitable to describe the right itself, its
nature and contents, together with its normative development through
historical and philosophical debates. This theoretical and normative approach
alone, however, would allow a very isolated and limited understanding of the
right to seek asylum, especially when its relation with security is under
investigation.
Furthermore, producing knowledge in migration studies demands particularly
more scrutiny on the choice of research methods, because as Castles and his
67 Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto Sano, and Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, ‘Human Rights Research
Method’, in Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto Sano, and Siobhán McInerney-Lankford (eds), Research
Methods in Human Rights: A Handbook (Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2017), pp. 1-13.
68 Damian A. Gonzalez-Salzberg and Loveday Hodson, ‘Introduction: Human Rights Research beyond
the Doctrinal Approach’, in Damian Gonzalez-Salzberg and Loveday Hodson (eds), Research Methods
for International Human Rights Law: Beyond the Traditional Paradigm (Oxford; New York:
Routledge, 2020), pp. 1-12. In this regard, also see: Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto Sano, and Siobhán
McInerney-Lankford, ‘Human Rights Research Method’, in Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto Sano, and
Siobhán McInerney-Lankford (eds), Research Methods in Human Rights: A Handbook (Cheltenham;
Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), pp. 1-13.
69 Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto Sano, and Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, ‘Human Rights Research
Method’, in Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto Sano, and Siobhán McInerney-Lankford (eds), Research
Methods in Human Rights: A Handbook (Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2017), pp. 1-13. In this regard, also see: Malcolm Langford, ‘Interdisciplinarity and
Multimethod Research’, in Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto Sano, and Siobhán McInerney-Lankford
(eds), Research Methods in Human Rights: A Handbook (Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), pp. 161-191.
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collaborators have formulated, ‘[m]igration is hardly ever a simple individual
action.’ The cross-border movement of human populations is ‘a collective action,
arising out of social, economic and political changes and affecting the whole
society in both origin and destination areas.’70 The combination of this complex
character of human migration together with the development of human rights
protection mechanisms for the benefit of immigrants – in many ways – is bound
to political, societal, and cultural changes, which could not be understood in
isolation as a merely normative phenomenon. Therefore, the scientific field of
migration studies engages a wider range of theories and research methods from
various disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, political science, history,
economics, geography, demography, psychology, cultural studies, law, and
archaeology, amongst other fields of humanities and social sciences.71
Considering the complexity and multifaceted character of migration, as a social
phenomenon itself, and the inherently interdisciplinary character of migration
studies, conducting research on the legal aspects of migration should also have
some touches of interdisciplinarity.72 The reason for this methodological choice
is that the interdisciplinary research method has the scientific and intellectual
capacity to identify possible gaps and shortcomings in different disciplines
under study, and to bridge the analytic and methodological deficiencies, while
relying on their respective strengths.73
70 Hein de Haas, Stephen Castles, and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population
Movements in the Modern World (6th edn, New York: Macmillan International Higher Education,
2020), p. 42.
71 Caroline B. Brettell and James Frank Hollifield, ‘Introduction: Migration Theory: Talking Across
Disciplines’, in Caroline B. Brettell and James Frank Hollifield (eds), Migration Theory: Talking Across
Disciplines (3rd edn, New York; Oxford: Routledge, 2015), pp. 1-36, pp. 3-11. Also, see: Hein de Haas,
Stephen Castles, and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the
Modern World (6th edn, New York: Macmillan International Higher Education, 2020), pp. 42-45. Also,
see: Mathias M. Siems, ‘The Taxonomy of Interdisciplinary Legal Research: Finding the Way out of the
Desert’ (2009) 7(1) Journal of Commonwealth Law and Legal Education, pp. 5-17.
72 For more information in this regard, see: Paul Roberts, ‘Interdisciplinarity in Legal Research’, in Mike
McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2017), pp. 90-133. It is worth mentioning here that according to Menkel-Meadow (the
contemporary legal scholar), by Christopher Columbus Langdell revolutionising legal education in 1870
(which she calls the ‘Big Bang’ moment in legal education), all knowledge production in the field of law
must be multidisciplinary. By multidisciplinary (or as some say, interdisciplinary) she means that ‘[…]
a good legal education must include the “before”, “during”, and “after” causes and effects of law and legal
institutions on those whom the law seeks to influence and control.’ In this regard and its
counterarguments, see: Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Taking Law and _______ Really Seriously: Before,
During and After “The Law”’ (2007) 60(2) Vanderbilt Law Review, pp. 555-595, pp. 560-568.
73 Veronica Raffo, Chandra Lekha Sriram, Peter Spiro, and Thomas Biersteker, ‘Introduction:
International law and International Politics – Old Divides, New Developments’, in Thomas J. Biersteker,
Peter J. Spiro, Chandra Lekha Sriram, and Veronica I. Raffo (eds), International Law and International
Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 1-23, p. 3. Also, see:
Paul Roberts, ‘Interdisciplinarity in Legal Research’, in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds),
Research Methods for Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), pp. 90-133. Also,
see: Mathias M. Siems, ‘The Taxonomy of Interdisciplinary Legal Research: Finding the Way out of the
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Eventually, what assigns the research method of this doctoral dissertation and
the choices of theories, sources, and materials is the main research question.74
If the research question addressed in this dissertation were the internal
functionality of a legal system and its legal norms or rules, then, a doctrinal legal
research method would suffice.75 However, as I investigate the external effects
of a legal norm or a legal system, the doctrinal method alone would not suffice.
Studying the external dimensions of a legal norm is not merely about the
definition, consistency, or coherency of the legal norm internally compared to
other norms in a legal system.76 On the contrary, the question here addresses
the multidimensional external functionality and the effectiveness of EU asylum
law in action and within the context of a certain society (the EU), with all its
historical, political, economic, social, and cultural peculiarities.77 The key
component of the research question in this dissertation is the theory of
securitisation – a theory that was originally developed within the sub-disciplines
of social sciences. Therefore, a natural, if not even necessary, secondary method
arises from social sciences, which would give a strong socio-legal character to
this research. Such a characterisation, however, would be too broad, since using
a socio-legal research method covers a wide range of scholarship and theories
Desert’ (2009) 7(1) Journal of Commonwealth Law and Legal Education, pp. 5-17. Also, see: Hester
Sanne Taekema and Wibren van der Burg, ‘The Incorporation Problem in Interdisciplinary Legal
Research’ (2015) 8(2) Erasmus Law Review, pp. 39-42. Moreover, see: Terry Hutchinson, ‘The
Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming the Law’ (2015) 8(3) Erasmus
Law Review, pp. 130-138.
74 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’, in Mark Van
Hoecke (ed.), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline?
(Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011), pp. 1-18, pp. 12-14. In this regard, also see: Jaap Hage, ‘The Method
of a Truly Normative Legal Science’, in Mark Van Hoecke (ed.), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which
Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011), pp. 19-44, pp. 22-24.
On the importance of a well-defined and precise research question in directing the research and its
methods, see: Jan Vranken, ‘Methodology of Legal Doctrinal Research: A Comment on Westerman’, in
Mark Van Hoecke (ed.), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of
Discipline? (Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011), pp. 111-121, pp. 120 and 121. Also, see: Maurice Adams,
‘Doing What Doesn’t Come Naturally. On the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’, in Mark Van Hoecke
(ed.), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Oxford:
Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011), pp. 229-240, p. 236. Also, see: Wendy Schrama, ‘How to Carry out
Interdisciplinary Legal Research: Some Experiences with an Interdisciplinary Research Method’ (2011)
7(1) Utrecht Law Review, pp. 147-162, pp. 148 and 149.
75 Wendy Schrama, ‘How to Carry out Interdisciplinary Legal Research: Some Experiences with an
Interdisciplinary Research Method’ (2011) 7(1) Utrecht Law Review, pp. 147-162, pp. 148 and 149.
76 Paul Roberts, ‘Interdisciplinarity in Legal Research’, in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds),
Research Methods for Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), pp. 90-133.
77 Ibid. Also, see: Wendy Schrama, ‘How to Carry out Interdisciplinary Legal Research: Some
Experiences with an Interdisciplinary Research Method’ (2011) 7(1) Utrecht Law Review, pp. 147-162,
pp. 148 and 149.
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including law and economics, law and gender, law and politics, law and science,
etc.78
As mentioned above in Section 1.1, the theory of the securitisation of
immigration is inherently incapable of addressing the implications and
consequences of this process on the rights of immigrants.79 Hence, we would
need to go beyond this theory to be able to investigate the gap. The school of
‘critical security studies’ does that.80 One of the main criticisms of this school
against the theory of the securitisation of immigration is that the latter puts
national security or the collective security of society, as opposed to or inherently
against the security of individuals, especially when those individuals just happen
to be immigrants. Therefore, according to the securitisation of immigration,
whenever the rights and security of asylum seekers is to be balanced against
collective security or national security, the latter prevails, as asylum seekers are
not part of the collective (in this case, the EU). Critical migration and security
studies analyse the prevalent security concerns of the collective over the rights
and freedoms of individual, within the de- and post-colonial literature, as the
result of the legacy of European imperialism and colonial powers.81
Another criticism against the securitisation of immigration is that according to
this theory, the security of EU is divided into the two categories of ‘internal
78 Margaret Davies, ‘Doing Critical-Socio-Legal Theory’, in Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten
McConnachie (eds), Routledge Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory and Methods (Oxford; New York:
Routledge, 2020), pp. 83-96. In this regard, also see: Paul Roberts, ‘Interdisciplinarity in Legal
Research’, in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (2nd edn,
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), pp. 90-133
79 The theory of securitisation, known as the Copenhagen School, has been recently the subject of
criticisms by some political scientists. In this regard, see, for example: Alison Howell and Melanie
Richter-Montpetit, ‘Is Securitization Theory Racist? Civilizationism, Methodological Whiteness, and
Antiblack Thought in the Copenhagen School’ (2020) 51(1) Security Dialogue, pp. 3-22.
80 Elspeth Guild, Security and Migration in the 21st Century (Cambridge; Malden, Massachusetts: Polity
Press, 2009), pp. 6-10.
81 Lucy Mayblin and Joe Turner, Migration Studies and Colonialism (Cambridge, UK; Medford, MA:
Polity Press, 2021). In this regard, also see: Ulrike Krause, ‘Colonial Roots of the 1951 Refugee
Convention and its Effects on the Global Refugee Regime’ (2021) 24 Journal of International Relations
and Development, pp. 599-626. Also, see: Sherally Munshi, ‘Immigration and the Imperial’, in Simon
Stern, Maksymilian Del Mar, and Bernadette Meyler (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law and
Humanities (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 497-516. Also, see: Glen Peterson,
‘Colonialism, Sovereignty and the History of the International Refugee Regime’, in Matthew Frank and
Jessica Reinisch (eds), Refugees in Europe, 1919-1959: A Forty Years’ Crisis? (London; New York:
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019), pp. 213-228. Also, see: Lucy Mayblin, Asylum after Empire: Colonial
Legacies in the Politics of Asylum Seeking (London: Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd, 2017).
Also, see: Lucy Mayblin, ‘Colonialism, Decolonisation, and the Right to be Human: Britain and the 1951
Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees’ (2014) 27(3) Journal of Historical Sociology, pp. 423-
441. Also, see: Bhupinder S. Chimni, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third
World Approach’ (2007) 8(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law, pp. 499-515.
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security’ versus ‘external security.’82 This division is the foundation of the
current EU legal system of immigration and asylum. Articles 1 and 2 of the 2016
Schengen Borders Code83 divide the EU borders into two types of ‘internal’ and
‘external’ borders, by imposing the greater emphasis on external border control
for the purpose of securing the freedom of movement of persons within the EU
and for creating an ‘area of freedom, security, and justice.’84 The implication of
this division is that once immigrants are considered as threats to the internal
security of EU, the employment of any measure in controlling the external
Schengen borders would be justifiable, no matter if these measures fail to
comply with the human rights of asylum seekers.
It is important to highlight here that the theory of securitisation offers no insight
into the legal or normative implications of this process such as the possible
deterioration of the most basic and fundamental human rights of immigrants or
asylum seekers. In trying to provide an answer to the main research question in
this dissertation by benefiting from the socio-legal method, I employ a critical
or counter approach to securitisation offered by critical security studies. This
critical approach challenges the basic assumptions of the theory of securitisation
as understood by the Copenhagen School, and point out other deficiencies, some
of which may be normative in nature or at least have normative implications. In
contrast to the theory of securitisation, the critical school of security studies
invites us to move far beyond the process of ‘speech-act’ in securitisation and to
pay a close attention to the negative impacts of this theory on the lives and rights
of its subjects.85 This is precisely what is under study in this doctoral
dissertation. Instead of addressing whether immigrants are, in fact, or are not a
matter of national security, I scrutinise the normative implications of asking
these kinds of questions or even trying to answer them. The critical security
studies, hence, could offer an intellectual basis for developing a more
meaningful and effective right to seek asylum.
82 Elspeth Guild, Security and Migration in the 21st Century (Cambridge; Malden, Massachusetts: Polity
Press, 2009), pp. 6-10.
83 The Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a
Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, OJL 77, 23 March 2016,
pp. 1-52 (referred to as ‘the 2016 Schengen Borders Code’).
84 For an overall discussion on the creation of EU as an area of ‘freedom, security, and justice’, see: Neil
Walker, ‘In Search of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Constitutional Odyssey’, in Neil
Walker (ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press,
2004), pp. 3-37. In this regard, also see: Rens van Munster, Securitizing Immigration: The Politics of
Risk in the EU (Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 65-97.
85 Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu, ‘Methods in Critical Security Studies’, in Alexandra Gheciu and
William Curti Wohlforth (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Security (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2018), pp. 167-178.
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Based on this explanation, it is necessary to narrow down the analytical tool I
employ in this thesis, which is ‘critical discourse analysis,’ an analytical tool
available to both critical legal and critical security studies.86 The critical
discourse analysis is highly sensitive to detecting the ways, through which the
dynamics of social power enacts, reproduces, and resists abuses, dominance,
and inequalities. These ways may take various forms of verbal and non-verbal
‘speech-acts.’ In other words, the driving force behind this method of analysis is
offering intellectual tools to the researcher and to the audience of the research
to understand, expose, and ultimately resist against social inequalities.87 The
reason for this particular choice of method and tool in this research is that
securitisation – as a constructivist theory – builds primarily on the discursive
analysis of a variety of narratives or ‘speech-acts’ about security.88 In the case of
my doctoral dissertation, the primary idea underlying the main research
question is the public and official narratives of fear, anxiety, and emergency
that form and thereafter portray immigration as an existential threat to the
internal security of EU in general and the national security of its Member States,
particularly.89
Using critical discourse analysis, embedded within both critical legal and
security studies, helps me show that the recent normative deterioration of the
right to seek asylum, as an exceptional measure in time of emergency, is the
inevitable result of the sociologically and politically constructed securitisation
86 Laura Alba-Juez, Perspectives on Discourse Analysis: Theory and Practice (Newcastle upon Tyne:
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), pp. 235-263. Also, see: Isabela Fairclough and Norman
Fairclough, Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students (Oxford; New York:
Routledge, 2012), pp. 78-116.
87 Laura Alba-Juez, Perspectives on Discourse Analysis: Theory and Practice (Newcastle upon Tyne:
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), pp. 235-263. Also, see: Teun A. van Dijk, Discourse and Power
(Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Macmillan International Higher Education, 2008), pp. 85-101.
88 Thilo Marauhn and Marie-Christin Stenzel, ‘Power, Security, and Public International Law – an
Intricate Relationship’, in Regina Kreide and Andreas Langenohl (eds), Conceptualizing Power in
Dynamics of Securitization: Beyond State and International System (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag,
2019), pp. 265-289. Also, see: Andreas Langenohl, ‘Dynamics of Power in Securitization: Towards a
Relational Understanding’, in Regina Kreide and Andreas Langenohl (eds), Conceptualizing Power in
Dynamics of Securitization: Beyond State and International System (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag,
2019), pp. 25-66. Also, see: Thierry Balzacq, ‘Enquiries into Methods: A New Framework for
Securitization Analysis’, in Thierry Balzacq (ed.), Understanding Securitisation Theory: How Security
Problems Emerge and Dissolve (New York; Oxford: Routledge, 2011), pp. 31-53. Also, see: Barry Buzan
and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), pp. 191-221.
89 Regina Kreide, ‘The Power of Border Politics: On Migration in and outside Europe’, in Regina Kreide
and Andreas Langenohl (eds), Conceptualizing Power in Dynamics of Securitization: Beyond State and
International System (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2019), pp. 67-90. In this regard, also see: Barry
Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies (Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 226-255. Also, see: Didier Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration:
Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease’ (2002) 27 Alternatives, pp. 63-92.
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of immigration in the EU.90 Other factors may have contributed to this
development. However, the critical discourse analysis of relevant sources in EU
law and practice draws some possible conclusions about the tangled relationship
between the securitisation of immigration and the right to seek asylum, on the
one hand, and the negative impact of the former on the latter, on the other.
1.5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND THE USE OF SOURCES AND
THEORIES
This section elaborates on how I intend to provide answers to the research
question of this doctoral dissertation. In the following pages, I will sketch a brief
outline of what each individual chapter of this research comprises. Meanwhile,
I will also give an overview of the theories, sources, and materials used to
provide possible answers to the research question.
In Chapter 2, in order to understand the nature of the right to seek asylum as
a fundamental human right, it is pertinent to study the historical background
behind the creation of this right. For this purpose, I will apply a doctrinal legal
research method, alongside the historical and philosophical approaches to the
subject. This chapter elaborates on how asylum, as a traditional practice, has
transformed to become a normative and legal institution through time, reaching
the status of a fundamental right in the EU. For the purpose of this legal analysis,
the first key method is the historical study and philosophical investigation on
the formation of the right to seek asylum within different phases of history,
starting from early human life on Earth until today. This is the subject of Section
2.2 of Chapter 2. It should be noted that the historical reading presented in this
part is not necessarily in a strict chronological order. The narrative jumps back
and forth throughout history, depending on the development of the concept and
practice of asylum seeking and thereafter its transformation from a traditional
practice existing in the World into a fundamental right in the EU.
The research sources and materials used in Chapter 2 are the historical literature
and academic texts. Subsection 2.2.1 describes asylum seeking as a traditional
practice recognised in different cultures and within religious ideologies.
Thereafter, the historical sources in Subsection 2.2.2 narrate how asylum
seeking, as a religious and cultural tradition, evolved into a legal institution
under the control of nation-states. This part of the research demonstrates that
the formation of nation-states in Europe imposed the concept of security upon
90 For more information on applying discourse analysis and its derivatives such as critical discourse as
analytical tools within socio-legal research, see: Bettina Lange, ‘Researching Discourse and Behaviour
as Elements of Law in Action’, in Reza Banakar and Max Travers (eds), Theory and Method in Socio-
Legal Research (Oxford; Portland: Hart Publishing, 2005), pp. 159-175.
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asylum seeking. This discussion brings a Eurocentric perspective to the matter;
however, this approach illustrates how the modern legal system of refugee
protection – based on individual rights and the assessment of alleged
persecution claims, indeed, is inherently at odds with the security agenda of the
EU as a collective entity.
After explaining the historical development of the practice of asylum seeking
into the current right to seek asylum, in Section 2.3, I apply the ‘theory of rights’
to identify and analyse the conceptual and doctrinal components of this right as
a fundamental right. The intellectual product of Hohfeld and Alexy, i.e. the
theory of rights, provides a doctrinal analysis tool to understand the nature of
the right to seek asylum as a fundamental right. The significance of this analysis
is uncovering the essence of this right, without which its realisation is factually
and legally impossible. These essential elements, which are inviolable, i.e. no
derogation is allowed against them, are the right to access the asylum procedure
and the prohibition of refoulement. The conceptual and doctrinal analysis of the
composing elements of the right to seek asylum under this section, together with
Chapter 3, prepare the premises of arguments in the remaining chapters of this
research.
In Chapter 3, I locate the securitisation of immigration within the theory of
securitisation, as formulated by political scientists under the discipline of
International Relations (IR) within the field of security studies. In Section 3.2,
by referring to the literature and academic sources available in security studies,
I identify the IR theory of securitisation to be a by-product of the post-Cold War
era, in which any societal matter could be, in theory, considered a threat to the
security of states. One of these societal phenomena is immigration, which,
especially in the post 9/11 attacks and after the 2015-2016 terrorist attacks in
various European cities, has been recognised as an existential threat to the
internal security of EU in general and the national security of its individual
Member States, specifically. This is the subject of study under Subsection 3.2.2
under Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
In Section 3.3, I analyse the tangled relationship between protecting the rights
of asylum seekers, as opposed to safeguarding the national security of host states
on a general level. First, in Subsection 3.3.1, I will dispel some popular
misconceptions about this relationship by paying a particular attention to the
tension between respecting the right to seek asylum as a fundamental human
right, while countering terrorism. In Subsection 3.3.2, by introducing the critical
school of security studies to this research, I reveal the deficiency and incapability
of the theory of securitisation in analysing the normative implications of
applying this theory in security analysis. In this subsection, the school of critical
security studies brings this new outlook and analytical dimension to my research
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that, instead of focusing on the process of securitisation itself, we should rather
move beyond the ‘speech-act’ process in order to be able to analyse the
implications of this process on the human rights discourse. Therefore, by the
end of Chapter 3, I have prepared the conceptual and theoretical scenes
necessary for evaluating the implications of the securitisation of immigration on
the right to seek asylum in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation and
offering answers to the main research question.
In Chapter 4, the main subject of study is Article 18 of the 2000 EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights as the main legal provision of EU law on the right to seek
asylum. For the reason that the CJEU is the guardian of the EU Charter, its
jurisprudence with regard to Article 18 is of utmost relevance to this study. The
goal of this chapter is to show that the EU as a transnational legal entity and its
Member States, individually, are undermining the position of the right to seek
asylum as a fundamental right by using security concerns as an excuse for
preventing asylum seekers from entering the EU in order to submit asylum
applications. To support this claim, Section 4.2 first locates the unique position
of the CJEU in safeguarding the fundamental rights stipulated under the EU
Charter.
Then, in Section 4.3, by employing the method of critical discourse analysis as a
tool available to critical legal analysis, I criticise EU asylum law. Through a close,
careful, and critical textual analysis of relevant EU legislation on the matter, I
expose the inconsistencies of EU law in protecting the right to seek asylum as a
fundamental right in the EU. In other words, by critically scrutinising the EU
Treaties and secondary legislation within the Common European Asylum
System (CEAS), I unmask a dominant shadow of securitisation affecting the law
and policies that govern asylum seeking in the EU. To elaborate further on this
claim, I scrutinise how, in reality, the right to seek asylum is impossible to truly
implement, which unavoidably leads to this right being ineffective and therefore
meaningless in practice. Even though Article 18 of the EU Charter explicitly
guarantees the right to seek asylum as a fundamental right and Article 25(1) of
the EU Visa Code vouches for that, the EU does not provide pragmatic ways to
facilitate the arrival of asylum seekers to fulfil the right to seek asylum.91
At the end of Chapter 4, Subsection 4.3.2 also employs the method of critical
discourse analysis in scrutinising the EU practices regarding the right to seek
asylum, specifically within the jurisprudence of the CJEU. Article 18 of the EU
Charter is the stipulation of the right to seek asylum as a fundamental right.
91 Erik Fribergh and Morten Kjaerum, Handbook on European law relating to Asylum, Borders and
Immigration (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016), pp. 35-37.
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However, by critically reading its reasoning in the case of X and X v. Belgium
(2017),92 the CJEU has removed the burden for violating the right to seek asylum
from the shoulders of Member States of the EU, instead locating it within the
political will and discretionary power of EU Member States. This critical case
analysis, by showing the extent of the hypocrisy of authorities deciding on EU
law, provides an answer to the main research question of this dissertation. The
result of the embedded securitisation of immigration in both EU law and
decisions of the CJEU make the right to seek asylum meaningless even though
this right is, in normative terms and legally speaking, a fundamental right.
Henceforth, in the final part of Chapter 4, I further argue that asylum decision-
making is about balancing the interests of individual security against those of
collective security. If we discuss this balancing act with Ronald Dworkin’s theory
of ‘legal interpretivism,’ as formulated in his book entitled ‘Taking Rights
Seriously,’93 there is a clash between individual human rights and freedoms
against the collective-interest policies. On the one hand, from the point of the
view of individual, there is the right of an individual searching for personal
security through requesting asylum, which is a matter of law. In fact, it is a
matter of constitutional law, as the right to seek asylum is a fundamental right.
On the other hand, from the perspective of host or receiving states, by taking a
collective security point of view, the acts or procedures of asylum seeking is
merely a matter of policy.
The reason for the clash between protecting the human rights of asylum seekers,
as opposed to safeguarding the national security of states is that from the
standing viewpoint of states, collective security is far more important and
weightier than the rights, freedoms, and security of individuals. Consequently,
instead of being a fundamental right, the right to seek asylum has become
nothing more than a policy-based decision-making apparatus. The right to seek
asylum, at the end of the day, reduces to a matter of policy, which states
themselves get to decide whether to uphold or not. The literature on the colonial
origins of asylum law and the current legal system of refugee protection clearly
reflect this mindset.
In Chapter 5, I further address the main research question of this dissertation
on the implications of the securitisation of immigration on the right to seek
asylum, especially when the second element of its essence – meaning the
principle of non-refoulement – falls under attack. In Section 5.2, by applying the
doctrinal legal research method, I analyse the legal status of the principle of non-
92 Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge (Belgium), Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Decision of 7 March 2017 (referred to as ‘X and X v. Belgium’).
93 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).
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refoulement as a customary norm of international law. Since this principle is the
very foundation of the right to seek asylum, it would be impossible to realise this
right without the principle of non-refoulement remaining intact.
Thereafter, in Section 5.3, I present how the principle of non-refoulement,
combined with the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture and other
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, has elevated the prohibition of
refoulement to torture and other forms of ill-treatment to a peremptory norm of
customary international law – better known as a jus cogens norm. Considering
the unique absolute and non-derogable position of the principle of non-
refoulement to torture and other forms of ill-treatment, in Section 5.4, through
a critical discourse analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR under Article 3 of
the Convention, I provide further answers to the main research question.
Through these case law analyses, I demonstrate that the political pressure to
combat terrorism has facilitated Article 3 expulsions through legitimising the
use of diplomatic assurances. As another answer to the main research question,
I conclude that if the absolute and non-derogable prohibition of refoulement to
torture and other ill-treatment were to persist, the position of this principle
would degrade from a jus cogens norm to an empty and meaningless provision.
Under this scenario, there is no principle left supporting the right to seek
asylum; hence, this right would also lose its normative character of being a
fundamental right. By referring back to Dworkin, if we wanted to take a right
seriously,94 in practice, we would need to keep to the founding principles of law
and the legal system, in which those laws have been adopted. In the case of
taking the right to seek asylum seriously, primarily, we need to keep to the
founding principle of this right and its essential core, meaning the principle of
non-refoulement, otherwise the very existence of this right is in jeopardy.
In Chapter 6, first, I present a summary of the findings of this dissertation and
identify the gap in existing knowledge that this research fills. Then, as final
words, I address the practice of the ‘collective expulsion of aliens’ as another
example of practices that the securitisation of immigration has created. There is
a good reason for an explicit prohibition against this practice under Article 4 of
Protocol No. 4 of the ECHR. The collective expulsion of aliens is in direct
violation of the right to seek asylum. In other words, this practice results in
preventing asylum seekers from gaining access to the territory of EU in order to
submit asylum applications. Recently, the most important case in this regard is
the ECtHR case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain (2020).
The critical discourse analysis of the arguments offered by the respondent
Government (Spain) demonstrates that protecting the collective security of EU,
94 Ibid.
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as a ‘meta right,’ is against the rationale behind refugee protection, which
depends on the individual assessment of subjective persecution. By this, I mean
that Europe has put its need for collective security against individual security
and the protection of those in need of asylum, mainly coming from the Global
South. As a result, safeguarding the national security of EU Member States or
the internal security of the EU, in practice, has been negatively affecting the
prohibition on the collective expulsion of immigrants.
Henceforth, not only the enjoyment of the right to seek asylum and its derivative
rights (such as the right to an effective remedy) by groups of asylum seekers
again loses its real meaning and becomes ineffective, but also the securitisation
of immigration in the law, polices, and practices of EU is making a certain group
of people ‘illegal.’95 Under this scenario, the very legal and social existence and
the protection of some people fall outside the realm of the ‘Law’s Empire.’96 After
all, depending on the law alone and the language of rights, as such, does not
suffice in realising the right to seek asylum. In addition to the inherent
incapability and inability of law to solve the issue of illegality, this approach
limits us to the myopia of ‘legalistic dogma.’97 The limitations of thinking solely
from a legal standpoint leads to ignoring the political, social, and cultural
contexts, within which human rights in general, and the right to seek asylum,
specifically, have found meaning.98
In conclusion, instead of studying the right to seek asylum from a purely
legalistic approach, we should analyse the ‘political processes,’ which could give
this right a real meaning. By way of explanation, human rights are not only
matters of legal dogmatic discourse. The political, social, cultural, and economic
contexts, within which these rights are formed and dismantled, need
consideration to restore the essence of the right to seek asylum in the EU. This
right is so fundamental in the realisation of other human rights of asylum
seekers, so that to me, it resonates with what Hannah Arendt called, ‘the right
to have rights.’99
95 Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
96 I have borrowed the phrase ‘Law’s Empire’ from the title of one of Dworkin’s books: Ronald Dworkin,
Law’s Empire (Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd, 1998).
97 Richard Ashby Wilson, ‘Tyrannosaurus Lex: The Anthropology of Human Rights and Transnational
Law’, in Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry (eds), The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law
between the Global and the Local (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 342-
369, pp. 360-363.
98 Ibid, pp. 350-369. Also, see: Jean Grugel and Nicola Piper, Critical Perspectives on Global
Governance: Rights and Regulation in Governing Regimes (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 18-21.
99 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Orlando: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979), pp.
267-302.
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2. UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF THE
RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM AS A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT
2.1. INTRODUCTION
In order to understand the nature of the right to seek asylum, it is pertinent to
grasp the background story from which this right has emerged. The etymology
of the term ‘asylum’ suggests that this word is a Latin term, originated from the
Greek word ‘asylon.’100 In the English language, asylon literally translates to
‘freedom from seizure.’101 To its very core, asylum is a protection given to a
person in a certain place.102 In common use, the term asylum is frequently
mistaken with the word refugee. Asylum is a more general term, which includes
all refugees; whereas, a refugee is an asylum seeker whose refugee application
has met all the inclusion criteria under Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Refugee
Convention and its 1967 Protocol.103
Asylum seeking in international law occupies something of a highly disputed
and contradictory legal space, swaying between the principle of state sovereignty
and an urgent need for the humanitarian protection of individuals.104 In this
chapter, I will first study the historical background behind the formation and
development of the concept of asylum and the practice of asylum seeking in the
World (Section 2.2). I divide this historical analysis into two stages of before and
after the creation of nation-states. Although this categorisation implies a
chronological historical study of asylum, this section follows a diachronic logic,
i.e. sometimes going backwards and forwards along the historical timeline.
100 Kent J. Rigsby, Asylia: Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1996), pp. 423 and 424.
101 Atle Grahl-Madsen, ‘Asylum, Territorial’, in Peter MacAlister-Smith and Guðmundur S. Alfreðsson
(eds), The Land Beyond: Collected Essays on Refugee Law and Policy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2001), pp. 280-286, p. 280. In this regard, also see: Rebecca M.M. Wallace and Fraser A.W.
Janeczko, ‘The Concept of Asylum in International Law’, in Mary Crock (ed.), Refugees and Rights
(Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 33-58, p. 33.
102 Kent J. Rigsby, Asylia: Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1996), pp. 2-5. In this regard, also see: Rebecca M.M. Wallace and Fraser A.W.
Janeczko, ‘The Concept of Asylum in International Law’, in Mary Crock (ed.), Refugees and Rights
(Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 33-58, p. 33.
103 James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 78. In this regard, also see: Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane
McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press,
2007), pp. 35-41.
104 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, Oxford; New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 1.
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Meanwhile, in the same section, I will analyse the philosophical debates, which
have formed the intellectual foundations of the acceptance and development of
the right to seek asylum in the EU as a fundamental right. Based on these
theoretical arguments, the receiving EU Member States are responsible for the
realisation of the right to seek asylum.
Since this chapter covers the philosophical and intellectual history of the right
to seek asylum in the EU, the mainstream research materials available on the
topic explore the Eurocentric approach to asylum as part of a wider Western
imperial project. Being aware of this fact, in the midst of this historical and
philosophical analysis, I critically weigh the European version of asylum against
the recent and currently growing body of de- and post-colonial literature in the
field of critical migration studies.105 I will examine this body of literature in
further details in the discussion chapter of this dissertation, meaning Chapter 6.
After studying the historical background and philosophical debates on the
formation of the right to seek asylum as a fundamental right in the EU, in
Section 2.3, I will address the conceptual elements of this right. Keeping this
short introduction in mind, the questions I address in this chapter are the
following: how did the right to seek asylum come into existence? What are the
historical explanations that justify the necessity of upgrading the legal status of
this right to a fundamental right in the EU? What are the legal implications of
considering the right to seek asylum as a fundamental and constitutional human
right? The historical and philosophical analyses of this chapter set the scene to
answer the main research question in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
105 Ulrike Krause, ‘Colonial Roots of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Effects on the Global Refugee
Regime’ (2021) 24 Journal of International Relations and Development, pp. 599-626. In this regard,
also see: Lucy Mayblin, Asylum after Empire: Colonial Legacies in the Politics of Asylum Seeking
(London: Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd, 2017). Also, see: Glen Peterson, ‘Colonialism,
Sovereignty and the History of the International Refugee Regime’, in Matthew Frank and Jessica
Reinisch (eds), Refugees in Europe, 1919-1959: A Forty Years’ Crisis? (London; New York: Bloomsbury
Publishing, 2019), pp. 213-228. In this regard, also see: Lucy Mayblin, ‘Colonialism, Decolonisation, and
the Right to be Human: Britain and the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees’ (2014) 27(3)
Journal of Historical Sociology, pp. 423-441.
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2.2. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE CREATION
OF THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM AS A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT
2.2.1. THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ASYLUM BEFORE NATION-
STATES (TERRITORIAL ASYLUM)
For unfolding the historical debates on the formation of the right to seek asylum,
it is worth mentioning that the relationship between immigrants and nation-
states is not a ‘chicken-and-egg’ dilemma. In fact, we know that people have
been migrating since a much longer time before the establishment of the nation-
state system, meaning the formation of sovereign powers and their territorial
borders.106 The same narrative applies to the practice of asylum seeking and the
existence of asylum seekers in the World. Some historical studies on the subject
of human migration have shown that the origin of the term ‘asylum’ and the
practice of ‘asylum seeking’ dates right back to the early times of human life on
this planet.107 This historical evidence indicates that it is, indeed, in our nature
and a part of survival mechanism to fear what threatens our lives. Thereafter, in
time of danger, we either fight back or if unable to do so, escape and seek shelter
in safer places.108 Therefore, when needed, humans are bound – by the rule of
nature – to move about in order to find a sanctuary to remain alive and safe.109
However, by the development of ancient civilisations, the practice of escaping
dangers and seeking asylum transformed to a religious-based social institution,
also known as ‘sanctuary,’ which was linked with the power of divinity and holy
spaces.110 Because this kind of asylum was associated with a sacred place and
granted to fugitives once they had entered that space, it is known as ‘territorial
106 Sherally Munshi, ‘Immigration and the Imperial’, in Simon Stern, Maksymilian Del Mar, and
Bernadette Meyler (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Humanities (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2020), pp. 497-516, pp. 497 and 498. In this regard, also see: Ranabir Samaddar, A Postcolonial
Enquiry into Europe’s Debt and Migration Crisis (Singapore: Springer, 2016), pp. 87-94.
107 Rebecca M.M. Wallace and Fraser A.W. Janeczko, ‘The Concept of Asylum in International Law’, in
Mary Crock (ed.), Refugees and Rights (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 33-58, pp. 33 and 34.
In this regard, also see: Michael H. Fisher, Migration: A World History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2014), pp. 1-27. Also, see: S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 5.
108 Thomas John de'Mazzinghi, Sanctuaries (Stafford: Halden & Son, 1887), pp. 4 and 5.
109 Ibid. Also, see: Rebecca M.M. Wallace and Fraser A.W. Janeczko, ‘The Concept of Asylum in
International Law’, in Mary Crock (ed.), Refugees and Rights (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), pp.
33-58, p. 33.
110 Henri Wallon, Du Droit d’Asyle (Paris: The Sorbonne University Press, 1837), pp. 1-3. In this regard,
also see:  Thomas John de'Mazzinghi, Sanctuaries (Stafford: Halden & Son, 1887), pp. 1-7. Also see:
Rebecca M.M. Wallace and Fraser A.W. Janeczko, ‘The Concept of Asylum in International Law’, in Mary
Crock (ed.), Refugees and Rights (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 33-58, pp. 34 and 35.
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asylum.’111 Due to the respect for holy places, the pursuers deemed the
sanctuaries inviolable.112 This reverence and sanctity was based on the belief that
violating the sacred space would anger the god(s) or it would bring misery and
bad luck to the violator.113 Therefore, in ancient times, the inviolability of
divinity and holy spaces were reasons to grant asylum to persons who were
escaping certain forms of punishment or cruel treatments.114
Within the historical context of the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam), the concept of territorial asylum was also vastly practiced by the
virtue of the divinity of religious places and administered by religious leaders.115
In an early era of criminal law, in which the Biblical principle of Lex Talionis
(necessitating for revenge and vengeance or ‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a
tooth’) dominated, the priest or the head of a tribe had the power to impose
retaliatory punishments on the offender on behalf of the community or the
whole tribe.116 Due to the religious character of the principle of Lex Talionis, any
offence against individuals was deemed an offence against the God, too. Hence,
the priest or the Imam, on behalf of the God or as the God’s representative on
Earth, had the power to decide whether the offender deserved asylum once they
entered a holy place.117
111 Rebecca M.M. Wallace and Fraser A.W. Janeczko, ‘The Concept of Asylum in International Law’, in
Mary Crock (ed.), Refugees and Rights (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 33-58, p. 34. In this
regard, also see: Atle Grahl-Madsen, ‘Asylum, Territorial’, in Peter MacAlister-Smith and Guðmundur
S. Alfreðsson (eds), The Land Beyond: Collected Essays on Refugee Law and Policy (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), pp. 280-286, p. 281.
112 Kent J. Rigsby, Asylia: Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1996), pp. 1-9.
113 S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 5.
114 Ibid, p. 6. In this regard, also see: Kent J. Rigsby, Asylia: Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic
World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 1-9. Also, see: Emma Dench, Romulus’
Asylum: Roman Identities from the Age of Alexander to the Age of Hadrian (Oxford; New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005), pp. 1-35. Also, see: Rebecca M.M. Wallace and Fraser A.W. Janeczko, ‘The
Concept of Asylum in International Law’, in Mary Crock (ed.), Refugees and Rights (Oxford; New York:
Routledge, 2016), pp. 33-58, p. 34.
115 Karen Musalo, Jennifer Moore, and Richard A. Boswell, Refugee Law and Policy: A Comparative
and International Approach (3rd edn, Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2007), pp. 3-
12. In this regard, also see: Thomas John de'Mazzinghi, Sanctuaries (Stafford: Halden & Son, 1887), pp.
2 and 6-10. Also, see: S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1971), pp. 7, 8, and 10-13.
116 James F. Davis, Lex Talionis in Early Judaism and the Exhortation of Jesus in Matthew 5.38-42
(London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005), p. 10. In this regard, also see: Richard H. Hiers, Justice and
Compassion in Biblical Law (New York; London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009), pp. 146-151. Also see:
Matthew Henry Kramer, The Ethics of Capital Punishment: A Philosophical Investigation of Evil and
its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 77 and 78. Also see: Jeffrie G. Murphy,
Punishment and the Moral Emotions: Essays in Law, Morality, and Religion (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012), pp. 77 and 78. Also see: Maher S. Mahmassani, Islam in Retrospect: Recovering
the Message (Northampton, Massachusetts: Interlink Publishing, 2014), pp. 232, 234, and 453-455.
117 S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 6. In this
regard, also see: James F. Davis, Lex Talionis in Early Judaism and the Exhortation of Jesus in
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In ancient Greece, although no formal right to seek asylum existed as such, in
certain Greek city-states, some temples offered asylum to criminals escaping
punishment and to slaves escaping their masters.118 This practice emerged from
the idea that the absolute power of the law needed mitigation by the interference
of the fear of divinity. Some Greek city-states removed any limitation on asylum
until almost anyone could seek asylum in certain Greek temples (even foreigners
with any religion or criminals escaping the justice of their countries).119 Some
historical analysts believe that this limitless possibility to seek asylum in some
ancient Greek city-states encouraged some to abuse the institution of asylum,
leading to the promotion of crimes and public disorder.120 Some studies show
that the Greek’s generosity in offering asylum brought an opportunity for the
Romans to use the practice of asylum as a political tool against Greeks. This
resulted in the Romans obtaining domination over some of the city-states in
ancient Greece.121 Once established in Greece, the Romans imposed heavy
restrictions on asylum to prevent any possible abuse. In other words, the Roman
law stood above any divinity or religious beliefs, with no mercy shown to those
breaking the laws of the Roman Empire.122
The collapse of the Ancient Roman Empire in the late third and early fourth
centuries, and because of the expansion of the power of Christianity in Europe,
the church became the place of refuge for the weak and the clergy held the power
to grant asylum.123 This gave a personalised character to the institution of
asylum as opposed to the pre-Roman territorial asylum, which was merely
dependent on the fugitive accessing holy places.124
Matthew 5.38-42 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005), pp. 17-20. Also see: Maher S. Mahmassani,
Islam in Retrospect: Recovering the Message (Northampton, Massachusetts: Interlink Publishing,
2014), p. 300.
118 Kent J. Rigsby, Asylia: Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1996), pp. 1-9.
119 S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 9. Also,
see: Kent J. Rigsby, Asylia: Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1996), pp. 1 and 2.
120 Kent J. Rigsby, Asylia: Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1996), pp. 397 and 398.
121 Rebecca M.M. Wallace and Fraser A.W. Janeczko, ‘The Concept of Asylum in International Law’, in
Mary Crock (ed.), Refugees and Rights (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 33-58.
122 S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 10. In this
regard, also see: Gary Wiener, Refugees throughout History: Searching for Safety (New York:
Greenhaven Publishing LLC, 2019), pp. 18-20.
123 Gary Wiener, Refugees throughout History: Searching for Safety (New York: Greenhaven Publishing
LLC, 2019), p. 20.
124 John Charles Cox, Sanctuaries and Sanctuary Seekers of Mediaeval England (London: G. Allen &
Sons, 1911), pp. 2-5. Also, see: S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1971), p. 10. Also, see: Simon Behrman, Law and Asylum: Space, Subject, Resistance (Oxford;
New York: Routledge 2018), pp. 19-22.
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Supported by the recognition of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman
Empire, the Constantine Edict of Toleration, passed in 313 A.D., gave
permission to all churches in Europe to grant asylum to fugitives.125 In the years
following the passing of this law, different metropolitan bishops adopted the
canon law, which granted a right to intercede in granting protection to asylum
seekers.126 In 461 A.D., Pope Leo I approved the canon law, which granted an
exclusive right to the church for the examination of asylum claims and hence,
gave full power to bishops to take whatever action they deemed appropriate in
asylum cases.127
With this vast ecclesiastical power over the institution of asylum in Europe, the
church condemned and the bishops excommunicated all those who opposed the
institution of asylum and those who sought to impede the practice of asylum
seeking.128 Thus, during the early Middle Ages, the concept of asylum and the
practice of seeking asylum possessed such an absolute nature that by the late
600s A.D., almost anyone who had committed any crime, could ask for
asylum.129 In addition, the places of asylum expanded to include not only
churches, but also convents, monasteries, cemeteries, the residences of bishops,
and even hospitals.130 By this virtue, the more personal characteristic of asylum,
which was exclusive to bishops, was replaced by a territorial character of asylum,
something similar to what had already existed in the pre- and early Christian
eras.
Nevertheless, during the entire Middle Ages, the emperors were not pleased
with the limitless power of the church on granting asylum to anyone that the
125 Hiroshi Oda, ‘Ethnography of Relationships among Church Sanctuary Actors in Germany’, in Randy
Lippert and Sean Rehaag (eds), Sanctuary Practices in International Perspectives: Migration,
Citizenship, and Social Movements (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 148-161, p. 157.
126 Ibid. Also, see: Simon Behrman, Law and Asylum: Space, Subject, Resistance (Oxford; New York:
Routledge 2018), pp. 29 and 30.
127 Hiroshi Oda, ‘Ethnography of Relationships among Church Sanctuary Actors in Germany’, in Randy
Lippert and Sean Rehaag (eds), Sanctuary Practices in International Perspectives: Migration,
Citizenship, and Social Movements (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 148-161, p. 157. In this
regard, also see: Simon Behrman, Law and Asylum: Space, Subject, Resistance (Oxford; New York:
Routledge 2018), pp. 29 and 30.
128 John Charles Cox, Sanctuaries and Sanctuary Seekers of Mediaeval England (London: G. Allen &
Sons, 1911), pp. 5 and 6. In this regard, also see: Simon Behrman, Law and Asylum: Space, Subject,
Resistance (Oxford; New York: Routledge 2018), pp. 20 and 21.
129 John Charles Cox, Sanctuaries and Sanctuary Seekers of Mediaeval England (London: G. Allen &
Sons, 1911), p. 7. In this regard, also see: Simon Behrman, Law and Asylum: Space, Subject, Resistance
(Oxford; New York: Routledge 2018), pp. 30-33.
130 John Charles Cox, Sanctuaries and Sanctuary Seekers of Mediaeval England (London: G. Allen &
Sons, 1911), p. 7. In this regard, also see: Simon Behrman, Law and Asylum: Space, Subject, Resistance
(Oxford; New York: Routledge 2018), pp. 30-33. Also, see: Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: Harvard University
Press, 1983), p. 215.
36
bishops desired. Therefore, a clash between the will of emperors and that of
bishops emerged. For example, in 535 A.D., Justinian the Great, while
reluctantly verifying the Edicts of Asylum passed by his predecessors, exempted
murderers, adulterers, and rapists from asylum.131 The battle of power between
the emperor and the church over the institution of asylum continued until the
eleventh and twelfth centuries, when the canon law and the ecclesiastical law of
asylum went under a drastic reform.132 These reforms not only ended excluding
certain types of criminal offences from asylum, but they even limited the places
of asylum to only churches, chapels, and the residences of bishops.133
2.2.2. THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ASYLUM AFTER THE
CREATION OF NATION-STATES (POLITICAL ASYLUM)
2.2.2.1. Asylum prior to WWI
By the rise of the Reformation and the advancement of Protestant power in
Europe around the sixteenth century, the position of the church in handling
criminal justice matters came noticeably under scrutiny.134 The newly formed
civil authority claimed full power over serving justice and decided to secularise
the institution of asylum – making it similar to all other legal and societal
institutions.135 Therefore, by the end of the Middle Ages and by the formation of
nation-states in Europe, at the end of the fifteenth and early sixteenth
centuries,136 the institution of asylum departed from the territorial and divine
character of church asylum and moved towards a secular concept.137 As a result,
131 S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 11. In this
regard, also see: Simon Behrman, Law and Asylum: Space, Subject, Resistance (Oxford; New York:
Routledge 2018), pp. 28 and 29.
132 John Charles Cox, Sanctuaries and Sanctuary Seekers of Mediaeval England (London: G. Allen &
Sons, 1911), pp. 11-14. In this regard, also see: Simon Behrman, Law and Asylum: Space, Subject,
Resistance (Oxford; New York: Routledge 2018), p. 34.
133 At this time, certain crimes were excluded permanently from the right to seek asylum. These crimes
included converting to Judaism, assassination in the church or a cemetery by a traitor or for a price,
violation of the right of asylum itself, forging church documents, and engaging in duels. In this regard,
see: S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 12.
134 Heikki Pihlajamäki, ‘Executor divinarum et suarum legum: Criminal Law and the Lutheran
Reformation’, in Virpi Mäkinen (ed.), Lutheran Reformation And the Law (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp.
171-204.
135 John Witte Jr., Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 33-50, 53-85, and 199-255. In this regard, also see:
Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge,
Massachusetts; London: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 272-276.
136 On the topic of creation of States in International Law, the principle of state sovereignty, and
consequently, the equality of state sovereignty, see: James Richard Crawford, The Creation of States in
International Law (2nd edn, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 3-37.
137 Simon Behrman, Law and Asylum: Space, Subject, Resistance (Oxford; New York: Routledge 2018),
pp. 50 and 51. In this regard, also see: Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the
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the practice of granting asylum was tightly restricted to the kingdoms.
Therefore, the jurists selected by the kings became in full control of asylum as
an institution created by man with no divine character.138 European kings, one
after another, started to erode and dismantle the institution of asylum within
the territories under their ruling. For example, King Louis XII of France, King
Philip II of Spain, and King George I of Great Britain abolished the institution
of church asylum in 1515, 1570, and 1722, respectively.139
In spite of the restrictive environment of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries against the practice of asylum, the seventeenth century jurist and
natural lawyer, Hugo Grotius – known as the father of modern international law
– advocated for a ‘natural’ and ‘inviolable’ right of asylum.140 In 1621, as a
political activist convicted of high treason, Grotius had to flee his home country,
Holland, and lived in Paris under the protection of King Louis XIII until 1631.141
It was during his time in exile that he published his famous book on
international law, entitled, ‘De jure belli ac pacis.’142 In this book, Grotius opined
that, ‘[accepting asylums] is not contrary to friendship [between states], for over
exiles the state has no right.’143 In this work, Grotius continued, ‘[…] granting of
asylum to exiles is not only natural, but also advantageous,’ because ‘such
protection are designed only for those, who are the victims of unmerited
persecution.’144
The right to seek asylum might seem to be a ‘natural right’ in Grotius’ legal
philosophy; however, he did not consider it an absolute right. He contended
that, ‘[The right to seek asylum] is not for those who have committed crimes
injurious to mankind and destructive to society.’145 Accordingly, Grotius
Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 1-
45.
138 Simon Behrman, Law and Asylum: Space, Subject, Resistance (Oxford; New York: Routledge 2018),
pp. 56-60.
139 S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 13.
140 Grotius used the phrase ‘the rights of suppliants’ as what we know today as ‘the rights of asylum
seekers’. In this regard see: Hugo Grotius, ‘De Jure Belli ac Pacis’, in Stephen C. Neff (ed.), Hugo Grotius
on the Law of War and Peace: Student Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 295.
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recognised some limitations to the right to seek asylum against war slaves and
deliberate murderers escaping a ‘justly deserved penalty.’ In Grotius’ words,
‘deliberate murderers, or those, who had disturbed the peaceful order of the
state, found no protection even from the altar of God.’ Perhaps, this is one of the
first historical documents, in which the security considerations of nation-state
and the safety of host society have limited the right to seek asylum. In the
following quotation, we will read the grounds, based on which Grotius believed
that some people should be excluded from the right to seek asylum:
[W]hen such men, prompted by malice, or rapacity have plunged into evils; they
have no right to talk of misfortune or to wear the name of suppliants [meaning
asylums]. For that is a privilege granted by the laws of nature to the innocent, who
are beaten down by the hard and oppressive strokes of ill fortune. But refuge of
compassion is withheld, where every line of a life has been marked with cruelty and
injustice.146
As we can see in this quotation, the outlook of Grotius towards the right to seek
asylum is based on the necessity of human mobility. This attitude, however, has
acknowledged and integrated an inherent tension between the interests of
sovereign power, on the one hand, and the necessity of the movement of asylum
seekers, on the other.147
Even though Grotius had found sanctuary under the protection of King Louis
XIII of France, the French Protestant Reformists – known as ‘Huguenots’ –
became the subject of persecution by the King’s successor. In 1685, King Louis
XIV adopted the ‘Edict of Fontainebleau,’148 revoking the former ‘Edict of
Nantes.’149 According to the latter document, Protestants were tolerated in the
Kingdom; however, the Edict of Fontainebleau abolished the right to freedom of
religion and announced Protestantism illegal.150 In fact, the word ‘refugee,’
referring to ‘Protestant Huguenots,’ for the very first time in history appeared in
Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, translated by Archibald Colin Campbell (Altenmünster:
Jazzybee Verlag Jürgen Beck, 2018), p. 201.
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Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 65.
148 ‘The Edict of Fontainebleau’, issued by King Louis XIV of France on 22 October 1685, in this regard,
see: <huguenotsweb.free.fr/english/edict_1685.htm>.
149 ‘The Edict of Nantes,’ signed by King Henry IV of France in April 1598, in this regard, see:
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the 1685 Edict of Fontainebleau.151 The term ‘refugee’ comes from its French
root, ‘réfugié,’152 originally referring to ‘Protestant Huguenots,’ who were
persecuted by King Louis XIV of France.153 This term, at the time of creation,
exclusively referred to ‘Huguenots,’ but with the passing of time and especially
since the early twentieth century, it has expanded its meaning to cover all those
fleeing because of religious beliefs and political convictions.154
In response to the Edict of Fontainebleau, Duke Frederick William of Prussia
signed the ‘Edict of Potsdam’ in the same year (meaning in 1685), according to
which the French Huguenots were welcomed in Prussia.155 Frederick William,
the Elector of Brandenburg and the Duke of Prussia (from 1640 to 1688) was a
staunch Calvinist and an enthusiastic promoter of the Protestant
Reformation.156 William’s Edict of Potsdam, welcoming over 20,000 Huguenots
to Prussia, was not based on the belief in a natural right to seek asylum or liberty
of movement, but it stemmed mainly from his political opinion and religious
sentiment. In fact, he trained and used the majority of the French Huguenot
asylum seekers to rebuild the Prussian army and to restore the territories that
the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) had damaged before.157
Similar to Grotius, Christian Wolff, the German philosopher of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, who like Grotius was subjected to live in exile,
subscribed to a ‘natural right to free movement’ and a ‘right to seek asylum’ in
other lands.158 However, what substantially differed in his opinion compared to
Grotius’ was that this right – as a rule of nature and in an absolute term – was
applicable only within ‘primitive societies.’ Thence, in a civilised society, Wolff
151 Wolf Gunther Plaut, Asylum: A Moral Dilemma (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995), p.
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152 According to Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the French term ‘réfugié’ comes from the Latin word
‘refugium’, a noun that meant ‘the act of taking refuge’ or ‘a place of refuge or asylum’. ‘Refugium’ itself
came from the verb ‘refugere’, meaning ‘to run away’ or ‘to escape’. In this regard, see: Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, ‘The Origin of Refugee’, <www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/origin-and-meaning-
of-refugee>.
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Books, 2007), pp. 67, 68, and 149.
157 Ibid, 166 and 167.
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40
asserted that sovereign power decided whether an outsider be allowed to enter
the kingdom.159 While Grotius had hinted to a tension between the right to seek
asylum and the interests of the host nation-state, Wolff explicitly outweighed
the decision of state over a natural right to seek asylum.160
Building his legacy on the scholarships of Grotius and Wolff, the international
lawyer of the eighteenth century Emer de Vattel161 rendered that, ‘[…] in an
abstract perfect world, the right to seek asylum is necessarily absolute;
nevertheless, as we live in an imperfect, relative world, the right to seek asylum
cannot be a perfect, absolute right.’162 According to de Vattel, when outsiders
pose a danger to the nation or may cause serious problems, the nation-state has
the right to refuse the admission of foreigners.163 The difference between de
Vattel and his predecessors is that while Grotius believed in a ‘natural right to
seek asylum’ and de Vattel applied a theory of ‘balancing act,’ Wolff gave more
weight to the interests of the nation-state. The bottom line in de Vattel’s theory
is that the right to seek asylum is an ‘imperfect right,’ the realisation of which
depends on the discretion and decision of the nation-state authorities.164
At the end of the eighteenth century, the abolition of the institution of asylum
by the kingdoms and newly formed European nation-states made it necessary
to enter into bilateral extradition treaties for regulating and facilitating the
return of fugitives and criminals. Bilateral extradition treaties initially were
created as part of a diplomatic practice between European States and their
counterparts in Europe and elsewhere in the World. The formation of these
treaties was based heavily on the newly emerged principle of state sovereignty,
the equality of the sovereignty of states, and the principle of non-interference.
However, by the development of commercial transactions beyond state borders,
a common interest grew amongst European States in tracking down the
criminals who were constantly moving from one sovereign state to another and
those considered threats to the commercial benefits of states.165 As of today, the
159 Ibid, pp. 149 and 150.
160 Ibid, pp. 150-152.
161 Britannica, ‘Emmerich de Vattel: Swiss Jurist’, <www.britannica.com/biography/Emmerich-de-
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concerns of states with regard to safeguarding their interests have developed to
a general principle in international law and international relations, known as
the ‘protective principle.’ Accordingly, states, based on the principle of state
sovereignty and the equality of sovereignty, have the right to protect themselves
from the acts of individuals or groups abroad, which might undermine their
sovereignty and independence.166
Overall, some international lawyers assert that the practice of signing bilateral
and multilateral extradition treaties is a product of the European nation-states’
multifaceted commercial and societal interactions, based on the principles of
reciprocity and comity, and as a matter of courtesy and good will between
sovereigns.167 Therefore, there is no obligation to extradite as such in
international law; that is why a treaty should regulate the matter.168 However,
others have a different rationale. They believe that according to the general
principle of aut dedere aut judicare in criminal law, states should extradite
criminals; otherwise, they have to apply their own territorial jurisdiction in
addressing the criminal case and prosecuting the alleged crime suspects.169 For
example, regarding the core international crimes such as genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes, the states’ obligation to extradite or to
prosecute based on the general principle of aut dedere aut judicare has reached
the level of a customary norm of international law.170 No matter which of the two
above-mentioned positions we accept, the term ‘extradition’ is a ‘bilateral or
multilateral process, through which a person, who is a suspect in an alleged
crime or has been convicted of committing a crime, would be handed over to the
166 Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015),
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authorities of the requesting state.’171 On 25 August 1850, France and Spain
signed one of the very first bilateral extradition treaties in Europe.172 According
to Article 9 of this treaty, church refugees could only be extradited if the
returnees would be safe from punishment by death. This is perhaps one of the
very first examples of using assurances against death penalty in the cases of
returning refugees.
The mainstream narrative of history originating from a strictly European
perspective suggests that the treaties of the Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648,
created the modern sovereign nation-states and diplomatic relations in the
World.173 The outcome of this Eurocentric approach is to accept that refugees
and asylum seekers are the ‘inevitable consequence of the modern system of
nation-states’ and the result of a ‘breakdown in the state-citizenship
relationship.’174 However, a critical reading of history shows that it would be
almost impossible to put an exact date on the transformation of the territorial
and church asylum into the institution of political asylum.175 Regardless of this
historical controversy, by the creation of nation-states in Europe in the mid-
seventeenth century, there was a consensus amongst the newly independent
kingdoms that under the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, ordinary crimes
should not go without prosecution and punishment. Therefore, there is an
obligation to hand over the alleged criminals to the justice system.176 The
necessity of criminal prosecution was already emphasised by natural law jurists
and political philosophers of that time. For example, Jean Bodin, a lawyer of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, emphasised that it was in the interest of all
171 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice (6th edn,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 2.
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that crimes be suppressed, no matter where they were committed.177 In this
regard, Bodin asserted that it was in favour of ‘distributive justice’ as part of
‘substantive justice’ to make sure that no crime goes unpunished.178
Another example is the assertions by Cesare Beccaria, the eighteenth-century
Italian jurist and philosopher – also known as the father of criminal law and
criminal justice.179 He vigorously defended the concept of ‘justice’ and argued
that granting asylum for criminals, who have committed ordinary and common
crimes, is against justice. According to Beccaria, ‘[i]n the whole extent of a
political state, there should be no place, which is independent of the laws.’180 He
continued that, ‘[t]he power of the law should follow every subject, as the
shadow follows the body,’181 but the ‘protection of those, who were oppressed by
arbitrary powers or tyranny, is indeed in the direction of justice.’ Furthermore,
Beccaria emphasised that it was not only a ‘right’ for those, who were oppressed
by tyrannies because of their religious and political beliefs, to be granted asylum,
but also that the states had a ‘duty’ to grant them asylum. In his words:
To increase the number of sanctuaries, is to erect so many little sovereignties; for,
when the laws have no power, new bodies will be formed in opposition to the public
good, and a spirit established contrary to that of the state. History informs us that
from the use of sanctuaries have arisen the greatest revolutions in kingdoms and in
opinions.182
In this regard, however, Beccaria, while reminding us of the ‘social contract’
theory of Hobbes, reserved the power to decide about the fate of criminals only
to the hands of states through their legislative and executive arms:
Only laws can determine the punishment of crimes; and the authority of making
penal laws can only reside with the legislator, who represents the whole society
united by the social compact. If every individual were bound to society, society is
equally bound to him by a contract, which, from its nature, equally binds both
parties. The sovereign, who represents the society itself, can only make general laws
to bind the members; but it belongs not to him, but to judge, whether any individual
177 The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ‘Jean Bodin’, <plato.stanford.edu/entries/bodin/>.
178 Jean Bodin, Les Six livres de la République (1576), Translated by M.J. Tooley ‘The Six Books of the
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‘Dei delitti e delle pene (1764)’, in Richard Bellamy (ed.) and translated by Richard Davies, An Essay on
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182 Ibid, pp. 67 and 68.
44
has violated the social compact, or incurred the punishment in consequence. For,
in this case, there are two parties, one represented by the sovereign, who insists
upon the violation of the contract, and the other is the person accused, who denies
it. It is necessary then that there should be a third person to decide this contest;
that is to say, a judge, or magistrate, from whose determination there should be no
appeal; and this determination should consist of a simple affirmation or negation
of fact[s]. No magistrate [or judge] then (as he is one of the society) can inflict with
justice on any other member of the same society, punishment that is not ordained
by the laws.183
As Beccaria has formulated on the importance of ‘just’ criminal prosecutions,
the legal institution of extradition and signing treaties for exchanging alleged
criminals became more important than the practice and the legal institution of
territorial asylum. Extradition, very much, depends on bilateral agreements,
based on the principle of reciprocity. As mentioned above, there is no consensus
in international law on the obligation to extradite; extradition depends on
reciprocity and the decision of individual sovereign states. Consequently, the
concept of asylum and the practice of asylum seeking as a natural right of
individuals, lost its position to the right of states ‘to grant permission to fugitives
to remain within their territories.’184 Hence, by the end of the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, no territorial asylum, nor asylum for those who had
committed ordinary crimes, existed in Europe; instead, a new form of asylum,
named ‘political asylum’ appeared.185
The main trigger for the creation of political asylum was the French Revolution
of 1789. During and after the French Revolution, many poets, writers,
philosophers, intellectuals, and even jurists became the subject of persecution
for opposing the dominant religious and political beliefs of the time.186 Having
the Americas as a new haven, His Majesty’s Colonies in America gave asylum to
those fleeing persecution in Europe.187 Therefore, a general tendency towards
183 Ibid, p. 13.
184 S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 18. In this
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other European countries. In this regard, see: Atle Grahl-Madsen, ‘The European Tradition of Asylum
and the Development of International Refugee Law’, in Peter MacAlister-Smith and Guðmundur S.
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protecting those fleeing religious and political oppression created the notion and
practice of political asylum as a legal institution within Europe and all around
European colonies.188 The French Revolution of 1789 brought the idea of
freedom of thoughts, opinion, expression, and religion under the spotlight.
Accordingly, the nation had the right, not only to form an uprising against the
government, but also there was a moral duty based on humanity to protect the
revolutionists.189 Therefore, around this time in history the intellectual
foundations for including the right to seek asylum as a fundamental and
constitutional right was established, which resulted in including this right in the
text of the French post-Revolutionary Constitution of 1791.190 During the
century following the French Revolution (meaning the nineteenth century),
many declarations, pieces of legislation, and several treaties distinguished
between ‘political crimes’ and ‘common crimes’ as two essentially different
categories of crimes, especially with regard to the extradition and expulsion of
foreigners.191 In 1849, for instance, Lord Palmerston (the Foreign Secretary of
the United Kingdom at that time) endorsed political asylum and supported the
Turkish Government (the Ottoman Empire) by not returning five thousand
revolutionary Austrian and Russian asylum seekers to Austria and Russia,
respectively, who had helped with the Hungarian Revolution of 1848.192
Nevertheless, the de- and post-colonial reading of migration law shows that the
concept of security within the context of migration law as a legal regime is the
by-product of modernity and the urgent need of the newly formed European
(eds), U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Laws and Issues: A Documentary History (Westport:
Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999).
188 However, we should keep in mind that the laws of granting asylum did not necessarily in the entire
European colonies grant a full naturalisation protection to asylum seekers. In this regard, see: Atle
Grahl-Madsen, ‘The European Tradition of Asylum and the Development of International Refugee Law’,
in Peter MacAlister-Smith and Guðmundur S. Alfreðsson (eds), The Land Beyond: Collected Essays on
Refugee Law and Policy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), pp. 34-46, p. 35. In this
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nation-states in controlling the movements of people.193 The instabilities that
resulted from the 1789 French Revolution and thereafter, the Napoleonic Wars
(1803-1815) made it necessary for European empires to control the movement
of people in order to ensure that political adversaries gained no access to their
territories or threatened the security of their ruling monarchs. Hence, a system
of ‘border checks’ and ‘Aliens Acts’ was established for the very purpose of
controlling the movement of populations during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries.194 In this regard, for example, the Aliens Acts of 1793 and
1798 of the United Kingdom (UK) obliged all people entering the territory of the
UK to register upon arrival.195 According to these acts, shipmasters had an
obligation to report every detail about all the foreigners on board to the British
authorities. The 1793 Aliens Act of the UK, in fact, was the first ever legislation
in the modern World dealing with asylum seekers and refugees. The whole
purpose for creating this piece of legislation and similar acts was to detect
French revolutionaries and those who were possible adversaries to the British
monarchy by infiltrating their revolutionary ideas into British society.196
In addition to the enactment of legislation for controlling the movement of
populations across the European empires during the nineteenth century, the
institution of the expulsion of aliens came to the attention of international
lawyers. In 1892, the Institut de Droit International adopted a proposal for
international rules on the admission and expulsion of aliens.197 According to
Article 15 of this document, the measures of expulsion and extradition are
independent from each other and the refusal of extradition does not imply
reunification of the right to expel. However, Article 16 of this proposal states
that, ‘a returnee, who has sought asylum from criminal prosecution, must not
be returned to the requesting state, unless the conditions for extradition are
obeyed by the requesting state’. Based on this brief historical reading, we could
193 Simon Behrman, Law and Asylum: Space, Subject, Resistance (Oxford; New York: Routledge 2018),
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deduce that the concept of security is nothing new to the practice of asylum
seeking and the field of migration and refugee law. In other words, it is
reasonable to claim that the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the 2015/16 so-called
‘refugee crisis in Europe,’ together with the terrorist incidents of that time, did
not bring the security agenda of states to the law on migration and asylum.
However, in fact, the creation of nation-states had already done so. To conclude,
the World political players of the nineteenth century, which were mainly the
colonial and imperial European States, gradually accepted the exclusion of
political asylums from extradition treaties and expulsion practices. This
consensus reached such a high level that it formed a customary rule of
international law – known as the principle of non-refoulement.198
2.2.2.2. Asylum during the interwar period
As stated above, by the end of the nineteenth century, a new category of asylum
seekers, i.e. ‘political asylum,’ was recognised in practice and in the laws
amongst nations. By this type of asylum, the international community of that
time came to the consensus that political asylums should be exempt from
extradition treaties and expulsion to places where they might be in danger.199
The same way that the format of sovereignty changed from monarchies to
republics, asylum not only was a right of the sovereign to grant, but also a
duty.200 Therefore, the subject of extradition treaties was limited to those who
had committed general crimes; hence, the nature of asylum, instead of being
territorial, became political.201
As mentioned in Subsection 2.2.1, the institution of asylum is much older than
the legal institution of refugee and the legal regime of refugee protection. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, the legal system relating to refugees was in
its phase of conception.202 The current international regime of refugee
protection is the outcome of the catastrophic events during the First World War
198 Hélène Lambert, Francesco Messineo, and Paul Tiedemann, ‘Comparative Perspectives of
Constitutional Asylum in France, Italy, and Germany: Requiescat in Pace?’ (2008) 27(3) Refugee Survey
Quarterly, pp. 16-32, p. 26.
199 Atle Grahl-Madsen, ‘Asylum, Territorial’, in Peter MacAlister-Smith and Guðmundur S. Alfreðsson
(eds), The Land Beyond: Collected Essays on Refugee Law and Policy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2001), pp. 280-286, p. 282. In this regard, also see: María-Teresa Gil-Bazo, ‘Asylum as a
General Principle of International Law’ (2015) 27(1) International Journal of Refugee Law, pp. 3-28,
pp. 3 and 4.
200 María-Teresa Gil-Bazo, ‘Asylum as a General Principle of International Law’ (2015) 27(1)
International Journal of Refugee Law, pp. 3-28, p. 11.
201 Ibid, p. 23.
202 Robert Kolb, ‘The Protection of the Individual in Times of War and Peace’, in Bardo Fassbender and
Anne Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), pp. 317-337, pp. 327 and 328.
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(WWI), as well as the affairs of the interwar period (1914-1939).203 With the
explosion of mass displacements due to WWI in Europe and the four years that
followed the end of the war, the Armenians and the Greeks were the victims of
genocide and indiscriminate massacres by the Ottoman Empire.204
Simultaneously, the 1917 Russian Revolution forced those who opposed the
Bolsheviks to flee Russia.205 What distinguishes this refugee movement from the
displacements prior to WWI is the significantly large number of people affected.
Historians have recorded that approximately one million Armenians, one and a
half million Greeks, one and a half million Russians, and over one and a half
million Europeans (other than Greeks) lost their homes and became displaced
and/or stateless.206 Therefore, the issue of refugees and displaced people
attracted the attention of many, including statespersons and policy-makers all
around Europe.207
The chaotic environment of Europe during the two decades of WWI and the
interwar period created an overwhelming fear of ‘espionage’ and ‘enemy aliens’
as urgent threats to many European governments.208 This state of emergency
led to an increasing trend in legislation for the purpose of controlling and
limiting migration and population movements across the national borders. For
example, the French Government issued multiple decrees during the years of
WWI, according to which all aliens residing in France had to lodge a report to
the local police departments immediately and apply for residence permits.209
Other European countries and even the United States (US) followed the same
trend. In many ways, this was the peak of bringing the security concerns of states
into the realm of immigration and asylum.210 However, looking at the
203 Lucy Mayblin, Asylum after Empire: Colonial Legacies in the Politics of Asylum Seeking (London:
Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd, 2017), pp. 15-21. In this regard, also see: Emma Haddad, The
Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2008), pp. 74-96.
204 Gary Wiener, Refugees throughout History: Searching for Safety (New York: Greenhaven
Publishing LLC., 2019), p. 32. In this regard, also see: Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International
Society: Between Sovereigns (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 100-103.
205 Gary Wiener, Refugees throughout History: Searching for Safety (New York: Greenhaven
Publishing LLC., 2019), p. 32. In this regard, also see:  Lucy Mayblin, Asylum after Empire: Colonial
Legacies in the Politics of Asylum Seeking (London: Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd, 2017), p.
15.
206 Gary Wiener, Refugees throughout History: Searching for Safety (New York: Greenhaven
Publishing LLC., 2019), p. 32.
207 Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995, pp. 13 and 14.
208 Simon Behrman, Law and Asylum: Space, Subject, Resistance (Oxford; New York: Routledge 2018),
p. 92.
209 John Horne, ‘Immigrant Workers in France during World War I’ (1985) 14(1) French Historical
Studies, pp. 57-88, pp. 79, 81, and 83.
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contemporary immigration policies and legislation limiting access to territories,
we could comprehend that the state of emergency during WWI and throughout
the interwar period has become the dominant norm of our current time as well.
By the end of WWI, over seven million people, including prisoners of war,
refugees, and other categories of displaced persons were wandering all around
Europe in an absolute desperate need for a new home.211 Amongst these people
were not only Europeans, who were displaced by the war, but also anti-Bolshevik
Russians,212 Armenians,213 and the Greeks,214 who were left homeless as the
result of civil wars and the ethnic cleansing performed by the Ottoman Empire
and the Turkish revolutionaries (the Turkish National Movement). The homes
of these people had been destroyed and the existing states were not willing to
welcome them. This is when refugees and displaced people became a ‘problem
of our time;’ 215 therefore, there was an urgent need to find a solution.
As discussed in Subsection 2.2.1, asylum seekers and the practice of seeking
asylum have always existed throughout human history without these people
perceived as a ‘problem.’ However, asylum seekers were portrayed as ‘problems’
with the creation of modern nation-states and from the perspective of European
imperial governments. Even the use of the term ‘asylum’ slowly gave its place to
the word ‘refugee,’ which has a very limited and narrow connotation based on
what the European nation-states decided to define. In fact, states for the very
purpose of their own convenience and security, started to establish restrictive
211 Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995, pp. 13-21.
212 For accounts on the persecution of Russians, because of the Russian Revolution and Russian Civil
War, see: Gary Wiener, Refugees throughout History: Searching for Safety (New York: Greenhaven
Publishing LLC., 2019), pp. 37-41. In this regard, also see: Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-war
Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 32-40. Also, see: Peter
Gatrell, The Making of the Modern Refugee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 17-25.
213 For accounts on the persecution of Armenians (a genocide by the Ottoman Empire), see: Gary Wiener,
Refugees throughout History: Searching for Safety (New York: Greenhaven Publishing LLC., 2019),
pp. 42-45. In this regards, also see: Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe: The Emergence
of a Regime (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. 41-48. In this regard, also see: Peter Gatrell, The
Making of the Modern Refugee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 17-25.
214 For accounts on the persecution of Greeks by the Turkish Government, see: Claudena M. Skran,
Refugees in Inter-war Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 41-
48.
215 ‘Refugees: A Problem of Our Time’ is part of the title of a two-volume book written by the German-
American political scientist émigré Louise Wilhelmine Holborn. In this regard, see: Louise Wilhelmine
Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time: The Work of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, 1951-1972 (Vol. 1, Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1975). Also see: Louise
Wilhelmine Holborn, Refugees, a Problem of Our Time: The Work of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, 1951-1972 (Vol. 2, Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1975).
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rules and legal measures at domestic and international levels in order to control
the cross-border movements of people.216
In response to the ‘problem’ of refugees during the interwar period, several
humanitarian initiatives and actions were formed in an organic manner by
numerous grassroots movements or private relief organisations such as the
American Relief Administration, the American Friends Service Committee, the
Nansen Relief Organization, and the International Committee of the Red
Cross.217 Nevertheless, the magnitude of the misery of displaced people proved
that there was a need for a unifying force beyond individual relief organisations.
The main issue was that in addition to living in absolute conditions of poverty,
these people became stateless because of the creation and development of
nationality and restrictive citizenship law and consequently, the fact that no
government was willing to accept and recognise them.218 The problems that
governments had with refugees and displaced people did not alleviate in the
aftermath of WWI. In fact, it became even worse. That is why three decades
later, the philosopher and political theorist Hannah Arendt, who was a stateless
person for almost twenty years,219 righteously described the situation of refugees
as:
Once they had left their homeland they remained homeless, once they had left their
state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of their human rights they
were rightless, the scum of the earth.220
Keeping the chaos of the interwar period in mind, in 1921, the Council of the
League of Nations221 appointed Fridtjof Nansen as the first ‘High Commissioner
216 Zara Steiner, ‘Refugees: The Timeless Problem’, in Matthew Frank and Jessica Reinisch (eds),
Refugees in Europe, 1919-1959: A Forty Years’ Crisis? (London; New York: Bloomsbury Publishing,
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Sovereignty and the History of the International Refugee Regime’, in Matthew Frank and Jessica
Reinisch (eds), Refugees in Europe, 1919-1959: A Forty Years’ Crisis? (London; New York: Bloomsbury
Publishing, 2019), pp. 213-228.
217 Gary Wiener, Refugees throughout History: Searching for Safety (New York: Greenhaven Publishing
LLC., 2019), p. 35. In this regard, also see: Gilbert Jaeger, ‘On the History of the International Protection
of Refugees’ (2001) 83(843) International Review of the Red Cross, pp. 727-738, pp. 727-729.
218 Atle Grahl-Madsen, ‘The Emergent International Law relating to Refugees: Past – Present – Future’,
in Peter MacAlister-Smith and Guðmundur S. Alfreðsson (eds), The Land Beyond: Collected Essays on
Refugee Law and Policy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), pp. 180-244, p. 181.
219 Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques
Derrida (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 5-7.
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267.
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on Refugees’ with the mandate of coordinating all the above-mentioned relief
organisations.222 Amongst many other professions, Fridtjof Wedel-Jarlsberg
Nansen (1861-1930) was a Norwegian scientist, explorer, diplomat, and
philanthropist.223 Before his appointment as the High Commissioner for
Refugees by the League of Nations in 1921, he had already travelled extensively
to war-torn Russia and had provided humanitarian assistance such as food,
clothing, and vaccination to Russian asylum seekers through his private Relief
Organisation.224 Besides the famine, hunger, and miserable life conditions of the
displaced people, Nansen diagnosed the main problem: ‘statelessness.’ The
main challenge that Nansen faced was the ongoing hostile and unsolvable
political environment of the time. He needed the financial, material, logistic,
and political support of the US and its allies, while the West was less than eager
to give anything that might recognise the Soviet Union or benefit its Communist
party.
On the other side of the coin, the Soviet officials did not want to allow those who
had fled the Soviet Union for opposing the Revolution or the Bolshevik party to
return to Russia, because they were perceived as threats to the Communist
Government.225 Nansen negotiated with the two opposing super powers of the
time and created the ‘Nansen Passport.’226 This social-political innovation,
which brought Nansen the 1922 Noble Peace Prize, provided the refugees with
a legal status that was internationally recognised.227 As a result, the stateless
people possessed identification and travel documents, with which they could
travel, as over fifty states in the World were obliged to accept these people in
their territories.
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2.2.2.3. Asylum during WWII and in the post-war era
The efforts of Nansen in finding a solution to the ‘problem of refugees’ did not
end with his death in 1930. To continue his work, the League of Nations adopted
a document to define those deemed eligible for Nansen identification and travel
certificates and the refugee protection mechanisms subsequent to this
recognition. In 1933, the League of Nations adopted the Convention relating to
the International Status of Refugees (the 1933 Refugee Convention).228 This
document is the first international legal instrument on the protection of refugees
and it has set the basis for future legislation, amongst which most importantly,
the 1951 Refugee Convention.229 For the very first time in the history of refugee
law, Article 3 of the 1933 Refugee Convention used the term ‘refoulement’ and
set it against the national security of states:
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to remove or keep from its territory
by application of police measures, such as expulsions or non-admittance at the
frontier (refoulement), refugees who have been authorised to reside there regularly,
unless the said measures are dictated by reasons of national security or public
order.230
As the 1933 Refugee Convention covered only refugees from Russia and
Armenia, there remained the need for a legal instrument to protect other groups
of refugees. Henceforth, in 1938, the League of Nations adopted the Convention
Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany (the 1938 Refugee
Convention).231 What both the 1933 and 1938 Conventions have in common is
that none of them used the term ‘asylum’ nor mentioned the ‘right to seek
asylum;’ instead, they both used the word ‘refugee.’ In fact, the main goal of
these conventions was to give a clear-cut legal definition of ‘who a refugee is’ for
the purpose of controlling the mass movement of people, while applying the
conventions.232
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In 1938, the Assembly of the League of Nations was preparing to close its Office
of the High Commissioner for Refugees (the same Office held previously by
Nansen). The reason for this closure was that the members of the Assembly
assumed that the refugee problem of the World was something temporary and
would be resolved at the latest by early 1939. However, the expulsion and the
mass exodus of Jews from persecution under the Nazi Third Reich proved that
assumption wrong.233 The Second World War (WWII) left over thirty million
refugees and displaced people in the World.234
By the end of WWII, the League of Nations – with all its failures and hopes –
collapsed and gave its place to the United Nations (UN). From the perspective
of international human rights law, the post-war period is the era of the UN. In
1946, the UN Economic and Social Council established the Commission on
Human Rights with the Charter responsibility of ‘promoting universal respect
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
discrimination of any kind.’235 The UN Human Rights Commission under the
leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt created the 1948 Universal Declaration on
Human Rights (1948 UDHR).236 The 1948 UDHR is the legal ground for
establishing the field of international human rights law as a sub-branch of public
international law. Therefore, it is reasonable to claim that the current legal
system of protecting refugees both internationally and regionally is the fruit of
the UN system of human rights protection.
As mentioned above, none of the refugee conventions created by the League of
Nations had used the term ‘asylum’ nor mentioned the right to seek asylum. The
1948 UDHR is the first international legal document explicitly specifying in one
of its thirty articles the ‘right to seek asylum.’ According to the first paragraph
of Article 14 of the 1948 UDHR, ‘[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in
other countries asylum from persecution.’237 However, in the second paragraph
of this Article, the 1948 UDHR considers two categories of exceptions against
this right. According to Article 14(2) of the 1948 UDHR, the right to seek and to
enjoy asylum ‘[…] may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely
233 Zara Steiner, ‘Refugees: The Timeless Problem’, in Matthew Frank and Jessica Reinisch (eds),
Refugees in Europe, 1919-1959: A Forty Years’ Crisis? (London; New York: Bloomsbury Publishing,
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(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 20.
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arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations.’238
All the NGOs that had the chance to submit proposals to the UN Human Rights
Commission during the preparatory work of the 1948 UDHR recognised the
right to seek asylum. For example, the International Bill of Rights Proposal
submitted by the American Federation of Labor, in its paragraph 6 under title
IV on ‘Basic Human Rights,’ read, ‘[t]he right of asylum is to be guaranteed by
all nations. No human being, who is a refugee from any political regime he
disapproves, is to be forced to return to territory under the sovereignty of that
regime.’239 Similarly, the International Refugee Organisation – an
intergovernmental organisation which later was substituted by the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – submitted its
Constitution, which explicitly had recognised and reaffirmed the ‘[…] right of
asylum for political dissidents and victims of racial persecution.’240
On the other side of the coin, most government delegations had great difficulty
accepting some of the proposed rights such as the right to move between
countries, the right to seek asylum, and the right to a nationality. Their main
argument was that their national constitutions did not recognise nor contain any
of those rights.241 However, the de- and post-colonial reading of refugee law
uncovers that the representatives of states rejected the proposals on granting
the right to seek asylum because this right was not in line with the interests of
the imperial powers in the colonies under their control, in particular the human
rights violations widespread in the territories under their colonial rules.242
Therefore, the acceptance and implementation of these rights required nation-
states to compromise on part of their sovereignty in favour of the individuals’
rights and this was something that governments were not easily willing to
accept. In fact, the right to asylum was a real test for any list of universal human
rights, since this right is directly in conflict with the principle of state sovereignty
as the foundation of the modern system of nation-states, maintaining their
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colonial possessions and continuing to violate human rights in those territories.
Including the right to seek asylum in the Bill of Rights made the government
delegates at the Committee very uncomfortable, because the acceptance of this
right no longer allowed the governments to hide behind the shield of supremacy
of ‘positive national laws.’243
Nevertheless, not all the Government delegates were against the inclusion of the
right to seek asylum as a universally protected human right. In fact, most of the
former colonial or decolonised states were very much hoping to establish a
universal legal system of refugee protection.244 In the third session of the third
Committee of the UN General Assembly, for instance, Karim Azkoul, the
Lebanese representative, called the right to asylum a ‘part of the birth right of
man’ and one of those rights that was ‘inherent in the human person.’245 In
response, however, during the same session, René Samuel Cassin, the French
delegate, asserted that including the right to seek asylum was ‘a conception of
an essentially international character; therefore, it was necessary to specify who
was to ensure the enjoyment of that right.’246 Accordingly, John Humphrey, the
Directive of the Division of Human Rights, representing the UN Secretary
General, suggested the following text: ‘No alien who had been legally admitted
to the territory of a State may be expelled therefrom except in pursuant of a
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judicial decision or recommendation as a punishment for offences laid down by
law as warranting expulsion.’ The representatives of the Governments of the UK,
France, Italy, the US, and Australia, however, disagreed with Humphrey’s
suggestion and thought this provision, would, in fact, grant greater protection
to aliens than any existing constitutions. Under these political pressures,
Humphrey, the representative of the UN Secretary General, henceforth,
modified his text: ‘Every State shall have the right to grant asylum to political
refugees.’247
The NGOs and international humanitarian organisations present at the
Committee strongly rejected the proposal of the UN Secretary General.248 The
ground for their objection was that the Declaration should formulate from a
human rights perspective rather than from the rights of states, because without
considering a right to asylum, the right to life and the rights to freedom of
thought and expression under the Declaration would be meaningless.249 Based
on this argument, the suggestion from this group was to rephrase the article on
asylum as a ‘right to seek’ and a ‘right to be granted asylum.’ No surprise that
the representatives of the states vigorously opposed the phrase the ‘right to be
granted asylum’ and proposed that a ‘right to enjoy asylum’ should replace it. To
cut this long story short, the lastly mentioned proposal received the approval of
the vast majority of votes (thirty to one, with twelve abstentions) and the
explanation behind the first paragraph of Article 14 of the 1948 UDHR in the
text of its travaux préparatoires is what the British delegate Mrs. Corbet
expressed:
Replacing the phrase to “be granted asylum” by phrase “to enjoy asylum” makes it
clear that [the] intention [of the drafters] was not to grant a person fleeing
persecution the right to enter any and every country, but to ensure for him the
enjoyment of the right to asylum once that right had been granted him.250
In addition, the strong lobbyists from the Soviet Union present in the Committee
pushed for excluding war criminals such as the supporters of the Hitler Regime
from the subject matter of the provision on the right to asylum; a proposal which
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received the approval of all participants.251 Thus, a second paragraph was added
to Article 14, stipulating that the right to seek and the right to enjoy asylum
should not include criminals, whose acts are contrary to the principles and aims
of the UN. In the post-war era, the debate over the right to asylum – whether a
right of an individual to seek or the right of states to grant – was silenced in the
legal and political arenas. Instead, what became the main concern of the
national, regional, and international actors was establishing a legal framework
on refugee protection. This led to the creation of the 1951 Refugee Convention
and later its 1967 Protocol removing the geographical and temporal limitations
of the Convention.
The above-mentioned discussions were happening during the peak of the mass
displacement of people following the end of WWII, especially during the 1948
Arab-Israeli war and the mass displacement of Arab refugees in Palestine. To
that end, the opposing states reasoned that if the international organisations
were to recognise more privileges than that of the will of states, the host
countries would have difficulty in accommodating the demands for aliens.252
The preparatory discussions on the 1951 Refugee Convention unveiled the
colonial concerns of some Western European powers. The representative of
Italy, for example, attested that, ‘if the western countries were obliged to admit
the victims of national movements such as those that had recently occurred in
India and the Middle East, they would be faced with very serious problems, and
would be quite unable to meet the commitment.’253
In addition to the historical discussions on the formation of the right to seek
asylum, according to Skran, the theory that might possibly be able to best
explain the formation of the current international legal regime of refugee
protection is a ‘functionalist theory.’ Based on this theory, the pursuit of the self-
interest of states due to the market failure and economic depression of the
thirties and forties pushed the main actors of the World – meaning the Western
European States – to demand and agree on a regime to deal with the issue of
251 William Anthony Schabas, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The Travaux Préparatoires
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 1197.
252 Ulrike Krause, ‘Colonial Roots of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Effects on the Global Refugee
Regime’ (2021) 24 Journal of International Relations and Development, pp. 599-626. In this regard,
also see: Lucy Mayblin, Asylum after Empire: Colonial Legacies in the Politics of Asylum Seeking
(London: Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd, 2017), pp. 113-146. Moreover, see: Lucy Mayblin,
‘Colonialism, Decolonisation, and the Right to be Human: Britain and the 1951 Geneva Convention on
the Status of Refugees’ (2014) 27(3) Journal of Historical Sociology, pp. 423-441.
253 UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Nineteenth
Meeting, 26 November 1951, UN Doc. No. A/CONF.2/SR.19. In this regard, also see: Ulrike Krause,
‘Colonial Roots of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Effects on the Global Refugee Regime’ (2021) 24
Journal of International Relations and Development, pp. 599-626.
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refugees. While Western European States, by placing emphasis on the principle
of sovereignty, were not willing to compromise on the control over their
territories, they needed the labour force of refugees to help rebuild their national
economies and infrastructure that had been shattered by war. Therefore,
completely out of self-interest, they agreed to the formation of an international
regime of refugee protection, which could facilitate the movement and
settlement of displaced people. This legal system of refugee protection played
the role of a medium as a communication tool amongst the states in setting some
standards of behaviour, in order to reduce the uncertainty about the situation to
an optimal level.254
Therefore, it is logical to claim that the interests of states – termed as ‘national
security’ – found a place once again at the very heart of the international legal
regime of refugee protection. A functionalist theory of the creation of the
international refugee regime very well illustrates that the national interests of
states were the bedrock of this establishment. These interests included various
aspects from the existentialist interests of the newly founded nation-states in
the post-imperial era to the economic interests of major Western European
powers. For example, both France and Britain had a direct interest in Russian
refugees, who were fighting against Communism, up to the point that France
and Britain financially supported the anti-Communist or anti-Bolshevik
activists such as the White Army both inside and outside Russia.255 This is
besides the economic benefits that many Western countries experienced from
the settlement programmes of the League of Nations under the Nansen scheme,
which in the period following WWI considerably solved the market and labour
deficiencies of the Allies.256
On the brighter side, the emergence of an international regime of refugee
protection could partly be explained through the lenses of ‘idealists.’ This
approach goes back to the establishment of the League of Nations and thereafter
the creation of the United Nations (UN).257 The UN system of human rights
254 Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995), pp. 88-94.
255 Ibid, pp. 89 and 90.
256 Alexander Betts, Louise Bloom, Josiah David Kaplan, and Naohiko Omata, Refugee Economies:
Forced Displacement and Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 15 and 16. For
an extensive account on the economic benefits of the refugee settlement schemes of the League of
Nations for the Allies powers in the aftermath of WWI, see: Anne Orde, British Policy and European
Reconstruction after the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 284-
315.
257 Tamar L. Gutner, International Organizations in World Politics (Washington DC: SAGE
Publications, Inc., 2017), pp. 36 and 37. In this regard, also see: Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Reinvigorating the
“Second” United Nations: People Matter’, in Bob Reinalda (ed.), Routledge Handbook of International
Organization (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 299-311, p. 303.
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protection is the fruit of the efforts of idealists leading to the creation of the UN
Human Rights Commission.258 The idealists together with some NGOs and
humanitarian international organisations pushed for a pacifist agenda by
including human rights, disarmament, development, and the establishment of
peace and security mechanisms in their work. In 1946, The Commission on
Human Rights was established as the main UN legislative body to promote and
protect human rights. The Commission provided overall policy guidelines,
studied human rights problems of the time, developed and codified new
international norms, and monitored the observance of human rights around the
World. The Commission also provided a forum for states, civil society (through
non-governmental organizations), and international organizations to voice their
concerns about human rights issues. In 1947, when the Commission on Human
Rights met for the first time, its sole function was to draft the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. That task was accomplished within a year and the
Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948.259 The
successor of the UN Human Rights Commission is now the UN Human Rights
Council. The formation of the UN-based system of refugee protection together
with the UN-mandated Refugee Agency (UNHCR) to some commentators is the
result of the endeavours of this group by focusing on the principle of
humanitarianism.260
Navigating between the formalist and idealist approaches, the constituting
elements of refugee protection regime – similar to any other legal regimes – are
four elements of principles, norms, rules, and procedures. The main principles
constituting the foundation of the current international legal regime of refugee
protection are the two principles of state sovereignty and humanitarianism,
which are in a constant battle against each other. The norms, which govern the
legal regime of refugee protection, are those related to asylum, the assistance of
refugees, and burden sharing.261 Meanwhile, the current legal system of refugee
258 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd edn, New York: Cornell
University Press, 2013), pp. 24-28.
259 The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), ‘About the Commission’,
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CHR/Pages/Background.aspx>. Also, see: Factsheet on the UN
Commission on Human Rights, <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet27en.pdf>.
260 The UN General Assembly, ‘Refugees and Stateless Persons: Report of the Secretary-General’, 26
October 1949, UN Doc. A/C.3/527. In this regard, also see: Terje Einarsen, ‘Drafting History of the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol’, in Andreas Zimmermann, Jonas Dörschner, and Felix Machts (eds),
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 37-73, pp. 47-49. Also, see: Paul Weis, The Refugee Convention
1951: The Travaux Préparatoires Analysed (Cambridge International Documents Series, Series
Number 7, 1990), pp. 10-12.
261 Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995), pp. 65-78.
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protection functions through some rules on the definition of the term ‘refugee,’
non-refoulement,262 and rules on how to treat refugees. Lastly, there are certain
decision-making procedures, which all independent states are in charge of,
while implementing the 1951 Refugee Convention and other relevant
international legal instruments.263
What we could comprehend from this analysis is that asylum is a norm within
the modern legal system of refugee protection regime. As discussed in the
previous subsection, the concept of asylum and the practice of asylum seeking
have a very long history. However, in the post-war era, the 1948 UDHR has
legally established the norms and standards for the international protection of
human rights of asylum seekers by recognising the right to seek and enjoy
asylum as a human right under its Article 14. These standards include a
mechanism to allow individuals to search for safety and security of the person.
In the continuation of this dissertation, I will use the phrase ‘collective security’
or ‘meta-security,’ as opposed to ‘individual safety and security,’ which the right
to seek asylum guarantees.
However, it is important to mention here that the meaning of the phrase
‘collective security’ is different from the ‘collective security system,’ which was
used by the League of Nations and thereafter by the 1945 UN Charter within the
UN Security Council system in the period following the end of WWII.264 In fact,
both the League of Nations and UN were founded on the principle of ‘collective
security to prevent inter-state wars,’ in spite of the failure of both in this
regard.265 For instance, Chapter VII of the 1945 UN Charter under the title of
‘Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of
Aggression’ grants power to the UNSC to interfere in matters which would
threaten World peace and security. The same chapter allows the UNSC to
employ sanctions (either military or non-military), in order to restore World
peace and international security. Therefore, we should keep in mind throughout
this dissertation that the use of the phrase ‘collective security,’ which is in
tension with the individual’s security through the fulfilment of the right to seek
asylum, has a different meaning from what the League of Nations or the UN
Charter meant by the ‘collective security system.’266
262 The prohibition of refoulement was at the beginning a general principle of international law, but
slowly it has enhanced its position to a customary rule of international law.
263 Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995), pp. 65-78.
264 James Richard Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019), pp. 719-740.
265 David Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd, and John Redmond, International Organisation in World Politics
(3rd edn, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 18-21.
266 James Richard Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019), pp. 719-740.
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The term ‘collective security’ in this research as the guarantor of the national
security of host states, is the opposite of the personal and individual security of
asylum seekers. The right to seek asylum is the guarantor of personal security,
since the right to life and other basic human rights are all dependent on the
realisation of the right to seek asylum without which the enjoyment of other
human rights is not feasible. Nevertheless, over time and with the rise of various
non-state actors in cross-border conflicts and the growth of international
‘terrorism,’ the idea of collective security became more nation-wide. This new
environment of protecting national security as a collective security has blurred
the position of the right to seek asylum as a basic human right and the customary
rule on the prohibition of refoulement. Based on this explanation, in the
following parts of this chapter, I will first analyse the nature of the right to seek
asylum, and then, juxtapose this individual right with the collective right to
national security. The practical implication of these two concepts meeting each
other at the same intersection raises a very difficult question: whose right to
security should we take more seriously, the individual’s or the collective’s?
2.3. ADDRESSING THE CONCEPTUAL AND DOCTRINAL
ASPECTS OF THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM
2.3.1. THE ANALYSIS OF THE COMPOSING CONCEPTUAL ELEMENTS
OF THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The 1948 UDHR may have been the first legal instrument recognising the right
to seek asylum as a human right; however, it certainly is not the last one. Half a
century later, the EU legislated its own bill of human rights, i.e. the 2000 EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter),267 which included the right to seek
asylum. The Charter is legally binding on all individual EU Member States. Once
it entered into force in 2009, the Lisbon Treaty268 granted the Charter the same
legal position as the two main EU Treaties,269 meaning a primary source of EU
law.270 Article 18 of the EU Charter explicitly recognises the right to seek asylum
and asserts that this right should be guaranteed according to the 1951 Refugee
267 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (referred to as ‘the EU Charter’),
published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 26 October 2012 (2012/c 326/02).
268 The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community (Treaty of Lisbon), signed on 13 December 2007, entered into force on 1
December 2009, published in Volume 51 of the Official Journal of the European Union on 9 May 2008
(2008/C 115/01).
269 The two main founding treaties of the European Union are the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
270 Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
62
Convention and its 1967 Protocol. In addition, for the implementation of this
right, the EU and its Member States should follow the rules of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU)271 and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU).272
At the national level, the constitutions of many EU Member States have
recognised the right to seek asylum as a constitutional right. In this regard, the
following provisions could be named: Article 43 of the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic, Section 13(4) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain, Article 48
of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, Article 53 of the Constitution of
the Slovak Republic, Article 18(2) of the Constitution of Romania, Article 33 of
the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, Article 56(1) of the Constitution of
the Republic of Poland, Article 10 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic,
Article XIV(3) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 16(a) of the Basic
Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, § 4 of the preamble to the French
Constitution of 27 October 1946, Article 33 of the Constitution of the Republic
of Croatia, and Article 26(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria.
Those EU Member States, which have not included the right to seek asylum
within their constitutions, have instead referred to this right or to the principle
of non-refoulement in their national legislation, while covering immigration and
refugee issues. In this regard, for example, we could refer to Part 11 of the United
Kingdom’s Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Act of 2006, Article 8(1) of
the 2001 Refugees Act of the Laws of Malta, Article 1.1. of the Republic of
Lithuania’s Law on the Legal Status of Aliens, Section 2 of the Asylum Law of
Latvia, Section 9 of the Constitution of Finland on Freedom of Movement, the
Aliens (Consolidation) Act of Denmark, and the Estonian Act on Granting
International Protection to Aliens.
As briefly mentioned above, the current international legal framework for the
protection of human rights is a creation of the UN system. Article 55 of the 1945
Charter of the UN is the legal basis for this creation. The third part of this article
establishes the third pillar of the UN, based on which the peace and security of
the World could be promoted. This pillar is the ‘universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.’ This provision created a
universal human rights obligation for all UN Member States, which manifested
itself in the 1948 UDHR. Even though the 1948 UDHR is a Declaration and,
legally speaking, classified as a non-binding instrument, its provisions have
271 Treaty on European Union (TEU), entry into force on 1 December 2009, published in the Official
Journal of the European Union on 26 October 2012 (C 326/13).
272 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), entry into force on 1 December 2009,
published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 26 October 2012 (C 326/49).
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found the status of customary norms of international law. The reasons for this
claim is that first, the wide acceptance of this document and the subsequent
legislation show that the provisions of the 1948 UDHR have the elements of
customary norms of international law, i.e. the ‘persistent practice’ and ‘opinio
juris.’273 One indicator for this wide acceptance is that since the end of WWII,
the 1948 UDHR has been the main source of legislation for many post-colonial
and former communist constitutions. Secondly, the mainstream UN human
rights conventions have their legal basis in the provisions of the 1948 UDHR.
Thirdly and lastly, the 1948 UDHR, in itself, is a declaration of the customary
rules of international law, which had already been widely accepted at the time
of its adoption.274
Therefore, this positionality of the right to seek asylum at the three levels of
human right protection regimes – international (the 1948 UDHR), regional (the
EU Charter), and national (as stated above) – proves the nature of this right to
be a basic, fundamental, and constitutional human right, depending on the
context in which this right is addressed. Hence, we could easily argue against
the opinion of some of the drafters of the 1948 UDHR that the right to asylum is
the right of states to grant, not the right of the individual to effectively seek and
enjoy. As illustrated previously, during the preparatory negotiations of the 1948
UDHR, between the representatives of participating states a controversy existed
around the question of whether asylum is a right of individual to seek, demand,
and receive or the right of the host state to grant. During the preparatory
discussions on Article 14 of the 1948 UDHR, the representatives of the majority
of Western European States insisted on the right to asylum to be the right of
states to grant. This view is understandable by accepting the principle of state
sovereignty as the founding principle of the current international legal system –
a post-colonial system governed by World powers. However, what we should not
forget is that according to Skran, not only the principle of state sovereignty, but
also the principle of humanitarianism have constructed the modern legal regime
of refugee protection.275
Therefore, in order to have a well-functioning system of refugee protection in
the World, the two principles of state sovereignty and humanitarianism must
work together in harmony. In situations where states prevail sovereignty over
the principle of humanitarianism, the legal regime of refugee protection would
273 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2019), pp. 21-25. See also: Malcolm Nathan Shaw, International Law (8th edn,
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 62-66.
274 Hurst Hannum, ‘The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and
International Law’ (1995/96) 25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, pp. 287-397.
275 Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995), pp. 66-68.
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collapse. History gives testimony to this failure: for example, during the interwar
period (the 1920s and 1930s) until the time Nansen achieved the best possible
balance between these two principles. Nevertheless, by the growth of the role of
individuals and international organisations in international law in the aftermath
of WWII, the principle of state sovereignty needed to mould and adapt itself to
the fast changes of the World, the most important component of which being
the increasing role of individuals and their human rights in international law.
At this stage of debate, we should keep to the wording of Article 14 of the UDHR.
The final consensus in the drafting of this provision was ‘the right to seek and
to enjoy asylum.’ Defining the right to seek asylum as the right of individuals to
seek makes more sense not only within the context of the 1948 UDHR, but also
its subsequent human rights instruments. This is a harmonic method of
interpreting human rights norms based on the ‘presumption against normative
conflict.’276 According to the rules on the interpretation of treaties (Article 31 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties),277 the right to seek asylum
should be interpreted in harmony with related rights such as the right to
freedom of movement.
Thus, if the right to freedom of movement allows the individual, whose life and
basic freedoms are at risk, to leave the country of origin, the right to seek asylum
should include the right of that individual to access to asylum application
procedures.278 The reason for this claim is that the right to seek asylum is a
natural and inevitable result of the right to freedom of movement, including the
freedom in leaving one’s own country, as expressed under Article 13 of the 1948
UDHR. The right to freedom of movement, including the right to leave one’s
own country, is a norm of customary international law articulated under Article
2 of Protocol No. 4 of the ECHR and Article 12(2) of the 1966 ICCPR, amongst
many other human rights instruments.
However, once an asylum seeker submits an application to the country of
asylum, because of the principle of state sovereignty, it is within the discretion
and willingness of the host state to decide on granting asylum (or international
protection). In the case of a positive decision, the individual has a right to enjoy
asylum in the country of destination. Therefore, the realisation of Article 14(1)
of UDHR, meaning the right to seek and to enjoy asylum through the process of
asylum seeking, has three phases of action as presented below in Table 1.
276 Marjoleine Zieck, ‘Refugees and the Right to Freedom of Movement: From Flight to Return’ (2018)
39(19) Michigan Journal of International Law, pp. 19-116.
277 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January
1980, U.N.T.S. Vol. 1155, p. 331 (referred to as the ‘1969 VCLT’).
278 Marjoleine Zieck, ‘Refugees and the Right to Freedom of Movement: From Flight to Return’ (2018)
39(19) Michigan Journal of International Law, pp. 19-116, pp. 21-23.
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Table 1. Three phases of asylum seeking in practice
The stages of
seeking asylum
Name of the stage The specifications of the stage
1. Phase 1 Pre-asylum seeking phase The individual feels the need and an
urgency to leave the country of origin and
finds a way to do so (sometimes even
through human smugglers).
2. Phase 2 Asylum seeking phase The individual obtains access to the asylum
assessment procedures through entering the
territory of host state and by expressing an
intent to seek asylum.
3. Phase 3 Post-asylum seeking phase,
two scenarios are imaginable
at this phase:
3.1. Positive asylum decision: once
granted asylum, the individual enjoys the
rights aimed at those eligible for
international protection (this is enjoyment
phase of the right to enjoy asylum).
3.2. Negative asylum decision: In this
case, an appeal procedure against the
negative decision could be initiated or the
state could consider return procedures by
following the due diligence duties and due
process of law.
The composing conceptual elements of the right to seek asylum cover phases 1,
2, and 3.2 in the cases of negative asylum decisions. Since in stage 3.1 the
individual is recognised as a refugee or as a beneficiary of other types of
international protection (the subsidiary, complementary, or humanitarian
protections), they enjoy all the procedural and substantial human rights
emerging from this new migratory status.
2.3.2. THE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL AND DOCTRINAL ASPECTS OF
THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
2.3.2.1. Analysing the doctrinal elements of the right to seek asylum
through the theory of rights
Base on the above-mentioned elaboration on the composing conceptual
elements of the right to seek asylum, the legal or the doctrinal elements of this
right include the following parts:
1. The right of the individual to leave one’s own country;
2. The right of the individual to enter the territory of or to be admitted to the
country of asylum;
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3. The right of the individual to have access to a fair asylum procedure with
respect for due process of law;
4. The right of the individual to reside temporarily in the country of asylum
during the process of asylum application;
5. The right of the individual not to be expelled or not to be extradited from
the country of asylum (the principle of non-refoulement); and
6. The right of individual to be protected against unlawful prosecution,
punishment or otherwise any legally unfounded deprivation of personal
liberty, while residing in the country of asylum.279
To better understand the composing doctrinal elements of the right to seek
asylum, I shall first give a definition of the term ‘rights’ and then I will elaborate
on its various doctrinal aspects. The term ‘right’ in common use is defined as the
‘entitlements (not) to perform certain actions, or (not) to be in certain states; or
entitlements that others (not) perform certain actions or (not) be in certain
states.’280 Based on this definition, rights are a ‘claim’ or an ‘entitlement’ to
something, or are ‘protected options to act [or not to act].’281 Keeping this
definition in mind, now I apply the analytical ‘theory of rights’ to elaborate on
the composing doctrinal elements of the right to seek asylum. The main reason
for this choice of theory is that the theory of rights, developed by legal
philosophers Hohfeld and Alexy,282 has the analytical capacity to dissect the
composing doctrinal elements of fundamental rights and to discover the
inviolable essence at the very core of these rights.283
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, the legal philosopher of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, in his analytical framework of the rights created the theory
of ‘legal relations.’284 In this theory, Hohfeld distinguished between the concept
of ‘rights’ – which he also called ‘claims’ – and the concept of ‘privileges.’285 To
have a ‘right’ or a ‘claim,’ according to Hohfeld, is to be ‘in relation’ with another
279 Roman Boed, ‘The State of the Right of Asylum in International Law’ (1994) 5 Duke Journal of
Comparative and International Law, pp. 1-34, pp. 3-8.
280 The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ‘Rights’, <plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/>.
281 Frances Myrna Kamm, ‘Rights’, in Jules L. Coleman, Kenneth Einar Himma, and Scott J. Shapiro
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004), pp. 477-516, p. 477.
282 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1917)
26(8) Yale Law Journal, pp. 710-770. Also, see: Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
283 The history of analytical jurisprudence as part of analytical philosophy goes back to the eighteenth
century and to the legacy of Jeremy Bentham. However, the most influential philosopher for this theory
was H.L.A. Hart. In this regard, see: Edgar Bodenheimer, ‘Modern Analytical Jurisprudence and the
Limits of Its Usefulness’ (1956) 104 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, pp. 1080-1086.
284 Madeline Morris, ‘Structure of Entitlements’ (1993) 78 Cornell Law Review, pp. 822-898, p. 825.
285 George W. Rainbolt, The Concept of Rights (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), pp. 1-19.
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party – either natural or legal person such as another human being or a state or
a cooperation, etc. with regard to a certain ‘thing’ or a certain ‘action.’286 Hence,
there are three distinct factors involved in every right-claim situation: the right
holder, the duty bearer, and the object of the right (or the content of the
claim).287 The claim-right scenario could be negative (to non-interference) or
positive (to some contribution). This type of right is ‘directional,’ which means
that the object of right or the content of the claim is directed against someone
(the duty bearer) and entails that the latter have a ‘correlative’ and ‘directional’
duty towards the right holder.288
To have a ‘privilege,’ on the other hand, does not create a corresponding relation.
Now, I shall explain the Hohfeldian legal relation in the context of a familiar
scenario. Today, you become a member of your city’s library. Similar to all other
members, you can use the library space and access the facilities that they offer.
Your privilege to use the library space and its facilities means that other library
members do not have any corresponding responsibility or duty towards you. The
reason is that you all are equal members to each other, when it comes to
accessing and using the library space and its facilities. Therefore, you do not
have any corresponding relation in the sense of right with other library
members, as you all have an equal privilege to use the library. However, the
library owner or the library operator (like the librarian) has a duty to allow you
inside the library and to facilitate your access and the use of library space and
other facilities available (of course during opening hours). Therefore, the
librarian, with no good reason, cannot prevent you from entering the library or
using the facilities. Hence, here, we can say that in relation to the librarian, you
have a ‘right,’ but in relation to other library users, you just have a ‘privilege.’
In the library scenario, whoever shows up earlier in the morning at the library
would get to use a specific space, a particular corner, or a facility in the library.
If you need that specific space or facility, you have to wait for the first person to
leave, and then only you could use it. Alternatively, you could politely ask the
person if they would be willing to allow you to access that particular space or
facility. Nevertheless, you should keep in mind that the person has absolutely no
obligation to give up that space or facility to you (unless there is a time limit for
286 Matthew H. Kramer, ‘Rights without Trimmings’, in Matthew H. Kramer, Nigel E. Simmonds, and
Hillel Steiner (eds), A Debate over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries (New York: Oxford University Press,
1998), pp. 7-111, pp. 9 and 10.
287 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1917)
26(8) Yale Law Journal, pp. 710-770.
288 Frances Myrna Kamm, ‘Rights’, in Jules L. Coleman, Kenneth Einar Himma, and Scott J. Shapiro
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004), pp. 477-516, p. 478.
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every user), because you both have an ‘equal privilege’ to use the space, so the
applicable rule in this scenario is ‘first come, first served.’ To visualise the
difference between rights (or claims) and privileges, Table 2 demonstrates this
distinction through positioning rights and privileges against their
correlatives:289




Privilege <=> No right
Table 2 shows that there is a corresponding relationship between the right
holder and the duty bearer. However, this relationship is not necessarily
reciprocal in nature; it could be a one-way type of relationship. In other words,
the right holder is only the beneficiary in this relationship without having a
corresponding duty towards the addressee. By referring to Hohfeld’s theory of
legal relations, Robert Alexy, the contemporary jurist and legal philosopher, has
formulated rights by a general statement: ‘X has a right to G, as against Y’.290
Alexy’s formulation of rights encompasses the three following variables, which
are the same as the three elements mentioned above in the Hohfeldian theory of
legal relations or jural correlatives:
1. First is X, which is the subject of the right, known as the right holder
or the beneficiary of the right.
2. Second is Y, which is the addressee of the right, known as the duty
bearer.
3. Third is G, which is the object of the right, known as the subject
matter of the right.291
By keeping in mind the definition of rights and the distinction that Hohfeld
made between rights and privileges, together with the formulation of elements
of rights by Alexy, I shall break down the composing doctrinal elements of the
right to seek asylum and present them in Table 3. The purpose of dissecting the
composing doctrinal elements of the right to seek asylum is to demonstrate that
the nature of this right is a fundamental right, and not merely a privilege.
Considering this positioning, the host state is in the duty bearer and the asylum
289 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1917)
26(8) Yale Law Journal, pp. 710-770.
290 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 120.
291 Ibid, pp. 120-122.
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seeker remains as the right holder or the beneficiary of various composing
doctrinal elements of this while implementing the right to seek asylum in
practice.
As mentioned above, the right to seek asylum is a right of the individual who is
in need of asylum and protection against persecution. Therefore, the individual
who is seeking asylum is the ‘benefactor’ of this right and the state on the
territory of which the asylum seeker is located is the ‘duty bearer.’ Only if the
host state respects, protects, and fulfils all the above-mentioned human rights,
we could truly claim that the right to seek asylum has been realised and that the
right to seek asylum is a real fundamental right with an effective meaning.
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Now that we have a clear picture of the composing doctrinal elements of the
right to seek asylum, and its nature as a fundamental right, it is time to address
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the implementation of this right in practice. When it comes to implementing the
right to seek asylum in practice, it is important to test the fulfilment of this right
against the principle of non-discrimination. Thereafter, I shall analyse the legal
permissible grounds for limiting the right to seek asylum in practice, especially
by considering the fact that this right is a fundamental right.
2.3.2.2. Implementing the right to seek asylum within the context of the
principle of non-discrimination
The right to seek asylum as a basic and fundamental human right belongs to the
larger family of human rights. One of the very basic conditions for fulfilling the
enjoyment of all human rights is a full compliance with the principle of non-
discrimination as a foundation of the rule of law. Therefore, in the course of
implementing the right to seek asylum, this principle must constantly be taken
into account. As a customary norm of international law, the principle of equality
and non-discrimination has its legal roots in the major international and
regional human rights instruments. The most important legal document in
international law, meaning the 1945 UN Charter, besides emphasising the
equality of rights between men and women in its preamble, in Articles 1(3),
13(1)(b), 55(c), and 76(c), places emphasis on the principle of non-
discrimination (using the word ‘distinction’) in all matters of human rights.
While the grounds of discrimination or distinction under the 1945 UN Charter
is limited to the four grounds of ‘race,’ ‘sex,’ ‘language,’ and ‘religion,’ the core
human rights instruments created after the UN Charter have expanded the
grounds of discrimination to a non-exhaustive and open list, including any
possible future grounds. In this regard, we could name Article 2 of the 1948
UDHR, Article 26 of the 1966 ICCPR, Article 14 of the ECHR, Article 21 of the
2000 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 2 of the Banjul Charter, and
Articles 1, 17(2), 24, and 27(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights.
Article 26 of the 1966 ICCPR sets an independent and comprehensive
prohibition of discrimination on any imaginable grounds. Therefore, it is
accurate to claim that under international human rights law, it does not matter
whether those who are within the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of a State
are citizens, permanent residents, or are present on some other basis or in an
irregular situation. This international human rights law instrument applies to
‘all individuals,’ falling within its scope, irrespective of whether they are citizens
or noncitizens or whether they are lawfully or unlawfully present on the Member
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State’s territory or otherwise within its jurisdiction.292 The prohibition of
discrimination under Article 14 of the ECHR, however, is a dependent provision,
alleged violation of which relies on prior infringement of the Convention’s other
substantive human rights. In contrast, Protocol No. 12 of the ECHR has
introduced a general equality clause, which prohibits any kind of discrimination
with no need to have a link to other provisions of the Convention.293
The issue of equality of rights and non-discrimination is of such high importance
in international human rights law that an international convention is entirely
dedicated to the topic. The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (the ‘1969 ICERD’), adopted in 1969, is the
greatest achievement of the UN human rights system in setting standards and
practical mechanisms in eliminating racial discrimination of any forms and in
promoting racial and ethnic equality in the jurisdictions under the control of the
States Parties.
Within the European system of human rights protection, multiple legal
documents have addressed the prohibition of discrimination. Beside the ECHR,
as mentioned above, we could refer to the Council of Europe’s Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. In addition, the European
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which is a human rights
body of the Council of Europe, monitors closely the issues of racism,
xenophobia, antisemitism, intolerance, and racial discrimination in the Member
States.294 Within secondary sources of EU law, several directives target different
aspects of discrimination and its prohibition. In addition to the prohibition of
discrimination of any kind in the context of employment, the European Council
Directive of 2000/43/EC lays down an action framework for combating
discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin by putting into effect in
the Member States the principle of equal treatment.295
Within the American system of human rights protection, also the issue of non-
discrimination is the subject matter of a full convention. In this regard, the
Inter-American Convention against Racism, Racial Discrimination and related
292 The CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens under the Covenant, adopted at the
Twenty-seventh session of the Human Rights Committee on 11 April 1986. In this regards, also see:
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ‘The Rights of Non-citizens’,
<www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/noncitizensen.pdf>.
293 Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks, and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White, and Ovey: The European
Convention on Human Rights (7th edn, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 631-636 and 659-
661.
294 The Council of Europe, ‘The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)’,
<www.coe.int/en/web/european-commission-against-racism-and-intolerance>.
295 Article 1 of the European Council Directive of 2000/43/EC on implementing the principle of equal
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.
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Forms of Intolerance, adopted in 2013, is the key legal tool ‘in protecting and
promoting the rights of victims of historic wrongs in the Americas and tackling
discrimination in all its forms.’296
The implementation of the principle of non-discrimination in the context of the
right to seek asylum raises the question on how this principle would apply in
respect to asylum seekers, especially taking into account the exacerbated
vulnerable position of asylum seekers due to their irregular migratory status as
undocumented non-citizens. This question is a small part of a bigger dilemma
on how to apply the principle of non-discrimination in the context of
immigration in general. This is an extremely challenging situation from a human
rights protection perspective, since the legitimate grounds for discrimination
and their justifications vary tremendously from one country of asylum to
another. The instances of discrimination on the ground of asylum seekers’
migratory status, mainly due to being undocumented non-citizens, are plenty.
For example, a recent systematic study on the practice of the UN Committee on
the Rights of the Child demonstrates that the children of asylum seekers or
asylum-seeking children are discriminated constantly due to their own or their
parents’ migratory status, even within the context of applying the principle of
the best interests of the child.297
The majorities of immigration law have recognised legitimate discriminatory
grounds for accessing sovereign territories based on migratory status against the
so-called ‘illegal immigrants.’298 In addition to some states entitling themselves
to distinct asylum seekers from other categories of immigrants in the sense of
accessing their territory or even detaining them,299 others allegedly discriminate
between asylum seekers on several grounds.300 These grounds may include the
asylum seeker’s country of origin, the means of arrival (boat vs. airplane), the
296 The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ‘The UN human rights experts
welcome OAS adoption of key racism and discrimination conventions’,
<newsarchive.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13446&LangID=E>.
297 Milka Sormunen, ‘A Focus on Domestic Structures: Best Interests of the Child in the Concluding
Observations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’ (2020) 38(2) Nordic Journal of Human
Rights, pp. 100-121, pp. 105 and 108.
298 Lieneke Slingenberg, The Reception of Asylum Seekers under International Law: Between
Sovereignty and Equality (Oxford; Portland: Hart Publishing, 2014), pp. 92-98.
299 In this regard, see, for example the case of Čonka v. Belgium. The ECtHR found a violation of Articles
5(1), 5(4), and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 of the Convention for deceitfully inviting the asylum seekers of
Romani origin to the police station to assess their asylum claim. Instead, however, they were arrested,
detained, and collectively deported from Belgium. In this regard, see: Čonka v. Belgium, Application
No. 51564/99, European Court of Human Rights, Final Chamber Judgement (05 May 2002).
300 Kieran Oberman, ‘Refugee Discrimination – The Good, the Bad, and the Pragmatic’ (2020) 37(5)
Journal of Applied Philosophy, pp. 695-712. In this regard, also see: Lieneke Slingenberg, The Reception
of Asylum Seekers under International Law: Between Sovereignty and Equality (Oxford; Portland:
Hart Publishing, 2014), pp. 92-98.
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route of journey (land, air, or water), nationality, the last country of residence,
sur place refugee, financial status, health, disability, age, religion, sex, gender,
colour, race, ethnicity, etc.
In order to address the applicability of the principle of non-discrimination
within the context of the right to seek asylum, the universal standards set in the
ICERD could be a good starting point. These regulations together with the
Convention’s supervisory body, i.e. the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, constitute a solid legal ground for implementing the provisions
of this Convention in all contexts, including the realisation of the right to seek
asylum. The Committee’s practice and its supervisory and monitoring
mechanisms include the examination of both individual and inter-state
complaints, concluding observation of periodic country reports, and preventive
measures in the forms of early-warning and urgent procedures.301 The
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in its concluding
observations on country reports has repeatedly reinforced to Member States
that in all matters related to refugees and asylum seekers, the international
human rights rules and standards are applicable without any discriminatory
regards for the nationality or the migratory status of individuals.302
In addition to the work of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
(ECRI), in its several country reports and policy recommendations, has
explicitly reiterated that the asylum eligibility procedures should be without
consideration of any discriminatory grounds, especially national or ethnic
origins. Moreover, the ECRI reports emphasise that asylum seekers should
receive sufficient life conditions during the examination of their cases, because
leaving them in devastating life conditions would subject asylum seekers further
to prejudice, stereotypes, and hostilities by other members of the host society.
In this regard, the ECRI also emphasises that since the right to seek asylum is a
recognised human right both internationally and at the level of regional human
rights protection systems (European, Americas, and the African systems), the
lack of legal identity, travel, or residency documents should not be a ground for
discriminating against asylum seekers. Therefore, the lack of legal immigration
status should not prevent asylum seekers from entering the territory of the state
301 The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ‘The Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD): Monitoring racial equality and non-discrimination’,
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/CERDIntro.aspx>.
302 The Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Assembly Official
Records Sixty-seventh session, 13 February – 9 March 2012, Supplement No. 18 (A/67/18).
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and lodging an asylum claim supported with some safeguards such as legal
assistance or the services of a translator and/or interpreter.303
With regard to discriminating against asylum seekers from enjoying the right to
seek asylum due to their lack of legal identity or travel documents, the 1951
Refugee Convention has set a clear international standard in its Article 31 known
as the ‘non-penalisation clause.’304 According to this provision, refugees coming
directly from a country where their life or freedom is threatened should not be
punished because of their illegal entry or presence, as long as they are coming
directly from that country, present themselves immediately to the authorities,
and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence. Therefore, crossing a
border without authorisation to seek asylum is not a crime as such; hence, no
asylum seeker should be discriminated against because of unauthorised
arrival.305 However, state practices show that many forms of discriminatory
measures – such as mandatory detentions and the interception of immigrant
boats – are often deployed against asylum seekers arriving with no prior
authorisation.306
2.3.2.3. The permissible grounds for limiting the right to seek asylum in
practice
While non-discrimination clause applies to the right to seek asylum as a
customary rule of international law, we should keep in mind that not all
limitations against fulfilling this right are automatically discriminatory in
nature. Under certain exceptional circumstances, the enjoyment of the result of
the right to seek asylum shall be legally restricted.307 Within the international
legal system of refugee protection, the permissible limitation tests against
303 The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) General Policy Recommendation
No. 16 on Safeguarding Irregularly-Present Migrants from Discrimination, adopted on 16 March 2016,
Council of Europe Doc No. CRI(2016)16.
304 James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (2nd edn, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp. 511-519. In this regard, also see: Cathryn Costello and Yulia Ioffe,
‘Non-Penalization and Non-Criminalization of Refugees and Other Migrants for Illegal Entry and Stay’,
in Cathryn Costello, Michelle Foster, and Jane McAdam (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International
Refugee Law (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. 917-932.
305 Frances Nicholson and Judith Kumin, A Guide to International Refugee Protection and Building
State Asylum Systems: Handbook for Parliamentarians N° 27 (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017), pp. 61, 94, 95, 123, 259, and 263.
306 Daniel Ghezelbash, Refuge Lost: Asylum Law in an Interdependent World (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2018), pp. 165 and 166.
307 James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (2nd edn, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp. 399-423. In this regard, also see: Geoff Gilbert, ‘Terrorism and
International Refugee Law’, in Ben Saul (ed.), Research Handbook on International Law and
Terrorism (2nd edn, Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020), pp.
423-435.
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refugee protection are two under the 1951 Refugee Convention. The first
limitation is under Article 1(F) of the 1951 Refugee Convention known amongst
practitioners as the ‘exclusion clause,’ and the second one is Article 33(2) of the
same Convention as an exception to the prohibition of refoulement.
While the two above-mentioned articles impose limitations on the enjoyment of
refugee status, we should remember that in practice the threshold and nature of
the limitation imposed by Articles 1(F) and 33(2) is different. Article 1(F) aims
at facilitating the extradition of convicted or suspected criminals with a high
threshold of assessment. On the contrary, Article 33(2) has a very low threshold
for excluding whomever there are reasonable grounds against to be a danger to
the security of the host state.308 Another difference between these two provisions
is that in the case of Article 1(F) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, once convicted
of a serious crime or being an alleged suspect in an investigation of such crime,
the Refugee Convention ceases to apply to the person. However, there is a need
for practicing a balancing act between the interests of the state and the risk the
person imposes when it comes to the application of Article 33(2) of the Refugee
Convention.309
Before analysing these legal grounds for permissible limitation of this right, I
shall bring back the example of the library given above in understanding how in
practice the right to seek asylum may be limited. As pictured above, in
Subsection 2.3.2.1, you have a right to use the library space and its facilities,
when it comes in relation to the librarian. However, imagine that one day an
electricity emergency happens in the earlier hours of morning in the library.
According to the electrician, there is a danger of electric shock and probably an
electrically induced fire. Therefore, the librarian, based on the instructions of
the electrician, does not allow any member of the library to enter the building.
In this situation, your right to access and use the library has been limited and
put on hold by the duty bearer, with the justification of protecting your own
health and safety of others. This is a reasonable justification behind limiting
your right to access and use the library.
We could apply the same metaphor to the right to seek asylum. When it comes
to the enjoyment of the right to seek asylum, it is within the discretion of the
host state, as the duty bearer, to decide about the asylum cases. In order to
upgrade the legal status of an asylum seeker to the category of ‘refugee,’ the state
must assess and decide the case based on the facts presented, the information
308 James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (2nd edn, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp. 418-423.
309 James C. Hathaway, ‘Refugees and Asylum’, in Brian Opeskin, Richard Perruchoud, and Jillyanne
Redpath-Cross (eds), Foundations of International Migration Law (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), pp. 177-204, p. 190.
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available from the country of origin (known as the ‘country of origin
information’ or the ‘COI’), and the existing applicable laws. Refugee law
practitioners know this procedure of decision-making as ‘refugee status
determination’ (RSD). It is during this procedure that the host state addresses
and assesses the asylum claim of all applicants individually. During the RSD
procedure, the asylum seeker benefits from the most basic and fundamental
human rights stipulated above as the composing legal or doctrinal elements of
the right to seek asylum, namely the prohibition of refoulement and the
prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of personal liberty and security. In order to
understand the stages of the right to seek asylum and enjoy it after the refugee
status is granted, Figure 1 illustrates the three phases of seeking asylum.
Figure 1. The illustration of three stages of seeking asylum.
As shown in this figure, the right to seek asylum precedes the stage of the state’s
decision-making. Therefore, addressing permissible limitation grounds against
the right to seek asylum happens during the RSD procedure. It is during this
individual assessment of the applicant’s case that the host state may consider
exceptions to the enjoyment of this right.
The permissible legal grounds, based on which an asylum seeker cannot benefit
from refugee status or refugee protection, are stipulated under Article 14(2) of
the 1948 UDHR, Articles 1(F), 9, 32(2), and 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee
Convention. Based on these articles, the exempting grounds are that the asylum
seekers are those, against whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding
them as a danger to the security of the country in which they are. Other
permissible grounds are that the asylum seeker is under an active criminal
investigation, convicted of serious non-political crimes, or has committed
prohibited acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN. Based on
these permissible limitation grounds, we could claim that, even though being
fundamental in nature, the right to seek asylum is, therefore, not an absolute
























war or other exceptional situations) and for some legally stipulated and
legitimate reasons, the state could deprive asylum seekers from obtaining
refugee status. In this situation, the asylum seeker is de facto a refugee, but not
de jure.
Nevertheless, depriving individuals from enjoying the right to seek asylum or
failing to obtain refugee status (enjoying the asylum) is the subject of individual
case-by-case assessment. In other words, no security concern or state interest
could be provoked to prevent individuals from entering the territory of the state
and accessing the asylum decision-making procedure. This is to say that
national security could never be as such an excuse to deprive an individual from
seeking asylum – meaning from lodging an asylum application. This is due to
the nature of the right to seek asylum being a fundamental right as explicitly
stipulated under Article 18 of the EU Charter.
Understanding the nature of the right to seek asylum as a fundamental human
right implies that there is an ‘essence’ or ‘inviolable core’ at the heart of this
right, which may not be limited or balanced against, even if security concerns of
states are supposedly at stake.310 The permissible grounds for limitation – as
stipulated above – are provoked only to reject a refugee application and
therefore, not to grant the individual a refugee status. To comprehend and
further discuss the essential or inviolable cores of the right to seek asylum as a
fundamental right, we should apply Article 18 of the EU Charter in the light of
the Charter’s horizontal articles such as Article 52 on the scope of the application
and interpretation of rights and principles. According to the first paragraph of
Article 52 of the EU Charter, any legitimate interference with fundamental
rights must ‘respect the essence of those rights.’ Hence, also those fundamental
rights that as such are subject to legally permissible limitations (and not only
absolute or non-derogable rights such as the prohibition against torture or
slavery) should be understood to include one or more essential elements that
crystallise a broader principle into a rule or an essential core that allows no
limitations or exercise of ‘balancing act.’311 The identification of such essential
310 Tuomas Ojanen, ‘Making the Essence of Fundamental Rights Real: The Court of Justice of the
European Union Clarifies the Structure of Fundamental Rights under the Charter’ (2016) 12(2)
European Constitutional Law Review, pp. 318-329. In this regard, also see: Martin Scheinin, ‘Terrorism
and the Pull of ‘Balancing’ in the Name of Security’, in Martin Scheinin (ed.), Law and Security - Facing
the Dilemmas (Florence: European University Institute, 2009), pp. 55-63.
311 Tuomas Ojanen, ‘Making the Essence of Fundamental Rights Real: The Court of Justice of the
European Union Clarifies the Structure of Fundamental Rights under the Charter’ (2016) 12(2)
European Constitutional Law Review, pp. 318-329. Also, see: Martin Scheinin and Mathias Vermeulen,
‘Unilateral Exceptions to International Law: Systematic Legal Analysis and Critique of Doctrines that
Seek to Deny or Reduce the Applicability of Human Rights Norms in the Fight Against Terrorism’, in
Menno T. Kamminga (ed.), Challenges in International Human Rights Law (Vol. 3, London: Routledge,
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elements and the exact definition of their scope of application, indeed, is a
matter of interpretation.312
The European Court of Justice (ECJ), within its jurisprudence in interpreting
the scope of how the Charter is applied, has set a precedent in recognising the
essence of rights. The ECJ, in the case of Maximillian Schrems v. Data
Protection Commissioner and Digital Rights Ireland Ltd (hereinafter referred
to as ‘Schrems v. Ireland’),313 by elaborating on the inviolable core of the rights
under Articles 7 and 47 of the Charter has made the idea of the essence of
fundamental rights real. This clarification of the highest judicial body of the EU
enriches our understanding of the structure of fundamental rights under the
Charter.314 According to the ECJ in the case of Schrems v. Ireland, in the context
of data protection, the essence of the right to respect private life under Article 7
of the EU Charter is that ‘public authorities cannot have an indiscriminate
blanket access to the content of electronic communications.’315 Applying Article
47 to data protection cases, the essence of the right to an effective remedy and
to a fair trial is that legislative measures should be available to ‘provide for any
possibility for an individual to pursue legal remedies in order to have access to
personal data or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data.’316 The
significance of this ruling is that, in practice, by applying the test of the essence
of fundamental rights, the core of the right to privacy, the right to an effective
remedy, or other human rights under the Charter could not be restricted or
balanced even if important security concerns such as terrorism are allegedly at
stake.
As opposed to Article 52(1) of the EU Charter, no provision in the ECHR refers
to the essence of rights. However, the case law of the ECtHR includes many
2014), pp. 155-206. Also see: Martin Scheinin, ‘Terrorism and the Pull of ‘Balancing’ in the Name of
Security’, in Martin Scheinin (ed.), Law and Security - Facing the Dilemmas (Florence: European
University Institute, 2009), pp. 55-63.
312 Martin Scheinin and Mathias Vermeulen, ‘Unilateral Exceptions to International Law: Systematic
Legal Analysis and Critique of Doctrines that Seek to Deny or Reduce the Applicability of Human Rights
Norms in the Fight Against Terrorism’, in Menno T. Kamminga (ed.), Challenges in International
Human Rights Law (Vol. 3, London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 155-206. Also, see: Martin Scheinin,
‘Terrorism and the Pull of ‘Balancing’ in the Name of Security’, in Martin Scheinin (ed.), Law and
Security - Facing the Dilemmas (Florence: European University Institute, 2009), pp. 55-63.
313 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner and Digital Rights Ireland
Ltd, European Court of Justice (ECJ), Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court, Judgment of 6
October 2015 (referred to as ‘Schrems v. Ireland’), paras 94 and 95.
314 Tuomas Ojanen, ‘Making the Essence of Fundamental Rights Real: The Court of Justice of the
European Union Clarifies the Structure of Fundamental Rights under the Charter’ (2016) 12(2)
European Constitutional Law Review, pp. 318-329
315 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner and Digital Rights Ireland
Ltd, European Court of Justice (ECJ), Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court, Judgment of 6
October 2015 (referred to as ‘Schrems v. Ireland’), para. 94.
316 Ibid, para. 95.
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references to the idea of the existence of an essence in the rights, which the
Convention protects. One of the very first and early cases, which explicitly
touched upon the existence of an essence at the core of human rights, is a
collective case from 1968, better known as ‘the Belgian Linguistic Cases.’317 In
its judgement on the alleged violation of the right to education under Article 2
of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR, the Plenary Court opined that ‘the right to
education, by its very nature, calls for regulation by the State.’318 The Court
added that ‘such regulation must never injure the substance of the right to
education nor conflict with other rights enshrined in the Convention.’319
Thereafter, the ECtHR, on multiple occasions, referred to the Belgian Linguistic
Cases and emphasised that an essence existed at the very core of the right to
education with an inviolable character. In this regard, for example, in the cases
of Campbell and Cosans v. the United Kingdom320 and Mürsel Eren v.
Turkey,321 the Court asserted that the very nature of the right to education as a
fundamental right is that the ‘State must regulate access to educational facilities
and establishments.’
Moreover, in the cases of Golder v. the United Kingdom322 and Prince Hans-
Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany,323 while interpreting Article 6 of the
ECHR, the Court ruled that paragraph 1 of this Article encompasses the essential
element of the right to a fair trial. In other words, Article 6(1) of the ECHR,
containing the right to access an independent and impartial tribunal, is an
essential element inherent in the core of the right to a fair trial, without which
the latter right would not happen.324 This essential element originates from the
317 Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium” v.
Belgium (Merits), Application Nos 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64, European
Court of Human Rights, Judgement of Plenary Court (23 July 1968), referred to as ‘the Belgian
Linguistic Cases’.
318 Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium” v.
Belgium (Merits), Application Nos 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64, European
Court of Human Rights, Judgement of Plenary Court (23 July 1968), p. 28, paras 4 and 5 under
Subsection I.B. on the Meaning and Scope of Article 2 pf the Protocol No. 1.
319 Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium” v.
Belgium (Merits), Application Nos 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64, European
Court of Human Rights, Judgement of Plenary Court (23 July 1968), p. 28, paras 4 and 5.
320 Campbell and Cosans v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 7511/76; 7743/76, European Court of
Human Rights, Chamber Judgement (25 February 1982), paras 93-41.
321 Mürsel Eren v. Turkey, Application No. 60856/00, European Court of Human Rights, Final
Judgement of the Second Section of the Court (7 February 2006), para. 44.
322 Golder v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 4451/70, European Court of Human Rights,
Judgement of the Plenary Court (21 February 1975), paras 28-40.
323 Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany, Application No. 42527/98, European Court of
Human Rights, Grand Chamber Judgement (12 July 2001), paras 43-45.
324 Golder v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 4451/70, European Court of Human Rights,
Judgement of the Plenary Court (21 February 1975), paras 28-40. Also, see: Prince Hans-Adam II of
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prohibition of the denial of justice as a well-established and widely recognised
principle of law.325
Similar to the ECHR, the text of another important human rights treaty, which
is silent on the existence of an essence in human rights, is the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ‘1966 ICCPR’). However, within its
interpretative capacity, the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) in its General
Comment No. 27 has clearly referred to the ‘existence of an essence in human
rights.’ Especially with regard to interpreting the permissible grounds for
restricting the right to freedom of movement as stipulated under Article 12(3) of
the 1966 ICCPR, the Committee asserts that ‘States should always be guided by
the principle that the restrictions must not impair the essence of the right.’326
By applying the idea of the existence of an essence in fundamental rights and
the ‘essence test’ to the subject under study in this dissertation, the relevant
question is what exactly the essence or inviolable elements at the core of the
right to seek asylum are, considering the fact that this right is as fundamental
right in the EU. Based on the analysis I sketched in the previous pages of this
section on the conceptual and doctrinal elements of the right to seek asylum
(Subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.1), the essence at the core of the right to seek asylum
lays in two main elements. The first essential element is that asylum seekers
should be able to enter the territory of EU States to access the RSD procedures
and an individual assessment of their asylum claims. Hence, no EU State can
categorically prevent a group of people from entering or accessing its territory
for seeking asylum based on a discriminatory ground such as religion, colour,
race, ethnicity, etc. As Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention is an exclusion
clause and an exception to the general rule, in practice, this article should be
interpreted and used in a very limited, reserved, and restricted manner.327 Based
on this essential element, the mass expulsion of asylum seekers is also
Liechtenstein v. Germany, Application No. 42527/98, European Court of Human Rights, Grand
Chamber Judgement (12 July 2001), paras 43-45.
325 Golder v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 4451/70, European Court of Human Rights,
Judgement of the Plenary Court (21 February 1975), paras 28-40. Also, see: Prince Hans-Adam II of
Liechtenstein v. Germany, Application No. 42527/98, European Court of Human Rights, Grand
Chamber Judgement (12 July 2001), paras 43-45.
326 The ICCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), adopted at the Sixty-
seventh session of the Human Rights Committee, on 2 November 1999, UN Doc. No.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, para. 13.
327 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, submitted in accordance with
General Assembly resolution 62/159 and Human Rights Council resolution 6/28, adopted by the
General Assembly at its 62nd session on 15 August 2007, UN doc. A/62/263, paras. 65-69.
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prohibited, because this practice prevents the individual assessment of asylum
cases.
The second essential element of the right to seek asylum is the principle of
non-refoulement. Even more essential is the absolute and non-derogable
prohibition of refoulement to torture and other inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment known as a jus cogens norm of international law.328
No derogation from the two main essential cores of the right to seek asylum is
allowed even in situations of emergency such as a threat of major terrorist
attack. The right to seek asylum being a not-absolute human right does not
automatically mean that every aspect of this right could be limited. The essential
elements of this right – meaning entering the territory for the EU to access the
asylum procedure and the prohibition of non-refoulement – are the absolute
and non-derogable parts of the right to seek asylum, derogation from which even
in times of emergency is not allowed. As the jurisprudence of the ECHR has
shown, the ultimate aim of a legal system of human rights protection is to
‘protect rights, which are not theoretical or illusory, but real and effective.’329
Therefore, realising the inviolable and essential elements of the right to seek
asylum makes this right a real and meaningful human right in practice in the
EU.
However, by looking at the current state practices in the EU, we could observe
that this is not the case in reality. The security concerns of the EU and its
Member States have curtailed the realisation of right to seek asylum as a
fundamental right. Making immigration a major security issue in the EU has led
to laws, policies, and practices, which prevent asylum seekers from entering the
EU territory or accessing asylum procedures. To name some of these practices,
I could refer to the interception of boats carrying immigrants on the high seas,
the collective expulsion of immigrants, and other non-arrival or non-entrée
policies. In the past few years in the aftermath of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in
328 For definition of jus cogens, see: Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties (the
’VCLT’). For more information on the jus cogens norms, being at the core and above all of the sources
of international law, see: Martin Scheinin and Mathias Vermeulen, ‘Unilateral Exceptions to
International Law: Systematic Legal Analysis and Critique of Doctrines that Seek to Deny or Reduce the
Applicability of Human Rights Norms in the Fight Against Terrorism’, in Menno T. Kamminga (ed.),
Challenges in International Human Rights Law (Vol. 3, London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 155-206.
329 In this regard, see: Airey v. Ireland, Application No. 6289/73, European Court of Human Rights,
Chamber Judgment (9 October 1979), para. 24. In this regard, also see: Soering v. United Kingdom,
Application No. 14038/88, European Court of Human Rights, Plenary Decision (07 July 1989), para.
87. And, see: Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany, Application No. 42527/98, European
Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber Judgement (12 July 2001), para. 45. Also, see: Gäfgen v.
Germany, Application No. 22978/05, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber Decision (1
June 2010), para. 123. Also, see: Murray v. The Netherlands, Application No. 10511/10, European Court
of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Decision (26 April 2016), para. 104.
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Europe, promoting policies leading to the externalisation of EU borders and
preventing asylum seekers from entering the EU territory, the number of cases
for people entering the consular premises of different European countries and
asking for visas for the purpose of seeking asylum has increased.330 However,
the unwillingness of EU Member States in issuing humanitarian visas and the
prevention of the departure of asylum seekers through agreements with non-EU
countries (such as agreements signed with Turkey and Libya) have shown that
the two essential elements of the right to seek asylum are undermined.
Therefore, the focus in this dissertation is on analysing how the security
concerns of the EU affects the two essential elements of the right to seek asylum.
In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I will scrutinise the implications of bringing security
concerns into immigration policies on the core elements of the right to seek
asylum, meaning on the right to access the RSD procedures in the EU and the
protection of the principle of non-refoulement, especially expulsion to torture
and other forms of ill-treatment. The next chapter discusses the theory of
securitisation of immigration, in order to build the theoretical framework for
addressing the main research question in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
2.4. CONCLUSION
In Chapter 2, first, I defined the term asylum and presented a short introduction
to the history of the practice of asylum seeking. Thereafter, I gave an analytical
account on the theories and philosophical foundations, upon which the modern
international regime of refugee protection and the right to seek asylum as a
normative human right are constructed.
The term asylum is a Latin word, with the Greek origin of ‘asylon,’ translated to
‘freedom from seizure.’ The history of asylum seeking is as old as human life on
Earth. It has existed since the time our ancestors protected themselves and their
loved ones from the adversaries of nature and other humans by finding
sanctuary. With the development of civilisations, the practice of asylum turned
into a religious-societal institution very much bound to holy places such as
temples, churches, monasteries, and other religious avenues. That is why this
kind of asylum is known as ‘territorial asylum.’ For example, in Ancient Greece,
the temples in the city-states granted asylum to those criminals who were to be
punished and to slaves escaping their masters. This practice emerged from the
idea that the absolute power of law needed mitigation by the interference of the
330 Amongst all, the recent cases such as the cases of X and X v. Belgium (from the CJEU) and N.D. and
N.T. v. Spain (from the ECtHR) are of most direct interest to the topic of my thesis. In this regard, see:
X and X v. Belgium, C 638/16 PPU, Court of Justice of the European Union, Grand Chamber, Decision
(7 March 2017). Also, see: N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European
Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Decision (13 February 2020).
83
fear of divinity. In contrast, the Roman Empire used the generous practice of
asylum offered by the Greeks to dominate Greek city-states. Once established in
Greece, the Romans imposed restrictions on asylum and showed no mercy to
those breaking Roman laws.
By the time that the Ancient Roman Empire had collapsed and Christianity
emerged in Europe, the church became a place of asylum and the priest was the
authority behind allowing asylum. This gave a more personalised character to
the institution of asylum during the Middle Ages. With this vast ecclesiastical
power over the institution of asylum in Europe, those who opposed asylum by
introducing obstacles to the practice of asylum seeking, were condemned by the
church and excommunicated by bishops. The European emperors were not,
indeed, satisfied that the church and the bishops had full control over social
institutions and practices such as asylum seeking. This battle of power between
emperors and the church continued until the eleventh and twelfth centuries,
when the canon and ecclesiastical law of asylum underwent drastic reform
similar to other legal and social institutions.
At the end of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries and with the formation
of nation-states in Europe, the institution of asylum departed more and more
from its divine character towards a more secular one.  By the rise of the
Reformation and advancement of Protestantism, the power of the church in
handling criminal justice matters significantly reduced. The newly formed civil
authorities claimed full power over serving justice and decided to secularise the
institution of asylum from the divine power. European kings, one after another,
started to erode and dismantle the institution of asylum within the territories
under their ruling.
The ancestors of international law, Grotius, Wolff, and de Vattel all agreed upon
a ‘natural law’ regarding asylum. However, each reserved different levels of
importance for protecting the national security and public safety of host society.
Perhaps these are the first documents within the intellectual history of law that
discussed the concept of ‘security’ in relation to asylum.
As opposed to the term asylum and the practice of asylum seeking, the term
‘refugee’ is a modern concept and the result of the creation of nation-states in
Europe. The word ‘refugee’ originating from ‘réfugié’ appeared for the first time
in history in the official documents of 1685 by referring to the Protestant
Huguenots, who were persecuted under the ruling of King Louis XIV of France.
Being in the same religious and political line as Huguenots, Prussia opened its
territory to them and benefited from their labour in rebuilding the kingdom. The
practice of seeking asylum became so political that by the end of the eighteenth
century, kingdoms hardly allowed fugitives to settle in their territories. This
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situation created a need for signing agreements on the extradition of criminals,
in which some exceptions for those persecuted because of political convictions
were recognised. Therefore, by the early nineteenth century, no territorial
asylum, nor asylum for those who had committed non-political crimes, existed
in Europe. Instead, a new form of asylum named ‘political asylum’ came to the
picture.
After the 1789 French Revolution, the need to protect those fleeing political
oppression became a legal institution in the post-Revolutionary French
Constitution of 1793. This is the first time that the concept of political asylum
became a rule of positive law as a constitutional right. The political environment
in post-Revolution France and the Napoleonic Wars encouraged states to create
laws for imposing controls on territorial borders. The backlash of this new
system of border control became evident during WWI and its aftermath with the
displacement of Russians, Armenians, and Greeks, who had to flee persecution
in their countries of origin. A new class of people wandered in the World with
no blonging to anywhere. This is how human history created ‘statelessness.’ The
suffocating political atmosphere during the interwar period made it impossible
to find a solution to the ‘problem’ of refugees. However, Nansen, against all the
odds, managed to reconcile the interests of the main powers of the World at that
time with the interests of those displaced, and created an identity and travel
document called the ‘Nansen Passport.’ The holder of this document had the
right to travel, enter, and reside in fifty countries.
Nansen hoped that the darkness of WWI had taught humanity the lesson that
there should be no more war. Regrettably, he was much mistaken. The Second
World War and the series of wars that have since followed have demonstrated
that there is seemingly no end to the greed and brutality of humankind. The
international community reacted to the human suffering caused by WWII by
establishing the UN, hoping that this entity would comprise the building blocks
necessary for World peace, prosperity, and security. When it comes to the
‘problem’ of refugees, the 1948 UDHR, the 1951 Refugee Convention, and its
1967 Protocol are the pillars of an international regime of refugee protection.
However, the principle upon which this legacy is constructed contains an
inherent bias, i.e. the principle of state sovereignty. This principle infiltrates the
concept of ‘national security’ into the realm of the right to seek asylum.
However, by analysing the composing conceptual and doctrinal elements of the
right to seek asylum through the lenses of the Hohfeldian and Alexy’s theory of
rights, I concluded that no security concern as such is a reasonable justification
to prevent those in need of protection from accessing asylum procedures. The
reason for this claim is that the right to seek asylum – similar to other
fundamental rights – holds an essential and inviolable core, which allows
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absolutely no derogation. The elements of first entering EU territory for
accessing the RSD procedures, and second the prohibition of non-refoulement
are the two essential elements of this inviolable core, located at the very heart of
the right to seek asylum, without which this right would not crystallise as a real
and effective basic and fundamental human right.
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3. THE SECURITISATION OF IMMIGRATION AND
THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM: A MATTER OF
LAW OR POLICY?
3.1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to elaborate on the theory of the securitisation of
immigration for discovering and analysing the implications of this theory on the
right to seek asylum in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. In order to understand the theory
of securitisation, it is pertinent first to have a picture of the concept of security
itself. Accordingly, I start Section 3.2 of this chapter by defining the concept of
security and its derivatives (Subsection 3.2.1). The effort to define the term
‘security’ will set the scene for understanding the theory of securitisation in
general and the application of this theory to the issue of immigration,
particularly. To define the term ‘security,’ I need to provide an account on the
ontology and epistemology of this term. This means that I should first explore
how the knowledge about the concept of security is produced and studied. This
study brings an interdisciplinary character to my research, since the concept of
security is the subject of exploration mainly in the school of security studies and
several of its sub-branches, all of which fall under political science.
Thereafter, in Subsection 3.2.2, based on the evolution of the concept of security
through time – especially after the end of the Cold War era – I introduce the
formation and the creation of the theory of securitisation within the sub
discipline of Security Studies as a branch of International Relations (IR). At the
end of this section, I will provide one of the most exhaustive definitions available
on securitisation (given by Balzacq), and elaborate on this theory as a process of
‘speech-act.’ This section provides the knowledge background required to
introduce the securitisation of immigration and unravel the tangled relationship
between terrorism and asylum seeking.
Section 3.3 of this chapter contains two subsections. Subsection 3.3.1 addresses
the clash between the so-called ‘war on terror’ and the right to seek asylum, by
focusing on the fact that not all types of immigration are securitised by the EU
or its Member States. In this subsection, I argue that it would be a fallacy to
deduce a causal link between terrorism and asylum seeking or between terrorists
and asylum seekers. However, the reality of policies and practices at EU external
borders tells a very different story, which directs us to the analysis of Subsection
3.3.2 on implementing the right to seek asylum in a highly securitised
environment. In this part, by investigating the approaches of the three key
stakeholders of immigration – meaning the EU Member States, human rights
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organisations, and the European Courts – I demonstrate that the realisation of
the right to seek asylum in a securitised environment faces many significant
challenges. While EU States deal with the issue of asylum as a purely matter of
politics, human rights defenders (such as the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Special Rapporteur on Human
Rights and Counter-Terrorism) take a completely opposite path. The Reports of
these UN mandate holders illustrate how the securitisation of immigration
results in violating the well-established norms of international and regional
human rights law – amongst them most importantly the principles of non-
discrimination and non-refoulement.
The third approach is where the jurisprudence of European human rights courts
stand, which is extremely unclear and confusing. Sometimes the
implementation of the right to seek asylum becomes a matter of law, and on
occasion, its infringement is justified as a matter of policy. In this part of Chapter
3, I introduce the theory of ‘legal interpretivism’ formulated by the
contemporary legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin and his theory of ‘law as
integrity.’ According to Dworkin’s theoretical framework, while deciding on
‘hard cases,’ the institution of constitutional rights, which is a matter of law,
rests on the powerful principles of ‘human dignity’ and ‘political equality.’
Therefore, there is a grave ‘injustice’ if matters of social policy or administrative
efficiency impedes the proper procedural practices for realising those rights.
This theory is very well applicable to the realisation of the right to seek asylum
in the EU as a fundamental right. Once immigration is securitised, the normal
balancing exercise between different rights or between rights and policies would
no longer function. Under this scenario, authorities could easily justify the
infringement of individual fundamental and constitutional rights through the
label of ‘emergency’ and the necessity for ‘extraordinary measures.’
At the end of Chapter 3, I seek a critical outlook against the securitisation of
immigration by using the analytical tools available in the field of critical security
studies. According to the critical school of security studies, we should move
beyond the ‘speech-act’ processes of securitisation to be able to analyse the
implications of this process on human rights discourse. Therefore, at the end of
Chapter 3, I prepare the scene for analysing the implications of the securitisation
of immigration in the EU on the right to seek asylum in the remaining chapters
of this dissertation.
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3.2. THE THEORY OF SECURITISATION
3.2.1. SETTING THE SCENE BY ELABORATING ON THE CONCEPT OF
SECURITY
There is no exaggeration in claiming that the concept of security, as an abstract
concept, is one of the vaguest and most controversial notions in the current
system of human knowledge.331 Referring to the contemporary political scientist
James Der Derian, indeed, no other concept within the social sciences ‘packs the
metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of “security”.’332 One
way of explaining the vagueness of this concept and difficulty in defining it is
through Russell’s theoretical framework on human knowledge. The British
philosopher Bertrand Russell,333 writing in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, asserted that all our knowledge of events and objects
‘radiates from a space-time centre, which is the little region that we are
occupying at the moments.’334 Applying Russell’s idea of knowledge to the
concept of security, the reason for the complexity in defining this term is that
security – similar to other abstract concepts – is highly susceptible to the ‘spatio-
temporal’ aspects of human perception.335 In other words, the meaning of
security very much depends on who is defining it, whose security exactly we
are talking about, and within which temporal and spatial contexts the
definition is taking place, i.e. when and where we are defining security.
Consequently, before we could even successfully define security, it is pertinent
to unpack the epistemological and ontological aspects of this concept.336
Within the fields of science, the study, analysis, and understanding of the
concept of security and it derivatives is the subject of ‘security studies.’ Security
331 Alan Collins, ‘Introduction: What is Security Studies?’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security
Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 1-10, p. 1.
332 James Der Derian, Critical Practices in International Theory: Selected Essays (Oxford; New York:
Routledge, 2009), pp. 149-151. In this regard, also see: James Der Derian, ‘The Value of Security:
Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard’, in David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds), The Political
Subject of Violence (Manchester, UK; New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 94-113, pp.
94-97.
333 Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872-1970) was a British philosopher, logician, and social critic,
best known for his work in mathematical logic, analytic philosophy, and the theory of knowledge. In this
regard, see: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘Bertrand Russell’,
<plato.stanford.edu/entries/russell/>.
334 Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (Oxford; New York: Routledge 2009), p.
19.
335 Ibid, pp. 18 and 19.
336 James Der Derian, Critical Practices in International Theory: Selected Essays (Oxford; New York:
Routledge, 2009), p. 149. In this regard, also see: James Der Derian, ‘The Value of Security: Hobbes,
Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard’, in David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds), The Political Subject of
Violence (Manchester, UK; New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 94-113, p. 95.
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studies falls under the field of ‘International Relations (IR).’337 To be more
precise in the epistemological understanding of the concept of security, we
should first differentiate between ‘International Relations’ or ‘IR’ in upper case
and ‘international relations’ in lower case. The former is a scientific sub-
discipline within the social sciences, which studies the latter. The subject matter
of international relations is the relationship between the World actors. In this
dissertation, I use the abbreviation ‘IR’ to refer to International Relations as an
academic field within political and social sciences.338
The discipline of IR is a by-product of WWI in the early twentieth century.339
Because of this war, in 1919, an urgent need and sheer desperation to prevent
another war of such a huge scale resulted in the establishment of the
Department of International Politics340 at the University of Wales in
Aberystwyth (known today as ‘Aberystwyth University’).341 The scholars of
social and political sciences based at Aberystwyth created this new discipline to
study and understand the causes of war and to find possible solutions to prevent
it from happening again.342 The discipline of IR – although being related – is
distinct from other disciplines within the social sciences such as history,
economics, geography, and international law. IR as an academic sub discipline
is ‘the study of politics, economics, and law at a global level with a special
emphasis on preventing wars and promoting the World peace and security.’343
Therefore, it directly concerns the relationships between those legal and
337 Richard Devetak, ‘Introduction: The Origins and Changing Agendas of International Relations’, in
Richard Devetak, Jim George, and Sarah Percy (eds), An Introduction to International Relations (3rd
edn, Singapore: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 1-22, p. 4.
338 Richard Devetak, ‘Introduction: The Origins and Changing Agendas of International Relations’, in
Richard Devetak, Jim George, and Sarah Percy (eds), An Introduction to International Relations (3rd
edn, Singapore: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 1-22.
339 Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, ‘Introduction’, in Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard
Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Terry Nardin, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True (eds),
Theories of International Relations (5th edn, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 2013), pp. 1-31, p. 5.
340 International politics is the same as international relations. For more information in this regard, see:
Richard Devetak, ‘Introduction: The Origins and Changing Agendas of International Relations’, in
Richard Devetak, Jim George, and Sarah Percy (eds), An Introduction to International Relations (3rd
edn, Singapore: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 1-22, p. 4.
341 Alan Collins, ‘Introduction: What is Security Studies?’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security
Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 1-10, p. 1. In this regard, see: Patricia
Owens, John Baylis, and Steve Smith, ‘Introduction: From International Politics to World Politics’, in
John Baylis, Patricia Owens, and Steve Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics: An
Introduction to International Relations (7th edn, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 1-15.
342 Patricia Owens, John Baylis, and Steve Smith, ‘Introduction: From International Politics to World
Politics’, in John Baylis, Patricia Owens, and Steve Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics: An
Introduction to International Relations (7th edn, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 1-15.
343 Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, ‘Introduction’, in Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard
Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Terry Nardin, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True (eds),
Theories of International Relations (5th edn, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 2013), pp. 1-31.
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political entities in the World, which have a capacity to function at a global level
and beyond national borders. These entities are:
· Sovereign states;
· Inter-governmental organisations (IGOs);
· International non-governmental organisations (INGOs);
· Non-governmental organisations (NGOs);
· Multi-national corporations.344
As mentioned above, the primary goal of IR is to understand wars and to prevent
them through solutions offered by knowledge-based analyses. Therefore, it is
accurate to claim that the concept of security is located at the very heart of IR
studies. The sub-branch of IR, which studies the concept of security, its
derivatives, and implications, is called ‘security studies.’ Security, as the main
subject in security studies, is a matter of ‘high politics.’345 This means that the
very existence and survival of the agents of World politics (mentioned above)
depend upon the debates and properties constructed around the concept and
the state of security. Security studies have always been concerned with war and
primarily with the ways, we could prevent it, and if its outbreak is inevitable,
how we could possibly limit and control the negative impacts of war on humans.
Therefore, the second focus of security studies is human rights project, i.e. how
to prevent atrocities such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, slavery, torture, and other gross forms of human rights
violations, which could more easily take place during wars. These mass and
gross violations of human rights are more prone to happen in war situations,
because during wars the ‘state of emergency’ prevails over the application of
human rights norms. However, what we should not ignore in this context is that
some human rights rules are absolute in nature and no derogation from them is
allowed even during public emergencies or wars.346
After allocating the epistemology of security within the social sciences, it is time
to address the ontology of this concept for better understanding it. Although
security – as an utterly abstract concept – is incredibly contested and vague,
most scholars of security studies have reached some consensus on one single
344 Patricia Owens, John Baylis, and Steve Smith, ‘Introduction: From International Politics to World
Politics’, in John Baylis, Patricia Owens, and Steve Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics: An
Introduction to International Relations (7th edn, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 1-15.
345 Alan Collins, ‘Introduction: What is Security Studies?’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security
Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 1-10.
346 Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, ‘Between Utopia and Reality: The Practical Discourses of
International Relations’, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds), The Oxford Handbook of
International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 3-37, pp. 16 and 17.
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main element, which eventually constitutes the totality of this concept.347 The
consensus is over the term ‘threat.’348 As mentioned earlier, the reason for the
creation of IR and thereafter security studies was the ‘fear of war’ or to be more
precise, the ‘fear of the threat of war;’ hence, the terms ‘threat’ and the ‘fear of
threat’ are located at the centre of defining security.349 No matter who defines
security or whose security, when, and where we are talking about, all that we
could at the end agree on is that security represents the ‘absence of a threat.’ In
other words, security is simply the ‘lack’ or ‘non-existence of a threat.’350
During the interwar period and WWII, the concept of security primarily
intertwined with the threat of war between powerful States of the time, namely
Germany, the US, the UK, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China.351 However, by
the start of the Cold War immediately in the aftermath of WWII,352 security
studies focused on direct inter-state armed conflicts mainly between the US (the
West) and the Soviet Union (the East).353 Hence, traditionally only states were
the ‘referent objects of security’ – meaning that states were the only entities that
their existence was threatened by the military invasion of another state.
Therefore, the issue of inter-state war became equivalent to the national security
of states.354
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 closed the chapter of the Cold War
in history and to some degree, the nuclear arms race between the Western and
Eastern superpowers in World politics. Since the end of the Cold War in the early
1990s,355 threats against national security cover a much wider range of issues
347 For a more detailed account on different approaches to the concept of security and consequently
varied definitions of security, see: Anthony D. Burke, ‘Security’, in Richard Devetak, Jim George, and
Sarah Percy (eds), An Introduction to International Relations (3rd edn, Singapore: Cambridge
University Press, 2017), pp. 198-209.
348 Alan Collins, ‘Introduction: What is Security Studies?’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security
Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 1-10, p. 2.
349 Diane A. Desierto, Necessity and National Emergency Clauses: Sovereignty in Modern Treaty
Interpretation (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), pp. 146-148.
350 Alan Collins, ‘Introduction: What is Security Studies?’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security
Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 1-10, p. 3.
351 Richard James Overy, The Inter-war Crisis 1919-1939 (2nd edn, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited,
2007), pp. 76-93.
352 The Cold War lasted for about half a century (1947-1991), ending with the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in 1991. In this regard, see: Peter Kenez, A history of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the
End (2nd edn, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 261-291.
353 The security during the Cold War is the subject of another sub-branch of security, i.e. ‘strategic
studies.’ For more information, see: John Baylis and James J. Wirtz, ‘Introduction’, John Baylis, James
J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray (eds), Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic
Studies (5th edn, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 1-14.
354 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 26.
355 The current era we are living in now is the ‘post-Cold War era.’ In this regard, see: Kjell Goldmann,
Ulf Hannerz, and Charles Westin, ‘Introduction: Nationalism and Internationalism in the Post-Cold War
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including public health emergencies,356 environmental degradation, the threat
of terrorism and wars waged by non-state actors, the threats of transnational
organised crimes such as drug smuggling, human trafficking, and even the
irregular movement of populations.357 In the light of these rapid changes, new
referent objects of security – besides sovereign states – have emerged in World
politics.
In addition, the importance of the human rights discourse in the aftermath of
WWII has made individuals an active and influential agent in international
relations and a new subject of international law.358 The development of modern
technologies and their influence on media and telecommunication techniques
have made various domestic players such as grassroots movements and civil
society actors more relevant than ever and no longer simply a matter of internal
politics.359 To quote Alan Collins in this regard, ‘[t]he process of globalization
has led to internal issues becoming externalized and external issues being
internalized.’360 In the highly connected World we live in today, we should
always remember that the slightest change in one part of the World has
immense, unpredictable impact on the other parts. For example, the ongoing
proxy wars in the Middle East and the civil war in Syria, amongst much unrest
in other parts of the region, is no longer just the matter of the security of one
state. On the contrary, the security of one referent object may result in the
insecurity of another.
Against this background information, by bringing new subjects such as society,
identity, individuals, public health, and the environment, besides the sovereign
Era’, in Kjell Goldmann, Ulf Hannerz, and Charles Westin (eds), Nationalism and Internationalism in
the Post-Cold War Era (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 1-20, pp. 1-3.
356 For the global public health emergencies during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, we could
name HIV/AIDS, Ebola, influenza A (A/H1N1), SARS, and COVID-19. For more information, see: The
World Health Organisation (WHO), ‘Pandemic influenza’, <www.euro.who.int/en/health-
topics/communicable-diseases/influenza/pandemic-influenza>. Also, see: The World Health
Organisation (WHO), ‘Past Pandemics’, <https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/communicable-
diseases/influenza/pandemic-influenza/past-pandemics>. For more information on the pandemics as
an issue of security and on the nexus between ‘health’ and ‘security,’ see: Stefan Elbe, ‘Health and
Security’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2019), pp. 379-392. And: Brigit Toebes, ‘Human Rights and Public Health: Towards a Balanced
Relationship’, in Myriam Feinberg, Laura Niada-Avshalom, and Brigit Toebes (eds), National Security,
Public Health: Exceptions to Human Rights? (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 106-122.
357 Alan Collins, ‘Introduction: What is Security Studies?’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security
Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 1-10, pp. 1, 2, and 8-10.
358 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2019), p. 111.
359 Ronald R. Krebs, ‘The Politics of National Security’, in Alexandra Gheciu and William C. Wohlforth
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp.
259-273.
360 Alan Collins, ‘Introduction: What is Security Studies?’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security
Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 1-10, p. 2.
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nation-states, as the referent objects of security, the traditional theories of
security studies are no longer sufficient in analysing the newly emerged security
issues. There are two traditional IR theories that offer opposing conceptual
frameworks for understanding security: ‘realism’ and ‘neorealism,’ on the one
hand, and ‘liberalism’ and ‘neoliberalism,’ on the other.361 Since the end of the
Cold War, as opposed to the traditional theories, new conceptual frameworks
have emerged to study security. The IR theory of securitisation is one such
example of non-traditional approaches to studying security.362
The theory of securitisation is the intellectual product of two decades of research
and academic work at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute in Copenhagen
– also known as the ‘Copenhagen School’ in IR.363 The scholarly work of some
IR theorists – amongst them most importantly Barry Buzan and his colleagues
Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde – created this theory. In the first edition of his
book published in 1983 on the subject of national security, Buzan asserted that
‘the concept of national security was an underdeveloped concept,’ which
required expansion ‘beyond military considerations and [should] encompass
non-military sectors such as political, social, economic, and environmental
security.’364 In 1998, Buzan and his colleagues further developed this theory by
361 With regard to the use of these two IR theories in security studies, see the following chapters,
respectively. Charles Louis Glaser, ‘Realism’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies (5th
edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 13-29, and Patrick Morgan, ‘Liberalism and Liberal
Internationalism’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019), pp. 30-46.
362 The list of non-traditional IR theories used in security studies is long. However, amongst them, the
most important ones include ‘constructivism,’ ‘post-structuralism,’ ‘post-colonialism,’ ‘gender security
studies and feminism,’ ‘securitisation theory,’ ‘human security,’ and ‘critical security studies.’ With
regard to the ‘constructivism’ approach to security, see: Christine Agius, ‘Social Constructivism’, in Alan
Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 74-
90. On a ‘post-structural’ outlook to security, see: J. Marshall Beier, ‘Poststructural Insights: Making
Subjects and Objects of Security’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies (5th edn, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 111-125. For the ‘post-colonial’ reading of security, see: Mark Laffey
and Suthaharan Nadarajah, ‘Postcolonialism’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies (5th
edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 126-143. For a feminist and gender-based approach to
security, see: Caroline Kennedy and Sophia Dingli, ‘Gender and Security’, in Alan Collins (ed.),
Contemporary Security Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 159-172. On
‘securitisation theory,’ see: Ralf Emmers, ‘Securitization’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security
Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 173-187. On ‘human security’ approach to
security, see: Randolph B. Persaud, ‘Human Security’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security
Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 144-158. On ‘critical security studies,’ see:
David Mutimer, ‘Critical Security Studies: A Schismatic History’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary
Security Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 91-110.
363 The Conflict and Peace Research Institute is now at the Danish Institute for International Studies.
The main goal of the Danish research institute is to conduct multidisciplinary research on peace and
security. For more information, see: The Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), ‘About DIIS’,
<diis.dk/en/about-diis/the-institute/about-diis>.
364 Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations
(Hemel Hempstead: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1983), pp. 1-8.
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publishing their most important scholarly work on the theory of securitisation
entitled, ‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis.’365 The main premise of this
work is that the ‘language’ and ‘tool’ of security could tackle any issue in today’s
World.
Some IR scholars, however, have warned against the intellectual and political
dangers posed by the theory of securitisation and over-securitising a wider range
of issues.366 For example, according to Walt, viewing non-military issues as
threats to security, ‘would destroy the intellectual coherence of the field [of
security studies] and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of […]
important problems such as pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic
recession.’367
In 2011, the political scientist Thierry Braspenning-Balzacq elaborated further
on the theory of securitisation that this school of thought was not an original
theory standing alone on its own feet. According to Balzacq, securitisation is a
theory constructed through borrowing many bricks of thoughts from other non-
traditional IR theories such as ‘constructivism,’ ‘post-structuralism,’ and the
‘critical security theory.’368 Therefore, anything could become a security
problem through ‘social constructivism’ and ‘discursive politics.’369 To
paraphrase Balzacq, we as a community choose to deal with some social
phenomena in a particular way; we name something a security problem and
once we have done so, our attitude towards that issue or our way of interaction
with it changes from a societal or political matter to a security issue.
The process of changing public opinion and the behaviour of actors after calling
a subject a security threat is ‘speech-act.’370 The basic idea behind ‘speech-act’ is
that certain statements have the power of describing things or events without
the intention of judging them being false or true. What is meant exactly by
365 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder,
Colorado; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).
366 Ibid, pp. 1-20. Also, see: Didier Bigo, ‘Liberty, Whose Liberty? The Hague Programme and the
Conception of Freedom’, in Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera (eds), Security Versus Freedom? A
Challenge for Europe’s Future (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 35-44.
367 Stephen Martin Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’ (1991) 35(2) International Studies
Quarterly, pp. 211-239, p. 213.
368 Thierry Balzacq, ‘A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants’, in Thierry
Balzacq (ed.), Securitisation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London; New
York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 1-30.
369 Ibid. On the importance of the use of language and discourse in security studies, see: David Campbell,
Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1992), pp. 2-23.
370 Thierry Balzacq, ‘A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants’, in Thierry
Balzacq (ed.), Securitisation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London; New
York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 1-30. Also see: Ralf Emmers, ‘Securitization’, in Alan Collins (ed.),
Contemporary Security Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 173-187.
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‘speech-act’ is that within the process of securitisation, the securitising actors
convince a particular audience through using ‘assertive language’ and
‘discursive politics,’ and certain practices – or even both – that ‘something’
poses an ‘existential threat to the safety and security’ of that particular audience
– either physical safety or economic, ideological, societal, or identity security.371
The former act of securitisation is known as the ‘philosophical securitisation,’
since it uses the tool of language and is based on the philosophy of semiotics,
while the latter is called the ‘sociological securitisation,’ as the agent or actor of
securitisation performs certain ‘habitus’ or acts.372 The habitus are the practices
of the securitising actors as results of power games within a certain societal
context.373 To sum up this process, the definition of securitisation that Balzacq
has offered seems to be an exhaustive one:
[Securitisation is] an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic
artefacts [such as] (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies,
stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who
works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings,
sensations, thoughts, and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent
object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by
investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening
complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its
development.374
According to this definition, by the end of the securitisation process, the ‘subject’
has already elevated its position from being on the political agenda to the
security agenda of the state.375 In order to sustain the status of securitisation,
the securitising speech-act should repeat or even intensify through time;
otherwise, the matter under question might de-securitise and return to the level
of politicisation or even non-politicisation.
In addition, as the above-mentioned definition of Balzacq suggests,
securitisation is the politics of ‘exceptionalism.’ This means that under
371 Thierry Balzacq, ‘A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants’, in Thierry
Balzacq (ed.), Securitisation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London; New
York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 1-30, pp. 1 and 2.
372 Ibid, pp. 1-4.
373 Ralf Emmers, ‘Securitization’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies (5th edn, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 173-187, p. 176. In this regard, also see: Thierry Balzacq, ‘A Theory
of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants’, in Thierry Balzacq (ed.), Securitisation
Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 1-30,
pp. 2 and 3.
374 Thierry Balzacq, ‘A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants’, in Thierry
Balzacq (ed.), Securitisation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London; New
York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 1-30, p. 3.
375 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder,
Colorado; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 23. In this regard, also see: Ralf Emmers,
‘Securitization’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019), pp. 173-187, p. 175.
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exceptional circumstances, we could easily justify the use of extraordinary
measures, which we would not employ in regular politics. A step further, if we
employ harder security measures such as military forces or the use of violence
to handle securitised issues, we are militarising the matter. At this stage, we have
entered into an ultra-level of panic, which I would term the ‘politics of paranoia.’
The final chapter of this dissertation elaborates further on the justifications for
using extraordinary and extra-legal measures in controlling the EU external
borders in the name of the ‘state-of-exception’ or the ‘state-of-emergency.’
Figure 2 below visualises the processes of securitisation and ultra-securitisation
(or militarisation) and vice versa.
Figure 2. The securitisation and de-securitisation processes.
3.2.2. WAR ON TERROR AND THE SECURITISATION OF IMMIGRATION
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
After learning about the concept of security and its categorisations within the
epistemological field, and by understanding the theory of securitisation in
general, it is time to return to the main research question of this doctoral
dissertation and see how this background information helps answer that
question. The main research question in this thesis is what the implications of
securitisation of immigration are on the right to seek asylum. Before responding
this question (which comes in Chapters 4, 5, and 6), I need to elaborate further
on the theory of securitisation, particularly in relation to immigration.
In this dissertation, I shall address the securitisation of immigration only in the
EU. When we say that immigration is a security threat to the EU, regardless of
whether this statement is factually accurate or not, we have created an
existential narrative through which immigration endangers EU security. This








which could be addressed through normal political-legal means. On the
contrary, an exceptional situation prevails, which in order to solve requires the
employment of extraordinary measures that are not necessarily legal. To note,
the concept of national security within the context of EU foreign policy is known
as EU ‘internal security.’ Therefore, in this dissertation, I shall use the phrase
‘internal security’ when it comes to EU security and the phrase ‘national security’
when talking about the security of EU individual Member States.
The securitisation of immigration in Europe has not happened in a vacuum. The
formation of the attitude that immigration is a thereat to the security of the EU
is the outcome of multiple factors and incidents. The economic, social or
collective, and identity securities all have contributed to the speech-act, leading
to the portrayal of immigration as a threat to EU security.376 Amongst the
security concerns of the EU Member States for the past three decades, the threat
of terrorism and fears arising from that have leapt to the top of the agenda of EU
institutions and its Member States.377 Figure 3 illustrates the link between
immigration and security in a regulary political environment (non-securitised)
with the overlapping area being economic, social, identity, or physical securities.
In the case of this doctoral dissertation, I shall assume that this overlapping area
is terrorism and terrorist-related crimes.
Figure 3. The immigration-national security nexus.
The issue of immigration and security meeting each other at an intersection is
nothing new to the scholarship and the practices of states and decision-makers.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the issue of national security and the safety of host
society entered into discussion on asylum with the formation of nation-states
after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.378 Notwithstanding the fact that the trace of
the immigration and security nexus dates back to the mid-seventeenth century,
to view immigration through the prism of exclusively security is something
376 Audie Klotz, ‘Migration’, in Alexandra Gheciu and William C. Wohlforth (eds), The Oxford Handbook
of International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 442-456.
377 Sam Mullins, Jihadist Infiltration of Migrant Flows to Europe: Perpetrators, Modus Operandi and
Policy Implications (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland AG, 2019), pp. 1-18.
378 See: Subsection 2.2.2 of Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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new and a by-product of the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era that
we live in now, several unprecedented security issues have started to appear in
security studies, issues such as the human rights of individuals. In addition, a
novel outlook to security and the conceptualisation of different security
practices have begun to develop approaches such as the human security
approach.379
The domination of viewing immigration through the lenses of security
intensified further because of the 9/11 attacks and the international
counterterrorism policies following that.380 In fact, the international concern
over global terrorism has gone through significant shifts for the last two decades.
At the end of the Cold War and during the 1990s, although there was no
consensus about the definition of terrorism, states agreed on a distinct line
between international and domestic terrorism, with an emphasis on the general
idea that ‘one nation’s terrorists were another nation’s freedom fighters.’381
However, with 9/11 and the attacks that followed, the line dividing international
and domestic terrorism became more and more blurred.382 The fear arising from
the growth of Communism has been replaced with the fear of radical political
Islam spreading. As of today, the problem of radical Islamic terrorism has
become a global matter.383 The international coalition against Al-Qaeda and the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) testifies to this.
379 Jef Huysmans and Vicki Squire, ‘Migration and Security’, in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry
Balzacq (eds), Routledge Handbook of Security Studies (2nd edn, Oxford; New York: Routledge 2017),
pp. 161-171.
380 Ibid. Also, see: Anastassia Tsoukala, ‘Defining the Terrorist Threat in the Post-September 11 Era’, in
Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala (eds), Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal
Regimes after 9/11 (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 49-99, pp. 65-69. Also, see: Elspeth Guild,
‘Protection, Threat and Movement of Persons: Examining the Relationship of Terrorism and Migration
in EU Law after 11 September 2001’, in Francois Crepeau, Delphine Nakache, Michael Collyer, Nathaniel
H. Goetz, and Art Hansen (eds), Forced Migration and Global Processes: A View from Forced
Migration Studies (Lanham, Maryland; Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006), pp. 295-317, p. 295.
381 Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), p. 18. Also, See: Ashok Swain, Understanding Emerging Security Challenges:
Threats and Opportunities (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 2 and 3.
382 Christopher Rudolph, National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States
and Western Europe since 1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 1 and 2. Also, see:
Elspeth Guild, ‘Protection, Threat and Movement of Persons: Examining the Relationship of Terrorism
and Migration in EU Law after 11 September 2001’, in Francois Crepeau, Delphine Nakache, Michael
Collyer, Nathaniel H. Goetz, and Art Hansen (eds), Forced Migration and Global Processes: A View
from Forced Migration Studies (Lanham, Maryland; Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006), pp. 295-317.
Also, see: Gabriella Lazaridis, ‘Introduction’, in Gabriella Lazaridis (ed.), Security, Insecurity and
Migration in Europe (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 1-12.
383 Ashok Swain, Understanding Emerging Security Challenges: Threats and Opportunities (Oxford;
New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 3. In this regard, also see: Ali Al’amin Mazrui, ‘The Resurgence of Islam
and the Decline of Communism: What is the Connection?’ (1991) 23(3) Futures, pp. 273-288. Also, see:
Arolda Elbasani and Olivier Roy, ‘Islam in the Post-Communist Balkans: Alternative Pathways to God’
(2015) 15(4) Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, pp. 457-471.
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Since the 2015-2016 attacks in different European cities, the security
dimensions of terrorism – especially that of radical Islamic terrorism – have
become so bold that EU leaders swiftly have intensified their model of speech
and behaviour towards Muslim immigrants. This shift in language and
behaviour could be conceptualised under the theory of the securitisation of
immigration.384 To be more accurate, however, one should make distinction
between different categories of immigrants and point out that indeed not all
immigrants are perceived as threats to the security of EU. History has shown
that the European countries have been able to cope well with the large number
of immigrants, those having positive impact on the wealth and the growth of
capital within the single market area. In addition, immigrants with similar or
homogenous systems of values, identity, and religion as the host societies have
always been welcomed to Europe.385
On the contrary, the category of immigrants, defined as ‘forced migrants’ or
‘asylum seekers’, especially those coming from ‘majority-Muslim’ countries of
origin, are the subject referents of security and are deemed to bring terrorism
and crimes associated with that to the EU.386 The public opinion and the
institutional narrative of EU is that, in Member States with a larger number of
Muslim asylum seekers, a greater existential threat is present against the
survival of a secular polity. Moreover, there is a perception that Muslim
immigrants – particularly Muslim asylum seekers – threaten the homogeneity
of European identity, religion, class, ethnicity, and hence the coherent social
structure of the EU.387 As a result, this particular category of immigrants is
384 Elspeth Guild, ‘Protection, Threat and Movement of Persons: Examining the Relationship of
Terrorism and Migration in EU Law after 11 September 2001’, in Francois Crepeau, Delphine Nakache,
Michael Collyer, Nathaniel H. Goetz, and Art Hansen (eds), Forced Migration and Global Processes: A
View from Forced Migration Studies (Lanham, Maryland; Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006), pp. 295-
317, pp. 295-300. In this regard, also see: Elspeth Guild and Didier Bigo, Anti- & Counter-Terrorism
and Human Rights in Europe: 5 Snapshots of Current Controversies (Online: Éditions L'Harmattan,
2018), pp. 79-92.
385 Gabriella Lazaridis, International Migration into Europe: From Subjects to Abjects (Basingstoke,
Hampshire; New York Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp.107-123.
386 John Crowley, ‘Where Does the State Actually Start? The Contemporary Governance of Work and
Migration’, in Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (eds), Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and
Within Europe (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 140-160, p. 142. Also, see: Laurent Bonelli,
‘The Control of the Enemy within? Police Intelligence in the French Suburbs (banlieues) and its
Relevance for Globalization’, in Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (eds), Controlling Frontiers: Free
Movement Into and Within Europe (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 193-208.
387 Elspeth Guild and Didier Bigo, Anti- & Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights in Europe: 5
Snapshots of Current Controversies (Online: Éditions L'Harmattan, 2018), pp. 79-82. Also, see: Elspeth
Guild, ‘The Legal Framework: Who is Entitled to Move?’, in Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (eds),
Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016),
pp. 14-48. Also, see: Didier Bigo, ‘Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control?’, in
Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (eds), Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe
(Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 49-99, p. 63.
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somehow associated with a general sense of ‘insecurity’ and ‘instability’ in the
majority of EU host societies.388 If we agree that ‘security’ constitutes freedom
from fear of threat and insecurity is feeling a threat then securitising
immigration gives an illusion to the members of host societies that those in
charge are constructing an environment of ‘political trust,’ ‘loyalty,’ and
‘identity.’389 The way they do this is through projecting ‘others,’ the ‘outsiders,’
or ‘aliens’ as the source of fear and instability – a process which very much
resonates with racism and xenophobia.
Moreover, the securitisation of immigration involves a set of political
assurances, in which not only the ruling party, but also the opposition –
particularly during elections through their media and campaign races – frame
immigrants and asylum seekers as the agencies of crisis, the causes of
emergencies, and the enemies of the societies that host them.390 Creating a
climate of threat, emergency, and urgency politically benefits the ruling
government by creating a perception that the political community is in charge.
This is a vicious-circule mode of reproducing a sense of insecurity. When the
process of securitisation happens to immigration in the EU and towards a
certain category of immigrants (mainly Muslim asylum seekers), the practice of
asylum seeking, which has always existed in the history of humankind, suddenly
becomes a threatening act against stability of the EU. Figure 4 shows that once
immigration is securitised, it loses all its attributions and amenities and
becomes entirely a matter of security.
Figure 4. The Securitisation of immigration.
388 Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU (Oxford; New York:
Routledge, 2006), pp. 44-47.
389 Ibid, pp. 47-57.





3.3. ADDRESSING THE TANGLED RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN TERRORISM AND ASYLUM SEEKING
3.3.1. THE CLASH BETWEEN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERROR AND THE
RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM
The relation between terrorism and asylum seeking, especially in the case of
asylum seekers coming from primarily Muslim countries of origin, is multi-
layered and extremely complex. It is factually inaccurate to obtain a causal link
between these two separate – but at the same time – two tightly intertwined and
interrelated phenomena.391 Besides a lack of universally accepted definition of
terrorism,392 the reason for the complexity of understanding the nexus between
terrorism and asylum seeking is that terrorism, similar to many other crimes, is
not just simply the result of one factor. Instead, this crime is the outcome of
numerous multifaceted factors, interplaying with each other in a very complex
way.393
Notwithstanding the fact that no universal definition of terrorism exists, what
agreed internationally is that terrorism as an act of violence indeed is a crime.394
Simultaneously, terrorism has become one of the most pressing security threats
of the twenty-first century.395 Holding both legal (criminal law) and political
(national security) aspects, dealing with terrorism is extremely difficult. On the
one hand, taking terrorism as a crime, we would need to present a clear-cut and
exhaustive definition in the criminal codes. This is to comply with the principle
of legality of penalties and punishment in criminal law, i.e. nulla poena sine
lege, which is a necessary part of the rule of law. Deriving from this principle,
which is both a customary norm and stated in Article 15 of the 1966 ICCPR, the
national criminal codes must explicitly and clearly state all the composing
elements of a crime (the principle of nullum crimen sine lege).396
391 With regard to a recent research on immigration to Europe and its link with radical Islamic terrorism,
see: Sam Mullins, Jihadist Infiltration of Migrant Flows to Europe: Perpetrators, Modus Operandi and
Policy Implications (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland AG, 2019). For more information on the
complex nexus between terrorism and migration, see: Elspeth Guild, ‘Terrorism and Migration Law’, in
Ben Saul (ed.), Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism (2nd edn, Cheltenham;
Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020), pp. 436-448.
392 Carsten Stahn, A Critical Introduction to International Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2019), pp. 29-32.
393 Ibid, p. 16.
394 Ibid, pp. 29-32.
395 Julian Richards, A Guide to National Security: Threats, Responses and Strategies (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), pp. 35-40.
396 Elspeth Guild, ‘Terrorism and Migration Law’, in Ben Saul (ed.), Research Handbook on
International Law and Terrorism (2nd edn, Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar
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On the other hand, considering terrorism as a matter of national security, and
therefore, becoming a subject of political debates, makes this crime highly
susceptible to ambiguities and interpretation of beneficiary political actors. This
complicated nature of terrorism makes the nexus between terrorism and asylum
seeking even more puzzling.397 In this regard, for example, by looking at the
following three premises, we could conclude that it is a fallacy to simply deduct
a causal link between terrorism and Muslim asylum seekers. First, not all
terrorists are asylum seekers from the predominantly Muslim countries of
origin.398 Secondly, not all Muslim asylum seekers turn out to be terrorists.399
In fact, statistics and figures have shown that only a very small portion of
Muslim asylum seekers have committed terrorist crimes or have been involved
in one way or another with Jihadist-Islamic terrorist organisations.400
Thirdly, as an undeniable fact, ‘non-Muslims’ also have committed some of the
deadliest terrorist attacks in Europe.401 According to the European Union
Publishing, 2020), pp. 436-448. Also, see: Marcello Di Filippo, ‘The Definition(s) of Terrorism in
International Law’, in Ben Saul (ed.), Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism (2nd
edn, Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020), pp. 2-15. Also, see:
Geoff Gilbert, ‘Terrorism and International Refugee Law’, in Ben Saul (ed.), Research Handbook on
International Law and Terrorism (2nd edn, Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2020), pp. 2-15. And, see: Martin Scheinin and Mathias Vermeulen, ‘Unilateral Exceptions
to International Law: Systematic Legal Analysis and Critique of Doctrines that Seek to Deny or Reduce
the Applicability of Human Rights Norms in the Fight Against Terrorism’, in Menno T. Kamminga (ed.),
Challenges in International Human Rights Law (Vol. 3, London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 155-206. Also,
see: Ben Saul, ‘Civilising the Exception: Universally Defining Terrorism’, in Aniceto Masferrer (ed.), Post
9/11 and the State of Permanent Legal Emergency: Security and Human Rights in Countering
Terrorism (London: Springer Science, 2012), pp. 79-100.
397 For more detailed information in this regard, see: Myra Williamson, Terrorism, War and
International Law: The Legality of the Use of Force against Afghanistan in 2001 (Oxford: Routledge,
2016), pp. 37-70. Also, see: Alex Peter Schmid, ‘The Definition of Terrorism’, in Alex Peter Schmid (ed.),
The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 39-157, pp.
39-87. Also see: Anthony Richards, ‘Defining Terrorism’, in Andrew Silke (ed.), Routledge Handbook of
Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 13-21, pp. 13-20.
398 Elspeth Guild, ‘Protection, Threat and Movement of Persons: Examining the Relationship of
Terrorism and Migration in EU Law after 11 September 2001’, in Francois Crepeau, Delphine Nakache,
Michael Collyer, Nathaniel H. Goetz, and Art Hansen (eds), Forced Migration and Global Processes: A
View from Forced Migration Studies (Lanham, Maryland; Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006), pp. 295-
317, pp. 296-299.
399 Tarik Fraihi, ‘(De-)Escalating Radicalisation: The Debate within Immigrant Communities in Europe’,
in Rik Coolsaet (ed.), Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American
Experiences (2nd edn, Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 205-213, p. 207.
400 With regard to the latest trends and facts on the situation of terrorism in Europe, see: The European
Union (EU) Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2020, by the European Union Agency for
Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). In this regard, also see: Sam Mullins, Jihadist Infiltration of
Migrant Flows to Europe: Perpetrators, Modus Operandi and Policy Implications (Cham: Springer
Nature Switzerland AG, 2019), pp. 19-41.
401 In Europe, terrorism for centuries had been associated with non-Muslims, for example, the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) in the UK, because of the long-standing disputes in Northern Ireland. For more
information in this regard see: Elspeth Guild, ‘Protection, Threat and Movement of Persons: Examining
the Relationship of Terrorism and Migration in EU Law after 11 September 2001’, in Francois Crepeau,
Delphine Nakache, Michael Collyer, Nathaniel H. Goetz, and Art Hansen (eds), Forced Migration and
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Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), ‘both jihadist and right-
wing extremist propaganda incite individuals to perpetrate acts of violence
autonomously and praise perpetrators as “martyrs” or “saints,” respectively.’402
Therefore, it is more reasonable to say that any radical or extremist political sect
may employ violent means to achieve political and/or ideological goals.
However, one might oppose this argument by asking why the EU should take
even the slightest risk and allow a small fraction of Muslims, who might be
associated with terrorist organisations, or may become radicalised later on and
possibly commit terrorist crimes, to enter EU territory. This line of argument
might continue such that what would be wrong in having the majority of Muslim
communities pay for the mistakes of the minority, who happen to share the same
religious identity. I would like to respond to this argument from the three
following perspectives. First, there should be no punishment before a crime has
happened. This is against the principle of legality (nulla poena sine lege) in
criminal law. Therefore, we cannot prevent someone from accessing the
territory of EU by simply assuming that they may in future become radicalised,
join terrorist organisations, and commit terrorist crimes.
Secondly, we should remember that the practice of ‘risk assessment’ is at the
very heart of protecting national security.403 We cannot just assume that
someone or a group of people is a threat to national security or the internal
security of EU without individually assessing their case or without checking
their background. Therefore, many policies that prevent asylum seekers from
accessing the territory of EU and deny asylum claim procedures – which
includes comprehensive risk assessment – is against the very idea of protecting
national security. Thirdly, a majority of those who have committed some of the
recent terrorist crimes in the EU are not members of any radical Islamic terrorist
organisations such as Al-Qaeda or ISIS. These people are the so-called ‘lone
wolves’ or ‘lone-actor terrorists’ who became radicalised after arriving in the EU
and while spending an idle life in detention camps under harsh living
conditions.404
Global Processes: A View from Forced Migration Studies (Lanham, Maryland; Oxford: Lexington
Books, 2006), pp. 295-317, pp. 296-299.
402 For more information in this regard and on the trends of acts of terrorism by different radical groups,
see: The 2020 Europol report at The European Union (EU) Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-
SAT) 2020, by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), pp. 5 and 6.
403 Julian Richards, A Guide to National Security: Threats, Responses and Strategies (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), p. 5.
404 Sakina Abushi and Götz Nordbruch, ‘Preventing the Risk of Radicalisation of Asylum Seekers and
Refugees, and Far-Right Mobilisation against Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Immigrants: Breaking the
Cycle’ (2020) Policy Brief by Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), pp. 3-19. Also, see: Khalid
Koser and Amy Cunningham, ‘Migration, Violent Extremism and Social Exclusion’, in Marie McAuliffe
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Since the 2015-2016 terrorist attacks in the EU, the shadow of the fight against
terrorism has fallen so heavily on Muslim communities that the right to seek
asylum has started to lose all legal weight. Especially when it comes to applying
the principle of non-discrimination with regard to asylum seekers, certain
groups are discriminated against on the ground of religion. For example,
suspecting that a certain community represents terrorist threats – in this case,
Muslim asylum seekers – is purely a matter of policy.405
To give an example of this bias, since 2019, the Chinese Government has
systematically persecuted Hong Kong protesters who opposed the security and
extradition bill facilitating the return of those suspected of crimes from Hong
Kong to Mainland China. The reason for the vast wave of protests is that if the
bill were to become a new law, it would give endless power to China over Hong
Kong, leading to oppression of the freedom of expression and the safety and
security of journalists and free media.406 With the surge of the 2019 crisis in
Hong Kong resulting in the persecution of protestors by the Chinese
Government, some EU leaders publicly welcomed Hong Kong citizens to Europe
with a promise of asylum protection.407 In sharp contrast, when it comes to
and Martin Ruhs (eds), World Migration Report 2018 (Geneva: International Organization for
Migration, 2018), pp. 209-223, pp. 213-216. Also, see: Alex Peter Schmid, Links between Terrorism and
Migration: An Exploration (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016), pp. 35-51.
Also, see: Monish Bhatia, ‘Turning Asylum Seekers into ‘Dangerous Criminals’: Experiences of the
Criminal Justice System of Those Seeking Sanctuary’ (2015) 4(3) International Journal for Crime,
Justice and Social Democracy, pp. 97-111.
405 On the theory of ‘suspect community’, see: Emma Ylitalo-James, ‘Suspect Community: A Product of
the Prevention of Terrorism Acts or a Product of Conflict Dynamics?’ (2020) 14(3) Perspectives on
Terrorism, pp. 46-58.
406 BBC, ‘The Hong Kong protests explained in 100 and 500 words’, <www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
china-49317695>. Also, see: The New York Times, ‘Boris Johnson Pledges to Admit 3 Million from Hong
Kong to U.K.’, <www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/world/europe/boris-johnson-uk-hong-kong-
china.html>. Also, see: The Guardian, ‘Hong Kong protester announces asylum granted in Germany’,
<www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/20/hong-kong-protester-announces-asylum-granted-in-
germany>. Also, see: BBC, ‘Hong Kong anti-government protests’,
<www.bbc.com/news/topics/c95yz8vxvy8t/hong-kong-anti-government-protests>. After months of
protests and violent persecution of demonstrators in Hong Kong, the Committee of the National People’s
Congress of China adopted a National Security Act on 30 June 2020 to oppress the oppositions even
further. On the Hong Kong National Security Act, see: BBC, ‘Hong Kong security law: China passes
controversial legislation’, <www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-53230391>. About the reaction of the
EU towards Hong Kong National Security law, see: The Guardian, ‘European leaders condemn China
over ‘deplorable’ Hong Kong security bill, <www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/30/european-
leaders-condemn-china-over-deplorable-hong-kong-security-bill>. Also, see: Council of the European
Union, ‘Council conclusions on Hong Kong released on 24 July 2020’,
<www.consilium.europa.eu/media/45222/council-conclusions-on-hong-kong.pdf>.
407 BBC, ‘Hong Kong: UK makes citizenship offer to residents’, <www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-
53246899>. Also, see: The New York Times, ‘Boris Johnson Pledges to Admit 3 Million from Hong Kong
to U.K.’, <www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/world/europe/boris-johnson-uk-hong-kong-china.html>.
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asylum seekers from the Middle East and Africa, the EU has tightened its asylum
policies further and further.408
Therefore, the issue of asylum is no longer a matter of right or principle, but
rather a matter of policy. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I showed the development
of the right to seek asylum through history and in the preparatory work of Article
14 of the 1948 UDHR, Article 18 of the EU Charter, and the formation of the
principle of non-refoulement as one of the customary norms of international
law. This study illustrated that the right to seek asylum has been endorsed by
the international community as one of the fundamental and basic human rights,
and not just a matter of policy per se. Hence, the EU Member States should not
be permitted to claim that they have a choice to include or exclude this right
from their human rights obligations.
Nonetheless, looking at the current practices of EU institutions and Member
States, we cannot deny that the political aspects of managing asylum prevails
over human rights obligations. There is no doubt that management policies
should develop based on existing law and principles. Therefore, since asylum is
clearly a matter of human rights, the legislation and policy-making decisions in
this regard should originate from human rights law and principles, amongst
them most importantly, the fundamental right to seek asylum and the principle
of non-refoulement. This discussion brings us to the question that if security
policies tend to override the fulfilment of the right to seek asylum, would this
right any longer have any practical or effective value. The following part
responds to this question by addressing the challenging nuances of
implementing the right to seek asylum in practice.
408 In this regard, see, for example, The Independent, ‘Refugees forced to put themselves in danger to
join relatives under Home Office family reunion policy’, <www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
news/refugees-family-reunion-safe-legal-route-home-office-red-cross-b1721205.html>. Also, see:
Deutsche Welle (DW) News, ‘EU weighs tighter border controls after Paris terrorism summit’,
<www.dw.com/en/top-stories/s-9097>. In addition, see: Deutsche Welle (DW) News, ‘France’s Macron
wants ‘real’ police protecting EU borders, <www.dw.com/en/frances-macron-wants-real-police-
protecting-eu-borders/a-55512155>. Also, see: European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE),
‘Things are Heating up along the Balkan Route’, <www.ecre.org/things-are-heating-up-along-the-
balkan-route/>. Also, see: International - Der Spiegel, ‘Illegal Practices: EU Border Agency Frontex
Complicit in Greek Refugee Pushback Campaign’, <www.spiegel.de/international/europe/eu-border-
agency-frontex-complicit-in-greek-refugee-pushback-campaign-a-4b6cba29-35a3-4d8c-a49f-
a12daad450d7?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter#ref=rss>. Moreover, see: The Guardian,
‘“Catastrophe for human rights” as Greece steps up refugee “pushbacks”’,
<www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/sep/27/catastrophe-for-human-rights-as-greece-
steps-up-refugee-pushbacks>. In addition, see: The Guardian, ‘EU border force ‘complicit’ in illegal
campaign to stop refugees landing, <www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/oct/24/eu-
border-force-complicit-in-campaign-to-stop-refugees-landing>.
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3.3.2. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM IN
PRACTICE IN A HIGHLY SECURITISED ENVIRONMENT: A MATTER OF
LAW OR POLICY?
The tension between human rights and security is nothing new to constitutional
lawyers. In the same manner that the 9/11 terrorist attacks brought the issue of
safeguarding national security in direct conflict with the right to seek asylum
and the freedom of movement, other basic and fundamental human rights have
been heavily affected by securitisation.409 In this regard, some contemporary
constitutional law scholars have produced some knowledge on the tension
between the right to privacy and protection of personal data as well as the right
to private and family life,410 the right to a fair trial and due process, and the right
to an effective remedy411 when the issue of national security is at stake.412 What
I have learned from this research is that by taking a highly securitised approach
in the so-called era of the ‘war on terror,’ the European courts have given a wide
discretion to the political branches of national governments in dealing with
issues in which the fundamental rights of individuals seem to be in clash with
safeguarding national security.413
409 In this regard, see, for example, Federico Fabbrini, Fundamental Rights in Europe (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), pp. 51-95. Also, see: Lord Justice (retired) Stephen Sedley, ‘Terrorism and
Security: Back to the Future?’, in David Cole, Federico Fabbrini, and Arianna Vedaschi (eds), Secrecy,
National Security and the Vindication of Constitutional Law (Cheltenham; Northampton,
Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), pp. 13-21. Also, see: Clive Walker, ‘Terrorists on Trial:
an Open or Closed Case?’, in David Cole, Federico Fabbrini, and Arianna Vedaschi (eds), Secrecy,
National Security and the Vindication of Constitutional Law (Cheltenham; Northampton,
Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), pp. 209-228. And, see: Tuomas Ojanen,
‘Administrative Counter-Terrorism Measures: A Strategy to Circumvent Human Rights in the Fight
against Terrorism?’, in David Cole, Federico Fabbrini, and Arianna Vedaschi (eds), Secrecy, National
Security and the Vindication of Constitutional Law (Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), pp. 249-267.
410 The right to privacy and family life are the subjects of Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 7 of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights.
411 The rights to a fair trial and due process as well as the right to an effective remedy are the subjects of
Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
412 In this regard, see, for example: Arianna Vedaschi and Gabriele Marino Noberasco, ‘From DRD to
PNR: Looking for a New Balance between Privacy and Security’, in David Cole, Federico Fabbrini, and
Stephen Schulhofer (eds), Surveillance, Privacy and Trans-Atlantic Relations (Portland: Hart
Publishing, 2017), pp. 67-87. Also, see: Evangelia Psychogiopoulou and Maja Brkan, ‘Introduction:
Courts, Privacy and Data Protection in the Digital Environment’, in Maja Brkan and Evangelia
Psychogiopoulou (eds), Courts, Privacy and Data Protection in the Digital Environment (Cheltenham;
Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), pp. 1-9. Also, see: Evangelia
Psychogiopoulou, ‘The European Court of Human Rights, Privacy and Data Protection in the Digital
Era’, in Maja Brkan and Evangelia Psychogiopoulou (eds), Courts, Privacy and Data Protection in the
Digital Environment (Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), pp.
32-62.
413 Federico Fabbrini, Fundamental Rights in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 52.
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In the EU, similar to the US, the public pressure to respond to the threat of
terrorism and state insecurities related to that has encouraged governments to
adopt policies resulting in restrictive counterterrorism measures. The legitimacy
of these policies came from mainly the serial resolutions adopted by the UN
Security Council in the aftermath of 9/11. A few days after the terrorist attacks
against the Twin Towers at the World Trade Centre complex, in New York City,
USA, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution S/RES/1373(2001) with the
title ‘Threats to International Peace and Security caused by Terrorist Acts.’
According to this resolution, all UN Member States shall deny a ‘safe haven’ to
those connected to terrorism414 and shall prevent any suspects from accessing
their territories.415 This was a turning point in many states applying intense
security measures against terrorism. Some of these measures include
extraordinary renditions416 in interrogation and detention without charge
(similar to what has happened in Guantanamo Bay and other ‘black sites’
belonging to the CIA in Europe),417 expelling suspects of terrorism to places
where they would face torture and other inhumane acts,418 and waging complex
proxy wars in the Middle East.419 For example, the Swedish Government in the
414 UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting
on 28 September 2001, UN doc. S/RES/1373(2001), para. 2(c). For in depth analysis in this regard, see:
Geoff Gilbert, ‘Terrorism and International Refugee Law’, in Ben Saul (ed.), Research Handbook on
International Law and Terrorism (2nd edn, Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2020), pp. 423-435.
415 UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting
on 28 September 2001, UN doc. S/RES/1373(2001), para. 2(d).
416 The phrase ‘extraordinary rendition’ refers to ‘transfer of a person from one State to another, for the
purpose of arrest, detention, and/or interrogation by the receiving State’. In this regard, see: Michael
John Garcia, ‘Renditions: Constraints Imposed by Laws on Torture’ (2009) Congressional Research
Service (CRS) Report for Congress Members and Committee, p. 1. Also, see: Silvia Borelli,
‘Extraordinary Rendition, Counter-Terrorism and International Law’, in Ben Saul (ed.), Research
Handbook on International Law and Terrorism (2nd edn, Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020), pp. 336-353. Moreover, see: Elspeth Guild, ‘Terrorism and Migration
Law’, in Ben Saul (ed.), Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism (2nd edn,
Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020), pp. 436-448.
417 Btihaj Ajana, ‘Introduction to Identity, Security and Democracy’, in Emilio Mordini and Manfred
Green (eds), Identity, Security and Democracy: The Wider Social and Ethical Implications of
Automated Systems for Human Identification (IOS Press: Amsterdam, 2009), pp. 1-10, p. 2. In this
regards, also see: Henry F. Carey, Reaping What You Sow: A Comparative Examination of Torture
Reform in the United States, France, Argentina, and Israel (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, LLC,
2012), pp. 28, 29, 204, and 216-218. In this regard, also see: Amnesty International, ‘European
complicity in CIA torture in ‘black sites’’, <www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/02/european-
complicity-in-cia-torture-in-black-sites/>.
418 In this regard, see: Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, UN Committee Against Torture
(CAT): Communication No. 233/2003 (referred to as ‘Agiza v. Sweden’), 24 May 2005, UN doc.
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 and Mohammed Alzery v. Sweden, UN Human Rights Committee (HRC):
Communication No. 1416/2005, 10 November 2006, UN doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (referred to as
‘Alzery v. Sweden’).
419 David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced
Capabilities for Counterinsurgency (Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, 2008), pp. 2-5.
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cases of Agiza v. Sweden and Alzery v. Sweden excluded the applicants from
international protection and extradited them to Egypt on the ground of being
‘security threats.’ This decision was made based on the information that the
Government of Sweden had obtained from the US intelligence service (CIA) and
by relying on the memoranda of understanding, which the Swedish State
Secretary had signed with Egyptian officials in the Swedish Embassy in Cairo.
Later on, the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee,
respectively, found that both applicants were tortured and subjected to other
inhumane and degrading acts upon their expulsion to Egypt.
Since 2001, the international community has continuously overweighed the
security concerns of states against the right to freedom of movement and the
right to seek asylum by referring to the Security Council resolutions on
counterterrorism.420 Consequently, national courts have been reluctant to
oppose the decisions of EU governments and their political bodies (decisions
made by relying on the Security Council resolutions related to
counterterrorism). For example, in 2007, the UK House of Lords in the case of
R (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) v. Secretary of State for Defence421
rejected the application on the ground that the UN Charter and resolutions
adopted by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter had
priority over the ECHR as those measures were necessary for imperative reasons
of World peace and security.422 What the House of Lords ignored in this case
was the fact that the Security Council resolutions on countering terrorism do not
remove the responsibility of states towards human rights protection, based on
the principles of equality and non-discrimination.423
Hiding behind the counterterrorism resolutions of the UN was not exclusive to
the UK Government. Some other EU Member States deployed similar
extraordinary measures in their ‘war on terror,’ which did not necessarily
comply with their international and European human rights obligations. As a
420 UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005), adopted by the Security Council at its 5261st meeting
on 14 September 2005, UN doc. S/RES/1624(2005). UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004),
adopted by the Security Council at its 5053rd meeting on 8 October 2004, UN doc. S/RES/1566(2004).
UN Security Council Resolution 1535 (2004), adopted by the Security Council at its 4936th meeting on
26 March 2004, UN doc. S/RES/1535(2004).
421 R (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) (Appellant) v. Secretary of State for Defence (Respondent)
[2007] UKHL 58, 12 December 2007.
422 In this regard, see the opinion of Lord Bingham of Cornhill, as part of the opinions of the Lords of
Appeal for judgement in the cause: R (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of
State for Defence (Respondent) [2007] UKHL 58, 12 December 2007, paras 2 and 3.
423 Martin Scheinin and Mathias Vermeulen, ‘Unilateral Exceptions to International Law: Systematic
Legal Analysis and Critique of Doctrines that Seek to Deny or Reduce the Applicability of Human Rights
Norms in the Fight Against Terrorism’, in Menno T. Kamminga (ed.), Challenges in International
Human Rights Law (Vol. 3, London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 155-206.
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result, the UN Human Rights Council (replacing the UN Commission on Human
Rights in 2005) felt the need to take action to prevent the violation of established
human rights rules and standards in the highly securitised atmosphere of the
‘war on terror.’ Hence, in 2005, at the international level of human rights
protection, the UN Human Rights Council (at that time the UN Commission on
Human Rights) adopted Resolution 2005/80, according to which the mandate
of a ‘special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’ was created.424 The mandate
holder of this special rapporteur is an independent expert assigned to:
[…] gather, request, receive and exchange information on alleged violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, and to report
regularly to the Human Rights Council and General Assembly about inter alia
identified good policies and practices, as well as existing and emerging challenges
and present recommendations on ways and means to overcome them.425
Within their mandates, all three Special Rapporteurs so far have addressed the
negative impacts of the securitisation of immigration on the right to seek asylum
in the context of counterterrorism measures and policies. For example,
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin (the current Special Rapporteur) while reminding of the
adverse impact of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373(2001),426 warned
against the misuse of ‘terrorism rhetoric’ against refugees and asylum seekers –
that this rhetoric, reproduced by some states, merely serves discriminatory and
racist political agendas by feeding on ‘public anxiety and fear.’427 In addition, in
her annual report submitted to the UN General Assembly in September 2020,
on multiple occasions, she emphasised that in all matters connected to
combatting terrorism, the rules of international law – in particular international
424 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights), ‘Special Rapporteur on
the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’,
<www.ohchr.org/en/issues/terrorism/pages/srterrorismindex.aspx>.
425 The first mandate older was Martin Scheinin (2005-2011), succeeded by Ben Emmerson (2011-2017).
The current UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism is Fionnuala Ní Aoláin
(2017-present). In this regard, see: The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human
Rights), ‘Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism’,
<www.ohchr.org/en/issues/terrorism/pages/srterrorismindex.aspx>.
426 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin,
submitted in accordance with Assembly resolution 72/180 and Human Rights Council resolution 31/3
at its Seventy-third session on 3 September 2018, UN Doc. A/73/45453, para. 35.
427 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘Calling out the Misuse of Terrorism Rhetoric against Refugee and Asylum
Seekers’, (Online: Just Security, 2019), available at: <www.justsecurity.org/67289/calling-out-the-
misuse-of-terrorism-rhetoric-against-refugee-and-asylum-seekers/>.
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human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law – must be observed by all
states.428
The former Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism, Ben
Emmerson (2011-2017), in his 2016 Report submitted to the UN General
Assembly, addressed the impact of counterterrorism measures on the human
rights of immigrants and refugees and concluded the Report with some
recommendations for the modification of state actions.429 Emmerson started
this Report by acknowledging the challenges that the states, international
organisations, and civil societies have had in dealing with terrorism, especially
considering that, as of 2016, some terrorist organisations (such as ISIS) had
occupied territories. He continued that because many of the people who
approached the European borders came from areas where terrorist groups were
active and with the growth of the phenomenon of ‘foreign fighters’ in Europe,430
a perception has been formed that the movement of people is a threat to national
security.431 However, he asserted that states must not use the ‘security concerns’
as an excuse to deny access to humanitarian and refugee protection to those
coming from terrorist-affected areas.432
The Special Rapporteur, further, expressed his concerns about the existing
institutional and policy structures, which have integrated immigration and
border controls into security frameworks. According to him, the result of this
policy setting is ‘policing,’ ‘defence,’ ‘militarisation,’ and ‘criminality’ at the
428 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin,
submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 72/180 and Human Rights Council
resolution 40/16, adopted by the General Assembly at its Seventy-fifth session on 3 September 2020,
UN doc. A/75/337, paras 11, 24, 28, and 42.
429 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ben Emmerson, submitted in
accordance with Assembly resolution 68/178 and Human Rights Council resolutions 22/8 and 25/7,
adopted by the General Assembly at its 71st session on 13 September 2016, UN doc. A/71/384.
430 The term ‘foreign fighter’ in this context is the emigration of Europeans to areas where terrorists are
active and voluntarily participate in their military training and activities. As a general term, ‘foreign
fighter’ has been defined as ‘an individual who leaves his or her country of origin or habitual residence
to join a non-State armed group in an armed conflict abroad and who is primarily motivated by ideology,
religion, and/or kinship’. In this regard, see: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Foreign
Terrorist Fighters Manual for Judicial Training Institutes: South-Eastern Europe,
<www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/FTF%20manual/000_Final_Manual_English_
Printed_Version_-_no_foreword.pdf>. Also, see: Foreign Fighters under International Law, Geneva
Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Academy Briefing No. 7 (Geneva,
2014), p. 6.
431 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ben Emmerson, adopted by
the General Assembly at its 71st session on 13 September 2016, UN doc. A/71/384, paras 6-9.
432 Ibid, para. 10.
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European external borders over rights and human rights-based approaches.433
In this regard, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR), in its ‘Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders,’
asserted:
International borders are not zones of exclusion or exception for human rights
obligations. States are entitled to exercise jurisdiction at their international
borders, but they must do so in light of their human rights obligations. This means
that the human rights of all persons at international borders must be respected in
the pursuit of border control, law enforcement and other State objectives,
regardless of which authorities perform border governance measures and where
such measures take place.434
Similarly, as part of his mandate, Martin Scheinin, the first UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism (2005-2011), submitted
a comprehensive report to the UN General Assembly in 2007, addressing ‘[…]
some of the challenges to refugee law and asylum caused by global measures to
counterterrorism.’435 In this Report, he examined the following issues:
[…] pre-entry interception and screening measures related to border control;
detention of asylum-seekers and shortcomings in securing court review of such
detention; exclusion from refugee or other protection status; the application and
non-derogability of the principle of non-refoulement; the return, repatriation or
resettlement of rejected asylum-seekers, including persons detained for terrorism-
related reasons; the use of so-called diplomatic assurances; and strengthening
global responsibility for international protection as an inherent part of a
comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy.436
Amongst the issues addressed by Scheinin and Emmerson in their respective
2007 and 2016 Reports, the prohibition on discrimination and a firm stand on
the non-derogability of the principle of non-refoulement are of direct interest to
the topic of this dissertation. With regard to the implementation of the right to
seek asylum and the status of the institution of asylum in the context of
counterterrorism, Scheinin and Emmerson have reiterated that the immigration
control policies of some countries have been discriminating against those
seeking refuge from countries, where Al-Qaeda or ISIS operate or where their
433 Ibid, para 11. Also, see: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François
Crépeau, Regional study: management of the external borders of the European Union and its impact on
the human rights of migrants, submitted to General Assembly on 24 April 2013, UN doc. A/HRC/23/46.
434 The OHCHR’s Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders,
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2014), p. 1,
<www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/OHCHR_Recommended_Principles_Guidelines.pdf>
435 The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, submitted in accordance with
General Assembly resolution 62/159 and Human Rights Council resolution 6/28, adopted by the
General Assembly at its 62nd session on 15 August 2007, UN doc. A/62/263.
436 Ibid, p. 2 (the summary page of the Report).
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supporters are known to reside.437 In the case of this particular group, asylum
seekers are either detained indefinitely at the border cross points or are returned
with no admission or with just applying a summary or accelerated procedure
under the title of ‘unlawful or illegal mass migrants,’ without respect for the due
process of law.438 With reference to the principle of non-refoulement, both
Scheinin and Emmerson have observed that the violation of this prohibition has
been going on for the past two decades in the format of ‘forcible removals,’ under
the premises of ‘deportation,’ ‘expulsion,’ ‘extradition,’ and ‘rendition’ or
through ‘non-admission policies at the borders.’439
The prohibition of refoulement possesses an absolute and non-derogable nature
of norms (known as a jus cogens norm), whenever a risk of torture, inhuman
and degrading treatment is involved in the removal of asylum seekers. Based on
this analysis and moving back to the question asked at the beginning of this
subsection (the question of whether the application of the right to seek asylum
in practice is a matter of law or politics), it would, indeed, be farfetched to
provide a unified answer. As shown in the previous paragraphs, depending on
who approaches the right to seek asylum, the answer to this question would vary.
If taking the position of EU Governments, one would wish to make the
implementation of the right to seek asylum, as far as possible, a matter of
politics, because this approach would give wider room for interpreting the
437 The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, submitted in accordance with
General Assembly resolution 62/159 and Human Rights Council resolution 6/28, adopted by the
General Assembly at its 62nd session on 15 August 2007, UN doc. A/62/263, paras. 30-32, 35, and 46.
In this regard, also see: Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ben
Emmerson, submitted in accordance with Assembly resolution 68/178 and Human Rights Council
resolutions 22/8 and 25/7, adopted by the General Assembly at its 71st session on 13 September 2016,
UN doc. A/71/384, paras 17, 29, and 45.
438 The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, submitted in accordance with
General Assembly resolution 62/159 and Human Rights Council resolution 6/28, adopted by the
General Assembly at its 62nd session on 15 August 2007, UN doc. A/62/263, para. 47. Report of the
Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ben Emmerson, submitted in accordance with
Assembly resolution 68/178 and Human Rights Council resolutions 22/8 and 25/7, adopted by the
General Assembly at its 71st session on 13 September 2016, UN doc. A/71/384, paras 26, 36, and 41.
439 The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, submitted in accordance with
General Assembly resolution 62/159 and Human Rights Council resolution 6/28, adopted by the
General Assembly at its 62nd session on 15 August 2007, UN doc. A/62/263, paras 50, 78, and 79. Also,
see: Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ben Emmerson, submitted in
accordance with Assembly resolution 68/178 and Human Rights Council resolutions 22/8 and 25/7,
adopted by the General Assembly at its 71st session on 13 September 2016, UN doc. A/71/384, paras 30,
36, 37, and 55(c).
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notion of ‘national security’ and therefore, act according to the political agenda
of the desired ruling parties.
On the opposite side, looking at the position of human-rights advocacy actors,
such as the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism and
the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, the implementation
of the right to seek asylum should always be a matter of law, rules, and
principles. However, the question here remains that where European courts
stand in this regard. The unclear positions of the European human rights courts
(the ECtHR and the CJEU) brings us to two contemporary constitutional
theories, namely Alexy’s theory of ‘constitutional rights’ based on ‘balancing’
and ‘rationality,’440 and Dworkin’s theory of ‘law as integrity,’ based on ‘law as
an interpretive concept.’441 Both of these theories could converge under the
umbrella of ‘legal interpretivism.’442
As one of the most recent schools of legal thought, the theory of legal
interpretivism offers an alternative approach to the traditional schools of ‘legal
positivism’443 and a ‘natural theory of law,’444 in an effort to understand the
‘nature of law.’ According to the positivist jurists such as Austin, ‘the existence
of law is one thing, its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one
enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a
different enquiry.’ The preposition of positivism is not to address the merits of
law, nor to determine if they are intelligible or important; instead, it is to
determine whether laws or legal systems exist. In addition, the answer to the
question whether a society has a legal system depends on the ‘presence of certain
structures of governance, not on the extent to which it satisfies ideals of justice,
democracy, or the rule of law.’445 The natural law theory accepts one of the
premises of legal positivism namely, ‘law can be considered and spoken of as a
sheer social fact of power and practice.’ However, natural law jurists add that
law should also contain ‘a set of reasons for action that can be and often are
440 In this regard, see: Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by Julian Rivers, New
York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
441 In this regard, see: Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 2006). Also, see: Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1986). Also, see: Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London; New
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).
442 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘Legal Interpretivism’, <plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-
interpretivist/>.
443 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘Legal Positivism’, <plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-
positivism/>.
444 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘Natural Law Theories’, <plato.stanford.
edu/entries/natural-law-theories/>.
445 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘Legal Positivism’, <plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-
positivism/>.
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sound as reasons and therefore normative for reasonable people addressed by
them;’ in other words, ‘unjust laws are not laws.’446 In fact, an interpretivist
approach to the law is an intellectual effort to find a balance or a middle-way
between positivism and the theory of natural law, in order to fill in the gaps
found in both of these schools of thought.447
Legal interpretivism suggests that law is not a neutral entity created in a vacuum
(what positivists believe); instead, law is a concept filled with the ‘shared
practices and values of a community.’448 Once the community has decided upon
a new law, the participants in the course of practicing law might agree or
disagree with each other on the meaning of that law.449 The battle of agreeing
versus disagreeing creates a dynamic environment, in which all the values
behind the law are tested. As a result, the accuracy or falsehood of the law is
checked and balanced. This is what the theory of natural law lacks, i.e. there is
no check and balance of values in a natural law setting. According to legal
interpretivism, for a legal system to function well in practice, a ‘thread of
coherence’ should link all the stages of legal reasoning.450 This thread of
coherence is the most fragile and difficult thing to keep intact in deciding about
cases where the matters of values and policies contradict each other.451 Both
Alexy and Dworkin call these cases, ‘hard’ or ‘controversial’ cases, and according
to them, in the process of adjudicating (or ‘adjudicative practice’) on these hard
cases, the coherence or the incoherence of a legal system is exposed.452
Within his theory of constitutional rights and discursive or argumentative law,
Alexy emphasises the importance of distinguishing between ‘rules’ and
‘principles,’ as different forms of law or as different, but relevant, components
in building a legal system.453 The reason for the necessity of this distinction is
446 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘Natural Law Theories’, <plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-
law-theories/>.
447 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘Interpretation and Coherence in Legal Reasoning’,
<plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-interpret/>. Also, see: Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 9-11 and 26-29.
448 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp.
195-202.
449 Ibid, pp. 202-206.
450 Ibid, pp. 206-208
451 Dworkin defines ‘legal reasoning’ as the use of ‘a vast network of principles of legal derivation or
political morality’. With regard to this definition, see: Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 50. In this regard, also see: The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘Interpretation and Coherence in Legal Reasoning’,
<stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/fall2008/entries/legal-reas-interpret/>.
452 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by Julian Rivers, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010), pp. 8-10. In this regard, also, see: Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously
(London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), pp. 81-130.
453 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by Julian Rivers, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010), pp. 13-15. For a full account on the outline of a theory of legal argumentation or
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that, ‘[i]f there is no clarity in the structure of constitutional rights and
constitutional rights norms, then there will be no clarity in constitutional
adjudication either.’454 Applying this theory to the right to seek asylum as a
constitutional right, the elements of ‘principle’ and ‘rule’ are distinguished from
each other. The right to seek asylum, as a norm or rule with a constitutional and
fundamental right character, is constructed upon the very basic principles and
common values of human communities. These values are some principles such
as ‘the principle of inherent and essential nature of human dignity,’ ‘the
principle of equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family,’
and ‘an essential and inherent value in human life,’ ‘human safety,’ ‘human
security,’ and ‘human physical and mental integrity.’455 These general values and
principles have been enacted in the form of rules under various legislation.
Applying the theory of legal interpretivism to the securitisation of immigration,
the implementation of the right to seek asylum does not seem to be only a matter
of law (meaning applying certain rules based on the principles mentioned
above). The question is what would happen in practice to the right to seek
asylum as a fundamental and constitutional right, when implemented in highly
politicised, securitised, or even militarised contexts. This is one example of the
‘hard cases’ discussed by Alexy and Dworkin. Even though Alexy has extensively
elaborated on the role of ‘balancing act’ or ‘balancing exercise’ in deciding about
colliding instances of individual rights versus collective interests,456 I was unable
to find an answer to the question which side of the coin prevails in a highly
securitised environment: the side of law or the side of politics. To Alexy, the
rights of individuals and public interests are matters of principles. Thus, as
‘optimization requirements,’ when two principles collide, we simply need to
exercise a balancing act on the basis of the principle of proportionality in order
to satisfy the intention of the law to the highest degree possible, the limit for this
highest degree being the principle of legality.457
However, Dworkin’s theory of ‘law as integrity’ seems to be offering a guiding
hand in solving the hard case of tension between the right to seek asylum as a
matter of law, and safeguarding national security as a matter of politics. In fact,
discursive law, see: Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse
as Theory of Legal Justification (translated by Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989), pp. 221-286.
454 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by Julian Rivers, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010), p. 15.
455 These values are enshrined in the preamble and Articles 1-5 of the 1948 UDHR.
456 For more detailed analysis on Alexy’s stand with regard to the conflict of rules and principles and the
balancing exercise, see: Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by Julian Rivers,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 44-110.
457 Ibid, pp. 47-86.
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to Dworkin, the matters of public interest (given here that the issue of national
security is a matter of public interest) are ‘policies,’458 which he defines as,
‘standards that set out a goal to be reached, generally for the purpose of making
some improvements in the economic, political, or social conditions of the
community.’459 Meanwhile, Dworkin makes a distinct division between ‘policies’
and ‘principles,’ and defines the latter as, ‘standards that need to be observed,
not because they are to meet goals such an economic, political, or social
betterment, but, because they are necessary for the fulfilment of “justice” and
“fairness,” as the ultimate moral dimension of the law.’460
Moreover, to Dworkin, law is what judges and legal scholars interpret, i.e. law
as an ‘interpretive concept.’ These legal practitioners should interpret the law in
the same direction as ‘moral principles and values, amongst them most
importantly the principles of “justice” and “fairness”.’461 This is what I have
understood as Dworkin’s conception of ‘law as integrity’ and this method of
interpretation seems to be giving the law a coherent and consistent body.462
Applying Dworkin’s philosophy of ‘law as integrity’ to this research, cases related
to the right to seek asylum with a link to security must be interpreted and
decided based on the principles and values upon which the EU community is
founded. These values are the principles of human dignity, respect for human
life, human integrity, human safety, and security.463
According to the theory of ‘law as integrity,’ for a legal system to be harmonised
and to make sense as a logical body, the system should function coherently. In
other words, all the composing elements of law, meaning the elements of values,
principles and norms should go together harmoniously, hand in hand, heading
in the same direction to reach the ultimate goal of law: ‘justice’ and ‘fairness.’
Referring to Dworkin, what helps the law to remain on this track are the
principles of ‘morality’ or ‘the shared values of the community.’464
However, the question remains that what role policies, as external factors to the
law but extremely influential ones, play in this scenario, especially when we are
trapped in a dilemma to choose between the right to seek asylum, on the one
458 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), pp.
82-90.
459 Ibid, p. 22.
460 Ibid, pp. 22 and 23.
461 Ibid, pp. 10-12.
462 On the creation and defence of Dworkin of his theory of ‘law as integrity’, see the following sources
respectively: Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1986), pp. 164-168, and Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 2006), pp. 75-105.
463 The values and principles upon which the EU is founded are stipulated under the preamble and
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
464 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp.
206-215.
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hand, and national security, on the other. Back to Dworkin, this situation is
indeed an example of the distinction between the arguments of ‘principles,’ on
the one hand, and the arguments of ‘policy’, on the other. Dworkin might not
have offered a clear-cut answer to which side of the scale to take, but he has
provided legal practitioners with some indicators, a toolkit, based on which
judges and, those who hold discretionary power, could apply when deciding on
hard asylum cases. In Dworkin’s toolkit, I found the following tools for
interpretation. Based on his theory of ‘law as integrity,’ there should be a
‘consistency in the application of principles in question,’ because the judges and
other governmental officials have a ‘political responsibility’ in justifying their
decisions.465 Through the prism of his theory of law as interpretation, Dworkin
suggests three grounds for a matter of policy to overrule a matter of right. We
can assume here that safeguarding national security is a matter of public or
societal policy. First, only if the decision maker shows that the values protected
by the principles and legal rights are not really at stake (through a factual
assessment of the case). Second, if the decision maker, through the exercise of
a balancing act, demonstrates that a greater value (and therefore a right) is at
stake. Third, only if the decision maker can prove that dismissing the matter of
policy brings greater harm to society if the matter of principle is prevailed
through interpretation and the factual assessment of the case.466
According to Dworkin, the institution of constitutional rights, which is a matter
of law, rests on the powerful ideas and principles of ‘human dignity’ and
‘political equality.’ Therefore, there is grave ‘injustice’ if the matters of social
policy or efficiency infringes those rights.467 Nevertheless, in the highly
securitised environment of immigration, how should the governments protect
the fundamental and constitutional right of an individual to seek asylum? It
comes all down to what kind of interpretation the judges decide to apply –
whether they choose to be on the side of human dignity and equality or on the
side of public policy. In response to this scenario, Dworkin asserts that the
normal balancing exercise between different rights or between rights and
policies would not work, because through securitisation, the government could
justify the employment of ‘emergency’ measure and the violation of individual’s
rights.468 Extraordinary measures could be easily justified in exceptional
circumstances because of public emergency.
465 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), pp. 81-
88.
466 Ibid, p. 200.
467 Ibid, pp. 198 and 199.
468 Ibid, pp. 195-197.
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In order to unfold the relation of asylum policies with regard to the right to seek
asylum, I shall analyse the kind of policies governments could adopt in a given
situation. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines policy as, ‘a definite course
or method of action selected by government, institution, group of people or even
individual from amongst alternatives and in the light of given conditions to
guide and, usually, to determine present and future decisions.’469 We could
apply the same definition to asylum policies since they are a certain plan for a
series of actions. For example, the ‘EU asylum policy’ is a plan, according to
which different EU actors could approach the issue of asylum. Policy as a driving
force behind the actions of actors could be ‘reactive’ – meaning created in
response to a current pressing problem or to a matter of urgency or
emergency.470 An example of a reactive asylum policy in the EU is the
‘externalisation of European border control.’ This policy is the direct result of
securitising immigration and employing extraordinary measures in response to
terrorism by perceiving that asylum seekers represent threats to EU security.
To the contrary, a policy could be ‘proactive,’ meaning that a plan is designed for
a course of actions in order to prevent a problem from happening in the first
place.471 A proactive example of asylum policy could be focusing on the
integration of asylum seekers in a manner to avoid radicalisation, while the plan
is subjected to evolutionary analysis, scrutiny, and chances of improvement.
This is the model of approach that the school of critical security studies, for
example, has adopted by highlighting the defects of the securitisation theory and
has opened new windows in addressing the referent objects of security.
According to those taking a critical approach to security and security studies, the
theory of securitisation of immigration is a reactive policy approach. Instead, we
469 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, ‘Policy’, <www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/policy?src=search-
dict-hed>.
470 In this regard, see: Cristina Fernández, Alejandra Manavella, Iñaki Rivera, and Gabriela Rodríguez,
‘Exceptionalism and its Impact on the Euro-Mediterranean Area’, in Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth
Guild, and R.B.J. Walker (eds), Europe’s 21st Century Challenge: Delivering Liberty (Oxford; New York:
Routledge, 2016), pp. 201-215, p. 212. In this regard, also, see: Richard Staring, ‘Controlling
Immigration and Organized Crime in the Netherlands. Dutch Developments and Debates on Human
Smuggling and Trafficking’, in Elspeth Guild and P. Paul E. Minderhoud (eds), Immigration And
Criminal Law in the European Union: The Legal Measures and Social Consequences of Criminal Law
in Member States on Trafficking and Smuggling in Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2006), pp. 241-269, pp. 248-265.
471 Christiane Timmerman, Helene Marie-Lou De Clerck, Kenneth Hemmerechts, and Roos Willems,
‘Imagining Europe from the Outside: The Role of Perceptions of Human Rights in Europe in Migration
Aspirations in Turkey, Morocco, Senegal and Ukraine’, in Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland (eds),
Communicating Europe in Times of Crisis: External Perceptions of the European Union (Basingstoke,
Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 220-247, pp. 221. In this regard, also, see: Martin
Holland and Natalia Chaban, ‘Conclusions: Perceptions, Prisms, Prospects’, in Natalia Chaban and
Martin Holland (eds), Communicating Europe in Times of Crisis: External Perceptions of the European
Union (Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 248-252, p. 252.
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should take a proactive approach when deciding on immigration including
asylum policies.472 Asylum policies and asylum law may be mistaken to be
similar things. These two are different entities – although highly influential on
each other and sometimes one disguising the other. As explained, policies are
plans used to guide the decisions and actions of an organisation or institution;
while law is a set of established rules used to implement ‘justice’ and ‘order’ in
society. Not all policies are legal and not all law is considered when making
policies. Policy is a plan for action, but law is an established procedure to realise
the will of the legislator or widely accepted standards that must be followed by
all members of society. However, policies are sometimes used to create law after
certain time has passed and the procedure approved. Moreover, by keeping in
mind the binding nature of law, it should be adhered to in creating new policies;
otherwise, that particular policy is illegal and hence, not legitimate. For
example, the policy of not allowing asylum seekers to access EU territory for
lodging asylum applications through different methods of externalised EU
border control is illegal. The existing refugee law together with customary norms
international law (such as the principle of non-refoulement) prohibit any
penalisation or deportation of those in need of international protection.
As explained earlier, according to the theory of securitisation, the security
concerns of state – such as national security – are the main targets for insecurity.
The critical theory to security, however, while acknowledging the normative
dimensions of the securitisation approach extends our attention to challenge the
existing hierarchal structures, coercion, and tyranny, embedded in the power-
relation between the sovereign state and asylum seekers.473 In this regard,
another example of a proactive approach to EU asylum policy is to address the
root causes of terrorism in a holistic manner. We should first give an answer to
the question what makes young, mostly educated, second-generation
472 In this regard, see: Jef Huysmans and Vicki Squire, ‘Migration and Security’, in Myriam Dunn Cavelty
and Thierry Balzacq (eds), Routledge Handbook of Security Studies (2nd edn, Oxford; New York:
Routledge 2017), pp. 161-171. Also, see: Michael J. Butler and Zena Wolf, ‘Introduction: Revisiting
Securitization and the ‘Constructivist Turn’ in Security Studies’, in Michael J. Butler (ed.), Securitization
Revisited: Contemporary Applications and Insights (London; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 3-27.
Also, see: Roxanna Sjöstedt, ‘Assessing Securitization Theory: Theoretical Discussions and Empirical
Developments’, in Michael J. Butler (ed.), Securitization Revisited: Contemporary Applications and
Insights (London; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 28-46. In addition, see: Blanca Camps-Febrer,
‘Counter-Terrorism as a Technology of Securitization: Approaching the Moroccan Case’, in Michael J.
Butler (ed.), Securitization Revisited: Contemporary Applications and Insights (London; New York:
Routledge, 2020), pp. 69-90.
473 Roxanna Sjöstedt, ‘Assessing Securitization Theory: Theoretical Discussions and Empirical
Developments’, in Michael J. Butler (ed.), Securitization Revisited: Contemporary Applications and
Insights (London; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 28-46, p. 33.
120
immigrants find attraction in radical Islam or in far-right extremism, so that
they are willing to employ violence to make their voice heard.
The debate over immigration and security should not take place in a vacuum;
instead, it should occur against a background of facts and comprehensive
knowledge drawn from across multiple disciplines. This includes addressing the
conditions conductive to terrorism and determining the role of the West’s
foreign policies – including the EU and its Member States – in the Middle East
and Africa and towards the majority-Muslim countries of those regions.474 For
example, we should not forget the historical contexts within which the US and
the UK considered the overthrew of the democratically-elected governments in
the Middle East such as the government of Prime Minister Mohammad
Mosaddegh in favour of strengthening the monarchical rule of the Shah,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the 1953 coup d’état.475 The intention behind this
political manipulation was securing Western interests over Iran’s oil reserves
after the nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry in 1951, and thereafter, the
confirmation of nationalisation as a domestic affair by the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) in 1952.476
Another example is the chaos created by the World powers in Afghanistan since
the Anglo-Russian ‘Great Game’ of the early twentieth century, which
accelerated during the Cold War. The main result of this power struggle was the
creation of the Mujahedeen and the Taliban, the formation of Al-Qaeda, 9/11
attacks, the immediate invasion of Afghanistan by the US and NATO coalition
(as an act of collective self-defence), the invasion of Iraq, and the formation of
ISIS.477 A very clear chain of events; however, studying foreign policy lies well
474 For more information and a deeper analysis on this issue, see, for example, Christian Koch, ‘EU Policy
in the Middle East: Unfulfilled Aspirations’, in Shahram Akbarzadeh (ed.), Routledge Handbook of
International Relations in the Middle East (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2019), pp. 222-236.
475 In this regard, see: Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-
Iranian Relations (New York: The New Press, 2013).
476 With regard to detailed information on the role of the US and UK governments and their secret
services in the 1953 coup d’état in Iran and its snowball effect on the future of Iran and the Middle East,
see:  Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations
(New York: The New Press, 2013). In this regard, also see: Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An
American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
2011). On the judgement of ICJ in the case of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which objected the claim
of the UK over the Iranian oil reserves and its industry, see: United Kingdom v. Iran (Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. Case) - Judgment of 22 July 1952 - Preliminary Objection - Judgments [1952] ICJ 2; ICJ Reports
1952, p 93; [1952] ICJ Reports 93 (22 July 1952).
477 For a brief but informative account on the modern history of Afghanistan and the events behind the
creation of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, see: Michael Rubin, ‘Who Is Responsible for the Taliban?’ (Online:
Middle East Review of International Affairs, 2002), <www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/who-is-responsible-for-the-taliban>. Also, see: Veronica L. Taylor, ‘Afghanistan’, in
Simon Chesterman, Hisashi Owada, and Ben Saul (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in
Asia and the Pacific (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 675-700, pp. 679-681
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outside the focus of this research. Nonetheless, what needs to be emphasised is
that the majority of asylum seekers coming from the Middle East are themselves
the victims of terrorism and political unrest in the region. Looking at the
ongoing proxy wars in the Middle East, one could observe that all the major
political powers in the World have a role to play.478 Hence, all should share the
responsibility – whether it be finding ways to de-escalate the violence in the
region or bearing the humanitarian consequences of this violence and warfare.
The least that these stakeholders and other interested parties could do is to let
civilians access their territories to apply for protection.
As mentioned above, policies are so powerful that sometimes they may affect
existing law in the form of changing them – for better or even for worse. In the
context of the right to seek asylum, the principle of non-refoulement is the
bedrock of refugee legal protection regime. If policies affect this principle and
the law that has been made based on that in a negative way, the legal system of
refugee protection may break. The current practices of EU actors towards
asylum show that the policies, which have emerged from the securitisation of
immigration, are negatively affecting the principle of non-refoulement,
replacing this principle with non-entrée policies.
Merely focusing on the theory of securitisation is inadequate to analyse the
effects of this theory on the law in a comprehensive manner. The way to a more
comprehensive understanding of the effects of policies on law is to move beyond
the theory of securitisation and examine closely the gaps in this theory through
the lenses of critical security studies. A critical approach to security and
securitisation is the result of recent developments in the form of a ‘constructivist
turn’ in security studies. This turn has also developed in response to the
securitisation of immigration.479 The critical and analytical methods available to
critical security studies – such as critical discourse analysis – provide the
analytical tools to discover and scrutinise the negative implications that the
securitisation of immigration has upon the right to seek asylum as a
fundamental right.480 Critical security studies highlight the challenges,
limitations, and shortcomings of the theory of securitisation from various
478 Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen, Nir T. Boms, and Sareta Ashraph, ‘Introduction: An Overview of
Stakeholders and Interests’, in Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen, Nir T. Boms, and Sareta Ashraph (eds), The
Syrian War: Between Justice and Political Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020),
pp. 1-8. In this regard, also see: Amichai Cohen, ‘Syria: International Use of Force and Humanitarian
Intervention’, in Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen, Nir T. Boms, and Sareta Ashraph (eds), The Syrian War:
Between Justice and Political Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), pp. 11-28.
479 Michael J. Butler and Zena Wolf, ‘Introduction: Revisiting Securitization and the ‘Constructivist
Turn’ in Security Studies’, in Michael J. Butler (ed.), Securitization Revisited: Contemporary
Applications and Insights (London; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 3-27.
480 Ibid, pp. 9 and 10.
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security aspects.481 The main criticism of critical security studies is towards the
conceptual framing of the ‘relation’ between immigration and security. Security
is not just a condition of state or individual; however, it refers to ‘sets of
knowledge’ and a ‘variety of discourses, technologies, and practices,’ which all
make a link between the social process of human mobility and population
movements, on the one hand, and the search for governmental control and
reinforcing sovereignty, on the other.482
Based on this outlook, different aspects of securitising immigration – especially
the securitisation of asylum seeking – could be criticised through paying
attention to everyday ‘practices,’ ‘contexts,’ and ‘power relations.’483 For
example, although human security focuses on the protection of vulnerable
people and dismantling the harmful practices of the state, this theory lacks the
element of empowering the victims of human rights violations. A critical
approach to human security, however, suggests that individuals subjected to
violation of human rights are influential political actors and legal agents, who
are capable of standing up for their own rights and winning them back – and not
simply the beneficiaries of charities and humanitarian aid with a passive
position.484
From a national security point of view, the theory of securitisation of
immigration reproduces the ‘speech-act’ of immigrants being ‘threats’ even
though its intent is to develop immigration policies that could possibly enhance
the security of hosting state as the main referent object of security.485 The
481 David Mutimer, ‘Critical Security Studies: A Schismatic History’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary
Security Studies (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 91-110, pp. 93-97.
482 Jef Huysmans and Vicki Squire, ‘Migration and Security’, in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry
Balzacq (eds), Routledge Handbook of Security Studies (2nd edn, Oxford; New York: Routledge 2017),
pp. 161-171, pp. 161-163.
483 Roxanna Sjöstedt, ‘Assessing Securitization Theory: Theoretical Discussions and Empirical
Developments’, in Michael J. Butler (ed.), Securitization Revisited: Contemporary Applications and
Insights (London; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 28-46, pp. 35. In this regard, also, see: Didier Bigo
and Elspeth Guild, ‘Policing at a Distance: Schengen Visa Policies’, in Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild
(eds), Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe (Oxford; New York: Routledge,
2016), pp. 233-263.
484 Jef Huysmans and Vicki Squire, ‘Migration and Security’, in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry
Balzacq (eds), Routledge Handbook of Security Studies (2nd edn, Oxford; New York: Routledge 2017),
pp. 161-171, pp. 163 and 164. For more criticisms of the theory of human security, see: Randolph B.
Persaud, ‘Human Security’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies (5th edn, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 144-158, pp. 153-156.
485 Jef Huysmans and Vicki Squire, ‘Migration and Security’, in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry
Balzacq (eds), Routledge Handbook of Security Studies (2nd edn, Oxford; New York: Routledge 2017),
pp. 161-171, pp. 162-164. In this regard, also, see: Roxanna Sjöstedt, ‘Assessing Securitization Theory:
Theoretical Discussions and Empirical Developments’, in Michael J. Butler (ed.), Securitization
Revisited: Contemporary Applications and Insights (London; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 28-46,
pp. 35-38. Also, see: In this regard, see, for example: Elspeth Guild, ‘Protection, Threat and Movement
of Persons: Examining the Relationship of Terrorism and Migration in EU Law after 11 September 2001’,
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scholars of critical security studies, therefore, suggest that instead of focusing
on the process of securitisation itself as an act of politics or speech-act, it would
be more pragmatic and beneficial for society to move beyond the securitisation
of immigration and look at the consequences of practices and power relations.
One way of doing so is to analyse the effects of securitising immigration on the
rights of individuals within human rights discourse.486 In this way, we would be
able to fill the gaps in the securitisation theory and respond to the criticisms
posed against it.487 Therefore, to answer the main research question of this
dissertation, in the chapters that follow, I will address the implications and
consequences of securitising immigration in the EU on the right to seek asylum
as a fundamental right.
3.4. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, for understanding the theory of securitisation of immigration, I
first gave an account on the meaning of the concept of security and its different
variations. From the point of view of the theory of knowledge, formulised by
Russell, the concept of security is immensely vague, because the understanding
of this concept is highly dependent on the spatio-temporal contexts. Moreover,
the subjects and objects of security, as well, have an influence on the meaning of
security.
Thereafter, I studied the ontology and epistemology of the concept of security.
A sub-branch of political sciences International Relations (IR) studies this
concept, more specifically under the category of security studies. IR as a field of
study is a by-product of WWI – created by political scientists at University of
Wales in Aberystwyth – to study and understand the causes of war and to find
ways to prevent it. Notwithstanding the vagueness of the concept of security,
scholars of security studies have agreed on one element in defining and
understanding security: a ‘lack of threat of war’ or a ‘lack of fear of the threat of
war.’ This understanding of security sustained until the end of the Cold War.
in Francois Crepeau, Delphine Nakache, Michael Collyer, Nathaniel H. Goetz, and Art Hansen (eds),
Forced Migration and Global Processes: A View from Forced Migration Studies (Lanham, Maryland;
Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006), pp. 295-317.
486 Jef Huysmans and Vicki Squire, ‘Migration and Security’, in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry
Balzacq (eds), Routledge Handbook of Security Studies (2nd edn, Oxford; New York: Routledge 2017),
pp. 161-171, pp. 164-168. Also, see: Elspeth Guild, ‘Protection, Threat and Movement of Persons:
Examining the Relationship of Terrorism and Migration in EU Law after 11 September 2001’, in Francois
Crepeau, Delphine Nakache, Michael Collyer, Nathaniel H. Goetz, and Art Hansen (eds), Forced
Migration and Global Processes: A View from Forced Migration Studies (Lanham, Maryland; Oxford:
Lexington Books, 2006), pp. 295-317, pp. 303-306.
487 In this regard, see, for example, Blanca Camps-Febrer, ‘Counter-Terrorism as a Technology of
Securitization: Approaching the Moroccan Case’, in Michael J. Butler (ed.), Securitization Revisited:
Contemporary Applications and Insights (London; New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 69-90.
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However, by the end of the Cold War and the nuclear arms race in the early
1990s, the range of threats to security of states expanded to cover a variety of
issues including public health, economic prosperity, environmental
degradation, and societal identity. In this new era, anything could be possibly
and potentially a matter of security, so some scholars of security studies such as
Barry Buzan and his colleagues created the theory of ‘securitisation,’ as an
alternative to the traditional security theories. According to Buzan and his
colleagues, the ‘language’ and ‘tool’ of security could tackle any issue in today’s
World.
Two decades after the creation of this theory, another scholar of security studies,
Thierry Balzacq – by collecting scholarship in the field – provided a
comprehensive definition on the theory of securitisation. According to Balzacq,
securitisation is a process known as ‘speech-act,’ through which an issue
changes its character in public opinion from an ordinary political/societal issue
to a security concern. The speech-act may include the use of a certain type of
language (the language of security) or behaving in a certain manner. The result
of the securitisation process is that normal rules no longer would apply;
whereas, the employment and use of extraordinary measures becomes justified
under these exceptional ‘emergency’ circumstances.
Since the 2015-2016 terrorist attacks, securitisation has more than ever affected
the immigration of people from the Global South to the EU. Nonetheless, we
should remain aware that the securitisation of immigration in the EU has not
occurred suddenly in a vacuum; the formation of this attitude is the outcome of
multiple factors and incidents. Economic, social or collective, and identity
securities all have contributed to the speech-act leading to the portrayal of
immigrants as threats against the security of the EU. Amongst the security
concerns of the past three decades, the threat of terrorism and fears arising from
that have leaped to the top of the political agenda of EU institutions and its
Member States. The securitisation of immigration in the EU is partly the result
of public pressure to respond urgently to the threat of terrorism. Hence, state
insecurities related to that have encouraged governmental bodies to adopt
policies, resulting in extraordinary and restrictive counterterrorism measures.
For example, different reports from Special Rapporteurs on Human Rights and
Counter-Terrorism have shown how the securitisation of immigration has
struck hard at the most basic and fundamental rules of human rights such as the
prohibition of discrimination and the principle of non-refoulement.
Applying Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretivism and law as integrity to the
topic of this dissertation, one could analyse the perceived tension between
fulfilling the right to seek asylum, on the one hand, and safeguarding national
security, on the other, as the difference between the matters of principle and
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policy, respectively. In this regard, Dworkin offers a tool for interpretation to
practitioners and to those whose decisions matter. Using Dworkin’s scale to
decide on asylum cases and the right to seek asylum – as a constitutional and
fundamental human right – is a matter of law. Henceforth, the interpretation of
the right to seek asylum and its juxtaposition against national security – which
is a matter of policy – must rely on the powerful ideas and principles of ‘human
dignity’ and ‘political equality.’ Not taking the right to seek asylum seriously thus
constitutes gross ‘injustice;’ if we simply allow matters of social policy or
efficiency to infringe this right. Based on this reading of law, a critical security
study outlook helps me discover and analyse the negative implications of
securitising immigration upon the right to seek asylum in the following
chapters.
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4. THE SECURITISATION OF IMMIGRATION IN EU
LAW AND PRACTICE
4.1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter of this dissertation, I elaborated on the concept of
security, the theory of securitisation, and what the securitisation of immigration
means. At the end of that chapter, I discussed that critical security studies have
been exposing the damaging practical effects of securitisation on the human
rights discourse. The main aim of this school of thought is to move beyond the
process of securitisation itself as a process speech-act, and instead, to focus on
addressing the implications of securitisation on the enjoyment of rights. The
ultimate goal of this ‘moving beyond’ is to create pragmatic ways, through which
right holders could be active agents in the realisation of their rights rather than
simply being passive objects to the power of duty bearers.
As the geographical scope of this research suggests, I will analyse the practices
of the two courts in the EU dealing with fundamental and human rights, i.e. the
CJEU and the ECtHR. The main aim of this chapter is to unveil that the EU and
its Member States, by bringing security as an excuse, are undermining the
position of the right to seek asylum as a fundamental human right. One of the
reasons for this claim is the use of the language of security within the EU law on
asylum and the practice of EU actors, especially within the jurisprudence of the
CJEU.
After a critical discursive  analysis of EU law on asylum, in this chapter, I will
critically analyse the most important asylum case law related to the right to seek
asylum within the jurisprudence of the CJEU meaning the case of X and X v.
Belgium (2017). Article 18 the EU Charter is the stipulation of the right to seek
asylum as a fundamental right. However, looking at its reasoning in the case of
X and X v. Belgium, the CJEU removes the burden for violating the right to seek
asylum from the shoulder of EU Member States by granting a full power of
discretion on asylum-related matters to the States. This position of the Court
makes Article 18 of the EU Charter meaningless because the CJEU, as the
enforcing power behind the Charter, is not willing to take an independent stand
and safeguard the protection of this article. The main question, thus, arising
here is, if gaining access to the territory of EU for the purpose of asylum
protection is within the discretion of individual States, why did the drafters of
the EU Charter included the right to seek asylum in this law?
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4.2. THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE EU CHARTER OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Article 2 of the TEU places emphasis on the ‘respect for human rights’ –
including the rights of persons belonging to ‘minorities’ – as  one of the
constituting values of the EU. Adding to the ‘respect for human rights,’ the same
article explicitly states that the EU is founded on other values such as ‘respect
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law.’ Article 7
of the same document provides for some mechanisms in order to determine the
existence of and to sanction any ‘serious and persistent breach’ of the founding
values of the EU. Once a serious and persistent breach of the EU values is
determined, the Council of the European Union (the Council) acting by a
qualified majority may decide to suspend certain rights of the Member State in
question. These rights are those that derive from the application of the EU
Treaties to the Member State, including the voting rights of the representative
of the government of that Member State in the Council.488
In addition to the determination and sanction mechanisms mentioned under
Article 7 of the TEU, when it comes particularly to respecting human rights,
Article 6(1) of the same document gives a binding and authoritative power to the
EU Charter. With the same legal value as the EU Treaties, the Charter is a
primary source of EU law. Published in the Official Journal of the European
Communities on 18 December 2000 (2000/C 364/01), the Charter became
legally binding when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 01 December
2009.489 By incorporating all the rights set out in the EU Charter into the TFEU,
the EU places great emphasis on all Member States respecting fundamental
rights – those mentioned in the Charter.490 Considering this position, the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights constitutes the EU’s moral foundation.491
Accordingly, the Charter stipulates:
[The EU,] conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, is founded on the
indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it
488 Paragraphs 1-3 of Article 7 of the TEU.
489 The European Parliament, ‘Fact Sheets on the European Union: The Protection of Fundamental
Rights in the EU’, <www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/146/European-Union-Charter>.
490 Simon Usherwood and John Pinder, The European Union: A Very Short Introduction (4th edn,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 54.
491 Marie-José Schmitt, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Reading Guide in
the light of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
and of the European Social Charter (Strasbourg: Conference of the INGOs of the Council of Europe,
2008), pp. 10 and 11.
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is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual
at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by
creating an area of freedom, security and justice.492
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Luxembourg is the
judiciary body of the EU. As the final authority in relation to the main EU
Treaties, the Charter, and other sources of EU law, the CJEU assures that EU
law is interpreted and applied consistently across the Union. Moreover, the
CJEU ensures that all EU institutions and Member States do what EU law
requires.493 The Preamble of the EU Charter gives the jurisdiction over the
interpretation of the Charter to the CJEU and the national courts in the Member
States, with due regard to the explanations prepared under the authority of the
Praesidium of the Convention.494
In spite of the fact that protecting fundamental rights is one of the underlying
principles of the EU, whether the CJEU is a human rights court is a matter of
serious debate. As mentioned above, Article 2 of the TEU states that, the EU ‘is
founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of
persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member
States in a society, in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice,
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’ In this regard,
Williams reminds us that the CJEU is not a creature of human rights; neither
was it ever constructed for realising human rights. He asserts that, instead, the
human rights protection agenda was added later on to the remit of the Court
when the EU project widened from an initially economic cooperation to also
including matters of societal justice.495 In fact, the whole idea behind the Treaty
of Rome or the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
(EEC)496 was to establish a ‘system for capitalist free market economic
cooperation.’497
492 The Preamble of the EU Charter is legally as binding as the main text and articles of this document.
In this regard, see: The Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
published in the Official Journal of the European Communities on 18 December 2000 (2000/C 364/01).
493 European Union, ‘Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)’, <europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en>.
494 The Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, published in the Official
Journal of the European Communities on 18 December 2000 (2000/C 364/01).
495 Andrew Williams, ‘Human Rights in the EU’, in Anthony Arnull and Damian Chalmers (eds), The
Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 249-270, p.
250.
496 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty or the Treaty of Rome),
Document 11957E/TXT (EEC).
497 Andrew Williams, ‘Human Rights in the EU’, in Anthony Arnull and Damian Chalmers (eds), The
Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 249-270, p.
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However, with adopting the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 and the full expansion of
the EU project to a societal enterprise, the EU founders concluded that the moral
legitimacy and a value-based identity of the EU would be in danger if the issues
of fundamental and basic human rights had continued to be ignored by EU
law.498 Since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009, the EU Charter has
become the main legal source of human and fundamental rights within EU law.
Hence, the CJEU stands to be the main EU judicial authority in charge of
adjudicating human rights issues and fundamental rights matters falling under
the jurisdiction of the EU Charter.499
Considering the legal nature of the EU Charter as a primary source of EU law500
and based on the principles of the ‘primacy of EU law’ and its ‘direct effect,’ the
provisions of the EU Charter have supremacy over national law.501 The principle
of the ‘primacy of EU law’ was established by the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) in the landmark case of Costa v. ENEL in 1964. Accordingly, ‘[…] all EU
law has absolute and unconditional precedence and should always be given
precedence over all conflicting provisions of national law. The latter, therefore,
can never be invoked to escape the application of EU law. This obligation to
award priority to EU law applies to all state bodies, legislative, executive, and
judicial.’502
The principle of the ‘direct effect of EU law’ was also created by the ECJ in 1963
in the case of Van Gend en Loos v. the Netherlands. In this case, the Court ruled
252. Also, see: Andrew Williams, The Ethos of Europe: Values, Law and Justice in the EU (Cambridge;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 110 and 111.
498 Andrew Williams, ‘Human Rights in the EU’, in Anthony Arnull and Damian Chalmers (eds), The
Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 249-270, pp.
250 and 251. According to Williams, the claims thereafter made by the ECJ, the EU Commission, and
the Council that human rights were fundamental in the creation of the EU is a total ‘myth.’ In this regard,
see: Andrew Williams, The Ethos of Europe: Values, Law and Justice in the EU (Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 110.
499 For further insights on how the CJEU has transformed from a tribunal of economic and commercial
matters to become a court of human rights and fundamental rights adjudication, see: Gráinne De Búrca,
‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator?’
(2013) 20(2) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, pp. 168-184. Also, see: Sergio
Carrera, Marie De Somer, and Bilyana Petkova, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union as a
Fundamental Rights Tribunal: Challenges for the Effective Delivery of Fundamental Rights in the Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2012) Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Papers in Liberty
and Security in Europe, ISBN 978-94-6138-222-1, pp. 5-8.
500 Thomas Horsley, The Court of Justice of the European Union as an Institutional Actor: Judicial
Lawmaking and its Limits (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 24.
501 Monica Claes, ‘The Primacy of EU Law in European and National Law’, in Anthony Arnull and
Damian Chalmers (eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), pp. 178-211.
502 Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL (Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica or the National Electricity
Board of Italy), European Court of Justice (ECJ), Judgement of the Court, decision of 15 July 1964
(referred to as ‘Costa v. ENEL’).
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that the EC law in question (Article 12 of the EEC) had a ‘direct application
within the territory of Member State,’ due to the spirit of the Treaty – meaning
the establishment of a ‘Common Market and of institutions with sovereign
rights.’503 Therefore, the EU Charter – as a primary source of EU law – has a
direct effect and applicability in the legal order of individual EU Member
States.504
4.3. THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM WITHIN THE CONTEXT
OF THE SECURITISATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE EU
4.3.1. THE PARADOX OF PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM
UNDER THE EU ASYLUM LAW
Although based on the ECHR and other human rights instruments (both
European and international), the EU Charter has been not only complementary,
but also extremely innovative to legal sources by including new categories of
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Article 6(3) of the TEU reiterates that
the fundamental human rights guaranteed under the ECHR constitute the
general principles of EU law, because these fundamental rights have originated
from the constitutional traditions common to all Member States. To emphasise
the important role of the ECHR on EU law in general, and on the system of
human rights protection established by the EU Charter specifically, Article 6(2)
of the TEU obliges the EU to accede to the ECHR. Moreover, the EU Charter in
Article 52(3) and (4) explicitly recognises all human rights and fundamental
freedoms included in the ECHR and those coming from ‘the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States.’
The EU Charter encompasses the areas of human rights, which the ECHR had
ignored. In this regard, some issues such as disability, age, sexual identities, and
gender orientation as grounds for discrimination,505 the access to EU
503 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (the Netherlands),
European Court of Justice (ECJ), Judgement of the Court, decision of 5 February 1963.
504 For detailed information on the principle of the direct effect of EU law, see: Allan Rosas and Lorna
Armati, EU Constitutional Law: An Introduction (3rd ed., London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018), pp.
135-143. Also, see: Dorota Leczykiewicz, ‘Effectiveness of EU Law before National Courts: Direct Effect,
Effective Judicial Protection, and State Liability’, in Anthony Arnull and Damian Chalmers (eds), The
Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 212-248, pp.
212-219. For more information on the direct effect of the EU Charter as a primary source of EU law, see:
Thomas Horsley, The Court of Justice of the European Union as an Institutional Actor: Judicial
Lawmaking and its Limits (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 162 and 163.
505 For detailed analysis in this regard, see: Thomas Horsley, The Court of Justice of the European Union
as an Institutional Actor: Judicial Lawmaking and its Limits (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2018), pp. 52 and 53.
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documents,506 the protection of personal data and access to data,507 the right to
good administration,508 and the right to asylum have all been explicitly
recognised as fundamental rights under the EU Charter.509 For example,
paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the EU Charter – under the title of ‘non-
discrimination’ – stipulates that, ‘[a]ny discrimination based on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language,
religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be
prohibited.’ Article 42 of the EU Charter – under the title ‘right of access to
documents’ – stipulates that, ‘[a]ny citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal
person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, has a right of
access to documents of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the
Union, whatever their medium.’
Keeping these foundations in mind, the part of the EU Charter relevant to the
topic of this dissertation is Article 18. This Article falls under Title II of the
Charter on the subject of ‘Freedoms,’ with the general title of the ‘Right to
asylum,’ and makes no distinction between the ‘right to seek asylum’ and ‘enjoy
asylum.’ Although the drafters of the EU Charter were aware of the division that
the 1948 UDHR had made in this regard, they consciously chose to keep to a
general title for Article 18 – meaning the ‘right to asylum.’510 Therefore, it is
reasonable to claim that this article includes both the right to seek and enjoy
asylum once asylum is granted. Whenever I refer to Article 18 of the EU Charter,
the ‘asylum seeking’ part of this right is intended, since what I study here is the
implications of the securitisation of immigration on the right to seek asylum in
the EU. Having this clarification in mind, Article 18 of the EU Charter reads:
The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva
Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the
status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and the
506 Article 42 of the EU Charter.
507 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 8 of the EU Charter, besides recognising ‘the right to the protection of
personal data’, stipulates that ‘[s]uch data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law’. In
continuation of Article 8(2), the Charter provides that ‘everyone has the right of access to data, which
has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified’.
508 Article 41 of the EU Charter specifies the components of the right to good administration.
509 Article 18 of the EU Charter is the legal basis for the right to asylum recognised within EU law as a
fundamental human right.
510 Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Brussels, 11 October 2000 (18.10) (OR.
fr) CHARTE 4473/00. Text of the explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter as set out in
CHARTE 4487/00 CONVENT 50. <www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/04473_en.pdf>. For a
detailed analysis in this regard, see: Maarten den Heijer, ‘Article 18 – Right to Asylum’, in Steve Peers,
Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner, and Angela Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A
Commentary (Oxford; Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2014), pp. 519-542, pp. 523 and 524.
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
Treaties’).511
Including the right to asylum in the text of the EU Charter under Article 18 is
based on Article 63(1)512 of the Treaty establishing the European Community
(TEC).513 According to Article 63(1) of this treaty, the 1951 Refugee Convention
and its Protocol of 1967 should be used as a reference point for adopting EU
asylum policies and all legislation on asylum within EU law. Following the TEC’s
lead, the first paragraph of Article 78 of the TFEU – substituting Article 63 of
the TEC – stipulates that:
The EU shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and
temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-
country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with
the principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to
the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.514 [Emphasis added.]
A literal reading of Article 18 of the EU Charter suggests a general ambit for the
right to asylum. Taken alone, this Article does not guarantee a substantial right
to asylum; but instead, it refers to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol
and the main EU Treaties. As a well-established matter of EU law, the EU
Charter does not extend the competence of the EU and its institutions beyond
the Treaties and subsequent legislation.515 Article 18 of the EU Charter, together
with Article 78 of the TFEU, set the legal foundation for developing a system of
secondary sources on asylum – both binding and soft law – within EU law. This
collection of law is the ‘Common European Asylum System’ (CEAS),516 which
includes various types of EU secondary legislation as a part of a corpus of EU
law called the ‘EU Asylum Acquis.’ The EU acquis is a ‘body of common rights
and obligations that bind all EU States.’ This body of law, which is constantly
evolving, is comprised of the content, principles and political objectives of EU
Treaties, legislation adopted pursuant to the Treaties, the case law of the Court
of Justice, declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union, the international
agreements concluded by the EU, and the agreements between Member
511 Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Published in the Official
Journal of the European Communities on 18 December 2000 (2000/C 364/01).
512 Article 78 of the TFEU replaces this article.
513 Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), published in the Official Journal of the
European Communities on 24 December 2002 (2002/c 325/01).
514 Article 78(1) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU), published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 7 June 2016 (2016/C 326/47).
515 Thomas Horsley, The Court of Justice of the European Union as an Institutional Actor: Judicial
Lawmaking and its Limits (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 233-235.
516 The European Commission, ‘Migration and Home Affairs: Common European Asylum System’,
<ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en>.
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States.517 Amongst them, the following documents are of utmost importance
when it comes to the realisation of the elements composing the right to seek
asylum.518 It is noteworthy stating here that this list is not exhaustive and is
given in reverse chronology, starting from the most recent, as follows:
· The 2016 Schengen Border Codes;519
· The 2013 EU Asylum Procedures Directive;520
· The 2013 Reception Conditions Directive;521
· The 2013 Dublin Regulation;522
· The 2013 Eurodac Regulation;523
· The 2011 EU Qualification Directive;524
· The 2001 Temporary Protection Directive.525
The existence of an acquis such as the CEAS might create an assumption that
the implantation of Article 18 of the EU Charter is a harmonised,
comprehensive, and well-functioning area of law and practice in the EU. In stark
contrast, however, the realisation of the right to seek asylum, in practice within
the EU Member States, is far from a harmonised or well-functioning
517 The European Commission, ‘Migration and Home Affairs: Acquis’, <ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/e-
library/glossary/acquis_en>.
518 The components of the right to seek asylum were mentioned in Chapter 2 under Subsection 2.3.1.
These elements are in Table 3 under the same subsection.
519 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a union
code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders.
520 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for
granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), 26 June 2013.
521 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down
standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast), 26 June 2013.
522 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining
an application for international protection lodged in one of the member states by a third-country
national or a stateless person (recast), 26 June 2013.
523 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the
Establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the Comparison of Fingerprints for the Effective Application of
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member
State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member
States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac
data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and
amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational
management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (recast).
524 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on
standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary
protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), 13 December 2011.
525 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary
protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of
efforts between member states in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, 20 July
2001.
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orchestration.526 In fact, the implementation of the right to seek asylum under
Article 18 of the EU Charter is a highly contested and fragmented sphere of law,
which in reality divides into twenty-seven ways of implementation – as many as
the number of EU Member States.527
Nevertheless, considering the position of the CJEU as the guardian of the
Charter, one may be inclined to think that the Court would provide a kind of
interpretation, which would harmonise the practices of EU Member States. In
addition, we may wish for an interpretation, which according to Article 18 of the
EU Charter, would crystallise the right to seek asylum without contradicting –
in any way – the most important legal instrument on refugee protection,
meaning the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. However, by
looking at the EU Treaties and some secondary legislation within the CEAS, we
are able to trace a dominant securitisation shadow affecting the EU law and
policies on asylum. To elaborate, as follows, I will scrutinise how, in reality, the
right to seek asylum is impossible to truly implement in the EU, which
unavoidably leads to this right being rendered ineffective and therefore,
meaningless in practice.
Even though Article 18 of the EU Charter explicitly guarantees the right to seek
asylum as a fundamental right, the EU law does not provide for pragmatic ways,
in practice and in reality, to facilitate the arrival of asylum seekers for fulfilling
the right to seek asylum.528 Those seeking asylum in the EU are mainly nationals
of countries who require an entry visa529 or a residence permit accompanied
with a valid travel document530 to enter into the EU territory. The EU Regulation
2018/1806, in its first Annex, has listed the third-country nationals who must
526 Helen O’Nions, Asylum – A Right Denied: A Critical Analysis of European Asylum Policy (Farnham:
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2016), pp. 100-132. Also, see: Kris Pollet, ‘Accessing Fair and Efficient
Asylum Procedures in the EU: Legal Safeguards and Loopholes in the Common European Asylum
System’, in Maria O’Sullivan and Dallal Stevens (eds), States, the Law and Access to Refugee Protection:
Fortresses and Fairness (Portland: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), pp. 137-166.
527 Helen O’Nions, Asylum – A Right Denied: A Critical Analysis of European Asylum Policy (Farnham:
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2016), pp. 125-132.
528 Erik Fribergh and Morten Kjaerum, Handbook on European law relating to Asylum, Borders and
Immigration (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016), pp. 35-37.
529 For more detailed information on the citizenship of the majority of asylum applicants in the EU since
2013, see the website of Eurostat: Eurostat: Statistics Explained, ‘Asylum Statistics, Citizenship of first-
time applicants: largest numbers from Syria, Afghanistan, and Venezuela’,
<ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Citizenship_of_first-
time_applicants:_largest_numbers_from_Syria.2C_Afghanistan_and_Venezuela>.
530 Regulation (EU) 2017/1954 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017
amending council regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits
for third-country nationals, published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 01 November
2017 (L 286/9).
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hold a visa when entering the EU external borders.531 Furthermore, without
gaining access to the territories of the EU Member States, it is practically
impossible to lodge an asylum application in the EU.532 Because of this
paradoxical vicious circle and the counter-intuitive EU law on asylum, these
individuals, who often do not qualify for ordinary visas or entry permits, are
compelled to cross external EU borders in an irregular or unauthorised manner.
Further, EU law has repeatedly criminalised crossing the external borders of the
EU in an irregular or unauthorised manner. Because of this criminalisation of
border crossing, the EU institutions and Member States have adopted
immigration policies and practices that are heavily securitised or even
militarised. The existing literature in the field of critical migration studies have
considered the labelling of undocumented immigrants as ‘criminals’ because of
their irregular migratory status, as the ‘criminalisation of immigration’ or
‘crimmigration,’ which in itself is a form of securitisation of immigration.533 The
criminalisation of immigration in EU law is linked closely to the crimes of
human smuggling and human trafficking. This is exactly where a clear clash with
the established international standards governing the protection of asylum
seekers comes to attention.
According to the so-called ‘non-penalisation clause’ stipulated under Article
31(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention – which in itself is based on the principle
of non-discrimination – no penalties or sanctions shall be imposed on asylum
seekers based on their ‘immigration status.’ In other words, whether the entry
or residence of an asylum seeker is inhumanely labelled as ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’
should not affect the full enjoyment of all components of the right to seek
asylum. I shall list these components in details here for a greater emphasis:
· The right to enter to the EU or to gain access to the EU territory for the
purpose of asylum seeking;
531 In this regard, see: Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14
November 2018 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing
the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (codification),
published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 28 November 2018 (L 303/39).
532 Marialena Tsirli and Michael O’Flaherty, Handbook on European Law relating to Asylum, Borders
and Immigration (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020), pp. 44-46. In this
regard, also see: Erik Fribergh and Morten Kjaerum, Handbook on European law relating to Asylum,
Borders and Immigration (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016), pp. 35-37.
533 Chiara Maria Ricci, ‘Criminalising Solidarity? Smugglers, Migrants and Rescuers in the Reform of
the ‘Facilitators’ Package’’, in Valsamis Mitsilegas, Violeta Moreno-Lax, and Niovi Vavoula (eds),
Securitising Asylum Flows: Deflection, Criminalisation and Challenges for Human Rights (Leiden:
Brill Publishers, 2020), pp. 34-56. In this regard, also see: Magdalena Kmak, ‘Crimmigration and
Othering in the Finnish Law and Practice of Immigration Detention’ (2018) 15 No Foundations: An
Interdisciplinary Journal of Law and Justice, pp. 1-22. Also, see: Valsamis Mitsilegas, The
Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Challenges for Human Rights and the Rule of Law (London:
Springer, 2015). Also, see: Elspeth Guild, Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Human Rights
Implications (Paris: The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009).
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· The right to have access to asylum procedures including the RSD
procedures performed by authorised officials such as national
immigration services or the UNHCR-assigned mandate holders;
· The right to temporary residence in the EU for duration of asylum
application procedure;
· The prohibition of expulsion and the full compliance of the EU and its
Member States with obligations under the principle of non-refoulement;
· The right to liberty and personal security for asylum seekers including the
freedom of movement within the territory of the country of asylum and
the prohibition of arbitrary and indefinite detention of asylum seekers;
· The right to an appeal in the case of receiving a negative decision on an
asylum application as part of procedural rights;
· The right to a fair trial and an effective remedy in situations where any of
substantial and procedural rights are allegedly infringed;
· The right to an effective remedy in situations where the violation of any of
the above-mentioned rights are proved in an independent judicial or
administrative trial.
Henceforth, based on Article 31(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the
enjoyment of the right to seek asylum and its constituting components should
be implemented with no reserve to or with no discrimination on the ground of
the individual’s immigration status. Regardless of the existence of the ‘non-
penalisation clause’ by the virtue of Article 31(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convection,
the EU Treaties and in following them, the CEAS and its legislation have divided
immigrants to Europe – including those seeking international protection – into
two distinct categories of ‘legal’ versus ‘illegal’ immigrants. According to Article
79 of the TFEU:
1. The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all
stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-
country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and
enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human
beings.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council,
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt
measures in the following areas:
(b) the definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing legally
in a Member State, including the conditions governing freedom of
movement and of residence in other Member States;
(c) illegal immigration and unauthorised residence, including removal and
repatriation of persons residing without authorisation;
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(d) combating trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.534
[Emphasis added.]
The so-called ‘legal immigrants’ are those who go through visa application
procedures and obtain a visa to enter into the EU. Whereas, the inhumanely
labelled ‘illegal immigrants’ are those who for one reason or another are unable
or unwilling to go through these procedures. As we know from the established
international legal regime of refugee protection and the 1951 Convention-based
definition of refugee, asylum seekers have to leave their countries of origin in
despair and due to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution.’ In addition, asylum
seekers are ‘unable’ or ‘unwilling’ to go through the official bureaucratic
procedures of obtaining ‘legal’ travel documents. In this regard, Article 1(A)(2)
of the 1951 Refugee Convention defines a ‘refugee’ as:
[…] a person, who […] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to
it.535
Therefore, the element of ‘fear’ from the authorities of the country of origin and
not trusting them are the determining factors for being an asylum seeker and
later on a refugee. In simple terms, asylum seekers are not tourists or leisure
travellers, nor are they travelling for business activities, who could plan their
journey months in advance and make rational choices during the path. Asylum
seekers are individuals with an urgent need of protection from persecution;
these people have been forced to flee their countries of origin in order to save
their lives, or the lives of their family members, and their very basic human
rights and freedoms. Therefore, going to the authorities of the country of origin
to obtain official travel documents would indeed expose them to a greater
danger of persecution, and for this reason, the 1951 Refugee Convention has
naturally included a ‘non-penalisation clause.’
Furthermore, following Article 79 of the TFEU, the EU secondary legislation in
the fields of asylum and immigration law have continued to categorise
immigrants into two groups of ‘legal’ versus ‘illegal’ immigrants. This securitised
perspective of EU law has resulted in further restrictive legislation in the area of
534 In this regard, see paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU), published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 7 June 2016 (2016/C
326/47).
535 Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees.
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border control and border security. Articles 1 and 2 of the 2016 Schengen
Borders Code have divided EU borders into two types of ‘internal’ and ‘external’
borders, by imposing greater emphasis on external border control for the
purpose of securing the freedom of movement of persons within the EU, and for
creating Europe as an ‘area of freedom, security, and justice.’536
Notwithstanding the fact that Article 4 of the 2016 Schengen Borders Code
reminds Member States of their obligations towards those in need of
international protection, the remainder of this legislation places all its emphasis
on the importance of preventing ‘illegal immigration’ and safeguarding the
‘internal security of the EU’ through ‘external border control.’ While mentioning
the compliance with the fundamental rights of those in need of international
protection only once,537 the 2016 Schengen Borders Code and its annexes
repeat more than twenty times that border control mechanisms are in the
direct interests of Member States in combating ‘illegal immigration’ and
protecting the ‘internal security’ of Europe. In this regard, we can refer, for
example, to paragraph six of the preamble of the 2016 Schengen Code, Article
8(3)(c)(iii), and Article 13(1) and (4) of the same document. According to these
provisions, the EU legislator implies that asylum seeking is an excuse for illegal
immigration to Europe, which is automatically a threat to the internal security
of the EU.
As explained above, EU law has divided immigrants into the two categories of
‘legal’ and hence, ‘desirable’ versus ‘illegal’ and therefore, ‘undesirable’
immigrants. In addition to labelling the latter group ‘illegal,’ EU law has given a
‘security threat’ character to this category of immigrants by positioning them
alongside human traffickers, smugglers, and the perpetrators of other organised
crimes such as drug traffickers and terrorists. This is, in addition to considering
so-called ‘illegal immigrants’ potential threats to the national security, public
policy, public health, and international relations of Member States. In this
regard, for example, paragraph six of the preamble of the 2016 Schengen
Borders Code reiterates that, ‘[b]order control is in the interest not only of the
Member State at whose external borders it is carried out but of all Member
536 For an overall discussion on the creation of EU as an area of ‘freedom, security, and justice’, see: Neil
Walker, ‘In Search of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Constitutional Odyssey’, in Neil
Walker (ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press,
2004), pp. 3-37. In this regard, also see: Rens van Munster, Securitizing Immigration: The Politics of
Risk in the EU (Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 65-97.
537 Article 4 of the 2016 Schengen Borders Code with the title of ‘Fundamental Rights’ reads that in
applying this Regulation, Member States shall act in full compliance with relevant Union law, including
the Charter, relevant international law, including the 1951 Geneva Convention, obligations related to
access to international protection, in particular the principle of non-refoulement, and fundamental
rights.
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States which have abolished internal border control.’ In addition, the same
paragraph continues with the promise that, ‘[b]order control should help to
combat illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings and to prevent any
threat to the Member States’ internal security, public policy, public health and
international relations.’538 Henceforth, it is feasible to claim that the EU
immigration agenda and its asylum acquis, which insist on immigration being
an issue of crime and security, clearly demonstrate the obvious case of the
securitisation of immigration in the EU. The process of the securitisation of
immigration includes various instances of speech-acts as showed above.
Moreover, by using the language of ‘fight,’ ‘war,’ or ‘combat’ against ‘illegal’
immigration in many contexts related to the management of population
movement into Europe. At legislative level, we could refer back to paragraph six
of the preamble of the 2016 Schengen Borders Code, according to which
combatting illegal immigration could be achieved through external border
control. At executive level and within the practice of EU institutions, we could
exemplify the establishment of the Joint Operational Team Mare (JOT Mare)
launched by Europol. According to Europol, JOT Mare is an intelligence-based
operation, which is shaped according to some intelligence information revealing
that organised criminal groups are actively facilitating the transport of irregular
migrants across the Mediterranean, and that these groups have links to human
trafficking, drugs, firearms, and even terrorism.539
The emphasis of the law and practices of EU agencies and some Member States
on external border surveillance, flourishing businesses and technologies related
to controlling the movement of immigration are other instances of securitising
immigration into the EU. In this regard, for example, we could name the
creation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in 2005,
with the main mandate of conducting border control at external Schengen
borders.540 In November 2019, the EU Council officially adopted the
Commission’s proposal to reinforce Frontex to have a standing corps of ten
538 With regard to in-depth discussions on how the emergence and the development of European politics
on internal security has created an environment of threat and the securitisation of immigration, see:
Rens van Munster, Securitizing Immigration: The Politics of Risk in the EU (Basingstoke, Hampshire;
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 16-64. In this regard, also see: Kay Hailbronner, ‘Asylum
Law in the Context of a European Migration Policy’, in Neil Walker (ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom,
Security, and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 41-88, pp. 41-43.
539 For more information in this regard, see: Europol, ‘Joint operational team launched to combat
irregular migration in the Mediterranean’, <www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/joint-
operational-team-launched-to-combat-irregular-migration-in-mediterranean>.
540 The EU Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 developed the Frontex.
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thousand border guards.541 The collection of biometric data and the EU
Commission’s controversial proposal for creating ‘Smart Borders’ are more
examples of the acts to further securitise immigration into the EU. The mass
collection of biometric data and the long-term storage of such data (in the case
of asylum seekers, for example, their biometric data is kept in the European
Dactyloscopy database known as ‘Eurodac’) is highly criticised for the alleged
violation of the right to privacy, and is considered to be against the protection of
personal data.542 The challenges of managing data related to immigration
control pushed the EU towards establishing the European Union Agency for the
Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice (eu-LISA) in 2011.543
An increasing trend in the privatisation and commercialisation of migration
control at EU external borders has raised serious concerns with regard to the
alleged violation of human rights of immigrants and particularly refugees and
asylum seekers, since the latter group are outlawed and considered ‘illegals.’
This ‘clandestine’ situation makes one wonder who ultimately benefits and at
what cost. The stakeholders involved here are European states and the EU,
private and/or multinational corporations, and asylum seekers. In this
environment of securitisation, criminalisation, privatisation, and the
commercialisation of immigration to the EU, this is what is happening in reality.
541 The European Commission, ‘EU delivers on stronger European Border and Coast Guard to support
Member States’, <//ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_19_6237>. Also, see
the EU Regulation 2019/1896 on the expansion of Frontex.
542 For example, in a campaign mobilised by thirty-one NGOs, the European Parliament is urged to
rethink plans to overhaul Eurodac. In this regard, see: The Guardian, ‘EU ‘seeking to turn migrant
database into mass surveillance tool’’, <www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/08/eu-seeking-to-
turn-migrant-database-into-mass-surveillance-tool>.
543 Julian Kamasa, ‘New Technologies for Border Controls in Europe’ (2019) 255 CSS Analyses in
Security Policy, pp. 2-4. Also, see: Elspeth Guild, ‘The Dark Side of Globalisation: Do EU Border
Controls Contribute to Death in the Mediterranean?’, in Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Jens Vedsted-
Hansen (eds), Human Rights and the Dark Side of Globalisation: Transnational Law Enforcement and
Migration Control (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 312-331. Moreover, see: Elspeth Guild,
‘Data Protection, Privacy and the Foreigner’, in Sionaidh Douglas-Scott and Nicholas Hatzis (eds),
Research Handbook on EU Law and Human Rights (Cheltenham; Northampton, Massachusetts:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), pp. 380-393. Also, see: Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera, and Florian
Geyer, ‘The Commission’s New Border Package: Does it take us one step closer to a ‘cyber-fortress
Europe’?’ (2008) 154 Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Policy Brief. For a more critical
analysis on the digitalisation of borders and the use of technologies in controlling EU frontiers, see:
Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild, ‘Introduction: Policing in the Name of Freedom’, in Didier Bigo and
Elspeth Guild (eds), Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe (Oxford; New York:
Routledge, 2016), pp. 1-13. In this regard, also see: Didier Bigo, ‘Frontier Controls in the European
Union: Who is in Control?’, in Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (eds), Controlling Frontiers: Free
Movement into and within Europe (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 49-99. In addition, see:
Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild, ‘Policing at a Distance: Schengen Visa Policies’, in Didier Bigo and
Elspeth Guild (eds), Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe (Oxford; New York:
Routledge, 2016), pp. 233-263.
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The first category reinforces its power and further emphasises its sovereignty
(and wins public opinion), and the second entity makes tremendous monetary
gain; whereas, the latter group pays the price of power and money for the benefit
of the first two groups through endangering their lives and losing their most
fundamental freedoms and human rights.544 As evidence, some anthropological
accounts have shown how the immigration industry is dependent on the
illegal status of a certain category of people (in this case asylum seekers) as the
‘economic value’ of this unethical business.545
The current policies of voluntary and involuntary return or repatriation of
immigrants to the country of origin – or to the last non-EU country of departure
– also exemplifies the securitisation of immigration into the EU. One instance
of these policies is the establishment of a European Return Fund in 2007 to
facilitate the return of immigrants to their countries of origin.546 To add, we
could refer to the EU’s extraterritorial control of immigration547 through the
non-arrival or non-entrée policies of agreements with third countries,548 non-
rescue policies, and the interception, disruption and return of boats carrying
migrants on the high seas known as examples of the extraterritorial control of
EU borders.549
544 On how the European border control has turned into a business with little or no consideration for
human rights of asylum seekers, see: Georg Menz, ‘The Neoliberalized State and the Growth of the
Migration Industry’, in Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen (eds), The Migration
Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2013),
pp. 108-127.
545 Ruben Andersson, Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe
(Oakland: University of California Press, 2014), pp. 66-97. For further analysis in this regard, see:
Patrizia Zanoni and Tammar B. Zilber, ‘What Are We Missing? Exploring Ethnographic Possibilities
beyond MOS Conventions’, in Raza Mir, Anne-Laure Fayard (eds), The Routledge Companion to
Anthropology and Business (New York; Oxford: Routledge, 2021), pp. 394-413.
546 Decision No 575/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 on
establishing the European Return Fund for the period 2008 to 2013.
547 On the challenges of human rights protection in the cases of externalisation of border control, see:
Maarten den Heijer, ‘Europe beyond its Borders: Refugee and Human Rights Protection in
Extraterritorial Immigration Control’, in Bernhard Ryan and Valsamis Mitsilegas (eds), Extraterritorial
Immigration Control: Legal Challenges (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 169-198.
548 With regard to an in-depth analysis on the externalisation of the EU border control in the form of
deals with third-countries, see: Anna Liguori, Migration Law and the Externalization of Border
Controls: European State Responsibility (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2019). Also, see: Violeta
Moreno-Lax, Accessing Asylum in Europe: Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under
EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 173-178.
549 In this regard, see: Marie-Laure Basilien-Gainche, ‘Leave and Let Die: The EU Banopticon Approach
to Migrants at Sea’, in Violeta Moreno-Lax and Efthymios Papastavridis (eds), ‘Boat Refugees’ and
Migrants at Sea: A Comprehensive Approach: Integrating Maritime Security with Human Rights
(Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2016), pp. 327-352. Also, see: Violeta Moreno-Lax, Accessing Asylum in Europe:
Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2017), pp. 188-199. Also, see: Jasmine Coppens, ‘Interception of Migrant Boats at Sea’, in Violeta
Moreno-Lax and Efthymios Papastavridis (eds), ‘Boat Refugees’ and Migrants at Sea: A Comprehensive
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The ultra-securitised and militarised measures against irregular immigration in
the EU through placing it in the same category as the crimes of human
smuggling and human trafficking are also examples of using a speech-act in
labelling a certain category of immigrants as threats and dangerous to safety and
public order.550 In this regard, the EU is completely ignoring the fact that the
existence of the crime of human smuggling and its darkest side, human
trafficking, are inevitable results of the lack of ‘legal’ channels for asylum seekers
and other types of immigrants to enter into and gain access to EU territory.551
As Carrera and Guild have rightly pointed out, ‘[t]here is nothing existential
about irregularity,’ for the reason that, ‘[…] the label of “irregularity” can never
be determined independently of the activities of the immigration and border
guards.’552 In other words, the exercise of power by a sovereign State, and how
this power is imposed and inserted upon humans, determines an immigrant to
be regularly or irregularly present on the territory of a State.553
It is also worth mentioning that, as opposed to the outlook of EU law towards
undocumented forced immigrants, this category of people are not criminals in a
technical legal sense. They are, in fact, in danger of their lives, basic human
rights, and fundamental freedoms, who with legitimate intention are exercising
the right to seek asylum in order to gain individual security. However, by taking
a securitised approach towards these people, the EU seeks to build a quasi-legal
justification – or as I would term it – a ‘façade’ to hide behind while grossly
violating its own constituting moral values and human rights obligations.
Approach: Integrating Maritime Security with Human Rights (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2016), pp. 200-
221.
550 For example, the Council Directive 2002/90/EC does not even mention human smuggling or human
trafficking; instead, it refers to ‘facilitation of irregular immigration’. For further analysis on this, see:
Alessandro Spena, ‘Human Smuggling and Irregular Immigration in the EU: From Complicity to
Exploitation?’, in Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild (eds), Irregular Migration, Trafficking and
Smuggling of Human Beings: Policy Dilemmas in the EU (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies,
2016), pp. 33-40. In this regard, also see: Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild, ‘Migrant Smuggling in the
EU: What Do the Facts Tell Us?’, in Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild (eds), Irregular Migration,
Trafficking and Smuggling of Human Beings: Policy Dilemmas in the EU (Brussels: Centre for
European Policy Studies, 2016), pp. 11-16.
551 Arjen Leerkes, ‘Managing Migration through Legitimacy? Alternatives to the Criminalisation of
Unauthorised Migration’, in Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild (eds), Irregular Migration, Trafficking
and Smuggling of Human Beings: Policy Dilemmas in the EU (Brussels: Centre for European Policy
Studies, 2016), pp. 24-32.
552 Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild, ‘Addressing Irregular Migration, Facilitation and Human
Trafficking: The EU’s Approach’, in Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild (eds), Irregular Migration,
Trafficking and Smuggling of Human Beings: Policy Dilemmas in the EU (Brussels: Centre for
European Policy Studies, 2016), pp. 1-9, pp. 3 and 4.
553 Ibid, p. 4.
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4.3.2. ANALYSING THE APPROACH OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF EU
TOWARDS PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM UNDER
ARTICLE 18 OF THE EU CHARTER
In addition to the securitisation of immigration within the EU legal framework,
the more problematic and concerning aspect of securitisation comes from the
approach of the CJEU towards the fundamental right to seek asylum. Having in
mind the analysis I provided in the previous subsection on securitised EU
legislation on immigration, in the remaining part of this chapter, I will analyse
the jurisprudence of the CJEU under Article 18 of the EU Charter. For the
purpose of this analysis, I will apply the theoretical framework offered by critical
security studies – more specifically, critical discourse analysis and the theory of
legal interpretivism as formulated by Ronald Dworkin.
Based on this critical analysis, I conclude that notwithstanding the fact that the
CJEU is the guarantor and guardian of the EU Charter, this Court is not, in
reality, performing in the way expected to safeguard the EU Charter, certainly,
when it comes to the protection of the right to seek asylum. The jurisprudence
of the CJEU with regard to Article 18 of the EU Charter demonstrates a high
level of submission and deference to the political will of EU Member States and
to the securitisation of immigration in the sense of not allowing asylum seekers
to gain access to EU territories. Therefore, the right to seek asylum under Article
18 of the EU Charter – in reality and in practice – becomes meaningless and
self-defeating. This is one of the negative outcomes of the securitisation of
immigration in the EU upon the right to seek asylum as a fundamental right.
The most important case, which has been decided so far by the CJEU with regard
to the right to seek asylum under Article 18 of the EU Charter is the case of X
and X v. Belgium (2017).554 The facts of this case unfold in this way that in 2016,
a married couple from Aleppo (Syria), together with their three very young
minor children, travelled to the Embassy of Belgium in Beirut (Lebanon) and
lodged a visa application based on Article 25(1)(a) of the EU Visa Code.555
According to this article, a Member State shall issue a ‘visa with limited
territorial validity,’ when this decision is deemed to be necessary based on
‘humanitarian grounds’ and due to the State’s ‘international obligations.’556 The
applicants submitted that the purpose of the type of visa they were applying, i.e.
554 C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge (Belgium), Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Decision of 7 March 2017 (referred to as ‘X and X v. Belgium’).
555 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009
establishing a Community Code on Visas (Schengen or EU Visa Code), published in Official Journal of
the European Union on 15 September 2009 (L 243/1).
556 See Article 25(1)(a) of the EU Visa Code (Regulation (EC) No 810/2009).
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a Schengen visa with limited territorial validity (also known as a humanitarian
visa),557 was ‘to enable them to leave the besieged city of Aleppo in order to apply
for asylum in Belgium.’ In the main proceedings of this case at national level,
one of the applicants claimed that they had been abducted by a terrorist group,
then beaten, tortured, and finally released following the payment of a ransom.
During the same proceedings, both applicants emphasised the ongoing Civil-
Proxy War in Syria and the imminent dangerous situation and insecurities
specifically in Aleppo. In addition to war, considering their faith as ‘Orthodox
Christians,’ they claimed to be at a greater risk of persecution in their particular
case based on their religious beliefs. They added that it had become impossible
for them to register as refugees in neighbouring countries, due to the closure of
borders between Lebanon and Syria.558
The Belgian immigration authorities refused to grant the applicants a visa with
limited territorial validity under Article 25(1)(a) of the EU Visa Code, i.e. they
were denied a humanitarian visa. The Belgian Embassy communicated the
rejection decision of the Immigration Office to the applicants in the main
proceedings, reasoning that:
[…] the applicants intended to stay more than 90 days in Belgium, [while] Article 3
of the ECHR did not require States that are parties to the convention to admit into
their respective territories ‘victims of a catastrophic situation’ and that Belgian
diplomatic posts were not among the authorities to which a foreign national could
submit an application for asylum. [Therefore,] authorising the issue of an entry visa
to the applicants in the main proceedings in order for them to be able to lodge an
application for asylum in Belgium would amount to allowing such an application to
be submitted to a diplomatic post.559
During the appeal instance, the Council for Asylum and Immigration
Proceedings of Belgium (the Belgian Immigration Court) referred this case to
the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, with regard to the interpretation of Article
25(1)(a) of the EU Visa Code, and specifically in the light of Articles 4 and 18 of
the EU Charter. The main questions of the Belgian Government posed to the
CJEU:
1. Do the “international obligations” referred to in Article 25(1)(a) of the Visa Code
cover all the rights guaranteed by the Charter, including, in particular, those
557 The IOM Glossary on Migration defines a ‘humanitarian visa’ as, ‘[a type of] visa granting access to a
temporary stay in the issuing State to a person on humanitarian grounds for a variable duration as
specified in the applicable national or regional law, often aimed at complying with relevant human rights
and refugee law.’ For more information in this regard, see: The International Organization for Migration
(IOM), International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration (Geneva: International Organization for
Migration, 2009), pp. 97-99.
558 C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge (Belgium), para. 20.
559 Ibid, para. 21.
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guaranteed by Articles 4 and 18, and do they also cover obligations which bind
the Member States, in the light of the ECHR and Article 33 of the Geneva
Convention?560
2. Depending on the answer given to the first question, must Article 25(1)(a) of the
Visa Code be interpreted as meaning that, subject to its discretion with regard
to the circumstances of the case, a Member State to which an application for a
visa with limited territorial validity has been made is required to issue the visa
applied for, where a risk of infringement of Article 4 and/or Article 18 of the
Charter or another international obligation by which it is bound is
established?561
In its answer to the first question, the CJEU started by reminding that Article
25(1)(a) of the EU Visa Code was legislated on the basis of Article 62(2)(a) and
(b)(ii) of the EC Treaty, according to which the EU had to adopt measures
concerning visas for intended stays of no more than ninety days.562 On this
account, Article 1 of the EU Visa Code asserted that, the objective of this
Regulation was to establish procedures and conditions for issuing visas for
transit through or intended stays on the territory of Member States, not
exceeding ninety days in any 180-day period.563
Looking at the facts recorded during the main proceedings of this case, the CJEU
pointed out that the applicants had submitted applications for visas on
‘humanitarian grounds’ based on Article 25 of the Visa Code at the Belgian
embassy in Lebanon with a view to applying for asylum in Belgium immediately
upon their arrival in that Member State. Upon submitting asylum applications
in Belgium, thereafter, the applicants intended to be granted a residence permit
with a period of validity not limited to ninety days.564 Positioning these facts
against Article 1 of the EU Visa Code, the CJEU deliberated that such an
application – even if formally submitted based on Article 25 of that Code – was
in contrast with the objective of the EU Visa Code; hence, it would fall outside
the scope of the application of this Regulation. According to the CJEU, therefore,
Article 25(1)(a) of the EU Visa Code and the concept of ‘international
560 Ibid, para. 28(1).
561 Ibid, para. 28(2)(a).
562 Article 62(2)(b) of the 2002 Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC or the Amsterdam
Treaty) reads that the Council shall adopt measures on the crossing of the external borders of the
Member States, which shall establish rules on visas for intended stays of no more than three months.
563 Article 1(1) of the 2009 EU Visa Code assigning the objectives and scope of this Regulation, reads
that, ‘[t]his Regulation establishes the procedures and conditions for issuing visas for intended stays on
the territory of the Member States, which do not exceed 90 days in any 180-day period’.
564 C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge (Belgium), para. 42.
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obligations’ mentioned in that provision (the interpretation of which was sought
by the referring court) did not apply to the case at hand in any way.565
Furthermore, the CJEU reasoned that until that date (the date of the facts of the
case), no measures had been adopted by the EU legislature on the basis of Article
79(2)(a) of the TFEU,566 with regard to the conditions governing the issue by
Member States of long-term visas and residence permits to third-country
nationals on humanitarian grounds. It is pertinent mentioning here that the
Belgian Government and the European Commission, in their written
observations, had submitted this very same reasoning to the CJEU. Relying on
this argument, the CJEU determined that the applications at issue in the main
proceedings would fall solely within the scope of national law – especially for
the reason that EU law has been silent on the matter of issuing visas on
humanitarian grounds. Therefore, it would be only within the discretion of the
national authorities themselves to decide whether a humanitarian visa in a given
case should or not be issued. Thus, deciding positively or negatively in this
regard would not be in violation of any rules of EU law. As a result, since EU law
does not cover humanitarian visas, there was no need to answer the second
question posed by Belgium. In other words, the CJEU ruled that the provisions
of the EU Charter – in particular Articles 4 and 18 thereof – were not applicable
in this case. Finally, the CJEU added that, to conclude otherwise, meant that
third‑country nationals would be legally allowed to lodge applications for visas
based on the Visa Code and to obtain international protection in the Member
State of their choice.567 According to the CJEU, allowing this type of visa
application would undermine the general structure of the EU asylum system
established by the EU Regulation No. 604/2013 – known as the 2013 Dublin
Regulation or Dublin system.568
It is worth noting here that during the proceedings of the case at the CJEU, the
Advocate General Paolo Mengozzi (AG Mengozzi) had already presented his
opinion to the Court before the final decision was concluded.569 Unlike the CJEU
judges, AG Mengozzi had asserted that EU Member States did have a positive
obligation to issue humanitarian visas under Article 25(1)(a) of the EU Visa
565 Ibid, para. 43.
566 According to Article 79(2)(a) of the TFEU, for the purpose of developing a common immigration
policy, the EU shall adopt legislation governing the conditions of entry and residence, and standards on
the issue by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits.
567 C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge (Belgium), para. 44.
568 Ibid, para. 48.
569 Article 253 of the TFEU describes the role of the advocate general at the CJEU as an impartial and
independent expert to make in open court reasoned submissions on cases, which in accordance with the
Statute of the CJEU, require their involvement.
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Code, in order to fulfil their positive human rights obligations under Articles 4
and 18 of the EU Charter.570 As both a practitioner and legal scholar, AG
Mengozzi explained that, ‘[i]t is […] crucial that, at a time, when borders are
closing and walls are being built, the Member States do not escape their
responsibilities, as they follow from EU law […]’.571 Similarly, some scholars of
EU migration law have criticised the CJEU’s decision – in spite of being the
guardian of the Charter – not to protect the principle of non-refoulement and
the right to seek asylum under Articles 4 and 18 of the EU Charter.572 Here, I
shall present two arguments against the decision of the CJEU, which provide a
clear answer to the main research question of this doctoral dissertation. In this
discussion, I shall embed the opinions of AG Mengozzi and the available
scholarly criticisms.573 Moreover, I will apply Dworkin’s theory of ‘legal
interpretivism’ to construct an analysis – which is theoretically both in-depth
and critical – in order to discover the implications of securitising immigration
in the EU upon the right to seek asylum as a fundamental right.574
First, as described above, a critical discursive analysis reveals a heavy shadow of
securitisation covering immigration. Perhaps, this securitised approach –
embedded in EU legislation on immigration and asylum – has pushed the CJEU
to maintain the status quo. However, why did the Court decide in such a way?
Is it only because the law dictates so? The disturbing confrontation here is that,
while the EU Charter is, in itself, a primary source of EU Law, why did the CJEU
give a heavier weight to EU securitised secondary legislation, such as the
infamously dysfunctional Dublin system.575 The Dublin system is a set of laws –
adopted by the EU Regulation No. 604/2013 (the 2013 Dublin III Regulation) –
for allocating asylum cases to one of the EU Member States. The predecessors
of this Regulation are the Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (the 2003
Dublin II Regulation) and the 1997 Dublin Convention. The Dublin system
exists due to this fallacy that all asylum law and practices in the EU are
570 Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge (Belgium), Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
Opinion of Advocate General Paolo Mengozzi, delivered on 7 February 2017 (referred to as the ‘opinion
of AG Mengozzi’), para. 3.
571 Ibid, para. 4.
572 In this regard, see, for example: Stephanie Law, ‘Humanitarian Admission and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights’, in Marie-Claire Foblets and Luc Leboeuf (eds), Humanitarian Admission to
Europe: The Law between Promises and Constraints (Baden-Baden: Hart Publishing, 2020), pp. 77-
114.
573 The opinion of AG Mengozzi in the case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge (Belgium).
574 For reasons choosing Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretivism in this dissertation, see: Section 3.3.
575 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining
an application for international protection lodged in one of the member states by a third-country
national or a stateless person (recast), 26 June 2013 (referred to as the ‘2013 Dublin III Regulation’).
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harmonised because of the EU common asylum standards allowing asylum
seekers to enjoy similar levels of protection in all EU Member States. However,
what happen in practice testify to quite the opposite.576
Addressing all available knowledge including the empirical data, analytical
research, and scholarly work on highlighting the deficiencies in the Dublin
system, however, lies beyond the focus of this research. However, since the
creation and enforcement of the Dublin system – for over twenty years – the EU
Commission has launched numerous amendment proposals trying to ‘fix’ the
inefficiency and dysfunctionality of the system.577 One of the most cited
criticisms is that the application of the Dublin Regulation have added extra
layers of bureaucracy to the already lengthy RSD procedures.578 Because of
unduly prolonged asylum procedures, EU Member States have arbitrarily
detained asylum seekers to prevent them from moving freely between EU
countries (preventing ‘secondary movement’). In particular, this has imposed a
heavier burden on the States with external Schengen borders such as Greece and
Italy – an extremely challenging situation known as ‘environmental or
geographical determinism,’ which is highly problematic.579 This is besides those
criticisms highlighting that Dublin transfers have systematically separated the
members of immigrant families – in a full violation of their rights to private and
family life – and, have infringed the right of immigrants to an appeal and to an
576 Francesco Maiani, ‘The Dublin III Regulation: A New Legal Framework for a More Humane System?’,
in Vincent Chetail, Philippe De Bruycker, and Francesco Maiani (eds), Reforming the Common
European Asylum System: The New European Refugee Law (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 101-142.
577 Ibid. Also, see: Steve Peers, ‘The Dublin III Regulation’, in Steve Peers, Violeta Moreno-Lax, Madeline
Garlick, and Elspeth Guild (eds), EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary) Vol. 3: EU
Asylum Law (2nd edn, Leiden: Brill, 2015), pp. 345-428. Also, see: Madeline Garlick, ‘The Dublin
System, Solidarity and Individual Rights’, in Vincent Chetail, Philippe De Bruycker, and Francesco
Maiani (eds), Reforming the Common European Asylum System: The New European Refugee Law
(Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 160-194.
578 Evangelia (Lilian) Tsourdi, ‘The Emerging Architecture of EU Asylum Policy Insights into the
Administrative Governance of the Common European Asylum System’, in Francesca Bignami (ed.), EU
Law in Populist Times: Crises and Prospects (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press,
2020), pp. 191-226, pp. 193-225. In this regard, also see: Francesco Maiani, ‘The Dublin III Regulation:
A New Legal Framework for a More Humane System?’, in Vincent Chetail, Philippe De Bruycker, and
Francesco Maiani (eds), Reforming the Common European Asylum System: The New European
Refugee Law (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 101-142.
579 Niovi Vavoula, ‘Databases for Non-EU Nationals and the Right to Private Life: Towards a System of
Generalised Surveillance of Movement?’, in Francesca Bignami (ed.), EU Law in Populist Times: Crises
and Prospects (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020), pp. 227-266. In this regard,
also see: Dallal Stevens, ‘Asylum Seekers, Detention and the Law: Morality in Abeyance?’, in Satvinder
Singh Juss, The Ashgate Research Companion to Migration Law, Theory and Policy (Oxford; New
York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 395-422, pp. 397-399. Moreover, see: Helen O’Nions, Asylum – A Right
Denied: A Critical Analysis of European Asylum Policy (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2016),
pp. 101-109.
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effective remedy in the cases of violating their human rights.580 Some legal
scholars and practitioners have raised a concern that although the judicial
decisions have, indeed, very clearly demonstrated the system’s inherent
deficiencies, and despite the fact that ‘[…] the Dublin system violates
fundamental rights in several respects, the tendency is [still] towards its ever
more coercive application, regardless of the administrative, financial, and
human costs.’581
As follows, I shall pose the second criticism against the decision of the CJEU in
the case of X and X v. Belgium. The main question of the referring Belgian Court
was whether Article 25(1)(a) of the EU Visa Code required Member States to
issue a humanitarian visa, where a risk of infringement of Articles 4 and/or 18
of the EU Charter or other international obligations existed according to the
facts of the case.582 Instead of responding to this question, the CJEU asserted
that, the EU Visa Code did not apply in this case because the Code only covered
issuing short-term visas (90-day visas) and not the instances of long-term visas
on humanitarian grounds. This interpretation from the facts of the case and
from Article 25(1)(a) of the Visa Code seems beyond rational comprehension.
Who said that the applicants had applied for a long-term visa? They, indeed,
wanted only a short-term visa (up to 90-days validity), which is the subject
matter of Article 25(1)(a) of the EU Visa Code. Why, therefore, this Article does
not apply to the facts of this case? According to the CJEU, the application was
refused because the Court was convinced that the intention of the applicants was
to stay beyond 90 days, in order to apply for asylum in Belgium. The CJEU ruled
that, although the applicants formally submitted a short-term visa application,
their request fell outside the scope of the Visa Code, because in line with the
Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU), applications for international
580 In this regard, for example, see: Paul McDonough, Magdalena Kmak, and Joanne van Selm, ‘Sharing
Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered’ (2008) European Council on
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), pp. 17-24. Also, see: The UNHCR Commentary on the EU Commission’s
Proposal for a recast of Dublin II Regulation (COM(2008) 820, 3 December 2008) and the EU
Commission’s Proposal for a recast of the Regulation concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the
comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin II Regulation (COM(2008) 825, 3
December 2008), available at, <www.refworld.org/docid/49c0ca922.html>. In this regard, also see:
Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and Nando Sigona, ‘Introduction: Refugee and
Forced Migration Studies in Transition’, in Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and
Nando Sigona (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (Oxford
University Press, 2014), pp. 1-14, pp. 3 and 4. Also, see: Ulrike Brandl, ‘Family Unity and Family
Reunification in the Dublin System: Still Utopia or Already Reality?’, in Vincent Chetail, Philippe De
Bruycker, and Francesco Maiani (eds), Reforming the Common European Asylum System: The New
European Refugee Law (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 143-158.
581 Elspeth Guild, Cathryn Costello, Madeline Garlick, and Violeta Moreno-Lax, Enhancing the Common
European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin (Brussels: EU Policy Department for Citizen’s
Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2015), p. i.
582 C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge (Belgium), para. 28(1).
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protection were to be made inside the territory of EU Member States. Allowing
the present case, according to the Court, would be allowing third-country
nationals to lodge visa applications to seek international protection outside EU
territory. The CJEU further stated that, the present case fell within the scope of
national law, because no EU measures had been adopted on the basis of Article
79(2)(a) of the TFEU on long-stay visas and residence permits on humanitarian
grounds.
Opposing this argument of the Court, Article 25(1)(a) of the 2009 EU Visa Act
in clear and plain wordings has recognised the issuance of humanitarian visas.
According to this Article, if an element of ‘necessity’ is diagnosed based on the
facts of the case and the circumstances around the claim, the Member State
should issue a visa with limited territorial validity. When the Belgian referring
Court requested from the CJEU to address the questions in an emergency
manner,583 the latter accepted this request and admitted that, ‘[…] the applicants
in the main proceedings were facing a real risk of being subjected to inhuman
and degrading treatment.’584 The CJEU, itself, accepted that according to the
facts at hand in the main proceedings, the applicants were, indeed, in an
emergency humanitarian situation. According to the CJEU, the ‘element of
urgency’ justifying the application of Article 107 of Rules of Procedure of the
Court had existed in the case, and hence, the Fifth Chamber of the Court
requested the case to be assigned to the Grand Chamber.585 Therefore, ruling
that the international obligations of Member States under Article 25(1)(a) of the
EU Visa Act do not apply seems an absurd conclusion to reach.
In Chapter 2, Subsection 2.3.1, I broke down the constituting elements of the
right to seek asylum. One of the components of this right is that asylum seekers
are able to access the territory of host States and to reside on that territory
without any violation of other human rights, while the RSD procedure is
ongoing. All the components of the right to seek asylum are embedded in Article
18 of the Charter – both as a primary rule of EU law586 and as one of the founding
values and principles of the EU.587 Having this in mind, the case of X and X v.
Belgium was an excellent opportunity for the CJEU to stand out as the superior
judicial body in charge of protecting EU fundamental rights, and to elaborate on
583 According to the rules of ‘urgent preliminary ruling procedure’, under Article 107 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Court, Article 107(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice stipulates that in
matters of urgency, exceptional procedures shall be applied in addressing the referred question.
584 C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge (Belgium), para. 33.
585 Ibid, paras 33 and 34.
586 According to Article 6(1) of the TEU, the EU recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in
the Charter, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties, as primary sources of EU law.
587 The preamble of the Charter.
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the right to seek asylum, its composing elements, and the positive obligation of
Member States in this regard. Nevertheless, the Court regrettably allowed this
chance to slip away by deferring to the Government of Belgium and the EU
Commission, while surrendering to the securitised approach of EU law towards
immigration.588 This opportunity was not only to reaffirm and reinforce the
position of the CJEU as ‘the Guardian’ of the Charter, but also it could provide a
suitable forum to showcase that there could be an effective, humanitarian, and
human rights-based approach to the so-called ‘refugee crisis in Europe.’589 In
the same direction, AG Mengozzi advised the Court that the state-of-the-art in
Article 25(1)(a) of the EU Visa Code, read in conjunction with Articles 4 and 18
of the EU Charter, had already established the legal grounds for a positive
obligation on Member States to issue humanitarian visas.590
It is not that the CJEU purposefully or with malicious intentions ignored the
fundamental character of the right to seek asylum. In fact, the problem lies with
EU law, itself. With creating the category of ‘illegal’ immigration, EU legislation
has taken away any real chance for seeking asylum.591 In practice, asylum
seekers arrive at EU external borders or enter into EU territory without
588 Evelien Brouwer also speculates that the CJEU’s decision is perhaps political and the Court seems to
have just ‘[…] opted for political inertia and the status quo.’ In this regard, see: Evelien Brouwer, ‘AG
Mengozzi’s Conclusion in X and X v. Belgium on the Positive Obligation to Issue Humanitarian Visas:
A Legitimate Plea to Ensure Safe Journeys for Refugees’ (2017) Centre for European Policy Studies
(CEPS) Policy Insights, ISBN 978-94-6138-588-8. In this regard, Baumgärtel analyses this decision of
the CJEU within the framework of ‘strategic adjudication’ in matters of hard and dilemmatic cases, in
which the EU Court makes sure not to shake the legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of the Member States.
For more information, in this regard, see: Moritz Baumgärtel, Demanding Rights: Europe’s
Supranational Courts and the Dilemma of Migrant Vulnerability (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2019), pp. 111-130. For a ‘strategic litigation’ approach toward the case of X and X v.
Belgium from the perspective of the advocate of the applicants, see: Tristan Wibault, ‘Making the Case
X&X for the Humanitarian Visa’, in Marie-Claire Foblets and Luc Leboeuf (eds), Humanitarian
Admission to Europe: The Law between Promises and Constraints (Baden-Baden: Hart Publishing,
2020), pp. 271-282.
589 Evelien Brouwer, ‘AG Mengozzi’s Conclusion in X and X v. Belgium on the Positive Obligation to
Issue Humanitarian Visas: A Legitimate Plea to Ensure Safe Journeys for Refugees’ (2017) Centre for
European Policy Studies (CEPS) Policy Insights, ISBN 978-94-6138-588-8. In this regard, also see:
Jean-Yves Carlier and Luc Leboeuf, ‘The X. and X. case: Humanitarian visas and the genuine enjoyment
of the substance of the rights, towards a middle way?’, <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-x-and-x-
case-humanitarian-visas-and-the-genuine-enjoyment-of-the-substance-of-rights-towards-a-middle-
way/>. Also, see: Violeta Moreno-Lax, ‘Asylum Visas as an Obligation under EU Law: Case PPU C-
638/16 X, X v État belge (Part I)’, <eumigrationlawblog.eu/asylum-visas-as-an-obligation-under-eu-
law-case-ppu-c-63816-x-x-v-etat-belge/>. Also, see: Violeta Moreno-Lax, ‘Asylum Visas as an
Obligation under EU Law: Case PPU C-638/16 X, X v État belge (Part II)’,
<eumigrationlawblog.eu/asylum-visas-as-an-obligation-under-eu-law-case-ppu-c-63816-x-x-v-etat-
belge-part-ii/>.
590 The opinion of AG Mengozzi in the case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge (Belgium), paras 3, 71-
108, and 176.
591 Stephanie Law, ‘Humanitarian Admission and the Charter of Fundamental Rights’, in Marie-Claire
Foblets and Luc Leboeuf (eds), Humanitarian Admission to Europe: The Law between Promises and
Constraints (Baden-Baden: Hart Publishing, 2020), pp. 77-114, pp. 86-90.
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possessing necessary travel documents. The rejection of humanitarian visas,
however, in the case of X and X v. Belgium by the Belgian Government and the
CJEU out of deference, gave only one message to all asylum seekers: ‘either
remain in the misery of war and lose your lives, or leave your faith in the hands
of smugglers and human traffickers.’592 In this regard, AG Mengozzi confronted
the Court:
Frankly, what alternatives did the applicants in the main proceedings have? Stay in
Syria? Out of the question. Put themselves at the mercy of unscrupulous smugglers,
risking their lives in doing so, in order to attempt to reach Italy or Greece?
Intolerable. Resign themselves to becoming illegal refugees in Lebanon, with no
prospect of international protection, even running the risk of being returned to
Syria? Unacceptable.593
Using an exclamation mark (!) in judicial decisions or in the official
documentation of courts is very rare. However, the case of X and X v. Belgium
is so disturbingly absurd that AG Mengozzi, in the public version of his opinion,
used this mark not once, but twice: Firstly, in paragraph 172 of his opinion:
[The applicants] were obliged to obtain an appointment at the consulate of the
Kingdom of Belgium in Lebanon, a prerequisite for being granted safe passage of
48 hours on the Lebanese territory after May 2015, travel hundreds of kilometres
in a country at war and in chaos to arrive in Beirut and present themselves in person
at that consulate, in order to satisfy the requirement of the latter and, finally, to
return to Syria to wait for the decision of the Belgian authorities!594
Secondly, in paragraph 173 of the same document:
[…] as I have already highlighted, refusing to issue a visa with limited territorial
validity in the circumstances of the main proceedings ultimately amounts to
directly encouraging the applicants in the main proceedings, in order to be able to
claim the right to international protection on the territory of a Member State, to
trust their lives with those against whom the EU and its Member States are
currently deploying, particularly in the Mediterranean, considerable operational
and financial efforts to curb and dismantle criminal activities!595
Perhaps, in the light of the decision of the CJEU in this case, someone should
remind EU politicians and judiciary that, ‘imagine yourself not had won the
lottery of life by being born and living in post-WW Europe, is this the message
you wanted to receive from those, who could offer you safe homes?’596 My
592 The opinion of AG Mengozzi in the case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge (Belgium), paras 150,
152, 157, 159, 173, and 175.
593 Ibid, para. 157.
594 Ibid, para. 172.
595 Ibid, para. 173.
596 With regard to the role of judges in the realisation of fundamental rights in politically sensitive cases,
see: Jean-Yves Carlier, ‘Conclusion: The Role of the Judge in Controlling the Genuine Enjoyment of the
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intention here is not to raise an emotionally invoked hypothetical solution.
Rather, I seek to convey that EU law is not silent on the matter of issuing
humanitarian visas; the CJEU chose to pretend otherwise.597 In addition to the
CJEU in denying humanitarian visas, it is worth mentioning that the ECtHR in
the case of M.N. and Others v. Belgium (with  similar facts to X and X v.
Belgium) found the application inadmissible for the reason that the territorial
jurisdiction of the Court could not be established under Article 1 of the ECHR.598
Now, I will apply Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretivism to offer some insights
into the matter and answer the main research question of this dissertation. The
theory of ‘legal interpretivism’ could be applicable here to criticise the decision
of the CJEU in the case of X and X v. Belgium with regard to Article 18 of the
EU Charter. The part of Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretivism, which could
frame the behaviour and inaction of the CJEU into a theoretical perspective, is
a ‘normative theory of adjudication.’ Before analysing the case of X and X v.
Belgium through this theoretical framework, I should elaborate on Dworkin’s
theory of legal interpretivism as a critic of legal positivism. In other words, legal
positivism is a theoretical model conceptualising law merely as a system of rules
by ignoring other existing legal norms and standards such as principles and
policies.599
Dworkin opposes the positivists’ definition of law as only ‘rules’ by elaborating
on the central propositions of this definition, which were provided by the most
influential legal positivists of all time – such as John Austin and H.L.A. Hart.
Substance of the Rights’, in Marie-Claire Foblets and Luc Leboeuf (eds), Humanitarian Admission to
Europe: The Law between Promises and Constraints (Baden-Baden: Hart Publishing, 2020), pp. 367-
371.
597 For more information on the existence of multiple channels available in EU law for humanitarian
admission to the EU, see: Luc Leboeuf and Marie-Claire Foblets, ‘Introduction: Humanitarian
Admission to Europe. From Policy Developments to Legal Controversies and Litigation’, in Marie-Claire
Foblets and Luc Leboeuf (eds), Humanitarian Admission to Europe: The Law between Promises and
Constraints (Baden-Baden: Hart Publishing, 2020), pp. 11-45, pp. 14-19. On the practices of the states
of Italy, Germany, and Belgium, see the following sources, respectively: Katia Bianchini, ‘Humanitarian
Admission to Italy through Humanitarian Visas and Corridors’, in Marie-Claire Foblets and Luc Leboeuf
(eds), Humanitarian Admission to Europe: The Law between Promises and Constraints (Baden-
Baden: Hart Publishing, 2020), pp. 157-198. Pauline Endres de Oliveira, ‘Humanitarian Admission to
Germany – Access vs. Rights?’, in Marie-Claire Foblets and Luc Leboeuf (eds), Humanitarian
Admission to Europe: The Law between Promises and Constraints (Baden-Baden: Hart Publishing,
2020), pp. 199-224. Serge Bodart, ‘Humanitarian Admission to Belgium’, in Marie-Claire Foblets and
Luc Leboeuf (eds), Humanitarian Admission to Europe: The Law between Promises and Constraints
(Baden-Baden: Hart Publishing, 2020), pp. 225-237. However, for a research on identifying the gaps
and inconsistencies in the EU’s humanitarian visa scheme see (which gives more reason for the CJEU
to make a firm human rights-based stand in this regard): Ulla Iben Jensen, Humanitarian Visas: Option
or Obligation? (Brussels: EU Policy Department for Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2014).
598 M.N. and Others v. Belgium, Application No. 3599/18, European Court of Human Rights, Grand
Chamber, Decision (5 May 2020), paras 96-142.
599 Ibid, pp. 22 and 82-84.
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The nineteenth-century legal philosopher John Austin defined law as a ‘set of
rules,’ and according to him, ‘exactly these rules are exhaustive of law.’600
Accordingly, if rules do not cover a case, the law in not applicable in that case at
all. About a century later, the British legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart offered a
more complex definition of law. Referring to Hart, law is a ‘set of rules and vice
versa, i.e. rules are general commands of law, which are “binding” on the
members of the community for two reasons: first, a general acceptance by the
community, and second, being enacted based on secondary rules, and thus,
being valid.’601 As opposed to these definitions, a ‘normative theory of
adjudication’602 distinguishes between ‘rules’ and ‘principles’ as different
functional units or forms of law, all existing within a legal system, on the one
hand, and ‘policy’ as a considerations that should be taken into account when
applying law in practice, on the other.603 In Dworkin’s definition, ‘principle’ is a
‘standard that is to be observed by the members of the community because it is
a requirement of “justice,” “fairness,” and “morality.” Reversely, policy is a
‘standard that sets out a goal to improve the “economic,” “political,” or “social”
well-being of the community.’604
Within the reign of legal interpretivism, after distinguishing norms of law into
rules, principles, and policies, we should apply the Hohfeldian theory of ‘legal
rights.’605 According to this theory, collective goals – as matters of policies –
might be sufficient to provide reasons for a political decision. However, these
goals cannot justify a particular disadvantage against individual rights, because
the latter is a matter of principle.606 Similar to Hohfeld, Dworkin asserts that
600 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1995), pp. 18-37.
601 Herbert Lionel Adolphus (H.L.A.) Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012), pp. 100-110.
602 With regard to Dworkin’s further divisions in the forms of law into rules, principles (or values), and
policy, see: Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic,
2013), pp. 22-31. Also, see: Ian McLeod, Legal Theory (6th edn, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 113-135. In this regard, also see: Scott J. Shapiro, ‘The “Hart–Dworkin”
Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed’, in Arthur Ripstein (ed.), Ronald Dworkin (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 22-55. Also, see: David Dyzenhaus, ‘The Rule of Law as the Rule
of Liberal Principle’, in Arthur Ripstein (ed.), Ronald Dworkin (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2007), pp. 56-81, pp. 56-60.
603 Following Dworkin, other contemporary scholars of jurisprudence have elaborated on a ‘normative
theory of adjudication’. For more information in this regard, see: Robert Samuel Summers, Form and
Function in a Legal System: A General Study (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 3-36.
In this regard, for example, see: Michael D. Bayles, Principles of Law: A Normative Analysis
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 1-17.
604 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), p. 22
and 82-84.
605 In this regard, see Subsection 2.3.1 under Chapter 2 on the Hohfeldian theory of rights.
606 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), pp. xi-
xv and pp. 90-123.
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individual rights are political ‘trumps’ – meaning advantages or privileges –
held by individuals.607 Therefore, a collective goal is never sufficient to deny
individual rights or to impose some loss or injury upon them.608
As mentioned above, a normative theory of adjudication distinguishes between
arguments of rules, principles, and policy, while defending that judicial
decisions based on the arguments of principles are compatible with the
democratic principles of a democratic society. Whenever courts face hard cases
– meaning legally and politically challenging and controversial cases – judges
should first distinguish between rules, principles, and matters of policies.
Thereafter, they should give a heavier weight to principles – upon which the
community and its values of fraternity were established.609
Considering the differentiation between rules and principles within a legal
system, combined with the depictions of the theory of rights within legal
interpretivism, it is even more important that when the law seems to be ‘silent,’
‘unclear,’ or ‘ambiguous,’ the Court considers the founding values and principles
of the community in interpreting the law. Amongst many values, upon which the
EU community is established, we should remember the values of the
inviolability of human dignity and the importance of protecting human rights –
formulated as fundamental rights under the 2000 EU Charter.
In this regard, Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretivism guides us towards the
idea that, ‘legal reasoning is an exercise in constructive interpretation,’610 which
creates an inseparable link between the law in books and the law in practice. To
Dworkin, ‘law consists in the best justification of our legal practices as a whole,
that it consists in the narrative story that makes of these practices the best they
can be.’611 To elaborate further, he continues, ‘once we identify and distinguish
the diverse and often competitive dimensions of political value, the one
interpretation that makes the law’s story better in the whole, than any other can,’
we have managed to define the law.612 Yet, the question is what this ‘better
conception or story of law’ could be. Relying on Dworkin, this ‘better conception
of law’ has its foundations deeply rooted in ‘a more general politics of “integrity,”
607 Unlike Hohfeld, Dworkin justifies the essential nature of individual rights based on various values
these rights serve, which relates to Dworkin’s ‘rights as trumps’ theory as justification of rights against
other countervailing considerations. In this regard, see: Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously
(London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), pp. 308 and 309.
608 Ibid, pp. 90 and 91.
609 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), pp. xii
and 84-86.
610 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd, 1998), pp. vii, 52, and 53.
611 Ibid, pp. vii and 176-224.
612 Ibid, pp. vii, viii, and 225-232.
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“community,” and “fraternity.”613 This is what Dworkin in general terms calls
‘law as integrity,’ within his theorisation of legal interpretivism.
Applying Dworkin’s theory of ‘law as integrity’ to the decision of the CJEU in the
case of X and X v. Belgium brings us to this conclusion that Article 18 of the EU
Charter has become completely meaningless. The reason for drawing this
conclusion is that, in this particular case, the CJEU dismissed the integrity of
EU law with regard to protecting human rights as the founding principle of the
EU community. If we were to assume that, the case of X and X v. Belgium was
a ‘hard case,’ in which the law is absent, contradictory, ambiguous, or unclear,614
Dworkin’s thesis of ‘law as integrity’ could have been a guiding tool for the CJEU
to decide on that case. Instead, the Court avoided providing any answer to the
questions and merely repeated what Member States had submitted in their
statements. Fourteen EU Member States joined the Belgium Government
during the hearing at the Court, and presented their oral arguments supporting
the position of Belgium, stating that the issuance of a humanitarian visa is not a
matter of EU law and it is strictly within the power and discretion of States. To
pressurise the Court further, the Czech Government, for example, warned the
CJEU that its judgment to the effect that the Member States are obliged to issue
humanitarian visas under Article 25(1)(a) of the Visa Code would cause seriously
‘fatal’ consequences for the EU and its Member States.615
The duty of the CJEU was to decide the case before it, even though it required
the extension or adaptation of a principle or the creation of a new law to meet
justice. ‘Law as integrity’ guides us to the point that ‘policy considerations will
have to be weighed; but the objective of judges is the formulation of principle,’
and ‘if principle inexorably requires a decision, which entails a degree of policy
risk, the court’s function is to adjudicate according to [the] principle, leaving
policy curtailment to the judgment of the Parliament.’616 This was not even the
case in X and X v. Belgium, because a clear law existed on the matter, i.e. Article
25(1)(a) of the EU Visa Code. The CJEU should have started its reasoning from
the baseline of the existing EU principles and values, and then, moved towards
finding a constructive interpretation; an interpretation of EU law consistent
613 Ibid, pp. viii and 206-215.
614 In my humble opinion, which seems to be in line with that of AG Mengozzi asserted in paragraph 170
of his Opinion, the case of X and X v. Belgium is not even a hard case. The law is present and quite clear;
it is obvious with a literal reading that the EU Visa Act has recognised the existence and necessity of
issuing humanitarian visas under Article 25(1)(a).
615 The opinion of AG Mengozzi in the case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge (Belgium), paras 5, 7,
8, and 42.
616 Denise Réaume, ‘Is Integrity a Virtue? Dworkin’s Theory of Legal Obligation’ (1989) 39(4) The
University of Toronto Law Journal, pp.  380-409, p. 385.
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with the principles recognised by the EU community under the Treaties and the
Charter. After all, we should keep in mind that the EU is a community, which
claims to be constructed, established, and developed based on the shared values
of respect for human dignity, human rights, and the claim that its purpose is to
promote all these values in its relations with the non-EU World.617 Are these
merely nice words on paper? The EU community might pretend that these
values are at the bedrock of its existence; however, the practices of its
institutions and Member States tell a rather different story. Considering the
competence of EU in the field of asylum and the nature of right to seek asylum
as a fundamental right (Article 18 of the Charter), the CJEU had in X and X v.
Belgium the perfect position – even the duty – to hold Belgium responsible for
the material scope and the substance of the right to seek asylum.618
In conclusion, even though the right to seek asylum is theoretically a
fundamental right based on Article 18 of the EU Charter, the securitisation of
immigration in the EU has made this right in practice ‘meaningless.’ As the
ECtHR reiterated before and quoted by AG Mengozzi, ‘[…] the purpose of the
Charter is to protect rights, which are not theoretical or illusory, but real and
effective.’619 The principle of effectiveness – that the law must be practical and
effective, not hypothetical, theoretical, or illusory – is a widely accepted legal
principle in all legal systems around the World, not only within contemporary
legal systems, but also in Roman law. The equivalence of the principle of
effectiveness in Roman law is the phrase lex imperfecta,620 which dictates that
the effectiveness of law is the ‘expressive function of law,’621 without which the
law becomes meaningless – as if it never existed.622
617 The opinion of AG Mengozzi in the case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge (Belgium), paras 165-
168.
618 Jean-Yves Carlier, ‘Conclusion: The Role of the Judge in Controlling the Genuine Enjoyment of the
Substance of the Rights’, in Marie-Claire Foblets and Luc Leboeuf (eds), Humanitarian Admission to
Europe: The Law between Promises and Constraints (Baden-Baden: Hart Publishing, 2020), pp. 367-
371, pp. 369-371.
619 In this regard, see: Airey v. Ireland, Application No. 6289/73, European Court of Human Rights, The
Chamber Judgment (9 October 1979), para. 24. In this regard, also see: Soering v. United Kingdom,
Application No. 14038/88, European Court of Human Rights, Plenary Decision (07 July 1989), para.
87. And, see: Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany, Application No. 42527/98, European
Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber Judgement (12 July 2001), para. 45. Also, see: Gäfgen v.
Germany, Application No. 22978/05, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Decision (1
June 2010), para. 123. Also, see: Murray v. The Netherlands, Application No. 10511/10, European Court
of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Decision (26 April 2016), para. 104. In this regard, also see: The
opinion of AG Mengozzi in the case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge (Belgium), para. 158.
620 Thomas A. McGinn, ‘The Expressive Function of Law and the Lex Imperfecta’ (2015) 11 Roman Legal
Tradition, pp. 19-41.
621 Ibid, pp. 1-19.
622 Clive Parry, John P. Grant, and J. Craig Barker, Parry & Grant Encyclopaedic Dictionary of
International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 177.
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Henceforth, the obligation of EU Member States to provide legal paths for
asylum seekers to access the asylum procedures is an obligation of means, not
one of result. This obligation fits very well within the principle of state
sovereignty and respect for the discretion of the state whether to grant
international protection or not. Although being a prerequisite to receiving
international protection, the right to seek asylum is very different from
obtaining refugee status. Therefore, without legal safeguards and channels to
seek asylum, no legal regime for protecting refugees would be plausible. The
frequent cases of lives lost at sea while seeking to enter EU territory for asylum
makes the case for humanitarian visas even more valid.623 This ironic dilemma
is well described by FitzGerald as a ‘catch-22’ situation for refugees – meaning
that rich democracies are sending a very clear message to asylum seekers that,
‘we will not kick you out if you come here [because of obligations under non-
refoulement], but we will not let you reach here.’624
4.4. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I critically studied EU law and practice with regard to the tension
between the right to seek asylum and the obligation to safeguard the security of
the EU. For that purpose, the EU asylum acquis and the approach of the CJEU
in the case of X and X v. Belgium on Article 18 of the EU Charter were critically
examined. This study showed that no real enforcement exists, in practice, for
guaranteeing the right to seek asylum under the ambit of Article 18 of the EU
Charter. This Article refers to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol of
1967; however, EU secondary legislation has categorised asylum seekers as
‘illegal immigrants.’ This is against the provision of ‘non-penalisation,’
stipulated under Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol.
Therefore, the right to seek asylum seems to be a merely theoretical right, when
it comes to EU law and practice, especially under the jurisdiction of the CJEU.
The hypothesis in Chapter 4 was that, as the result of the securitisation of
immigration in EU law and in the practice of the CJEU, no effective right to seek
asylum remains any longer in the EU. In this chapter, I showed that due to a lack
of proper legal mechanisms to gain access to EU territory for seeking asylum –
which, in itself, is a result of highly securitised immigration in the EU and
associating it with transnational crimes such as human trafficking and terrorism
– the right to seek asylum appears to have become an impractical right. In
623 In this regard, see: Eugenia Relano Pastor, ‘EU Initiatives on a European Humanitarian Visa’, in
Marie-Claire Foblets and Luc Leboeuf (eds), Humanitarian Admission to Europe: The Law between
Promises and Constraints (Baden-Baden: Hart Publishing, 2020), pp. 341-365.
624 David Scott FitzGerald, Refuge beyond Reach: How Rich Democracies Repel Asylum Seekers (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 9 and 10.
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addition, both EU legislation and the practice of the CJEU – in the way that it
discriminates against undocumented immigrants – is together eroding the
fundamental nature of the right to seek asylum. The EU legislator has
deliberately securitised a certain category of immigrants and the CJEU judges
have decided in the same direction – out of deference to the highly securitised
approach of the legislator and Member States. Therefore, securitisation has
become the backbone of policymaking, legislation, and judicial reasoning in the
EU.
Overall, the EU has securitised immigration and repeats this process
continuously by the ‘speech-act’ at all levels of legislation (primary and
secondary) and practice (Member States, policymaking, and judiciary). Not
taking the right to seek asylum seriously as a fundamental right is the
consequence of this speech-act. When EU law perceives a category of
immigrants as a security threat – for example, through associating them with
terrorism – it is inevitable that the CJEU would not want to challenge the rule.
After all, there are wide national parameters and high stakes for EU Member
States to safeguard their national security and the internal security of EU; hence,
the national governments would have full power and a wide range of discretion
in deciding on their asylum policies and legislation.
The legislating bodies within the EU and its Member States have managed to
securitise the EU judiciary. A politician can securitise immigration as their
personal or party’s political point of view. However, when securitisation
becomes the law or finds its way to the court through judicial reasoning, the
situation becomes different. This is no longer merely a matter of securitised
politics, but rather a serious precedent in creating an institutionally securitised
judiciary. The law, which is supposed to be interpreted according to the values
of the community (referring to Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretivism and the
integrity of the law), becomes the subject of politics. Accordingly, an issue, which
needed attention from an external political body – as was certainly in the case
of X and X v. Belgium – was instead decided by the Court through recognising
the security politics of that body, but not based on the values and principles of
the community.
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5. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECURITISATION
OF IMMIGRATION UPON THE PRINCIPLE OF
NON-REFOULEMENT
5.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I address what the securitisation of immigration would mean for
the right to seek asylum, when the very foundation of this right, meaning the
principle of non-refoulement, is under attack. Without any doubt, it would be
impossible to imagine the right to seek asylum being crystallised into reality if
the principle of non-refoulement is not intact. Based on this explanation,
Section 5.2 analyses the position of the principle of non-refoulement as a
customary rule of international law in the current legal framework of protecting
refugees. Thereafter, Section 5.3 discusses in great detail how the principle of
non-refoulement, when combined with the absolute nature of prohibition of
torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, has elevated
the prohibition of refoulement to a peremptory norm of customary international
law - known as jus cogens.
Having these foundations in mind, Section 5.4 encompasses a detailed critical
analysis of the securitisation of immigration on the absolute and non-
derogable prohibition of refoulement within the jurisprudence of the ECtHR
under the ambit of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Right. The
context within which this critical analysis takes are the cases of expulsion to
torture or other forms of ill-treatments including inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. The security pressure of combating terrorism at
whatever cost has facilitated the Article 3 expulsions by legitimising the use of
diplomatic assurances. At the end, this critical case law analysis poses the
important question that, if this continues to circumvent the absolute and non-
derogable prohibition of refoulement to torture and other inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, will the right to seek asylum be able to
survive this securitisation environment and preserve its position as a real and
effective fundamental right.
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5.2. THE FORMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-
REFOULEMENT AS A CUSTOMARY NORM OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In Chapter 2 under Subsection 2.2.2, I elaborated on the formation and creation
of the concept of ‘refouler,’625 within the context of a legal regime on refugee
protection. The First World War, together with the Russian Revolution of 1917,
and several other wars in Europe (such as the Greek and Armenian Genocides),
resulted in the displacement of over seven million people. The social innovation
of Nansen in creating identification and travel documents (known as the Nansen
Passport) for displaced people and asylum seekers gave a momentary relief to
the so-called ‘refugee problem.’ After Nansen passed away, the League of
Nations decided to adopt the very first international legal agreement or
multilateral treaty in the form of a ‘Convention,’ addressing the issue of refugees,
meaning the ‘1933 Refugee Convention.’626 For the very first time within the
history of international refugee law, the term ‘refoulement’ was mentioned
under Article 3 of this Convention.627 According to this provision, none of the
parties to the 1933 Refugee Convention could ‘… remove or keep from its
territory by application of police measures, such as expulsions or non-
admittance at the frontier (refoulement), refugees who have been authorised to
reside there regularly, unless the said measures are dictated by reasons of
national security or public order.’ Under the same light, Article 33 of the 1951
Refugee Convention, entitled ‘Prohibition of Expulsion or Return
(“Refoulement”),’ in its first paragraph, stipulates:
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
625 The term ‘refouler’ is a French verb, translated in English language as ‘to force back,’ ‘to turn away,’
or ‘turn back.’ With regard to this definition, see: Collins Dictionary, Collins Dictionary, ‘refouler’,
<www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/french-english/refouler>. For more information in this regard,
also see: Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), pp. 201 and 202.
626 James C. Hathaway, ‘Refugees and asylum’, in Brian Opeskin, Richard Perruchoud, and Jillyanne
Redpath-Cross (eds), Foundations of International Migration Law (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), pp. 177-204, pp. 177 and 178. In this regard, also see: James C. Hathaway, ‘The
Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920-1950’ (1984) 33(2) The International and
Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 348-380, pp. 348-350.
627 James C. Hathaway, ‘Refugees and asylum’, in Brian Opeskin, Richard Perruchoud, and Jillyanne
Redpath-Cross (eds), Foundations of International Migration Law (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), pp. 177-204, p. 178.
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threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.628
As of today, the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol are the key legal
sources for the protection of refugees. With 149 State Parties to either, or both,
they define the term ‘refugee’ and outline the rights of refugees, as well as the
legal obligations of Member States to protect them.629 The very core principle,
upon which the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol and all other legal
frameworks protecting refugees at international, regional, and national levels,
are based, is the principle of non-refoulement. According to this principle, a
refugee should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to
their life or freedom. This is now considered as a rule of customary international
law. The prohibition of refoulement – better known as the principle of non-
refoulement – is not only a matter of treaty law, but is also widely recognised
and accepted as a customary norm of international law.630 Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) enumerates the
sources of international law. Accordingly, the function of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) is to decide on disputes that were referred or submitted to
it ‘in accordance with international law,’ with the following sources:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.631
628 In this regard, see: Article 33(1) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol, concluded 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954, U.N.T.S. Vol. 189, p. 137 (referred to
as the ‘1951 Refugee Convention’).
629 The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), ‘The 1951 Refugee Convention’, <www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-
convention.html>.
630 Ibid. In this regard also, see: Walter Kälin, Martina Caroni, and Lukas Heim, ‘Article 33, para. 1 of
1951 Convention’, in Andreas Zimmermann, Jonas Dörschner, and Felix Machts (eds), The 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011), pp. 1327-1395, p. 1395. Also see: Andreas Zimmermann and Philipp Wennholz,
‘Article 33, para. 2 of the 1951 Convention’, in Andreas Zimmermann, Jonas Dörschner, and Felix
Machts (eds), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A
Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 1397-1423, p. 1411. Also see: Guy S.
Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2007), pp. 345-348. Also, see: Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, ‘The Scope and Content
of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion’, in Erika Feller, Volker Türk, and Frances Nicholson
(eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International
Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 87-177, pp. 96 and 140-149.
631 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, United Nations, 18 April 1946.
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Subparagraph ‘b’ of Article 38(1) is the stipulation of customary norms or the
customary rules of international law, with the definition that international
customs are ‘a general practice accepted as law’ by different actors of the
international community. Correspondingly, customary norms or rules of
international law have two main constituting and distinguishing characters: the
first is the material element of a ‘general practice,’ and the second is the mental
element of ‘being accepted as law,’ better known as the ‘opinio juris.’632 General
practice refers to material acts performed by states or other international actors.
These acts may be in the form of diplomatic correspondences, policy statements,
press releases, the opinions of government legal advisors, the official manuals
on legal questions, executive decisions and practices, orders issued to military
forces, comments by governments on the International Law Commission (ILC)
drafts and accompanying commentaries, various forms of legislation,
international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties, the practice of
international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN
organs (notably, UNGA resolutions).633
The phrase ‘Opinio juris’ is the shortened form of the Latin expression ‘opinio
juris sive necessitatis,’ meaning ‘an opinion of law or necessity.’ A court or
tribunal could confer on the existence of opinio juris in matters of customary
law by referring to the existence of the element of general practice, or from the
existence of scholarly consensus, or from its own or other tribunals’ previous
deliberations in existing decisions.634 Referring to the well-established
jurisprudence of the ICJ with regard to the customary rules of international law,
these types of rules have – by their very nature – an equal force on all members
of the international community, and therefore, they could not be subjected to
unilateral disobediences based on the will of a single member. For example, in
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, while deciding on maritime delimitation
between Germany and Denmark, on the one hand, and Germany and the
632 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2019), pp. 21 and 22.
633 Ibid. In this regard, also see: Malcolm Nathan Shaw, International Law (8th edn, Cambridge; New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 53-62. Also, see: Anthony Aust, Handbook of
International Law (2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.  6 and 7.
634 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2019), pp. 21-25. Also, see: Malcolm Nathan Shaw, International Law (8th edn,
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 62-66. In this regard, also see: Alain
Pellet, ‘Article 38’, in Andreas Zimmermann, Karin Oellers-Frahm, Christian Tomuschat, and Christian
J. Tams (eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (2nd edn, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 731-870, pp. 812-832. Also, see: Anthony Aust, Handbook of
International Law (2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 7 and 8.
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Netherlands, on the other, the ICJ ruled on the binding nature of the ‘principle
of equidistance’ on the virtue of a customary norm of international law.635
Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of the same court has accepted to exclude those
members of the international community that, from the very beginning of the
formation and adaptation of a particular custom, have objected to its application
consistently and persistently. In international law, this particular member of the
international community is known as a ‘persistent objector.’636 In this regard,
for instance, the ICJ in the case of Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries ruled that
Norway had been a ‘persistent objector,’ when it came to the application of the
customary ten-mile rule relating to straight base-line to the Norwegian coast;
therefore, the UK’s claim over the territorial waters of Norway was dismissed.637
The principle of non-refoulement – as provided for under Article 33(1) of the
1951 Refugee Convention – has been the founding principle of international
refugee law and the backbone of the right to seek asylum. This principle has not
only shaped the construction of the current refugee legal framework and the
right to seek asylum, but it also has had a great influence on the prohibition of
forcible and arbitrary returns within the context of extradition law.638
Extradition is the formal and legally regulated form of transferring an individual
suspected or convicted of committing a crime from one country to another. The
country that requests deportation is the ‘requesting state’ and the country within
whose jurisdiction the individual is found is the ‘sending state.’ Within the rules
of international law and international relations, this act of transferring through
legal channels takes place by signing either bilateral or multilateral treaties
known as extradition treaties. Therefore, extradition is a formal transfer
635 Germany v. Denmark and the Netherlands (North Sea Continental Shelf) [1969], Judgments [1969]
ICJ 1; ICJ Reports 1969, p 3; [1969] ICJ Rep 3, 20 February 1969 (referred to as the ‘North Sea
Continental Shelf’ cases), paras 70-74.
636 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2019), pp. 26 and 27. In this regard, also see: Patrick Dumberry, ‘Incoherent and
Ineffective: The Concept of Persistent Objector Revisited’ (2010) 59(3) International and Comparative
Law Quarterly, pp. 779-802, pp. 780-782. For a full account on the criteria of the persistent objector
rule, see: James A. Green, The Persistent Objector Rule in International Law (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016), pp. 57-185.
637 United Kingdom v. Norway (Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries) [1951], Judgments [1951] ICJ 3; ICJ
Reports 1951, p 116; [1951] ICJ Rep 116, 18 December 1951 (referred to as the ‘Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries’ case). For more information in this regard, see: Martin Dixon, Robert McCorquodale, and
Sarah Williams, Cases & Materials on International Law (6th edn, New York: Oxford University Press,
2016), pp. 33, 334, 358-359, and 362.
638 For more information with regard to the definitional aspects and historical development of
extradition law, see the following two sources, respectively: John A. E. Vervaele, ‘Rendition,
Extraterritorial Abduction, and Extraordinary Rendition’,
<www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-
0171.xml>. Also, see: Isidoro Zanotti, Extradition in Multilateral Treaties and Conventions (Leiden:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), pp. 1-11.
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procedure governed under the laws of treaties.639 Within the context of
extradition law, not only has there been no state to be recognised as a persistent
objector to the principle of non-refoulement, but also the consensus over it – as
reflected in various legislation and legal instruments – has earned this principle
the position of a customary norm of international law. Therefore, all states in
the World are bound by this principle, regardless of whether they have signed
the 1951 Refugee Convention or any other regional refugee law instruments.640
Nonetheless, it is pertinent to mention here that even though the prohibition of
refoulement has the position of a customary norm of international law, the
application of this principle within the ambit of Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee
Convention is not absolute. The second paragraph of this Article, meaning
Article 33(2), imposes an exception to the applicability of the principle of non-
refoulement within the context of refugee protection provided under the 1951
Refugee Convention. This paragraph reads:
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.641
As explained in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, considering the ambiguities
embedded in the concept of national security, however in practice states do hold,
in fact, the upper hand and a wide margin of appreciation in defining what their
matters of national security would be. However, it should be noted that since
Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention is an exceptional clause to the
general rule of non-refoulement, it should be interpreted very narrowly and by
carefully assessing the circumstances of a particular individual case.642 As some
refugee law scholars have advised, the type of danger to national security
targeted by Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention needs to be of a
‘qualified nature,’ – in the sense that it should factually and in reality constitute
a ‘serious, grave, and immediate threat’ to the very existence of the country.643
639 Isidoro Zanotti, Extradition in Multilateral Treaties and Conventions (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2006), pp. 1-11.
640 Walter Kälin, Martina Caroni, and Lukas Heim, ‘Article 33, para. 1 of 1951 Convention’, in Andreas
Zimmermann, Jonas Dörschner, and Felix Machts (eds), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 1327-
1395, p. 1395. In this regard, also see: Vincent Chetail, International Migration Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019), pp. 119-124.
641 Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
642 Paul Weis, Commentary on the 1951 Refugee Convention: The Travaux préparatoires Analysed
(Geneva: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 1990), pp. 341-343.
643 Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, ‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-
Refoulement: Opinion’, in Erika Feller, Volker Türk, and Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection
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The travaux préparatoires of this article reveals that the representatives of
some governments such as the UK, France, and Sweden, during their
plenipotentiary negotiations on this Convention, had emphasised that the right
to seek asylum was a ‘sacred right’ based on ‘humanitarian reasons;’ hence, no
one should be allowed to ‘abuse’ this right.644 In order to achieve this purpose,
they suggested that the principle of proportionality should always be applied to
cases in which the questions of the protection of asylum seekers and the
expulsion of individuals for the matter of national security meet at a junction
and clash against each other.645 In this regard, the proportionality test suggested
was to cover the following considerations:
(a) the seriousness of the danger posed to the security of the country;
(b) the likelihood of that danger being realized and its imminence;
(c) whether the danger to the security of the country would be eliminated or
significantly alleviated by the removal of the individual concerned;
(d) the nature and seriousness of the risk to the individual from refoulement;
(e) whether other avenues consistent with the prohibition of refoulement are
available and could be followed, whether in the country of refuge or by the
removal of the individual concerned to a safe third country.646
Known as an exception to the prohibition of refoulement within the context of
the Convention’s refugee protection system, Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee
Convention resonates very much with the refugee exclusion clauses stated under
Article 1(F) of the same document. According to the latter provision, the
protection offered by the 1951 Refugee Convention is not applicable to an
applicant, with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering
that the person has committed a ‘crime against peace,’ a ‘war crime,’ or a ‘crime
against humanity’ as defined in other international instruments.647 In addition,
in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 87-177, pp. 134-138.
644 Paul Weis, Commentary on the 1951 Refugee Convention: The Travaux préparatoires Analysed
(Geneva: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 1990), pp. 343 and 344.
645 Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, ‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-
Refoulement: Opinion’, in Erika Feller, Volker Türk, and Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection
in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 87-177, pp. 137 and 138. In this regard, also see: Paul Weis,
Commentary on the 1951 Refugee Convention: The Travaux préparatoires Analysed (Geneva: UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 1990), pp. 325-337.
646 Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, ‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-
Refoulement: Opinion’, in Erika Feller, Volker Türk, and Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection
in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 87-177, pp. 137 and 138. In this regard, also see: Paul Weis,
Commentary on the 1951 Refugee Convention: The Travaux préparatoires Analysed (Geneva: UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 1990), pp. 343 and 344.
647 Article 1(F)(a) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
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the same exclusion is imposed on someone who has committed a ‘serious non-
political crime outside the country of refuge prior to [their] admission to that
country as a refugee,’648 and who has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.649
In spite of apparent similarities between Article 1(F) and Article 33(2) of the
1951 Refugee Convention in excluding an asylum seeker from ‘refugee-hood’ or
from being granted the ‘refugee status,’ and notwithstanding the fact that the
standards of proof under both Articles meet the same threshold, the grounds for
exclusion in these Articles are essentially different.650 The English version of the
1951 Refugee Convention has used the phrase ‘serious reasons’ under Article
1(F), on one hand, and the phrase ‘reasonable grounds’ under Article 33(2), on
the other. However, the original version of this instrument, which was written
in French, has used exactly the same wordings – ‘des raisons sérieuses’– for the
standards of proof under both Articles. Therefore, it is accepted that the
standards of proof under both provisions are the same.651 This difference
includes both the scope of application and the criteria, which are required for
exempting an individual from refugee protection.652 In this sense, Article 1(F) of
the 1951 Refugee Convention is an exclusion clause. This means that to be
both de facto and de jure, a refugee, an applicant must meet all the inclusion
criteria mentioned under Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and at
the same time must be excluded from the provisions of Article 1(F) of the same
Convention. Therefore, a person, who meets the inclusion criteria under Article
1(A)(2), but holds one of the exclusion criteria under Article 1(F) is not a refugee
– neither in a factual nor legal sense. In other words, this individual does not
meet the Refugee Convention’s ratione personae scope of application.
Studying the travaux préparatoires of the 1951 Refugee Convention shows that
Article 1(F) of the Convention was adopted to set aside non-political crimes or
648 Ibid, Article 1(F)(b).
649 Ibid, Article 1(F)(c).
650 James C. Hathaway, ‘Refugees and asylum’, in Brian Opeskin, Richard Perruchoud, and Jillyanne
Redpath-Cross (eds), Foundations of International Migration Law (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), pp. 177-204, p. 190.
651 Andreas Zimmermann and Philipp Wennholz, ‘Article 1 F of the 1951 Convention’, in Andreas
Zimmermann, Jonas Dörschner, and Felix Machts (eds), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 579-
610, pp. 579 and 589-591. Also, see: Andreas Zimmermann and Philipp Wennholz, ‘Article 33, para. 2
of the 1951 Convention’, in Andreas Zimmermann, Jonas Dörschner, and Felix Machts (eds), The 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011), pp. 1397-1423, pp. 1413-1415.
652 Andreas Zimmermann and Philipp Wennholz, ‘Article 1 F of the 1951 Convention’, in Andreas
Zimmermann, Jonas Dörschner, and Felix Machts (eds), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 579-
610, pp. 589-591.
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crimes of general nature from political offences, because as a matter of general
principle of international law, extradition treaties should not cover offences of a
political nature.653 Nevertheless, in the case of Article 33(2) of 1951 the Refugee
Convention, the applicant is de facto a refugee – meaning that, in fact, the
person is a refugee – but the individual is not de jure a refugee – meaning that
they cannot benefit from the rights and protections aimed at refugees under this
Convention. The reason for not being able to benefit from the legal protection
provided under the 1951 Refugee Convention is that the individual falling under
Article 33(2) shall be subjected to a return or expulsion, contrary to the
prohibition of refoulement as stipulated under Article 33(1) of the Convention.
Referring to the European legal system of refugee protection, the 2004 EU
Qualification Directive – as the main refugee protection instrument in the EU
and an equivalent to the 1951 Refugee Convention – has vastly duplicated all the
provisions of the Convention. However, the 2004 EU Qualification Directive has
not made any distinction between the exclusion clause and being a threat to the
national security of the state as an exceptional ground to the principle of non-
refoulement. Article 17 of the 2004 EU Qualification Directive, entitled
‘Exclusion,’ has combined all the items stipulated under both Article 1(F) and
Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Accordingly, once an individual is
believed to be a danger to the security of one of the EU Member States based on
serious reasons, the person is excluded not only from refugee protection, but
also from subsidiary protection.
In addition to Article 17, the 2004 EU Qualification Directive in Articles 14, 21,
23, 24, 25, and 26 repeatedly evokes the concepts of ‘national security’ and
‘public order’ for exempting a third-country national from any rights that are
associated with the right to seek asylum and those rights, which are granted on
the basis of one’s refugee status. To give an example, if we consider gaining
access to the territory of the EU and the prohibition of refoulement to be the
most essential elements of the right to seek asylum, Article 21(2) of the 2004 EU
Qualification Directive conversely asserts that, the Member State may refouler
an individual on the ground of ‘security.’ Hence, the securitisation of
immigration – in the form of over considering the national security of EU
Member States – is highly regarded in the EU legislation on refugee protection
and on the rights associated with respect for the right to seek asylum.
653 Andreas Zimmermann and Philipp Wennholz, ‘Article 1 F of the 1951 Convention’, in Andreas
Zimmermann, Jonas Dörschner, and Felix Machts (eds), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 579-
610, p. 587 and 588. Paul Weis, Commentary on the 1951 Refugee Convention: The Travaux
préparatoires Analysed (Geneva: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 1990), p. 334.
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5.3. THE PROHIBITION OF REFOULEMENT TO TORTURE
AND OTHER INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT: A JUS COGENS NORM
In spite of the fact that the prohibition of refoulement under the 1951 Refugee
Convention holds no absolute nature, when it comes to returning an individual
to torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the
principle of non-refoulement enjoys the status of a jus cogens norm of
international law. The jus cogens norms of international law are those rules of
customary international law that, due to their unique importance to the
international community, have been elevated to the position of ‘peremptory
norms.’654 In this regard, Article 53 of the 1969 VCLT has explicitly offered a
definition on the jus cogens norms of international law. According to this
Article, a jus cogens norm is a ‘peremptory norm of general international law,’
which ‘the international community of States has accepted and recognised as a
whole and a norm from which no derogation in whatsoever manner is
permitted’.655
The one and only one way to modify or to change a jus cogens norm is through
a subsequent norm of general international law, which holds the exact same
character as the targeted jus cogens norm.656 In its Article 64, the 1969 VCLT
continues that, ‘[i]f a new peremptory norm of general international law
emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void
and terminates.’657 The inclusion of the notion of jus cogens norms and explicitly
reflecting on the supremacy of these norms over other sources of international
law in the 1969 VCLT speaks of the fact that there were such principles of
importance existing, and that, no actor of the international community is
allowed to take them lightly.658
654 For more information on the formation and the position of jus cogens norms as a primary source of
international law, see: Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Audience and Authority – The Merit of the Doctrine
of Jus Cogens’, in Maarten den Heijer and Harmen van der Wilt (eds), Netherlands Yearbook of
International Law 2015: Jus Cogens: Quo Vadis? (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016), pp. 115-145.
655 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted on 23 May 1969, entered into
force on 27 January 1980, U.N.T.S. Vol. 1155, p. 331 (referred to as the ‘1969 VCLT’), entitled ‘Treaties
conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (“jus cogens”).
656 Article 53 of the 1969 VCLT.
657 Ibid, Article 64.
658 Jean Allain, ‘Insisting on the Jus Cogen Nature of Non-Refoulement’, in Joanne van Selm, Khoti
Kamanga, John Morrison, Sanja Spoljar-Vrzina, and Aninia Nadig (eds), The Refugee Convention at
Fifty: A View from Forced Migration Studies (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books 2003), pp. 81-95,
pp. 82 and 83. In this regard, also see: Maarten den Heijer and Harmen van der Wilt, ‘Jus Cogens and
the Humanization and Fragmentation of International Law’, in Maarten den Heijer and Harmen van
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In order to prove that the prohibition of refoulement to torture and other
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is a jus cogens norm of
international law, I first need to establish that the prohibition of torture, per se,
is a jus cogens norm. By doing so, I then will argue that the prohibition of torture
not only means a negative human right obligation of not to torture, but also it
puts a heavy positive legal obligation with a due diligence character on the
shoulders of the state.
The prohibition of torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment in international law has deep roots in both treaty law and
customary international law. This prohibition is so grave that, in international
law, a single convention with over 170 Member Parties is entirely dedicated to
the subject.659 Besides defining torture in Article 1(1) and leaving this definition
open to inclusion of further instances in Article 1(2), the United Nations
Convention against Torture adopted in 1984 (1984 CAT) in Article 2(2) and (3)
puts an ‘absolute’ and ‘non-derogable’ prohibition on any acts of torture. This
type of prohibition means that torture can never be justified on any grounds or
under any circumstances whatsoever.
To clarify further, depending on the nature and level of the obligation they
impose and depending on the circumstances in which they are applied, human
rights norms are divided into two categories of ‘absolute as opposed to non-
absolute rights,’ one the one hand, and ‘derogable as opposed to non-derogable
rights,’ on the other. ‘Absolute’ and ‘non-derogable’ human rights are not the
same thing and they do not necessarily correspond to each other. ‘Absolute, but
derogable’ rights are human rights that cannot be violated in emergencies, but
some limitations may be imposed upon them if some other interests are
involved. In order to be able to withdraw the obligation from a derogable human
right, the authority in charge must exercise a ‘balancing act,’ encompassing a
four-level test of (a) legality, (b) legitimacy, (c) necessity, and (d)
proportionality.660 An example of an ‘absolute, but derogable’ right, is the rights
der Wilt (eds), Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2015: Jus Cogens: Quo Vadis? (The Hague:
T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016), pp. 3-21.
659 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT), adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution
39/46, 10 December 1984, U.N.T.S. Vol. 1465, p. 85 (referred to as the ‘1984 CAT’).
660 Bernadette Rainey, Pamela McCormick, and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White, and Ovey: the European
Convention on Human Rights (8th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 114-123. In this
regard, also see: Cees Flinterman, ‘Derogation from the Rights and Freedoms in Time of Emergency’, in
Pieter van Dijk, Fried van Hoof, Arjen van Rijn, and Leo Zwaak (eds), Theory and Practice of the
European Convention on Human Rights (5th edn, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2018), pp. 1053-1075, pp. 1053-
1068. In this regard, also see: Samantha Besson, ‘Human Rights in Relation: A Critical Reading of the
ECtHR’s Approach to Conflicts of Rights’, in Stijn Smet and Eva Brems (eds), When Human Rights
Clash at the European Court of Human Rights: Conflict or Harmony? (Oxford: Oxford University
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to freedom of opinion and expression stipulated under Article 19(1) and (2) of
the ICCPR, respectively. These rights shall be permissibly limited by conducting
a balancing act as provided under the third paragraph of the same Article. A
‘non-derogable, but not an absolute’ right is a right, which cannot be waived in
emergencies, but can be waived by ‘the order of law.’ An example of this is the
right to life under which even war cannot justify taking the lives of civilians;
however, taking the life of a human as a punishment for a serious crime is
possible (capital punishment or the death penalty is not yet abolished in many
countries of the World).
One of the very rare rights that is simultaneously ‘absolute and non-derogable’
is the freedom from torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. This means that neither a public emergency, nor any interests of
balancing acts or even an order of the law, could be used to limit or violate this
right.661 This prohibition is a repetition, continuation, and reaffirmation of the
prohibition of torture explicitly stipulated in the international and regional
human rights legal instruments that preceded the 1984 CAT. In this regard, we
could refer to Article 5 of UDHR, Article 3 of ECHR, Article 7 of ICCPR, Article
5 of ACHR,662 the 1975 UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment,663 and Article 5 of Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights.664 In turn, the 1984 CAT has inspired more specialised human rights
instruments on the prohibition of torture at the regional level of human rights
protection. In this regard, for example, we could refer to the 1985 Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture665 and the 1987 European
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment.666 Moreover, Article 8 of the 2004 Arab Charter on Human
Press, 2017), pp. 23-37. For information on derogation of human rights under other international
human rights treaties besides the ECHR, see: Diane A. Desierto, Necessity and National Emergency
Clauses: Sovereignty in Modern Treaty Interpretation (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) pp.
241-253.
661 Manfred Nowak, Moritz Birk, and Giuliana Monina, ‘Introduction’, in Manfred Nowak, Moritz Birk,
and Giuliana Monina (eds), The United Nations Convention Against Torture and its Optional Protocol:
A Commentary (2nd edn, New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 1-20, pp. 1-3.
662 The American Convention on Human Rights, adopted at the Inter-American Specialized Conference
on Human Rights, San José, 22 November 1969 (referred to as the ‘1969 ACHR’).
663 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution
A/RES/3452(XXX) on 9 December 1975.
664 The African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, entered into
force on 21 October 1986, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
665 The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, 9 December 1985, entry into force
on 28 February 1987, The Organization of American States (OAS) Treaty Series No. 67.
666 The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted by the Council of Europe on 26 November 1987, European Treaty Series No. 126.
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Rights has followed the same path in including the absolute prohibition of
torture or other cruel, degrading, humiliating or inhuman treatment.667
Besides treaty law, the decisions and practices of international tribunals and
committees have testified to the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of torture
and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. For instance, the
Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), in its 1998 judgement on the case of Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija,
ruled that, ‘the prohibition of torture is a jus cogens or peremptory norm of
international law; therefore, no agreement against this rule at any level is legally
permitted.’668 Furthermore, the Human Rights Committee, in its General
Comment No. 24 regarding reservations to the 1966 ICCPR, reiterated that, ‘no
reservation is allowed against the prohibition of torture, because as a
peremptory norm of international law, this prohibition holds an absolute and
non-derogable stand in the relation between states’.669
After firmly establishing the absolute and non-derogable prohibition of torture
and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as a jus cogens norm
of international law, it is time to analyse the nature of the prohibition of
refoulement to torture. In this regard, the ICTY in the case of Furundžija, stated
that, ‘one of the consequences of prohibition of torture being a jus cogens norm
is that, […] torture may not be covered by a statute of limitations and must not
be excluded from extradition under any political offence exemption.’670 This part
of the decision of the ICTY is in direct compliance with Article 3 of the 1984 CAT,
which very explicitly has set a blanket prohibition on any kind of returning a
person to torture. According to the first paragraph of Article 3 of CAT, ‘[n]o State
Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of
being subjected to torture.’671 Moreover, the ILC in its commentary on Article 26
of the Draft Articles regarding the ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts’ has rendered that where there is an apparent conflict between
primary obligations, one of which arises for a state directly under a peremptory
667 The Arab Charter on Human Rights, adopted by the League of Arab States on 22 May 2004, entered
into force on 15 March 2008.
668 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ICTY Trial Chamber Judgment, 10 December
1998, paras 144 and 153-155.
669 The CCPR General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or
Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article
41 of the Covenant, adopted at the Fifty-second Session of the Human Rights Committee, on 4 November
1994, UN Doc. No. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6.
670 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ICTY Trial Chamber Judgment, 10 December
1998, para. 156.
671 Article 3(1) of the 1984 CAT.
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norm of general international law, it is evident that such an obligation must
prevail.672
Alongside the same line of argument, former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture
(2004-2010) Manfred Nowak has rigorously emphasised that Article 3 of the
1984 CAT covers all forms of obligatory deportations of an alien, including any
ordinary or extraordinary renditions, which have commonly being practiced by
some CAT Member States under the premise of the so-called ‘global war on
terror.’673 The term ‘rendition’ as used by Special Rapporteur Nowak means that
whenever the transfer or return of a person, who is convicted of a crime or is
standing a trial, is not regulated through extradition treaties, the requesting
state would employ some forceful measures to return the individual to its
jurisdiction. Depending on whether these measures are arranged and
coordinated with the sending state, and if an arrest warrant was issued by a court
of law to respect due process in justice together with securing the human rights
of the detainee, renditions are divided into two categories of ‘ordinary
renditions’ and ‘extraordinary renditions.’ Ordinary renditions are the return
measures that are coordinated between the requesting and sending states, and
that the requesting state has already provided arrest warrants and other court
or legal documents to secure the human rights of the transferee.674 However, if
the acts of arrest, transfer, and return of individuals are performed unilaterally
by the agents of requesting state without meeting the court’s arrest warrant and
other judicial due process requirements, these kinds of transfers are known as
‘extraordinary renditions.’675 The secret abduction and transfer of Adolf
Eichmann by Mossad from Argentina to Israel in 1960 is one of the first
examples of this practice, which not only caused damages to the diplomatic
672 The Commentary of the ILC on Article 26 of the Draft articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session
and submitted to the General Assembly in 2001, UN Doc. No. A/56/10.
673 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, Manfred Nowak, submitted to the UN General Assembly on 5 February 2010, UN Doc. No.
A/HRC/13/39/Add.5, paras 27, 244, and 245. Also, see: Manfred Nowak, ‘‘Extraordinary Renditions’,
Diplomatic Assurances and the Principle of Non-Refoulement’, in Walter Kälin, Robert Kolb, Christoph
Spenlé, and Maurice Voyame (eds), International Law, Conflict and Development: The Emergence of
a Holistic Approach in International Affairs (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2010), pp. 107-134, pp. 117-119.
674 Manfred Nowak, ‘‘Extraordinary Renditions’, Diplomatic Assurances and the Principle of Non-
Refoulement’, in Walter Kälin, Robert Kolb, Christoph Spenlé, and Maurice Voyame (eds), International
Law, Conflict and Development: The Emergence of a Holistic Approach in International Affairs
(Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2010), pp. 107-134.
675 Ibid. In this regard also see: Arianna Vedaschi, ‘Extraordinary Renditions: A Practice beyond
Traditional Justice’, in Elspeth Guild, Didier Bigo, and Mark Gibney (eds), Extraordinary Rendition:
Addressing the Challenges of Accountability (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 89-121.
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relations between the two countries, but it also led to profound challenges for
the rule of law and human rights protection.676
Besides the explicit prohibition of refoulement to torture and other inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of the 1984 CAT, Article 3
of the 1950 ECHR encompasses a positive obligation on Member States in
expulsion to torture. In the following part of this chapter (Section 5.4) through
case studies, I will demonstrate how the securitisation of immigration in Europe
– especially within the context of the so-called ‘war on terror’ and combating
terrorism – threatens to undermine the absolute and non-derogable nature of
the principle of non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm. Undermining the
position of the principle of non-refoulement means directing an attack on the
realisation of the right to seek asylum as a real and practical fundamental right.
These case analyses include the relevant case law within the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR under Article 3 of the Convention and using diplomatic assurances (an
effort to expel unwanted or undesirable individuals), while justifying the
expulsion against the absolute and non-derogable prohibition of refoulement as
established under Article 3.
5.4. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECURITISATION OF
IMMIGRATION UPON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-
REFOULEMENT: THE USE OF DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES
IN TORTURE-EXPULSION CASES
Being the second essential element of the right to seek asylum as a fundamental
right, the principle of non-refoulement constitutes the backbone of this right.
Therefore, to complement the discussion on the implications of securitising
immigration on the right to seek asylum, I have to address the prohibition of
refoulement, especially within the context of returning an individual to torture
and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In this section,
through ECtHR case studies, I illustrate how the securitisation of immigration
is putting the foundation of the right to seek asylum, meaning the principle of
non-refoulement, to an extreme test. When it comes to this principle, the
676 John A. E. Vervaele, ‘Rendition, Extraterritorial Abduction, and Extraordinary Rendition’,
<www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-
0171.xml>. Also, see: Arianna Vedaschi, ‘Extraordinary Renditions: A Practice beyond Traditional
Justice’, in Elspeth Guild, Didier Bigo, and Mark Gibney (eds), Extraordinary Rendition: Addressing
the Challenges of Accountability (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 89-121. Also, see: Helen
Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2015), pp. 778-845. And, see: Manfred Nowak, ‘‘Extraordinary Renditions’, Diplomatic
Assurances and the Principle of Non-Refoulement’, in Walter Kälin, Robert Kolb, Christoph Spenlé, and
Maurice Voyame (eds), International Law, Conflict and Development: The Emergence of a Holistic
Approach in International Affairs (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2010), pp. 107-134.
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securitisation of immigration in the EU has shown itself in the form of some –
legally speaking – controversial practices such as the use of diplomatic
assurances in torture-expulsion cases.
These case analyses shed light on this very important concern that if complying
with the principle of non-refoulement to torture and other inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment depends on the choice of States by
considering merely their national interests, the position of this principle could
diminish to something less than a jus cogens norm. In other words, once the
backbone of the right to seek asylum, i.e. the principle of non-refoulement
cracks, there is the danger of reaching a point where this principle is replaced by
some questionable practices such as expulsions based on assurances. The
worrying aspect here is that if States continue to repeat these practices (the
element of practice) and start forming an opinion in favour of it (the element of
opinio juris), there may come a day when the securitised policies gradually
assume the customary character of the principle of non-refoulement, and
renditions based on assurances become the new norm. In the context of
renditions or transferring a person from one State to another, the UNHCR has
defined diplomatic assurances as:
‘[…] an undertaking by the receiving State to the effect that the person concerned
will be treated in accordance with conditions set by the sending State or, more
generally, in keeping with its human rights obligations under international law.’677
These agreements include some human rights safeguards to facilitate and
legitimise the removal, expulsion, or extradition to the third State of non-
nationals who are at risk of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.678 Hence, these assurances impose some conditions
by the sending State on the receiving State to ensure that the deportation of
those suspected of terrorism and those considered as threats to national
security, does not violate the rules of human rights law.679 Despite the existence
of a definition by the UNHCR, the history of creating assurances in international
law is not very clear. In spite of the fact that the number of assurances associated
with renditions has increased significantly in the years following the 9/11
677 The UN Refugee Agency, ‘UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances and International Refugee
Protection’ (2006), available at: <www.refworld.org/pdfid/44dc81164.pdf>, p. 2.
678 Nina Larsaeus, ʻThe Use of Diplomatic Assurances in the Prevention of Prohibited Treatment’,
Oxford University Working Paper Series, Refugees Studies Centre (RSC) Working Paper No. 32
(2006), p. 3. Also see: Gregor Noll, ʻDiplomatic Assurances and the Silence of Human Rights Law’, 7
Melbourne Journal of International Law (2006), pp. 104-126, at p. 104. In this regard, also see: ‘Human
Rights Watch Questions and Answers on “Diplomatic Assurances” against Torture’, p. 1,
<www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/ecaqna1106web.pdf>.
679 The UN Refugee Agency, ‘UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances and International Refugee
Protection’ (2006), available at: <www.refworld.org/pdfid/44dc81164.pdf>, p. 2.
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attacks, diplomatic assurances actually played a determining role in
international relations and the foreign policy of many States long before the 9/11
attacks. An early instance of this practice had happened already in 1876, when
Lord Derby of the UK rejected the extradition of a forgery suspect to the US.680
The reason for the refusal of the removal by the UK was that the US Government
had failed to provide an assurance on not to try the suspect for any other
offences.681 Some records show that since the beginning of the Cold War, the US,
some European States, China, and the Soviet Union have rendered individuals
in whom they were interested for political reasons.682 In addition, European
countries have had extensive experience in utilising diplomatic assurances,
mainly in order to prevent the death penalty in the context of extradition for
common crimes.683
Nevertheless, the use of diplomatic assurances in torture-expulsion cases is
legally more challenging than the use of assurances in death-penalty expulsions.
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR indicates that assurances in death-penalty
expulsions have a lower threshold for the ‘legality’ test compared to the cases of
expulsion to torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.684 The reason for this difference is that the factual circumstances
of committing torture are different from executing a death penalty.685 The death
penalty is a punishment usually assigned for serious crimes such as murder (in
countries where capital punishment is yet to be abolished); whereas, torture
occurs against those individuals accused of alleged terrorism-related crimes.
When the authorities of the receiving country believe that the returnee is
connected to a terrorist network, the officials prefer the suspect not to die;
instead, prefer to impose – notoriously termed – ‘enhanced interrogation
680 Eric Metcalfe, ‘The False Promise of Assurances against Torture’ (2009) 6(1) Justice Journal, pp. 63-
92, p. 64.
681 Ibid, pp. 64 and 65.
682 John F. Murphy, ‘Cold War’, in Rodney Carlisle (ed.), Encyclopedia of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 149-152, p. 149. In this regard, also see:
Ray S. Cline, The CIA under Reagan, Bush & Casey: The Evolution of the Agency from Roosevelt to
Reagan (Washington D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1981), p. 139.
683 Human Rights Watch, ‘Still at Risk: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard against Torture’ (2005)
Vol. 17, No. 4(D), available at: <www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/eca0405.pdf>, pp. 57-79. In
this regard, also see: Human Rights Watch, ‘Empty Promises: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard
against Torture’ (2004) Vol. 16, No. 4, available at:
<www.hrw.org/reports/2004/un0404/diplomatic0404.pdf>, pp. 21-36.
684 In this regard, see, for example the decision of the ECtHR Chamber on the admissibility in following
case: Ira Samuel Einhorn v. France, Application no. 71555/01, European Court of Human Rights, Final
Decision of Chamber as to the Admissibility (16 October 2001).
685 William Anthony Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 195 and 196.
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techniques’686 in order to obtain information on the alleged affiliated group and
its members.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the signing and exchange of diplomatic
assurances in renditions have been one of the most common practices in the
context of the ‘war on terror.’687 The adoption of Resolution 1373(2001) by the
UN Security Council urged many States around the World to include ‘promises
not to torture’ in their renditions, while many national courts failed to recognise
the illegality of assurances and renditions based on those assurances.
Considering the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of refoulement to torture,
the use of diplomatic assurances in the cases of expulsion to torture has resulted
in many controversies about the legality of this practice. One criticisms is that,
diplomatic assurances have a secret nature, and they lack formalities and
enforcement mechanisms that strengthen treaties; therefore, they do not hold
the same legal status as treaties.688 Even if assumed that they had a binding legal
status like treaties, they would still be void, because they are agreed against the
principle of non-refoulement to torture – a jus cogens norm in international
law.689 In this regard, some human rights activists and organisations, together
with mainstream human rights watchdog INGOs such as Human Rights Watch,
have unanimously criticised the use of diplomatic assurances in torture-
expulsion cases mainly for the very reason that any agreement against jus
cogens norms is legally invalid, and thus void.690
686 In this regard, see: Gloria Gaggioli and Pavle Kilibarda, ‘Unmasking the Challenges: Interrogation
and International Law’, in Steven J. Barela, Mark Fallon, Gloria Gaggioli, and Jens David Ohlin (eds),
Interrogation and Torture: Integrating Efficacy with Law and Morality (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2020), pp. 359-391.
687 Elspeth Guild, Security and Migration in the 21st Century (Cambridge; Malden, Massachusetts:
Polity Press, 2009), pp. 96 and 97. In this regard, also see: Mariagiulia Giuffré, ‘Access to Protection:
Negotiating Rights and Diplomatic Assurances under Memoranda of Understanding’, in Jean-Pierre
Gauci, Mariagiulia Giuffré, and Evangelia (Lilian) Tsourdi (eds), Exploring the Boundaries of Refugee
Law: Current Protection Challenges (Leiden: Brill, 2015), pp. 50-89, p. 51 and 52.
688 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn, New York: Cambridge University Press,
2013), pp. 28-35 and 40-50.
689 This point that no agreement against the jus cogens norms of international law is valid was
extensively elaborated in the previous part of this chapter, under Section 5.3.
690 The examples of objections against the use of diplomatic assurances in torture-expulsion cases are
beyond the page limit of this research, so I shall refer to only one of them here. In this regard, for
instance, Louise Arbour, the fifth United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, has vigorously
opposed employing assurances in the cases of expulsion to torture, because according to her, this
practice would impair the universal ban on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. In this
regard, see: Louise Arbour, ‘In Our Name and On Our Behalf’ (2006) 55(3) The International and
Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 511-526, pp. 517-522.
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In this regard, for example, the Swedish Government, in the cases of Agiza v.
Sweden691 and Alzery v. Sweden,692 not only excluded the applicants from
international protection, but it also extradited the applicants to Egypt – based
on the secret information and the aid it had received from the CIA. In both cases,
the UN human rights monitoring bodies, the HRC and the CAT Commit., held
the Government of Sweden accountable for the alleged violation of Articles 3
and 7 of the CAT and the ICCPR, respectively. The CAT Commit. in the case of
Agiza v. Sweden asserted that, ‘under no circumstances must diplomatic
assurances be used as a safeguard against torture where there are substantial
grounds for believing that a person would be in danger of being subjected to
torture upon return.’693 This is similar to the approach and practice of the HRC
in the case of Alzery v. Sweden. This case concerns the complaint of Mr. Alzery
against the Government of Sweden under Article 7 of the 1966 ICCPR with
regard to the allegedly unlawful expulsion of the complainant to Egypt. The HRC
concluded that Sweden had failed in this case to demonstrate that diplomatic
assurances were sufficient to eliminate all risks of torture and ill-treatment to a
level consistent with the requirements set under Article 7 of the 1966 ICCPR.694
Dealing with asylum seekers subjected to Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee
Convention creates a ‘legal limbo,’ which makes it challenging for the country of
refuge to deal with – not only legally, but also in a diplomatic sense. As explained
in Section 5.2, on the one hand, these individuals are de facto refugees under
Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention; therefore, based on the general rule of
non-refoulement, they should not be returned to their countries of origin.
However, in accordance with the rule of Article 33(2) of the same Convention,
they are not de jure refugees. Therefore, they cannot be granted refugee status,
and consequently, they will remain with no protection offered by the Refugee
Convention. In such situations, the option of ‘extradition’ or ‘removal’ is
available to the country in question. In the cases of alleged terrorism,
nevertheless, there are high chances that the returnee would be subjected to
torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; therefore,
the jus cogens norm of the prohibition of refoulement to torture legally prevents
the State from extraditing the individual. In this chaos, the State faces an
691 Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, UN Committee against Torture (CAT):
Communication No. 233/2003, 24 May 2005, UN Doc No. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003.
692 Mohammed Alzery v. Sweden, UN Human Rights Committee (HRC): Communication No.
1416/2005, 10 November 2006, UN Doc No. CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005.
693 The Committee against Torture, ‘Consideration of the report of Spain’,
<www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15905&LangID=E>.
694 Mohammed Alzery v. Sweden, UN Human Rights Committee (HRC): Communication No.
1416/2005, 10 November 2006, UN Doc No. CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005.
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individual who cannot be protected as a refugee, but also cannot be sent back to
the country of origin. The only option left is to prosecute the person based on
the general principle of aut dedere aut judicare available in criminal law.695 This
principle – translated into an ‘obligation to extradite or prosecute’ – is the
obligation of the State, under whose custody an alleged offender is, to extradite
that person to stand trial in another State. If failing to do so, then that State itself
should prosecute the person in question. The underlying rationale of this
principle is that no crime should go unpunished, and that, no alleged criminal
would find a ‘safe haven’ for serious crimes they have committed.696 In
international criminal law, a universal jurisdiction is recognised for the State
within whose territory suspects of terrorism are found.697
The ‘legal limbo’ in this situation occurs because the burden of proof in criminal
trials (including investigating and prosecuting terrorist-related crimes) fails to
match with its counterpart within the RSD procedures.698 In criminal
investigations, the burden of proof is on the State prosecuting the crime with the
highest standard of proof – meaning ‘beyond reasonable doubt.’699 However, in
RSD procedures, the standard of proof under Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee
Convention for being a danger to national security is ‘reasonable grounds,’
which is a lower standard of proof compared to beyond reasonable doubt.
Because of this difference in the standards of proof, the individual is neither a
criminal punishable by the rule of law, nor a refugee deserving protection under
the Refugee Convention. This is a grey legal zone: no refugee status, no eligibility
695 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2018), pp. 28 and 29.
696 With regard to the applicability of the principle of ‘aut dedere aut judicare’ to the crime of terrorism,
see: Michael A. Newton, ‘Terrorist Crimes and the aut dedere aut judicare Obligation’, in Larissa J.
Herik, Larissa van den Herik, and Nico Schrijver (eds), Counter-Terrorism Strategies in a Fragmented
International Legal Order: Meeting the Challenges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013),
pp. 68-92, pp. 84-92. In this regard, also see: Raphaël van Steenberghe, ‘The Obligation to Extradite or
Prosecute: Clarifying its Nature’ (2011) 9(5) Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp. 1089-1116,
pp. 1095-1113.
697 Kimberley N. Trapp, ‘Jurisdiction and State Responsibility’, in Stephen Allen, Daniel Costelloe,
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, and Edward Guntrip (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisdiction in
International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 356-380, pp. 358-364. Also, see:
Gideon Boas, Public International Law: Contemporary Principles and Perspectives (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012), p. 262.
698 Mariagiulia Giuffré, ‘Access to Protection: Negotiating Rights and Diplomatic Assurances under
Memoranda of Understanding’, in Jean-Pierre Gauci, Mariagiulia Giuffré, and Evangelia (Lilian)
Tsourdi (eds), Exploring the Boundaries of Refugee Law: Current Protection Challenges (Leiden: Brill,
2015), pp. 50-89, p. 51-53. Also, see: Mehrnoosh Farzamfar, ‘Diplomatic Assurances in Cases of
Expulsion to Torture: A Critical Analysis’ (2018) 24 Finnish Yearbook of International Law, pp. 51-74,
pp. 64-66.
699 Adrian Keane and Paul McKeown, The Modern Law of Evidence (13th edn, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2020), pp. 84-86. Also, see: Andrew L-T Choo, Evidence (5th edn, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2018), pp. 44-47. Also, see: Richard Glover, Murphy on Evidence (15th edn, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 100-102.
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for subsidiary protection, and no grounds necessary for long detention (not
proven guilty of terrorism). Simultaneously, the person becomes ‘undesirable’
due to security fears, and hence, cannot be granted a residence permit. Here is
where diplomatic assurances come to the picture. As a ‘pragmatic’ solution to
put an end to this legal limbo, while enforcing their sovereignty, assurances
enable States to remove ‘undesirable’ and ‘threatening non-citizens’ from their
territories, without violating the rules of international law in general, and their
human rights obligations, specifically.700 Figure 5 below illustrates the
implication of securitising immigration upon the jus cogens norm of non-
refoulement to torture and other forms of ill-treatment by using diplomatic
assurances in torture-expulsion cases.
Figure 5. The creation of diplomatic assurances due to the legal limbo created by the securitisation of
immigration.
As follows, I demonstrate how the ECtHR has recently adopted a favourable
approach towards the use of diplomatic assurances in torture-expulsion cases.
This is against the earlier jurisprudence of the Court, in which it rigorously
700 Elspeth Guild, ‘Asymmetrical Sovereignty and the Refugee: Diplomatic Assurances and the Failure
of Due Process, Agiza v. Sweden and Alzery v. Sweden’, in James C. Simeon (ed.), Critical Issues in
International Refugee Law: Strategies toward Interpretative Harmony (Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 119-142, pp. 119-124.
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opposed any mitigations on the absolute prohibition of refoulement under
Article 3 of the ECHR.701 Starting from the case of Chahal v. the U.K. (1996),702
the ECtHR changed its language in addressing the jus cogens norm of non-
refoulement under Article 3 of the Convection. Instead of emphasising the
absolute and non-derogable nature of this prohibition, the Court confirms that
the Contracting States to the Convention have the right – as a matter of a well-
established principle of international law, i.e. the principle of State sovereignty
and subject to their treaty obligations including the Convention – to control the
entry, residence, and expulsion of aliens.703 Since the 9/11 attacks, the
relationship between the ECtHR and European States on protecting asylum
seekers, especially those with an Islamist profile, has grown to become
extremely tense. The ECtHR opened itself to the idea of using diplomatic
assurances in torture-expulsions by taking into account the dimension of
‘torture-risk assessment,’ the peak of which could be seen in the case of Othman
(Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom. This is the first case within the
jurisprudence of the Court, where it ruled that no violation of Article 3 of the
Convention had occurred, giving the reason that the assurances had removed
the risk of torture and other forms of ill-treatment.704
Based on its high number of cases, the ECtHR has developed a well-established
jurisprudence with regard to the use of diplomatic assurances in the cases of
expulsion to torture or other forms of ill-treatment. One of the very early cases
evaluating diplomatic assurances is the landmark case of Soering v. the United
Kingdom.705 This case concerns the expulsion of Mr. Jens Soering, a German
national, from the UK to the US, in order to face charges of murder in the
Commonwealth of Virginia.706 Due to the nature of the crimes committed by Mr.
Soering in Virginia before escaping to the UK, he was indicted of charges of
multiple murders in the Circuit Court of Bedford County.707
Upon expulsion to the US to face trial, there was a high chance that the applicant
would be convicted of multiple murders and thus sentenced to the death
701 In this regard, we could mention, for example, the landmark case of Soering v. the United Kingdom,
Application No. 14038/88, European Court of Human Rights, Plenary Chamber Final Judgment (07
July 1989).
702 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 22414/93, European Court of Human Rights, Grand
Chamber Judgment (15 November 1996).
703 Ibid, para. 73.
704 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 8139/09, European Court of Human
Rights, Final Chamber Judgment (17 January 2012).
705 Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, European Court of Human Rights,
Plenary Chamber Final Judgment (07 July 1989).
706 Ibid, para. 11.
707 Ibid, para. 13.
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penalty.708 As a result, the applicant complained that his extradition to the US
would put him in danger of a phenomenon common in the US prisons known as
the ‘death row’ – an unnecessarily prolonged waiting-time, with the resulting
human distress, for those waiting execution. When Mr. Soering was supposed
to be expelled from the UK to the U.S., the average time between a trial and
execution in the State of Virginia was from six to eight years. The delays
happened due to a strategy used by some convicted prisoners to prolong the
appeal proceedings as much as possible. At that time, the US Supreme Court
had yet to consider the ‘death row phenomenon’ fall foul of the prohibition of
‘cruel and unusual punishment’ under the Eighth Amendment to the US
Constitution.709
The main issue in front of the ECtHR in this case was to decide whether the
expulsion of Mr. Soering to the US and the possibility of being subject to the
death penalty was in violation of Article 3 of the 1950 ECHR. The argument of
the Court was that, since no exception or derogation is allowed under Article 3,
it would be incompatible with the underlying values of the Convention if a
Contracting State could knowingly surrender a fugitive to another State where
there were substantial grounds for believing that the individual would be in
danger of torture or ill-treatment.710 Receiving a death penalty as a final
sentence to a crime in Virginia automatically meant that the convicted person
would be subjected to death row. According to the ECtHR, this was an example
of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment prohibited under Article 3 of
the Convention.711 Therefore, the Court established a positive obligation on the
Member States in Article 3 expulsion-cases.
Amid addressing the violation of Article 3 of the ECHR because of extraditing
Mr. Soering to the US, the ECtHR discussed the issuance of diplomatic
assurances between the Governments for removing the risk of the ‘death row’
phenomenon. In this regard, the Court ruled that the existence and use of
diplomatic assurances, by no means, would remove the risk of being subjected
to the inhuman treatment associated with death row.712 In this assessment, the
decisive test was not the existence or lack of assurances itself, but rather that,
according to the Court, the diplomatic assurances were inadequate in altering
the risk of being subjected to ‘death row’; therefore, the assurances would not
708 Ibid, paras 39-41.
709 Ibid, paras 25, 56, 61, and 63-68.
710 Ibid, para. 88.
711 Ibid, paras 92 and 93.
712 Ibid, paras 94-99.
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remove the danger of violating the individual’s right under Article 3 of the
ECHR.
Another landmark case within the jurisprudence of the ECtHR with regard to
expulsion to torture is Chahal v. the United Kingdom.713 This case concerns the
deportation of Mr. Singh Chahal, a Sikh separatist, together with his family
members (his wife and their two children) from the UK to the State of Punjab in
India.714 One of the main issues in front of the Court was whether the expulsion
of the applicant would be in breach of the UK’s obligations under Article 3 of the
ECHR. This question needed to be answered by considering the fact that
diplomatic assurances were signed and exchanged between the two
Governments of the UK and India.715
Similar to its decision in the case of Soering, the ECtHR primarily emphasised
the absolute nature of the prohibition rendered under Article 3 of the
Convention.716 Thereafter, the Court reiterated that even supposing that the
Government of India had given assurances in good faith and in accordance with
its obligations under international human rights treaties, Indian Government
could have neither in practice or in reality adequate or effective control over the
security forces established in the Indian province of Punjab. The Court asserted
that it was ‘persuaded [by evidence submitted by the 1994 National Human
Rights Commission’s report on Punjab] that, until mid-1994 at least, elements
in the Punjab police were accustomed to act without regard to the human rights
of suspected Sikh militants and were fully capable of pursuing their targets into
areas of India far away from Punjab.’717
The final decision of the Court with regard to the diplomatic assurances and the
alleged violation of Article 3 of the ECHR in this case was that in addition to the
existence of specific and explicit assurances, the general situation in the
receiving country must have been also taken into consideration.718 A very
important part of this consideration is the approval and the acceptance of
diplomatic assurances by the local authorities,719 in addition to the criterion that
the assurances should come from the highest-ranking officials of a
Government.720
713 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 22414/93, European Court of Human Rights, Grand
Chamber Judgment (15 November 1996).
714 Ibid, paras 12 and 13.
715 Ibid, para. 105.
716 Ibid, paras 37 and 92-94.
717 Ibid, paras 99 and 100.
718 Ibid, paras 97-107.
719 Ibid, para. 98.
720 Ibid, para. 105.
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In 2005, the Grand Chamber case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey raised
an alleged violation of Article 3 in the case of issuing diplomatic assurances.721
This case concerned the expulsion of two Uzbek nationals, Mr. Rustam
Sultanovich Mamatkulov and Mr. Zainiddin Abdurasulovich Askarov
(hereinafter, referred to as the ‘applicants’ or ‘the first’ or ‘the second applicant’)
on 11 and 22 March 1999, respectively, from Turkey to the Republic of
Uzbekistan.722 The Government of Uzbekistan had charged the applicants for
being terrorists because of their membership in Erk, an opposition party in
Uzbekistan.723
On 27 March 1999, the Turkish Government extradited both applicants to
Uzbekistan, despite the fact that about ten days before that the ECtHR had
indicated an interim measure to Turkey under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court,
not to extradite the individuals prior to the Chamber’s final judgement.724 In its
letter to the Court, the Turkish Government submitted that the extradition was
carried out based on the existing extradition treaty between Turkey and
Uzbekistan and by relying on assurances obtained via the Uzbek Embassy in
Ankara conveying memoranda of understandings issued by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Public Prosecutor of Uzbekistan.725 These assurances
included provisions on the commitment of the Uzbek Government to its human
rights obligations under the 1984 CAT and that the trials would be held in public
with the possibility for Turkish authorities to attend the trial sessions and to visit
the applicants in custody. At the end, the first applicant was convicted of murder
and terrorism and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, while the second
applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to eleven years in prison.726
In its assessment on whether the extradition of the applicants by relying on the
assurances obtained from the Government of Uzbekistan was in violation of
Article 3 of the Convention, the Grand Chamber ruled that since the individual
was already extradited before the inception of the ECtHR, only a violation of
Article 34 of the Convention could be concluded. To rule on Article 3, the Court
relied on the reports obtained from the authorities of Turkey on the compliance
of the Uzbek Government with the terms of the assurances. In its deliberation
on Article 3, the Court frequently referred to the test of ‘torture-risk assessment,’
which it had applied in the cases of Soering and Chahal. Accordingly, the Court
721 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Application Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, European Court of
Human Rights, Grand Chamber Judgment (4 February 2005).
722 Ibid, paras 1 and 3.
723 Ibid, paras 11 and 12-23.
724 Ibid, paras 24-27.
725 Ibid, paras 28 and 29.
726 Ibid, para 32.
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evaluated whether there were substantial grounds for believing that the
individuals would be subjected to torture and other ill-treatment if retuned by
relying on the assurances given.727 In spite of torture-risk assessment, the Court
failed to establish the violation of Article 3, due to the biased position of Turkey
to report in favour of Uzbekistan on the question of complying with the terms of
the assurances. In this regard, the Court asserted:
In the light of the material before it, the Court is not able to conclude that
substantial grounds existed at the aforementioned date for believing that the
applicants faced a real risk of treatment proscribed by Article 3. Turkey’s failure to
comply with the indication given under Rule 39, which prevented the Court from
assessing whether a real risk existed in the manner it considered appropriate in the
circumstances of the case, must be examined below under Article 34. Consequently,
no violation of Article 3 of the Convention can be found.728
As opposed to Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, but as an analogous to the
two cases of Soering v. the U.K. and Chahal v. the U.K., the ECtHR in its
subsequent Grand Chamber case of Saadi v. Italy,729 carefully examined the
adequacy of diplomatic assurances in removing the real risk of torture and ill-
treatment within the ambit of Article 3 of the 1950 ECHR. In this landmark case,
the Court held that the risk of ill-treatment was not abolished by the guarantees
of the Government of Tunisia, because these assurances solely stated that the
Tunisian Government would be bound and behave in accordance with its
commitments under international human rights instruments.730 According to
the ECtHR, the quality of assurances matter, particularly their detailed content
should project sufficient and explicit guarantees against the violation of Article
3 of the ECHR.731 In addition, the guarantees could not only refer to general
human rights obligations, but they should specify to which treaties and
conventions and to which provisions they are referring.732 One wonders why in
the case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, the Court decided not to
criticise the quality of assurances that had merely in general terms included the
human rights obligations of Uzbekistan.
From its famous judgement in Saadi until the landmark case of Othman (Abu
Qatada) v. the UK in 2012, the Court addressed a series of torture-expulsion
cases by relying on diplomatic assurances. In this regard, the following cases
727 Ibid, paras 66-78.
728 Ibid, para. 77.
729 Saadi v. Italy, Application No. 37201/06, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber
Judgement (28 February 2008).




could be named: Garabayev v. Russia,733 Ryabikin v. Russia,734 Ismoilov and
Others v. Russia,735 Ben Khemais v. Italy,736 Baysakov and Others v.
Ukraine,737 Yuldashev v. Russia,738 Klein v. Russia,739 Khaydarov v. Russia,740
and Auad v. Bulgaria.741 In spite of some factual differences, such as the
countries of applicants’ nationalities or the places where they were to be
expelled, the circumstances of expulsion in all the above-mentioned cases are
similar in the sense that the assurances were exchanged between the requesting
and sending States for expelling the applicants. With regard to the decision of
the Court, what all these cases have in common is that the ECtHR gave no legal
weight to the assurances. Instead, it placed emphasis on the absolute and non-
derogable nature of the prohibition of refoulement under Article 3 of the
Convention. Therefore, the Court held Member States responsible for the
alleged violation of Article 3 if the applicants were to be expelled.
The torture-risk assessment established in Saadi, which had been developed
based on the Soering and Chahal criteria and continued in the chain of cases as
mentioned above, provided a very strong empirical and experimental ground for
the ECtHR to build its jurisprudence with regard to deciding whether diplomatic
assurances could remove the risk of torture.742 Meanwhile, in 2011, the ECtHR
in the Grand Chamber case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,743 once again
reinforced the absolute and non-derogable prohibition of refoulement under
733 Garabayev v. Russia, Application No. 38411/02, European Court of Human rights, Final Judgment
of the Chamber (30 January 2008). As a side not, I should mention that the judgement of the Court in
this case was issued less than one month before the case of Saadi.
734 Ryabikin v. Russia, Application No. 8320/04, European Court of Human Rights, Final Judgement
of the Chamber (19 September 2008).
735 Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, Application No. 2947/06, European Court of Human Rights, Final
Judgement of the Chamber (1 December 2008).
736 Ben Khemais v. Italy, Application No. 246/07, European Court of Human Rights, Final Judgment of
the Chamber (6 July 2009).
737 Baysakov and Others v. Ukraine, Application No. 54131/08, European Court of Human Rights, Final
Judgment of the Chamber (18 May 2010).
738 Yuldashev v. Russia, Application No. 1248/09, European Court of Human Rights, Final Judgement
of the Chamber (8 July 2010).
739 Klein v. Russia, Application No. 24268/08, European Court of Human Rights, Final Judgment of the
Chamber (4 October 2010).
740 Khaydarov v. Russia, Application No. 21055/09, European Court of Human Rights, Final Judgment
of the Chamber (4 October 2010).
741 Auad v. Bulgaria, Application No. 46390/10, European Court of Human Rights, Final Chamber
Decision (11 January 2012).
742 With regard to the ECtHR using its own case law in building a body of jurisprudence, see: Yonatan
Lupu and Erik Voeten, ‘Precedent in International Courts: A Network Analysis of Case Citations by the
European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 42(2) British Journal of Political Science, pp. 413-439.
743 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, European Court of Human Rights, Grand
Chamber Judgement (21 January 2011).
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Article 3 of the Convention, while referring to the Soering, Chahal, and Saadi
assessment criteria.744
The difference between the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece and the
previously-discussed cases is that the former dealt with an expulsion procedure
within EU law, known as the ‘Dublin return’; meaning that the case concerned
the deportation of an applicant from one Member State to another.745 In this
case, the Grand Chamber clearly established that the fact that a person is
removed from one Contracting Party to another does not remove the positive
obligation of the sending State on conducting torture-risk assessment for
preventing the violation of refoulement under Article 3 of the Convention.746 In
this case, the Court ruled that Belgium had indeed violated its obligations under
Article 3 by returning the applicant to Greece (a Dublin transfer). The reasons
for this decision was that the deportation of the applicant to Greece had resulted
in exposing him to ill-treatment, including deteriorating detention conditions
and an inhumane life situation (in the Court’s terms, ‘the deficiencies in asylum
procedure’) together with considering that no guarantees indicated that the
applicant would not be returned to his country of origin, Afghanistan.747 In this
regard, the ECtHR considered the general assurances given by Greece to
Belgium – issued under the Dublin Regulation – totally irrelevant and
unreliable in providing adequate protection for the applicant against violation
of his human rights under Article 3 of the Convention.748
What we could conclude from the risk-evaluation tests applied by the ECtHR is
that diplomatic assurances – when formulated in general terms such as the
receiving State would act in accordance with its human rights obligations – do
not remove the real risk of torture or other forms of inhumane or degrading
treatment and punishments. What removes the real risk of torture upon
expulsion is something beyond mere general guarantees. Assurances need to be
detailed – formulated based on the circumstances of the case – and to contain
744 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, European Court of Human Rights, Grand
Chamber Judgement (21 January 2011), paras 353, 359, 365, and 409. In this regard also, see the
concurring opinion of Judge Villiger, attached to this case as separate opinions.
745 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, European Court of Human Rights, Grand
Chamber Judgement (21 January 2011), paras 323, 353, and 368. For more analysis on the cases, in
which the removal is done from one ECHR Member State to another, see: Fanny de Weck, Non-
Refoulement under the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Convention against
Torture: The Assessment of Individual Complaints by the European Court of Human Rights under
Article 3 ECHR and the United Nations Committee against Torture under Article 3 CAT (Leiden: Brill,
2017), pp. 322-326.
746 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, European Court of Human Rights, Grand
Chamber Judgement (21 January 2011), paras 323, 353, and 368.
747 Ibid, paras 341-368.
748 Ibid, para. 354.
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adequate and effective enforcement and monitoring mechanisms. Henceforth,
the tests that the ECtHR has applied in torture-risk assessment under Article 3
of the 1950 ECHR and the Court’s acceptance of diplomatic assurances in
torture-expulsion have evolved over time through the ‘trial and error’ of State-
level actors.
As mentioned above, the practice of the ECtHR in torture-real risk evaluation
started in the late 1980s with the case of Soering. This practice continued to the
landmark case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, which is the
most important case within the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the question of
diplomatic assurances and expulsion to torture under Article 3 of the
Convention.749 The reason for the importance of this case is that, for the very
first time, the ECtHR – instead of merely assessing the alleged violation of
Article 3 of the Convention in torture-expulsion cases – addressed this question
also under Article 6 of the Convention on the right to a fair trial. In fact, as we
will see in the case analysis in the following pages of this chapter, for the very
first time, the use of diplomatic assurances in torture-expulsion cases was ruled
to be removing the responsibility of the State under Article 3 of the ECHR, but
a violation of Article 6 of the Convention was found.
The applicant in this case was Mr. Omar Mahmoud Othman – also known as,
Abu Qatada al-Filistini – Jordanian cleric, born in 1960, near Bethlehem – then
administered as part of the Kingdom of Jordan.750 In 1993, he arrived in the UK
and immediately filed an asylum application on the grounds that, the Jordanian
authorities had detained and tortured him in 1988, 1990, and 1991.751
Subsequently, he was recognised as a refugee in 1994 and was granted the leave
to remain until June 1998.752 On 8 May 1998, the applicant applied for the
indefinite leave to remain in the UK, and while this application was pending, he
was arrested and detained under UK counterterrorism law, i.e. the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act of 2001. When this Act was repealed in
March 2005 on the grounds of being discriminatory,753 Mr. Othman was
released on bail subjected to a ‘control order’ under the UK’s amended
749 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 8139/09, European Court of Human
Rights, Final Chamber Judgment (17 January 2012).
750 Ibid, para. 7.
751 The reasons or grounds based on which the applicant was granted asylum in the UK was not disclosed
in the case by the Secretary of State. In this regard, see: Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom,
Application No. 8139/09, European Court of Human Rights, Final Chamber Judgment (17 January
2012), para. 7.
752 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 8139/09, European Court of Human
Rights, Final Chamber Judgment (17 January 2012), paras 7 and 8.
753 Later, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was replaced by the Terrorism Prevention and
Investigation Measures Act (14 December 2011).
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counterterrorism law, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. In August 2005,
while his appeal against the control order was still in process, he received a
‘notice of intention’ from the UK Secretary of State to be deported to Jordan.754
For the purpose of this deportation, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had
already advised the British Government and the State Secretary that Article 3 of
the 1950 ECHR prohibited the expulsion of individuals who were suspected of
committing crimes such as terrorism to counties where they would be in danger
of torture or torture-like treatment. Consequently, the UK Government decided
to obtain diplomatic assurances from the Jordanian Government promising not
to torture Mr. Othman.
On 10 August 2005, the representatives of the two Governments (the UK and
Jordan) signed a memorandum of understanding. The Secretary of State also
certified that the decision to deport the applicant was taken in the interests of
UK national security.755 The applicant appealed against this deportation
decision, as the deportation was related to his conviction in Jordan in absentia
for the alleged involvement in two of al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against
Western and Israeli targets in 1999 and 2000. It was alleged by the Jordanian
authorities that the applicant had inspired and encouraged his followers to plant
the bombs.756 Mr Othman, however, claimed that, if deported, he would be
retried in Jordan, which would put him at a high risk of torture, lengthy pre-trial
detention, and a grossly unfair trial based on evidence obtained through
torturing his co-defendants, which would result in the violation of Articles 3 and
6 of the 1950 ECHR.757
The Special Immigration Appeals Commission of the UK (SIAC) dismissed his
appeal, holding that Mr. Othman would be protected against torture and ill-
treatment based on the agreement negotiated between the UK and Jordan
Governments.758 The SIAC also found that the retrial would not be in total denial
of the applicant’s right to a fair trial.759 At the appeal instance against the
decision of SIAC, the Court of Appeal partially agreed and partially disagreed
with Mr. Othman’s complaint. According to the Court of Appeal, the assurances
had removed the risk of torture against the applicant; therefore, there was no
violation of Article 3 of the Convention.760 However, a real risk remained that
754 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 8139/09, European Court of Human
Rights, Final Chamber Judgment (17 January 2012), para. 8.
755 Ibid, para. 25.
756 Ibid, paras 18-20.
757 Ibid, para. 25.
758 Ibid, paras 25-39.
759 Ibid, paras 42-47.
760 Ibid, paras 48, 49, and 51.
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torture-obtained evidences would be used against him if the applicant were to
be deported to Jordan and stand a trial there. In the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, this would violate the international prohibition on torture, resulting in
a ‘flagrant denial of justice’ in breach of Article 6 of the 1950 ECHR.761
In the highest appeal instance, on 18 February 2009, the House of Lords upheld
the findings of the SIAC and the deportation order. In other words, the Lords
found that there was no violation of Article 3 of the Convention, because the
signed diplomatic assurances would protect Mr. Othman from being tortured.762
The Lords also ruled that the risk that the evidence obtained through torture
would be used against the applicant in criminal proceedings in Jordan would
not amount to a ‘flagrant denial of justice;’ hence, no violation of Article 6 of the
ECHR was found, either.763 On appeal against the decision of the House of
Lords, the ECtHR unanimously ruled that the Lords were correct in their
assessment that diplomatic assurances would remove any danger of torture and
mistreatment under Article 3 of the 1950 ECHR, and therefore, no violation of
that Article was found.764
With regard to the alleged violation of Article 6 of the 1950 ECHR, the European
Court dismissed the ruling of the House of Lords. It, instead, ruled that,
undeterred by the fact that the UK Government could lawfully deport the
applicant to Jordan, the UK still could be held liable for a ‘flagrant denial of
justice’ by virtue of Article 6 of the Convention. The assurances, according to the
Court, had removed the risk of torture, but failed to ensure that the evidence
obtained under torture would not be used against him.765
What is of direct interest for the purpose of my thesis is that the securitisation
of immigration urged the judges at both national and ECtHR levels to conduct a
torture-risk assessment test in addressing the claims under Article 3 of the 1950
ECHR. This securitisation leaves a certain margin of appreciation to the States
– even under a jus cogens norm such as the prohibition of Article 3 of the ECHR.
In this respect, we saw that the language of judgements in early cases was
different in the way of favouring the absolute and non-derogable prohibition of
Article 3. However, in the case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the UK, the
judgement started with an introduction to the importance of the ‘war on terror’
and protecting the national security of Member States; thus, the necessity and
761 Ibid, paras 50-52.
762 Ibid, paras 54-57.
763 Ibid, paras 59-66.
764 Ibid, para. 207.
765 Ibid, para. 287.
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need to examine closely the assurances in torture-expulsion cases. In this
regard, the ECtHR stated:
[…] as part of the fight against terrorism, States must be allowed to deport non-
nationals whom they consider to be threats to national security. [… and that …] [i]t
is not part of the ECtHR’s function to review whether an individual is in fact such a
threat; its only task is to consider whether that individual’s deportation would be
compatible with his or her rights under the Convention.766
Thereafter, the ECtHR applied an extensive evaluation test, established within
its jurisprudence in the previous cases, such as Chahal and Saadi, in addressing
not only the existence, but also the quality and adequacy of assurances. While
applying the torture-risk assessment test, the Strasbourg Court referred to the
assessments applied by the UK national judges and developed a jurisprudence
based on the arguments of national judges. In this regard, for example, the SIAC
had previously ruled that the assurances given by Jordan in relation to Mr.
Othman with regard to Article 3 of the Convention could be relied because of the
following reasons:
1. First, Jordan was willing and able to fulfil its undertakings;
2. Second, the applicant would be protected by his high profile; and
3. Third, there would be monitoring by a human rights NGO called the
‘Adaleh Centre.’767
In opposition to this argument, the main issue raised by the applicant during
the appeal instance was that, the assurances could not be relied upon when there
were consistent patterns of human rights violations in Jordan, accompanied
with impunity for the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) agents.
In the House of Lords, Lord Phillips responded to this claim by employing the
practice of the ECtHR within its jurisprudence in former cases, stating that, it
would suffice to remove the risk of torture by relying on the mere fact that
assurances exist in a torture-expulsion case.768 For instance, in the cases of
Ismoilov and Others v. Russia769 and Ryabikin v. Russia,770 the ECtHR had
emphasised the need for diplomatic assurances to ensure adequate protection
against the risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.
However, what Lord Philips failed to consider was that the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR had not yet been developed with regard to the appraisal of diplomatic
766 Ibid, para. 184.
767 Ibid, para. 163.
768 Ibid, paras 141-145, 184, 188, and 189.
769 Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, Application No. 2947/06, European Court of Human Rights, Final
Judgement of the Chamber (1 December 2008), paras 96-100.
770 Ryabikin v. Russia, Application No. 8320/04, European Court of Human Rights, Final Judgement
of the Chamber (19 September 2008), para. 119.
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assurances per se, as part of torture real-risk assessment. In addition, Lord
Hope relied on the findings of the ECtHR in the case of Saadi v. Italy that, the
burden of proof was on the Government of Italy to dismiss any doubt about the
non-reliability of the assurances. However, Lord Hope also missed the fact that,
in Saadi, the ECtHR had ruled on ‘no balancing act whatsoever’ in assessing the
alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention.771
The Lords, ultimately, followed the risk-assessment test that the SIAC had
conducted on Article 3, and unanimously ruled that the assurances between the
Governments of Jordan and the UK could successfully remove any doubt on the
existence of torture and ill-treatment, should the applicant be expelled to
Jordan. In doing so, the Law Lords repeated the torture and ill-treatment real-
risk assessment test performed by the SIAC, which consisted of the following
four items and eventually concluded that the assurances would be sufficient in
the current case:772
1. First, the terms of the assurances had been such that, if fulfilled, the
person returned would not be subjected to treatment contrary to
Article 3;
2. Second, the assurances had been given in good faith;
3. Third, there had to be a sound objective basis for believing that the
assurances would be fulfilled;
4. Fourth, the fulfilment of the assurances had to be capable of being
verified.773
Beyond mirroring the opinions of the Law Lords, the ECtHR developed the
torture-risk assessment that the SIAC had applied, and added seven more items
to the above-mentioned evaluation criteria. In this regard, the Court emphasised
that, in the light of the practice of the receiving State, it needs to be established
whether the assurances could be relied upon or not. In this sense, an assessment
of the human rights situation in the receiving State and the conformity of the
Government of Jordan with its human rights obligations was evoked.
Accordingly, the Court regarded the following factors in its assessment of the
assurances within the context of Article 3 of the 1950 ECHR:
1. Transparency: whether the terms of the assurances have been
disclosed to the Court;
2. Specificity: whether the assurances are specific or are general and
vague;
771 Saadi v. Italy, Application No. 37201/06, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber
Judgement (28 February 2008), para. 129.
772 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 8139/09, European Court of Human
Rights, Final Chamber Judgment (17 January 2012), paras 73-75.
773 Ibid, para. 73.
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3. Authoritatively given: who has given the assurances and whether
that person can bind the receiving State;
4. An effective control: if the assurances have been issued by the
central government of the receiving State, and whether local
authorities can be expected to abide by them;
5. The legal status of treatment: whether the assurances concern
treatment, which is legal or illegal in the receiving State;
6. Authoritatively given and legally binding: whether they have
been given by a Contracting State;
7. The quality of inter-State relations: the length and strength of
bilateral relations between the sending and receiving States, including
the receiving State’s records in complying with similar assurances;
8. Verifiability in practice: whether compliance with the assurances
can be objectively verified via diplomatic or other monitoring
mechanisms, including providing unfettered access to the applicant’s
lawyers;
9. Monitoring mechanisms and acceptance of international
monitoring: whether there is an effective system of protection
against torture in the receiving State, including whether it is willing to
cooperate with international monitoring mechanisms – including
human rights NGOs – and whether it is willing to investigate
allegations of torture and to punish those responsible;
10.The history of ill-treatment against the requested person:
whether the applicant has previously been ill-treated in the receiving
State, and;
11. Domestic judicial appraisal reliability: whether the reliability of
the assurances has been examined by the domestic courts of the
sending Contracting State.774
In response to the applicant and to the third parties’ interventions about the
general human rights situation in Jordan, the ECtHR stated that, only in rare
cases, the general situation in a country would mean that no weight at all should
be given to the assurances.775 Thereafter, the Court asserted that although the
Jordanian criminal justice system evidently lacked many of the common human
rights standards, it has internationally recognised safeguards to prevent torture
and punish its perpetrators.776 Hereof, this is how the ECtHR judges deferred to
the UK national judges and agreed with the ‘Catch-22’ situation, mentioned by
774 Ibid, para. 189.
775 Ibid, para. 188.
776 Ibid, para. 191.
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Lord Phillips at the final domestic appeal instance.777 By way of explanation, the
Court defended the position of the UK Government and followed the opinion of
the Law Lords on diplomatic assurances, noting that the UK certainly knows and
is well aware of human rights situation in Jordan, because otherwise there
would have been no need to sign the assurances in the first place.778
As some commentators have articulated, the ECtHR has taken a ‘pragmatic’ and
‘utilitarian’ approach towards the use of diplomatic assurances in torture-
expulsion cases, since these measures could practically provide a timely,
efficient and legally justifiable method of reconciliation and recalibration of
States’ positive obligations in multi-lateral and bilateral inter-state relations.779
As some have asserted, entirely in opposition to the idea that States are avoiding
their obligation of non-refoulement to torture, the employment of diplomatic
assurances are an extension of the on-going development of the positive anti-
torture obligations of States. The ECtHR demonstrated this approach in the case
of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the U.K., and thereby, concluded that returning Mr.
Othman to Jordan would not expose him to a real risk of torture and ill-
treatment; hence, no violation of Article 3 of the Convention was found. The
opinions of national judges at both the SIAC and House of Lords, in addition to
the evaluation of ECtHR judges in Soering, Chahal, Saadi, and Othman (Abu
Qatada) suggest that signing and exchanging diplomatic assurances in torture-
expulsion cases does not circumvent non-refoulement obligations.780
A first glance at Article 3 of the 1950 ECHR suggests that the Member States of
this Convention bear a negative obligation with regard to neither torture not
deporting individuals to face torture. However, within the context of non-
refoulement to torture, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has illustrated that there
is not only a negative obligation, but also they hold a positive obligation.781
Within the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in many torture-claim cases, the Court
has held that a State’s responsibility under Article 3 can be engaged by its failure
to provide methods, through which protection against torture and inhuman and
777 Ibid, para. 57.
778 Ibid, paras 35, 165, 195, and 196.
779 Fiona de Londras, ‘Shannon, Saadi and Ireland’s Reliance on Diplomatic Assurances’, 2 Irish
Yearbook of International Law (2009), pp. 79-90, pp. 80 and 81. In this regard, also see: Rumyana
Grozdanova, ‘The United Kingdom and Diplomatic Assurances: A Minimalist Approach towards the
Anti-Torture Norm’, 15 International Criminal Law Review (2015), pp. 517-543, pp. 519-521.
780 Rumyana Grozdanova, ‘The United Kingdom and Diplomatic Assurances: A Minimalist Approach
towards the Anti-Torture Norm’, (2015) 15 International Criminal Law Review, pp. 517-543.
781 For analysis of the Member States’ positive obligations to predict anti-torture protective measures
and to investigate torture allegations, see: Alistair R. Mowbray, The Development of Positive
Obligations Under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human
Rights (Oxford; Portland, Oregon: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004), pp. 43-65.
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degrading treatment or punishment could be ensured, and under which
incidents of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment could be proven.782
Accordingly, Member States to the ECHR are supposed to undertake direct
measures and act affirmatively to protect individuals from torture through all
means.783
Correspondingly, what we could conclude from the reasoning of the ECtHR in
Othman and its precedent cases is that torture-risk assessment is inherent in
the application of the principle of non-refoulement to torture under Article 3 of
the 1950 ECHR.784 Once national security interests enter into legislation (the
process of securitisation), there will be a certain margin of appreciation granted
to States to exercise power of discretion in assessing the rights of asylum
seekers, as opposed to national interests in torture-expulsion cases under Article
3 of the ECHR. However, the margin of appreciation may be tighter, compared
to other Convention rights. Article 15 of the ECHR has introduced the possibility
of derogation from most Convention rights in emergencies by applying a
balancing act. The elements of the balancing act are legality, legitimacy,
necessity, and proportionality. The exceptions for derogation are Articles 2
(except for deaths resulting from lawful acts of war), 3, 4(1), and 7 of the
Convention. However, this margin of appreciation still exists in the form of
torture-risk assessment, which is embedded inherently in the applicability of
Article 3 of the Convention.785 What, in fact, needs to be assessed is whether the
alleged inflicted act of torture is severe enough to constitute torture or whether
the assurances given are sufficient in preventing torture from happening in
future.
The main reason for the creation and use of diplomatic assurances and
continuous strengthening of them through time, as shown in the jurisprudence
of the ECtHR, is not only a solution to social and political needs, which in this
case is safeguarding the national security of sending States. Whereas it is also
782 For more detailed analysis of case laws, which have established the positive obligation of the Member
States under Article 3 of the Convention, see: Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks, and Clare Ovey,
Jacobs, White, and Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights (7th edn, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2017), pp. 191-196. In this regard, also see: Alastair Mowbray, Cases, Materials, and
Commentary on the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), pp. 145 and 158-161.
783 Debra Long, Guide to Jurisprudence on Torture and Ill-Treatment: Article 3 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (Geneva: Association for the Prevention of Torture,
2002), p. 20.
784 Michael John Garcia, ‘Renditions: Constraints Imposed by Laws on Torture’, in Brenden M. Zimmer
(ed.), Extradition and Rendition: Background and Issues (New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc.,
2011), pp. 135-169, at p. 142.
785 The ‘torture risk assessment’ is not explicitly mentioned under Article 3 of the ECHR, but it is under
Article 3(2) of the 1984 CAT.
196
part of the role of lawyers and judges in choosing how to apply existing law to
the facts of new hard cases. The lawyers working for the sending and receiving
States and judges at different judicial stances are well aware of the inherent
ambiguity in different aspects of the concept of torture. That is why they
managed to come up with the creation and use of diplomatic assurances in the
cases of expulsion to torture.
Nonetheless, the more the nexus between immigration and the security
concerns of State intensifies, the more European States, national courts, and the
ECtHR are willing to challenge the jus cogens nature of non-refoulement under
Article 3 of the Convention. Another case relevant to this discussion is the case
of Babar Ahmad and Others v. the UK.786 This case concerns the complaints of
six individuals on the alleged violation of their human rights under Article 3 of
the Convention in the case of extradition from the UK to the US to stand trials
for criminal charges related to radical Islamic terrorism. In this regard, the
applicants complained that, in the US, they would be detained at the
Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum Facility (ADX Florence), while being
subjected to Special Administrative Measures (SAMS).787 The SAMS is a
process, through which the US Attorney General may direct the United States
Bureau of Prisons to use special administrative measures on the correspondence
and visitors of specific inmates. It includes prisoners either awaiting or under
trial proceedings as well as those convicted, when it is alleged that there is a
‘substantial risk that a prisoner’s communications or contacts could result in
death or serious bodily injury to persons or substantial damage to property that
would entail the risk of death or serious bodily injury to persons.’788 Such
measures are used to prevent acts of violence or terrorism or disclosure of
classified information. The applicants submitted that the conditions of
detention at ADX Florence – whether alone or in conjunction with SAMS –
would violate their human rights under Article 3 of the Convention. In addition,
the applicants complained that, if convicted, they would face sentences of life
imprisonment without parole, which is, in itself, a violation of Article 3 of the
Convention.789 In this case, several diplomatic assurances were signed and
exchanged between the two Governments, including promises on behalf of the
786 Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08,
66911/09, and 67354/09, European Court of Human Rights, Final Judgement of the Chamber (24
September 2012).
787 Ibid, para. 158.
788 Title 9 of Chapter 24 of the US National Security Act; Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism,
28 CFR 501.3 (31 October 2001) on Requests for Special Confinement Conditions.
789 Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08,
66911/09, and 67354/09, European Court of Human Rights, Final Judgement of the Chamber (24
September 2012), para. 158.
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US Government that no death penalty would be imposed on any of the
applicants; neither would they be subjected to extraordinary renditions to
offshore US military bases.790
This case is a highly complex ‘hard case’ involving multiple human rights
questions not only concerning the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment and
extraditing to torture, but also the right to a fair trial and the admissibility of
evidence together with other evidential matters. Notwithstanding this multi-
facetedness, what makes this case extremely controversial – particularly with
regard to the jus cogens nature of non-refoulement under Article 3 of the
Convention – is that the Court engaged actively in an argument, which had been
initiated earlier by the House of Lords on taking a ‘relativist approach’ to the
scope of application of Article 3 in expulsion cases. This approach was previously
established by the majority of Lordships at the House of Lords in the case of R
(on the application of Wellington) (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department (Wellington).791 A relativist approach in this context means that
there should be a distinction between expulsion to torture, as opposed to other
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (ill-treatment) in Article 3
expulsion cases. The Lords claimed that this distinction came from the case of
Soering, in which the Court had stated that evaluating diplomatic assurances
‘[…] must be included among the factors to be taken into account in the
interpretation and application of the notions of inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment in extradition cases.’792 A majority of Their Lordships,
meaning Lord Hoffmann, Baroness Hale, and Lord Carswell found that, based
on this paragraph, in the extradition context, a distinction had to be drawn
between torture and lesser forms of ill-treatment. When there was a real risk of
torture, the prohibition on extradition was absolute, which leaves no room for a
balancing exercise; however, insofar as Article 3 is applied to inhuman and
degrading treatment, the prohibition is applicable only in a ‘relativistic format’
in extradition cases.793 Lord Hoffmann, in this regard, asserted:
A relativist approach to the scope of article 3 seems to me essential if extradition is
to continue to function. For example, the Court of Session has decided in Napier v
Scottish Ministers (2005) SC 229 that in Scotland the practice of ‘slopping out’
(requiring a prisoner to use a chamber pot in his cell and empty it in the morning)
790 Ibid, paras 20-61.
791 R (on the application of Wellington) (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD),
[2008] UKHL 72 on appeal from: [2007] EWHC 1109(Admin) (referred to as ‘Wellington’).
792 Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, European Court of Human Rights, Final
Judgment of the Plenary Chamber (07 July 1989), para 89.
793 Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08,
66911/09, and 67354/09, European Court of Human Rights, Final Judgement of the Chamber (24
September 2012), para. 66 and 67.
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may cause an infringement of article 3. Whether, even in a domestic context, this
attains the necessary level of severity is a point on which I would wish to reserve
my opinion. If, however, it were applied in the context of extradition, it would
prevent anyone being extradited to many countries, poorer than Scotland, where
people who are not in prison often have to make do without flush lavatories.”794
Although not in complete agreement with the exact version of the relativist
approach invoked by the House of Lords, ultimately the ECtHR formulated its
own version of relativism towards the application of Article 3 of the Convention
in torture and ill-treatment expulsion cases.795 In this regard, the Court
reiterated that although Article 3 conveys an absolute prohibition for both
torture and ill-treatment (other inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment), what constitutes torture or ill-treatment at assessment phase is a
matter of relativist speculation.796 For example, whether a specific type of
punishment or imprisonment such as solitary confinement is ill-treatment, is a
matter of assessment. Assessment is a relative exercise based on many objective
and subjective factors such as the general attitude of the society towards the
alleged crime and its punishment, the individual attributions of the applicant,
their mental health, and their level of vulnerability and disabilities.797
Besides, in the phase of applying Article 3 prohibition to expulsion cases in an
extra-territorial context, this relativism in assessment becomes a determining
factor in the sense that the absolute nature of Article 3 would not mean that ‘any
form of ill-treatment will act as a bar to removal from a Contracting State’. To
support this argument, the Court, thereafter, referred to its recent
jurisprudence, in the Grand Chamber case of Al-Skeini and Others v. the United
Kingdom on the issue of the extra-territorial applicability of the ECHR, and
stated that, the Convention does not purport to be a means of requiring the
Contracting States to impose Convention standards on other States. Based on
these lines of reasoning, the Court in Babar Ahmad and Others v. the UK opined
that:
This being so, treatment which might violate Article 3 because of an act or omission
of a Contracting State might not attain the minimum level of severity which is
required for there to be a violation of Article 3 in an expulsion or extradition case.
For example, a Contracting State’s negligence in providing appropriate medical
care within its jurisdiction has, on occasion, led the Court to find a violation of
794 Ibid, para. 68.
795 Natasa Mavronicola and Francesco Messineo, ‘Relatively Absolute? The Undermining of Article 3
ECHR in Ahmad v UK’ (2013) 76(3) The Modern Law Review, pp. 589-619, p. 598-601.
796 Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08,
66911/09, and 67354/09, European Court of Human Rights, Final Judgement of the Chamber (24
September 2012), paras 200-203.
797 Ibid, paras 204-215.
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Article 3 but such violations have not been so readily established in the extra-
territorial context (compare the denial of prompt and appropriate medical
treatment for HIV/AIDS in Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468/06, §§ 145–158, 22
December 2008 with N. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565/05, 27 May
2008).798
In its conclusion, the Court, without feeling a need to apply the Othman criteria
on evaluating the quality and adequacy of diplomatic assurances, ruled that,
there had been no violation of Article 3, since the removal is to ‘[…] a State which
had a long history of respect of democracy, human rights and the rule of law’.799
A question I would like to pose against this conclusion is why did the Court
ignore the long decade of human rights abuse and gross violations by the US
Government in its counterterrorism policies and activities all over the World
during the so called ‘war on terror’.800 If horrific off-shore detention sites such
as Guantanamo Bay,801 extraordinary renditions,802 solitary confinement, and
the torturous conditions of maximum-security prisons in the US803 are
insufficient to compel judges to act with greater scrutiny in their handling of
Article 3 violations, I have no idea what could possibly awaken the moral
conscience of the Court.
The absurd twist of the ECtHR in this case804 – meaning that it suddenly
considered a relativist approach to distinct domestic from extra-territorial
contexts in assessing a minimum level of severity under Article 3 – is extremely
798 Ibid, para. 177.
799 Ibid, para. 179.
800 For more information with regard to the role of the European countries in aiding the US
counterterrorism activities, see: Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild, João Soares da Silva, and Anja
Wiesbrock, The Results of Inquiries into the CIA’s Programme of Extraordinary Rendition and Secret
Prisons in European States in Light of the New Legal Framework following the Lisbon Treaty
(Brussels: European Parliament, Policy Department C – Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs,
2012). With regard to the debate on holding the European countries accountable for their aid to the US
illegal counterterrorism activities, see: Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild, and Raluca Radescu,
A Quest for Accountability? EU and Member State Inquiries into the CIA Rendition and Secret
Detention Programme (Brussels: European Union Policy Department on Citizens’ Rights and
Constitutional Affairs, 2015).
801 Amnesty International, ‘USA: Right the Wrong, Decision Time on Guantanamo’,
<www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR5134742021ENGLISH.PDF>. Also see: Human Rights
Watch, ‘US: CIA Torture is Unfinished Business’, <www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/01/us-cia-torture-
unfinished-business>.
802 Amnesty International, ‘“Rendition” and Secret Detention: A Global System of Human Rights
Violations’, <www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/80000/pol300032006en.pdf>.
803 Amnesty International, ‘USA: Prisoners held in extreme solitary confinement in breach of
international law’, <www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/07/usa-prisoners-held-extreme-solitary-
confinement-breach-international-law/>.
804 For further critical analysis of the decision of the ECtHR in this case, see: Natasa Mavronicola and
Francesco Messineo, ‘Relatively Absolute? The Undermining of Article 3 ECHR in Ahmad v UK’ (2013)
76(3) The Modern Law Review, pp. 589-619.
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alarming and disturbing.805 This approach has the potential to pave the way for
shattering the very foundation of the right to seek asylum, i.e. the principle of
non-refoulement. After all, this prohibition is not only a matter of ECHR rule or
EU law,806 but also a universal prohibition based on its position as a customary
norm of international law. The prohibition of refoulement in the cases of
expulsion to torture and ill-treatment finds a more fundamental importance,
due to being a jus cogens norm in international law. Once more, referring to
Dworkin, if law derives its meaning through practice and by taking rights
seriously, and if we wish that Article 3 of the Convention to be ‘practical and
effective, and not theoretical and illusory,’807 attacking the absolute and non-
derogable nature of this prohibition is definitely not an appropriate path to
follow.
To conclude, putting everything in the context of securitisation hoping to find
some answers to the contemporary challenges facing our World might seem to
be an easy solution. However, doing so blinds us to the dangers of undermining
our very few universal principles such as the prohibition of torture and other
forms of ill-treatment or refoulement to them. While concluding this
dissertation in next chapter, I will discuss more implications of securitising
immigration on the right to seek asylum by examining the collective expulsion
of immigrants.
5.5. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I provided more answers to the main research question of this
dissertation. By analysing the formation and use of diplomatic assurances as
another example of the securitisation of immigration, I have shown that the
absolute and non-derogable nature of the principle of non-refoulement, which
is in itself the foundation of the right to seek asylum, is prone to uncertainty and
scepticism.
Besides torture, Article 3 of the ECHR prohibits any expulsion to other inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.  I critically analysed the formation and
use of diplomatic assurances in torture and ill-treatment expulsion cases, and
805 Scott Poynting, ‘Entitled to be a Radical? Counter-Terrorism and Travesty of Human Rights in the
Case of Babar Ahmad’ (2016) 5(2) State Crime, pp. 204-219.
806 Article 19(2) of the 2000 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
807 Airey v. Ireland, Application No. 6289/73, European Court of Human Rights, Chamber Judgment
(9 October 1979), para. 24. Also, see: Soering v. United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, European
Court of Human Rights, Plenary Decision (07 July 1989), para. 87. And, see: Prince Hans-Adam II of
Liechtenstein v. Germany, Application No. 42527/98, European Court of Human Rights, Grand
Chamber Judgement (12 July 2001), para. 45. Also, see: Gäfgen v. Germany, Application No. 22978/05,
European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Decision (1 June 2010), para. 123. Also, see: Murray
v. The Netherlands, Application No. 10511/10, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber,
Decision (26 April 2016), para. 104.
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legally scrutinised these cases for challenging the absolute and non-derogable
nature of non-refoulement under Article 3 of the ECHR. The scrutinising
analysis of this practice clearly demonstrated how the securitisation of
immigration, in practice, is making the right to seek asylum ‘meaningless,’ and
therefore, degrading this right to a not real, nor an effective human right – as
envisaged by those who drafted and ratified the Convention.
Referring back to Dworkin, if we want to take a right seriously, in practice we
need to keep to the founding principles of the law and the legal system in which
the law was adopted. In the case of taking the right to seek asylum seriously,
primarily, we need to keep to the founding principle of this right, meaning the
principle of non-refoulement, otherwise the very existence of this right as a
fundamental and basic human right falls apart.
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
6.1. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 4, I addressed the implications of the securitisation of immigration
in the EU on the right to seek asylum as a fundamental right within the
jurisprudence of the CJEU under Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights. After that, in Chapter 5, I analysed another implication of the
securitisation of immigration under the jurisprudence of the ECtHR within the
ambit of Article 3 of the ECHR and its absolute and non-derogable prohibition
of refoulement to torture and other forms of ill-treatment. As argued extensively
in Chapter 5, Article 3 of the ECHR is the statement of the principle of non-
refoulement to torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment as a jus cogens norm, against which absolutely no derogation is
allowed. The securitisation of immigration manifests itself in the form of signing
diplomatic assurances in the cases of Article 3 expulsions.
In this chapter, I will first present the main findings of my research and the
answers to the main research question posed in this dissertation (Subsection
6.2.1). Thereafter, I will elaborate on the contribution of this study to existing
knowledge, while diagnosing the gap in literature and research on the link
between migration law and security (Subsection 6.2.2). In Subsection 6.2.3, I
then express some concerns with regard to the controversial debates on the
nexus between securitising immigration in the EU, on the one hand, and
protecting the human rights of asylum seekers, on the other. These concerns are
mainly due to the ambiguities and highly securitised language of the EU New
Pact on Migration and Asylum proposed by the EU Commission in late 2020.
In Section 6.3, I will conclude the discussion on the implications of the
securitisation of immigration in the EU on the right to seek asylum as a
fundamental human right. In this regard, I first address and analyse another
practice emerging from the securitisation of immigration in the EU, namely the
collective expulsion of immigrants (Subsection 6.3.1). A critical analysis of this
practice scrutinises how, in spite of bluntly contradicting with the right to seek
asylum and the principle of non-refoulement, this practice has found a
legitimate space in immigration management policies of the EU at controlling
its external borders. By critically analysing one of the recent cases in this regard
within the jurisprudence of the ECtHR – the case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain
(2020) – I extract and thereafter explore the idea of protecting the security of
EU as a ‘meta’ or ‘collective right.’ By considering the security of EU as a ‘meta
right,’ I demonstrate how a right to ‘collective security’ or ‘security for all’ is
fundamentally at odds with the rationale behind the current international and
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EU systems of refugee protection, which is substantially based on the individual
assessment of subjective persecution. By this, I mean that the EU and its
Member States have positioned collective security over and above individual
security and the protection of those in need of asylum protection – mainly
coming from the Global South. Therefore, the question I answer here is that how
safeguarding the security of EU in practice has affected the prohibition on the
collective expulsion of aliens, and therefore the enjoyment of the right to seek
asylum and relevant rights such as the right to an effective remedy.
With regard to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the prohibition of the
collective expulsion of aliens, a subject of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, I analyse
the most recent case and the dissenting opinion of Judge Koskelo annexed to
the decision of the Grand Chamber in the case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain (2020).
In this case, the Grand Chamber agreed with the responding Government that
the applicants had abused their right to non-refoulement and the prohibition of
collective expulsion of aliens. The abuse of this right is one basis for policy-
making with regard to the right to seek asylum. To explain, if we think of the
right to seek asylum as a legal path for individuals to personal security, as a
corresponding right to that, the members of the host State have a right to
collective security. In this regard, the primary function of the State is to protect
the collective security of society. Therefore, if someone uses the right to seek
asylum as a tool to undermine or harm the ‘collective security’ of the host
society, it becomes a clear misuse of the right to seek asylum. The Grand
Chamber judges of the ECtHR in the case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain (2020) have
taken this exact line of argument, acting as the advocates of the securitised
immigration policies of the EU, instead of being the guardian of the rights
guaranteed under the Convention.
At the end, without any intention to over-generalise the conclusion of this study,
I show that the securitisation of immigration in the EU – both at normative and
practical levels – has reduced the status of the right to seek asylum to less than
that of a fundamental right. I argue that the prohibition of mass expulsion is a
necessary precondition for the realisation of the right to seek asylum. Departing
from the opinion of Judge Koskelo on collective security prevailing over the
rights of individuals to security, in Subsection 6.3.2, I argue that protecting all
other fundamental rights of asylum seekers depends on respecting the right to
seek asylum through the prohibition of all practices violating this right such as
the collective expulsion of immigrants. The right to seek asylum is so
fundamental in the realisation of other human rights – by the way of making an
asylum seeker a subject recognised by law – that to me, this right resembles to
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the perception Hannah Arendt had of the ‘right to have rights.’808 For this
reason, I consider the right to seek asylum to be the mother of all other human
rights, particularly in the case of asylum seekers.
The ultimate destructive effect of the securitisation of immigration in the EU on
the right to seek asylum is to make a certain category of humans ‘illegal.’ Under
this scenario, the very social and legal existence of some people falls outside the
realm of the ‘Law’s Empire.’809 After all, depending on the law alone, or on the
language of rights, as such, does not suffice in the tangible realisation of the right
to seek asylum. In addition to the inherent incapability and inability of law in
solving the issue of the ‘illegality’ of some humans, this approach limits us to the
rigidity of a ‘legalistic dogma.’810 This rigidity in thinking ignores the political,
social, cultural, and civil contexts, within which human rights in general, and
the right to seek asylum particularly, have been formulated and found real
meaning over time.811
In conclusion, instead of understanding the right to seek asylum from a purely
legalistic approach, I propose that we should show due regard also to the
‘political processes,’ which give real meaning to this right. After all, human
rights are not merely matters of legal dogmatic discourse. Whereas, the political,
social, cultural, and even economic contexts, within which human rights form
and dismantle, should carefully and critically be studied to understand how we
could give a second life to the right to seek asylum in the EU.
6.2. WHAT DOES THE SECURITISATION OF IMMIGRATION
IN THE EU MEAN FOR THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM AS A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?
6.2.1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND THE SUMMARY OF RESEARCH
FINDINGS
In this doctoral thesis, I studied part of the tense relationship between
protecting the human rights of immigrants as opposed to safeguarding the
808 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Orlando: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979), pp.
267-302.
809 I have borrowed the phrase ‘Law’s Empire’ from the title of one of Dworkin’s books: Ronald Dworkin,
Law’s Empire (Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd, 1998).
810 Richard Ashby Wilson, ‘Tyrannosaurus Lex: The Anthropology of Human Rights and Transnational
Law’, in Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry (eds), The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law
between the Global and the Local (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 342-
369, pp. 360-363.
811 Ibid. In this regard, also see: Jean Grugel and Nicola Piper, Critical Perspectives on Global
Governance: Rights and Regulation in Governing Regimes (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 18-21.
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national security of host states.812 The main goal of investigation was to identify,
analyse, and challenge the affects that the securitisation of immigration in the
EU has on the enjoyment of the right to seek asylum as a basic and fundamental
human right. In other words, is there an effective right to seek asylum in the EU
today? The guiding hypothesis running through the whole research, connecting
the pieces of the puzzle was that the securitisation of immigration in the EU both
at law and practice levels has negatively affected the right to seek asylum in the
way that this right has become less effective in practice.
In order to test the hypothesis and provide possible answers to the main
research question of this thesis, first, I analysed the nature of the right to seek
asylum as a fundamental human right and its essential composing elements,
which are inviolable (Chapter 2). Then, in Chapter 3, I explained what the theory
of the securitisation of immigration in the EU means in the context of
counterterrorism. In Chapters 4 and 5, through a critical discursive analysis of
the case law within the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR, I
demonstrated that the right to seek asylum is becoming less than that of a
fundamental human right, because the securitisation of immigration attacks
directly at the very essence of this right.
In Chapter 2, I discussed that, in spite of the fact that the practice of asylum
seeking is as old as humanity itself, the formation of the right to seek asylum, as
a fundamental human right is actually only a recent normative development –
the history of which dates back to the post-war era. In the aftermath of WWII,
the 1948 UDHR, in its Article 14, for the very first time recognised a human right
to seek asylum as an international human right. Even though this right is not
mentioned explicitly in the 1951 Refugee Convention, the principle of non-
refoulement, the backbone of the legal system of refugee protection and the
founding principle of the right to seek asylum, comes under Article 33(1) of this
Convention.
Together with the principle of non-refoulement, as the humanitarian principle
for forming an international legal regime of refugee protection, the principle of
state sovereignty is another pillar, upon which this legal system rests. Therefore,
the interests of the host States are an integral part of implementing the right to
812 Valeria Bello, International Migration and International Security: Why Prejudice Is a Global Security
Threat (New York; Oxford: Routledge, 2017), pp. 51-69. Also, see: Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman,
International Human Rights: The Successor to International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics
and Morals: Text and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 383-486. Also, see:
Philippe Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order (New York;
Oxford: Routledge, 2011), pp. 11-48. Also, see: Edward Newman, ‘Refugees, International Security, and
Human Vulnerability: Introduction and Survey’, in Edward Newman and Joanne Van Selm (eds),
Refugees and Forced Displacement: International Security, Human Vulnerability, and the State (Tokyo;
New York: United Nations University Press, 2003), pp. 3-30.
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seek asylum. Accordingly, similar to many other human rights, which are not
absolute, and therefore, derogable, the right to seek asylum could be subjected
to some exceptions or limitations under certain circumstances if there are
concerns of national security or public safety. However, the nature of the right
to seek asylum being a fundamental human right means that there are certain
essential elements inherent at the core of this right, derogation from which
under no circumstances should be allowed. These essential elements are first,
allowing asylum seekers to gain entry to the territory of host States for accessing
asylum claim procedures and secondly, the prohibition of refoulement.
Derogating from these two essential elements means attacking directly at the
core of this right as a fundamental human right, making it both illusionary and
ineffective.
Accordingly, what is of particular importance here is that the right to seek
asylum as a right encompassing the elements of both procedural and substantial
human rights is based on individual assessment of every asylum application.
Therefore, through analysing the procedural and substantial elements of the
right to seek asylum through the lenses of Hohfeldian and Alexy’s theory of
rights, no security concern as such could prevent an individual from gaining
access to the asylum application procedures. The same applies to the associated
substantial human rights such as the right to life and personal security through
prohibition of refoulement. Despite this, in practice the dominance of the official
security narratives in the EU over immigration has detrimentally affected the
enjoyment of the right to seek asylum in the form of preventing asylum seekers
from even gaining access to RSD procedures. The dominance of security
narratives in the immigration discourse is theorised as the securitisation of
immigration.
As a response to the theory of the securitisation of immigration, and in order to
pave the way to offering an answer to the main research question, I sought
assistance from theories developed beyond securitisation, meaning the school
of critical security studies. The theory of securitisation applied to immigration
remains at the phase of speech-act, without providing any insights into the
implications of this process and the damage done to the real-life situation of
immigrants and their enjoyment of basic and fundamental human rights. In
contrast to the theory of securitisation, the critical school of security studies
invites us to move beyond the mere process of securitisation and pay attention
to the negative impacts this could have on the lives and rights of those subject
to securitisation.
This is exactly what I did in this doctoral thesis. Instead of answering to the
question whether immigrants are, in fact, a matter of national security, I
scrutinised the impacts and implications of asking these kinds of questions or
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even trying to answering them. By focusing solely on answering whether
immigration is or not a matter of security, we actually create, produce and
reproduce the process of securitisation through questioning. We should be well
aware that as academics, policymakers, judges, other officials and actors, or any
other immigration stakeholders, our speech-acts have real consequences on the
reality of daily life for immigrants and the enjoyment of their basic and
fundamental human rights.
In order to test the hypothesis of this research, I collected relevant empirical
data on the practice of duty holders of the right to seek asylum meaning
European States and Courts. What exactly I studied was the implementation of
Article 18 of the EU Charter on the right to seek asylum and Article 3 within the
jurisprudences of the CJEU and the ECtHR, respectively. For further analysis to
provide answers to the main research question, I investigated the EU legislation,
both primary and secondary sources of EU law.
Analysing the decision of the CJEU in the case of X and X v. Belgium showed
that a lack of proper legal mechanisms to gain entry to the EU to seek asylum –
because of securitising immigration and associating it with transnational crimes
such as human trafficking and terrorism – has made the right to seek asylum
both impractical and ineffective. In addition, EU legislation and the practice of
the CJEU, due to the securitisation of immigration and especially the treatment
of undocumented migrants, is eroding the position of the right to seek asylum
as a fundamental human right. In the case of asylum, the EU legislator has
deliberately securitised a certain category of immigrants and the judges at the
CJEU magnified the same attitude in their decisions and closely followed this
general idea; therefore, the securitisation of immigration has constructed the
backbone of policymaking, legislation, and judicial reasoning in the EU.
In order to inspect the implications of securitising immigration in the EU, I
applied Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretivism to analyse the tension between
fulfilling the right to seek asylum, on the one hand, and safeguarding national
security, on the other, as the difference between matters of principle and policy,
respectively. In this regard, Dworkin offers a tool for interpretation known as
the ‘law as integrity’, based on which deciding about asylum cases, as a matter
of constitutional and fundamental human right, must be in full compliance with
the values and principles upon which the community is established.
Therefore, the interpretation of the right to seek asylum, as a matter of
constitutional and fundamental law, against the security concerns of States, as
matter of policy, must rely on the principles of ‘human dignity’ and ‘political
equality’. Not taking these essential elements of the right to seek asylum
seriously, thus constitutes grave ‘injustice’ if matters of social policy or efficiency
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infringes this right. This mode of interpretation could have been applied to the
case of X and X v. Belgium. In this case, the judges of the CJEU had the duty to
interpret Article 18 of the EU Charter, as a fundamental human right, and in line
with the principle of human dignity and other values, upon which the EU
community was established.
Furthermore, by analysing the jurisprudence of the ECtHR under Article 3 of
the ECHR, I concluded that the use of diplomatic assurances in torture-
expulsion cases might endanger the jus cogens nature of the principle of non-
refoulement to torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Referring again to
Dworkin, if we want to take a right seriously, in practice, we need to keep to the
founding principles of our laws and the legal system in which those laws were
adopted. In the case of taking the right to seek asylum seriously, we need to keep
primarily to the essential founding principle of this right, meaning the principle
of non-refoulement; otherwise, the very existence of this right, as a fundamental
and basic human right, falls apart. This analysis suggested that the non-entrée
policy of the EU is replacing the principle of non-refoulement, as a customary
norm of international law. In the same direction, the prevalence of security
policies in the EU is seriously marginalising the right to seek asylum at the
margin; as if, this right was not a fundamental or constitutional human right.
6.2.2. CONTRIBUTION TO THE EXISTING KNOWLEDGE
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this research is part of the ongoing debates and
discussions on the tension between protecting the human rights of immigrants,
as opposed to safeguarding the national security of host States.813 The most
recently published bodies of research available on this topic have covered a wide
range of issues including criminalising immigration to Europe,814 the
criminalisation of the acts of solidarity in favour of undocumented
813 Valeria Bello, International Migration and International Security: Why Prejudice Is a Global
Security Threat (New York; Oxford: Routledge, 2017), pp. 51-69. Also, see: Philip Alston and Ryan
Goodman, International Human Rights: The Successor to International Human Rights in Context:
Law, Politics and Morals: Text and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 383-486.
Also see: Philippe Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order (New
York; Oxford: Routledge, 2011), pp. 11-48. Also, see: Edward Newman, ‘Refugees, International
Security, and Human Vulnerability: Introduction and Survey’, in Edward Newman and Joanne Van
Selm (eds), Refugees and Forced Displacement: International Security, Human Vulnerability, and the
State (Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, 2003), pp. 3-30.
814 Valsamis Mitsilegas, The Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Challenges for Human Rights and
the Rule of Law (London: Springer, 2015). Also, see: Magdalena Kmak, ‘Migration Law as a State
(Re)producing Mechanism’, in Margaret Franz, Kumarini Silva (eds), Migration, Identity, and
Belonging: Defining Borders and Boundaries of the Homeland (New York; Oxford: Routledge, 2020),
pp. 35-42.
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immigrants,815 the externalisation of European border control,816 and the
arbitrary detention of asylum seekers.817
Within the official narrative of EU States, those assisting asylum seekers on the
path to reach Europe even on a charity basis are allegedly human smugglers.818
However, no work has touched upon the normative implications of the
securitisation of immigration in Europe on the right to seek asylum as a
fundamental right. Comparing this claim with a book chapter written by
Ardalan, the latter could possibly be the closest academic work to my
dissertation in general terms of topic and conclusion. In her book chapter,
Ardalan has conducted a qualitative research on restrictive border practices at
the US-Mexico border and compared them with policies and practices at the EU-
Moroccan border.819
In addition, I must mention another recent book edited by James C. Simeon,
with the title of ‘Terrorism and Asylum’, which covers the normative
construction of excluding asylum seekers because of terrorism and its national
dimensions.820 Against this literature, one of the novel aspects of my research is
that first, I highlighted the methodological constraints of the theory of
securitisation in studying the nexus between migration law and security.
Thereafter, I exclusively analysed the implications of the securitisation of
815 Chiara Maria Ricci, ‘Criminalising Solidarity? Smugglers, Migrants and Rescuers in the Reform of the
‘Facilitators’ Package’’, in Valsamis Mitsilegas, Violeta Moreno-Lax, and Niovi Vavoula (eds),
Securitising Asylum Flows: Deflection, Criminalisation and Challenges for Human Rights (Leiden:
Brill Publishers, 2020), pp. 34-56.
816 Daniela Vitiello, ‘Legal Narratives of the EU External Action in the Field of Migration and Asylum:
From the EU-Turkey Statement to the Migration Partnership Framework and Beyond’, in Valsamis
Mitsilegas, Violeta Moreno-Lax, and Niovi Vavoula (eds), Securitising Asylum Flows: Deflection,
Criminalisation and Challenges for Human Rights (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2020), pp. 130-166.
817 Magdalena Kmak, ‘Crimmigration and Othering in the Finnish Law and Practice of Immigration
Detention’ (2018) 15 No Foundations: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Law and Justice, pp. 1-22. For
further accounts on country-specific studies of immigration detention, see different chapters in the
following edited book: Amy Nethery and Stephanie J Silverman (eds), Immigration Detention: The
Migration of a Policy and its Human Impact (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2015). Also see: Vladislava
Stoyanova, ‘‘Recasting’ Detention of Asylum Seekers: Human Rights Law, EU Law and Its Application
in Bulgaria’, in Valsamis Mitsilegas, Violeta Moreno-Lax, and Niovi Vavoula (eds), Securitising Asylum
Flows: Deflection, Criminalisation and Challenges for Human Rights (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2020),
pp. 319-338.
818 In this regard, for example, see: The Guardian, ‘Refugee rescuers charged in Italy with complicity in
people smuggling’, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/mar/04/refugee-
rescuers-charged-in-italy-with-complicity-in-people-smuggling>. In this regard, also see: The
Guardian, ‘‘Help and you are a criminal’: the fight to defend refugee rights at Europe’s borders,
<www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/mar/01/help-and-you-are-a-criminal-the-fight-to-
defend-refugee-rights-at-europes-borders>.
819 Sabrineh Ardalan, ‘EU and US Border Policy: Externalisation of Migration Control and Violation of
the Right to Asylum’, in Valsamis Mitsilegas, Violeta Moreno-Lax, and Niovi Vavoula (eds), Securitising
Asylum Flows: Deflection, Criminalisation and Challenges for Human Rights (Leiden: Brill Publishers,
2020), pp. 282-318.
820 James C. Simeon, ‘Introduction: Terrorism, Asylum, and Exclusion from International Protection’,
in James C. Simeon (ed.), Terrorism and Asylum (Leiden; Boston: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2020), pp. 1-
37.
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immigration in the EU upon the right to seek asylum as a basic and fundamental
human right by applying a multidisciplinary method, combining critical legal
analysis and critical security analysis through the tool of critical discourse
analysis to provide answers to the main research question of this thesis.
Accordingly, I first presented that the current practice of the EU Member States
and the deference of the CJEU in dealing with the issue of humanitarian visas
have rendered the right to seek asylum, as a fundamental right under Article 18
of the EU Charter, practically ineffective.
Secondly, in Chapter 5 of this thesis, I argued that under the pretext of
safeguarding national security, the Member States of the Council of Europe have
employed quasi-legal ways to circumvent their positive obligation under the
principle of non-refoulement in general and the absolute and non-derogable
prohibition of refoulement to torture and other forms of ill-treatments,
specifically. Customary norms of international law form through the elements
of general practice and opinio juris. Therefore, I expressed a concern that if the
current practices against non-refoulement continue to persist and a general
opinion forms that security concerns could justify refoulement, in practice, the
principle of non-refoulement loses its jus cogens character and further its
customary-norm status in international law and will be dismantled by non-
entrée policies.
6.2.3. RECOMMENDATIONS AND IDEAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This research exposed the fallacies of ongoing quasi-legal ‘solutions’ to the
problem of asylum seekers in Europe. In this research, I argued strongly that
asylum seekers are not a problem to the EU, whereas the real problem lays in
the highly securitised European asylum laws and practices. The securitisation of
immigration in Europe has resulted in excluding a group of human beings, who
are in desperate need of individual security and protection themselves, from
existing in the eyes of the law. Excluding asylum seekers from the domain of law
shows the depth of the hypocrisy that exists today in the EU – seeing human
rights as the founding value of the EU as an ‘area of freedom, security, and
justice’. This irony fully reflects itself in the practice of the European States and
Courts in not finding pragmatic ways to allow asylum seekers to gain access to a
fair and effective asylum application procedure.
I might have exposed this fallacy, but I have yet to address in depth what we
could do next to bring more effectiveness to the right to seek asylum in Europe.
To take the right to seek asylum more seriously as a fundamental human right,
the first step would perhaps be the de-securitisation of immigration at a
normative level. However, the path to this goal is, indeed, far more complex and
depends on many factors. One of the most influential factors in this regard is the
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willingness and the political direction that the EU takes with regard to the
amendment of existing legislation. The starting point, however, does not seem
too promising. In November 2019, Ursula von der Leyen, just before being
elected as the President of the European Commission (December 2019-current),
announced the creation of a new Commissioner during her upcoming
presidency, with the title ‘The European Commissioner for Promoting the
European Way of Life’.821 The role of this new Commissioner is assigning the EU
political will and direction (or policy-making) in the area of migration, amongst
other areas such as health, security, rule of law, etc.822
Ever since, this portfolio has provoked serious concerns over the real meaning
of ‘the European Way of Life,’ and on how this would affect the new EU policies
on immigration.823 For instance, Andrew Stroehlein, the media director for
Human Rights Watch, expressed worries that, ‘[p]utting migration under a
portfolio named “protecting our European way of life” is another example of just
how much mainstream politicians in Europe are adopting the framing of the far
right.’824 As another example, Jean-Claude Juncker, the predecessor of von der
Leyen, asserted, ‘I don’t like the idea that the European way of life is opposed to
migration. Accepting those that come from far away is part of the European way
of life.’825
Despite all criticisms, in September 2020, the EU Commissioner for Promoting
the European Way of Life proposed an amendment for EU legislation on
migration, called the ‘New Pact on Migration and Asylum’. This document
claims its main aim to be creating more efficient and fairer migration processes,
reducing unsafe and irregular routes, and promoting sustainable and safe legal
821 European Commission, ‘Promoting our European way of life: Protecting our citizens and our values’,
<ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life_en>.
822 Ibid. In this regard, also see: European Parliament, ‘Parliamentary Hearings of the Commissioners-
Designate: An Analysis of the Portfolios of the von der Leyen Commission’ (Brussels: European Union,
the European Parliamentary Research Service, 2019), pp. 55-58.
823 Hugo Balnaves, Eduardo Monteiro Burkle, Jasmine Erkan, and David Fischer, ‘European Populism
in the European Union: Results and Human Rights Impacts of the 2019 Parliamentary Elections’ (2020)
4 Global Campus Human Rights Journal, pp. 176-200. Also, see: The New York Times, ‘Protecting Our
European Way of Life’? Outrage Follows New E.U. Role,
<www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/world/europe/eu-ursula-von-der-leyen-migration.html>. Moreover,
see: Euronews: ‘Disagreement over “Protecting our European Way of Life” portfolio’,
<www.euronews.com/2019/09/12/exclusive-juncker-tells-euronews-portfolio-title-protecting-our-
european-way-of-life-must>. Also, see: Reuters, ‘New EU post to protect European Way of Life slammed
as “grotesque”’, <www.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-jobs-life/new-eu-post-to-protect-european-way-of-
life-slammed-as-grotesque-idUKKCN1VV26N?edition-redirect=uk>.
824 The New York Times, ‘Protecting Our European Way of Life’? Outrage Follows New E.U. Role,
<www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/world/europe/eu-ursula-von-der-leyen-migration.html>.




pathways to those in need of protection.826 The aims of this proposal might seem
noble on the surface, but the main concern involves how much the upcoming
legislation amendments are going to take a human rights-based approach, in the
direction of not only protecting the right to seek asylum, but also giving an
agency to asylum seekers.
Applying the lenses of critical discourse analysis against the text of the ‘New Pact
on Migration and Asylum,’ the language of securitisation prevails in the light of
predominantly focusing on external border security and border-control
management.827 Therefore, the question remains why the EU is not willing to
abide with its normative human rights obligations related to the right to seek
asylum. Is it perhaps because these obligations cost money and welcoming
outsiders means spending more? Is it perhaps because there is only a single
‘European Way of Life,’ that requires being ‘white’ and ‘Christian’? Are these not
rather the same narratives of the populist and far-right politicians to justify
closing EU borders? Perhaps, after all, it is simply more convenient to blame
‘others,’ especially ‘outsiders’ for the problems we face in society.
6.3. FINAL WORD: WHEN SECURITISED IMMIGRATION
LAW MAKES HUMANS ‘ILLEGAL’
6.3.1. THE PROHIBITION OF THE COLLECTIVE EXPULSION OF ALIENS
AND ENSURING THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM
At the crossroad between protecting the human rights of asylum seekers, against
safeguarding the national security of host States, one of the common practices
that can currently be witnessed at EU external borders is the ‘collective
expulsion of aliens.’ Recently, we have heard of this practice happening at the
external Schengen borders more frequently than ever before. This practice
results in preventing asylum seekers from entering the EU and submitting their
asylum applications. The practice of collective expulsion of aliens, not only on
the scale of number of returnees, but also in the use of excessively forceful
measures employed against immigrants, is unprecedented.828 The excessive use
826 European Commission, ‘New Pact on Migration and Asylum: A fresh start on migration in Europe’,
<ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/new-pact-
migration-and-asylum_en>.
827 The European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 23
September 2020, COM(2020) 609 final, pp. 11-26.
828 Ruben Andersson, ‘Rescued and Caught: The Humanitarian-Security Nexus at Europe’s Frontiers’,
in Nicholas De Genova (ed.), The Borders of “Europe”: Anatomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering
(Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2017), 64-94, pp. 64 and 65.
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of force has been so far documented by numerous journalists, human rights
activists (both individuals and organisations), and even on the cameras of
mobile phones or other recording devices by immigrants themselves or various
passers-by.829
Various international and regional human rights instruments have explicitly
prohibited the practice of collective expulsion of aliens. In this regard, the most
important instruments are: Article 22(1) of the Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Article 4 of
Protocol No. 4 of the ECHR, Article 19 of the EU Charter,830 Article 22(9) of the
American Convention on Human Rights, and Article 12(5) of the Banjul Charter.
The 1966 ICCPR, however, does not explicitly prohibit the collective expulsion
of aliens when addressing the issue of expulsions under Article 13. Nevertheless,
in its General Comment No. 15 on the position of aliens under the ICCPR, the
Human Rights Committee (HRC) has rendered that the collective expulsion of
aliens is contrary to the procedural guarantees anticipated for protecting
individuals against arbitrary and unlawful expulsions.831
According to paragraph 10 of this General Comment, Article 13 of the ICCPR is
the statement of the procedural and due process rights of individuals in
accessing legal procedures to address their immigration cases. Therefore, the
collective or mass expulsion of aliens violates the prohibition of arbitrary
expulsion under Article 13 of the 1966 ICCPR. The reason is that the collective
expulsion of aliens prevents non-nationals from receiving an individual decision
with regard to immigration cases and deprives the individual of demanding
remedies to compensate against expulsions.
Moreover, based on the principle of non-discrimination, the prohibition of the
collective expulsion of aliens does not depend on whether the group of aliens
have lawfully arrived in or are residing in the territory of the state that expels
them. In other words, the immigration status of aliens could never be a
justification for collectively expelling a group of asylum seekers, or those found
within the territory without possessing valid travel or identification documents.
829 José Palazón: “Que no le quepa la más mínima duda al ministro de que hay más imágenes”,
<www.eldiario.es/desalambre/Jose-Palazon-minima-ministro-imagenes_0_357315277.html>;
‘Refugee and Migrant Exclusion in Europe: Spain’s Push-Back Practice (Melilla)’,
<www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=6&v=amyEP7LIDF0&feature=emb_logo>; ‘Melilla: the
Spanish enclave that has become the backdoor to Europe’,
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHj58hYdhMg>.
830 Article 19(1) of the EU Charter, entitled ‘Protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition’,
explicitly reinforces that the collective expulsions are prohibited.
831 General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens under the Covenant adopted at the twenty-seventh
session of the Human Rights Committee, 11 April 1986, para. 10.
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In addition, the rule on the prohibition of collective expulsion encompasses a
positive and due diligence obligation, according to which States are bound by
the rule of law to provide accessible ‘judicial and/or administrative mechanisms’
for immigrants to challenge the expulsion decisions issued against them. In
other words, the members of a group of immigrants should not be expelled in a
mass manner, without the consideration of their individual cases. Moreover,
each individual should have effective access to the legal channels, including the
‘administrative and/or judicial appeal instances,’ to challenge the return
decisions made against them.
The starting point of discussion on the prohibition of mass expulsion is that this
prohibition is a necessary precondition for the realisation of the right to seek
asylum. In addition, other fundamental human rights of asylum seekers such as
the right to life and the right to an effective remedy (as a pertinent component
of the right to a fair trial and subjects of Articles 13 and 6 of the ECHR,
respectively), are highly dependent on the respect for the prohibition of the
collective expulsion of aliens. Therefore, the question I answer here is that how
safeguarding the internal security of EU, in practice, has affected the prohibition
on the collective expulsion of aliens and the enjoyment of the right to seek
asylum and its derivatives such as the right to life and the right to an effective
remedy.
Within the EU, technically speaking, national security is equivalent to internal
security, which guarantees the protection of the national security of every EU
Member State and those residing ‘legally’ within their territories. When it comes
to the practice of the collective expulsion of immigrants, the ECtHR has
produced the latest judiciary jurisprudence. For example, the recent
deliberation of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in the case of N.D. and N.T. v.
Spain (2020) shows that the bottom-line argument with regard to detangling
the tension between safeguarding the national security versus protecting the
human rights of immigrants is adherence to the idea of a ‘collective right to
security.’832 This collective right is the right of the ‘citizens of the European
Community’ and other ‘legal’ residents of the EU – an ‘area of freedom, security,
and justice’ – to security.
The concept of EU, as an ‘area of freedom, security, and justice’ derives from
Title V of the TFEU. The basic idea for creating EU as an ‘area of freedom,
security, and justice’ was to ensure the ‘freedom of movement of persons,’ and
to offer a ‘high level of protection, safety, and security to its citizens.’ In this
832 Ferruccio Pastore, ‘Visas, Borders, Immigration: Formation, Structure, and Current Evolution of the
EU Entry Control System’, in Neil Walker (ed.), Europe's Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 89-142, p. 97.
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regard, paragraph 1 of Article 67 of the TFEU stipulates that the EU ‘shall
constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental
rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States.’
According to Pastore, the EU’s area of security is ‘an expression of a general
evolutionary trend for growth in international security and control regime.’833
At the same time, security regimes have a strong tendency towards expanding
and covering more and more areas – even those beyond the physical territories
of a State.834 The most important aspect of policies guaranteeing EU security is
the ‘management of the European Union’s external borders.’ At the core of these
‘security and border-control management policies’ lie the ‘EU’s asylum and
immigration policies,’ with repeating some slogans such as the ‘fight against
different crimes, more specifically crimes related to population movement and
immigration such as terrorism, trafficking in human beings, illegal drug
trafficking, and human smuggling.’835
A noticeable shift in the thinking of EU policymakers has been visible in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks; a shift from protecting human rights of all
individuals subjected to States’ jurisdiction towards protecting the EU as an area
of ‘freedom, security, and justice.’ This indicates a change in the approach of
policymakers, legislators, and judicial decision-makers in the EU. For example,
referring to Article 77 of the TFEU, in order to have an area of freedom of
movement, there is a necessity or an urgent need to get rid of any possible
internal border checks within the EU. At the same time, in order to safeguard
the safety and security of this area, it is pertinent to construct an immensely
strong and highly effective system of external border control.
Consequently, the EU has created much legislation on border surveillance and
external European border control. Amongst this legislation, most importantly
we could refer to the 2016 Schengen Borders Code and the 2008 EU Return
Directive. According to Article 13 of the 2016 Schengen Borders Code, the main
purpose of border surveillance shall be ‘to prevent unauthorised border
crossings, to counter cross-border criminality, and to take measures against
persons who have crossed the border illegally.’ This Article continues that a
person, who has crossed a border illegally and has no right to stay in the territory
of the Member State concerned, shall be apprehended subject to return
procedures respecting the 2008 EU Return Directive.
833 Ferruccio Pastore, ‘Visas, Borders, Immigration: Formation, Structure, and Current Evolution of the
EU Entry Control System’, in Neil Walker (ed.), Europe's Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 89-142, p. 97
834 Ibid, p. 128.
835 Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
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With regard to expelling immigrants in a collective manner, the ECtHR case of
N.D. and N.T. v. Spain (2020) has established a controversial precedent. This
case concerns the complaint of two applicants, Mr. N.D. and Mr. N.T., who are
the nationals of sub-Saharan African countries of Mali and Côte d’Ivoire,
respectively. The respondent State in this case is the Kingdom of Spain
(hereinafter, referred to as ‘Spain’ or ‘the Government’). Prior to engaging in a
critical analysis of this case, it is important to have a thorough picture of the
factual background to this case and the relevant events leading the applicants to
lodge a complaint against the Government of Spain at the ECtHR. First, it is
important to describe the border area between Morocco and Melilla, and to
understand the legal regime governing this region.
Melilla is an autonomous city, which together with the city of Ceuta, officially
belongs to the Kingdom of Spain – a fact highly disputed by Morocco. The
autonomous city of Melilla is a Spanish enclave of 12 sq. km located on the North
coast of Africa and surrounded by Moroccan territory. The area separating the
cities of Melilla and Ceuta from the African country of Morocco is the only land
border area between the two continents of Africa and Europe.836 This border
area lies on the immigration route from the Northern and sub-Saharan Africa to
Europe, which not only Africans, but also Syrians and other Middle Eastern
immigrants use. The border between Melilla and Morocco is an external border
of the Schengen border area and thus, it provides access to the EU territory. As
a result, this area is subjected to particularly intense migratory pressure,
especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and after the so-called ‘2015-2016
EU refugee crises.’837
Henceforth, since 2014, the Spanish authorities have been building and
constantly maintaining a complex barrier, comprising of three parallel fences,
along the 13 km border separating Melilla from Morocco. The aim for
constructing this heavy infrastructure is to prevent irregular immigrants from
accessing Spanish territory and eventually from entering the EU. This border
barrier consists of the following physical components:
1. The outer fence: a six-metre-high, slightly concave fence;
2. The middle fence: a three-dimensional network of cables followed by a
second, three-metre-high fence; and,
836 BBC News, ‘Ceuta and Melilla: Spain’s enclaves in North Africa’, <www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
57305882>. Also: BBC News, ‘Ceuta, Melilla profile’, <www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14114627>.
837 Nicholas De Genova, ‘Introduction: The Borders of “Europe” and the European Question’, in Nicholas
De Genova (ed.), The Borders of “Europe”: Anatomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering (Durham;
London: Duke University Press, 2017), pp. 1-35, p. 27.
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3. The third or the inner fence: another six-metre-high fence on the
opposite side of a patrol road.
Most of the fences are equipped with anti-climbing grids. Therefore, to provide
access between, several gates are built into the fences at regular intervals. A
sophisticated CCTV system, including infrared cameras combined with
movement sensors, has been installed along the fences.838 There are four land
border-crossing points between Morocco and Spain located along the fences.
Between these crossings, on the Spanish side, the Guardia Civil (Spanish law
enforcement agency) has the task of patrolling the land border and the coast of
Melilla to prevent illegal entries to Spain. Mass attempts to breach the border
fences are organised on a regular basis. Groups generally comprising of several
hundred immigrants – many of whom from sub-Saharan Africa – attempt to
enter Spanish territory through these fences. They frequently operate at night in
order to produce a ‘surprise effect’ and to ‘increase their chances of success,’ due
to lack of visibility. Those immigrants, who do not manage to evade the Guardia
Civil and whom the officials succeed in persuading to come down of their own
accord by using ladders, are taken back immediately to Morocco and are handed
over to the Moroccan authorities, unless they are in need of urgent medical
treatment.839
The facts leading to the incidents of this case is that, on 13 August 2014, two
attempts took place to cross the border, both of which being organised by
smuggling networks: one at 4:42 a.m. involving 600 people and another at 6:25
a.m. involving 30 people. The applicants stated that they had taken part in the
first of these attempts. They had left the Mountain Gurugu camp on the same
day and tried to enter Spain together with their group by scaling the outer fence.
According to the respondent (the Government of Spain), the Moroccan police
prevented around 500 immigrants from scaling the outer fence, but around a
hundred of them, nevertheless, succeeded. Approximately 75 immigrants
managed to reach the top of the inner fence, but only a few came down the other
side and landed on Spanish soil, where the members of the Guardia Civil
confronted them. The others remained sitting on top of the inner fence for many
hours. The Guardia Civil officials helped them to climb down with the aid of
ladders before handcuffing, arresting, and escorting them back to the Moroccan
territory on the other side of the border through the gates between the fences,
and handed them over to the Moroccan authorities.840
838 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Grand Chamber, Decision (13 February 2020), para. 16.
839 Ibid, paras 17 and 18.
840 Ibid, paras 24-27.
218
The applicants alleged that they had not undergone any identification
procedures and had no opportunity to explain their personal circumstances or
be assisted by lawyers or any interpreters. The applicants complained of their
immediate return to Morocco and the lack of an effective remedy in that regard.
They submitted that they had been subjected to the illegal practice of ‘collective
expulsion,’ meaning that they had absolutely no opportunity to be identified or
to explain their individual circumstances. In addition, they alleged that by their
immediate expulsion to Morocco, they were exposed to the risk of inhuman and
ill-treatment upon return – as well as not being given any chance to challenge
their return decision by the means of a remedy with a suspensive effect.841
Therefore, based on the facts, the applicants raised an alleged violation of the
ECHR, Articles 3, 4 of Protocol No. 4, and Article 13 in conjunction with both
Articles 3 and 4 of Protocol No. 4.
As elaborated in Chapter 5, Article 3 of the ECHR stipulates the absolute
prohibition of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. Under the ECHR, there is no article on the right to seek asylum.
However, Article 3 of this Convention is the backbone of asylum and refugee
protection in the EU – in the same manner that this Article is the declaration of
and an equivalent to the principle of non-refoulement to torture and other ill-
treatment as a jus cogens norm of international law. What Article 13 of the
ECHR protects is the right to an effective remedy. This right is one of the
constituting elements of the right to a fair trial and due process under Article 6
of the Convention as a basic human right, which also guarantees the right to seek
asylum. The foundation of Article 13 of the ECHR is therefore the right to a fair
trial, which is enshrined in Article 10 of the 1948 UDHR, Article 14 of the 1966
ICCPR, and Article 6 of the ECHR. According to Article 13 of the ECHR, every
individual whose rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention are violated
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority. As can be seen from
the wording of Article 13 of the ECHR, the right to an effective remedy is a
dependent right. This means that the violation of this right does not stand alone,
whereas, it always attaches to the violation of other substantial human rights as
envisaged in the Convention.842
841 Ibid, para. 123. The ‘suspensive effect’ is a consequence of an appeal, which delays the enforceability
of the challenged decision, allowing the appellant to remain in the host country, while the outcome of
the trial is still pending. Regarding this definition, see: <ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/content/suspensive-effect-0_en>.
842 For detailed analysis on the dependency of applicability of Article 13 on violation of other substantial
rights mentioned in the Convention, see: Bernadette Rainey, Pamela McCormick, and Clare Ovey,
Jacobs, White, and Ovey: the European Convention on Human Rights (8th edn, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2020), pp. 135-144.
219
The most relevant article of the ECHR to current discussion is Article 4 of
Protocol No. 4 on the prohibition of the collective expulsion of aliens. This is an
umbrella prohibition covering any acts of returning aliens, which could be
categorised or labelled as ‘collective;’ hence, this Article in no way regulates the
individual expulsion of aliens.843 Based on this limited scope, the effectiveness
of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 highly depends on the interpretation of the term
‘collective.’844 One interpretive question is whether this term includes at least a
certain number of people, or if it includes the members of a group who share an
intrinsic characteristic that brings them together (such as being members of a
family or a group like the Romani people). If we define the practice of the
collective expulsion of aliens as ‘measures that force a group of non-nationals to
leave the country, without a reasonable and objective examination of particular
circumstances of each individual case,’ then, the expulsion of a group of
individuals who have the same nationality does not breach the prohibition of
this type of expulsion.845
The Explanatory Report issued by the Council of Europe on the preparatory
work of Protocol No. 4 reveals that the Committee of Experts did not intend to
impose any restrictions on the prohibition of collectively expelling aliens, except
for what Article 15 of the Convention had already assigned on derogation from
Convention duties in time of emergency. As a matter of fact, the Assembly Draft
of Protocol No. 4 had suggested that Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 should contain
the legal grounds for allowing the expulsion of an alien considered to be a
‘danger to national security,’ or whose existence is offensive to the ‘public order
and morality’ of the host State. However, the Committee of Experts did not
approve this suggestion of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
and instead, the Committee proposed a general prohibition on the collective
expulsion of aliens under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, especially since the
Convention was silent on this matter. At the end, the Committee decided not to
include explicitly the expulsion of individuals in the main text, because this topic
already was within the ambit of Article 3 of the ECHR under the absolute
843 Bernadette Rainey, Pamela McCormick, and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White, and Ovey: the European
Convention on Human Rights (8th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 624. Also, see: Julia
Wojnowska-Radzińska, The Right of an Alien to be Protected against Arbitrary Expulsion in
International Law (Leiden; Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2015), p. 19.
844 Jeroen Schokkenbroek, ‘Prohibition of Collective Expulsion of Aliens (Article 4 of Protocol No. 4)’, in
Pieter van Dijk, Fried van Hoof, Arjen van Rijn, and Leo Zwaak (eds), Theory and Practice of the
European Convention on Human Rights (Antwerp; Oxford: Intersentia, 2006), pp. 953-957.
845 Eeva Nykänen, Fragmented State Power and Forced Migration: A Study on Non-State Actors in
Refugee Law (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), pp. 48 and 49.
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prohibition of refoulement to torture and other inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.846
In September 2005, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
adopted a set of guidelines, including twenty items on the forced return of aliens
from the territories of the Member States of the Council of Europe. Guideline
No. 3 of this document provides for the prohibition of collective expulsion
stipulating that, ‘a removal order shall only be issued on the basis of a reasonable
and objective examination of the particular case of each individual person
concerned and it shall take into account the circumstances specific to each
case.’847 Prior to the adoption of these guidelines, the ECtHR in its admissibility
decision in the case of Vedran Andric v. Sweden had already defined the
collective expulsion of aliens, as follows:
[…] any measure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave a country, except where
such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of
the particular case of each individual alien of the group.848
Accordingly, the fact that a number of aliens receive similar decisions at the
same time does not necessarily mean that the collective expulsion has occurred
if each applicant had a separate and individual opportunity to lodge a complaint
against the expulsion decision to the competent authorities. Assessing whether
a case is an instance of collective expulsion, the ECtHR in the case of Čonka v.
Belgium ruled that the State should consider both expulsion measures and the
facts and circumstances of a particular case such as the background of the
expulsion decision, the COI, etc.849
Against the above-mentioned case law background, on 3 October 2017, the
ECtHR at the Chamber level delivered its ruling in the case of N.D. and N.T. v.
Spain, agreeing with the arguments of the applicants and hitherto ruled that
there had been a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 of the Convention.850
Subsequently, the violation of Article 13 of the same Convention, connected with
Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, was ruled.851 The ECtHR Chamber judges noted that
the removals had taken place in the absence of any prior administrative or
846 The Explanatory Report issued by the Council of Europe on the preparatory work of Protocol No. 4
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, securing certain
rights and freedoms other than those already included in the Convention and in the first Protocol
thereto, European Treaty Series No. 46, Strasbourg, 16.IX.1963, ECHR, paras 31-34.
847 Twenty Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Forced Return,
September 2005, Guideline 3 on the Prohibition of Collective Expulsion.
848 Vedran Andric v. Sweden, Application No. 45917/99, European Court of Human Rights, Chamber
Decision as to the Admissibility (23 February 1999), para. 1.
849Čonka v. Belgium, Application No. 51564/99, European Court of Human Rights (third section), Final
Judgement of the Chamber (5 February 2002), paras 59-63.
850 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Judgment (3 October 2017), paras 114-121.
851 Ibid, para. 122.
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judicial decisions. Consequently, there had been no assessment of each
individual situation or any identification procedures. The Court, therefore,
concluded that, in those circumstances, the removals amounted to an instance
of collective expulsion, and therefore, a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 of
the Convention.
The Court in this case reinforced that, ‘it understands the States’ sovereignty,
which gives the power to host States to determine their immigration policy.’
However, when it comes to ‘managing migratory flows – as part of the States’
migratory plans and policies – it is pertinent that none of these plans and
practices is in contradiction with the duties of Member States under the ECHR
or its Protocols.’852
The decisions of the ECtHR in the cases of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy853
and Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece854 were mentioned to reiterate that
the European States could not justify practices in violation of human rights
duties by using the principle of state sovereignty and safeguarding national
security, or the internal security of EU.855 Meanwhile, the Court recognised
migration management and controlling the movement of people to Europe in
irregular manners as ‘new challenges’ for European States. The Court, however,
reminded that these challenges were the result of the ongoing worldwide
economic crisis and recent social and political changes, which have had a
significant adverse impact on certain regions of Africa and the Middle East.856
In addition, the Court noted that the applicants had no access to interpreters or
legal assistance for informing them of the relevant provisions of asylum law or
procedures available to them to challenge their expulsion decision. In the view
of their immediate expulsion, the ECtHR Chamber considered that the
applicants had been deprived of accessing an effective domestic remedy.
Therefore, the ECtHR also found a violation of Article 13 taken into account with
Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 of the Convention.857 However, the Court both at the
Chamber and Grand Chamber levels did not find any violation with regard to
Article 3 of the ECHR. The reason for this conclusion was that the return of the
852 Ibid, paras 83 and 101.
853 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09, European Court of Human Rights,
Grand Chamber, Decision (23 February 2012), para. 190. Also, see the concurring opinion of Judge Pinto
de Albuquerque annexed to the same case.
854 Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, Application No. 16643/09, European Court of Human Rights,
Judgement (21 October 2014), paras 60 and 100.
855 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Judgment (3 October 2017), para. 101.
856 Ibid, para. 83.
857 Ibid, paras 109-122.
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applicants, in the Court’s opinion, did not result in putting the applicants in
danger of inhuman or degrading treatment in Morocco.858
The primary issue challenged by the Government of Spain was the State’s
jurisdiction over the practice of the mass expulsion of immigrants. The main
question was whether Spain had jurisdiction for returning a group of
immigrants to be liable under Article 1 of the ECHR.859 In this regard, the
representatives of the Spanish Government argued that the incidents in this case
– meaning the arrest and pushback of the applicants – had happened outside
the physical territory of Spain, and therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the
Spanish Government. The reason the representatives of Spain forwarded this
claim was that the applicants did not manage to cross the third border fence.860
In the continuation, the Spanish representatives added that, even if accepted
that these activities had occurred within the physical territory of Spain, the
applicability of the ECHR could not be invoked, because the expulsion had
happened in order to protect the territorial integrity of Spain. This augment is
in line with the premise that the prevalence of protection of borders is within
the State’s legal rights based on the well-established principle of State
sovereignty. Spain argued that, in fact, its law enforcement officials had an
obligation and duty to prevent the applicants from crossing the border and
subsequently, from entering the Spanish territory.861
In response to this argument, the advocates for the applicants asserted that, the
fact that the Spanish law enforcement officials had the legal authority to arrest
and return the applicants indicated that, Spain did, in fact, have an ‘effective
control’ over the border area between Morocco and Melilla. To strengthen their
argument on the issue of jurisdiction, the applicants additionally referred to the
third-party intervention, submitted by Mr. Nils Muižnieks, the Commissioner
for Human Rights of the Council of Europe. In his submission, Mr. Muižnieks
referred, in particular, to the statement, which Ms. Soledad Becerril, the Spanish
Ombudsperson, had published on her official website in 2014.862 According to
this statement, the Government of Spain, since the time of the construction of
Melilla border, has been exercising its jurisdiction in the territories between the
three-layer fences built at the border-crossing points. Therefore, the
858 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Grand Chamber, Decision (13 February 2020), paras 201 and 206.
859 Article 1 of the Convention is about establishing the scope of the jurisdiction of the Convention and
thereafter the jurisdiction of the ECtHR in a case referred to it.
860 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Grand Chamber, Decision (13 February 2020), paras 91-93.
861 Ibid, para. 94.
862 Ibid, paras 38-40 and para. 99.
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Government of Spain has been effectively exercising its sovereign power over
the individuals located in this area and not just over the lands beyond the border
structures.863
In addition to this argument, a statement was submitted by other interveners,
including the Centre for Advice on Individual Rights in Europe, Amnesty
International, the European Council for Refugees and Exiles, and the
International Commission of Jurists. This submission referred to the ECtHR’s
decision in the landmark case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy on
establishing the States’ extraterritorial jurisdiction. This case is about the
interception of immigrants’ boats on the high seas, in which the ECtHR ruled:
The removal of aliens carried out in the context of interceptions on the high seas by
the authorities of a State in the exercise of their sovereign authority, the effect of
which is to prevent migrants from reaching the borders of the State or even to push
them back to another State, constitutes an exercise of jurisdiction within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention which engages the responsibility of the State
in question under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.864
Based on this judgement, it is reasonable to deduce that when States do have
jurisdiction in their interception activities on the high seas (an area not
belonging to the territory of any State), they a fortiori do have jurisdiction for
their activities conducted at their border-crossing points. In addition to the case
of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, the above-mentioned intervening NGOs
referred to the case of Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece in arguing that the
jurisdiction of a Member State under Article 1 of the ECHR applies when persons
arrive unlawfully in a country were refused entry.865 In other words, the
jurisdiction of a Member State is applicable even in cases, in which no border
crossing has happened. Therefore, again, a fortiori the jurisdiction of Spain
shall be established in the case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, in which the applicants
had de facto passed the border infrastructures.
The Court, in the case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, with regard to the subject of
State jurisdiction placed emphasis on the principle of the ‘territoriality’ of
jurisdiction as established within its jurisprudence in the case of Banković and
863 The third party intervention by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights under Article
36, para. 3, of the European Convention on Human Rights Applications No. 8675/15 and No. 8697/15
N.D. v. Spain and N.T. v. Spain, CoE Doc No. CommDH (2015)27, 9 November 2015, paras 27-33.
864 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09, European Court of Human Rights,
Grand Chamber, Decision (23 February 2012), para. 180.
865 Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, Application No. 16643/09, European Court of Human Rights,
Judgement (21 October 2014), para. 212.
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Others v. Belgium and Others.866 In this case, the ECtHR admitted that, since
the principle of territoriality of jurisdiction is a primary rule in international law,
in order to expand the jurisdiction of States to areas outside their territories, the
alleged violations of the ECHR must be a ‘direct result of the action’ of the State
and its ‘effective control over the subjects.’867 This reasoning has expanded the
jurisdiction of the ECHR and its Member States to the regions outside the actual
physical territories of the Contracting States. That is why the Court voted for the
establishment of the jurisdiction of Italy in intercepting the immigrants’ boats
on the high seas of the Mediterranean Sea in the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others
v. Italy. By referring to the Banković criteria, the ECtHR, in Hirsi Jamaa and
Others v. Italy, ruled that when a State, through its agents outside its territory,
exercises ‘control’ and ‘authority’ over an individual, it is under an obligation to
secure to that individual all the rights and freedoms guaranteed under Section I
of the Convention.868
In other cases involving the question of jurisdiction such as Al-Skeini and
Others v. the UK,869 Hassan v. the UK,870 and Al-Jedda v. the UK,871 the ECtHR
demonstrated a tendency towards accepting the extraterritorial applicability of
the Convention. Therefore, the judges at the ECtHR in N.D. and N.T. v. Spain
agreed on the opinion that, similar to the position of the Court in its precedent,
whenever there is an ‘effective control’ over the individual, the jurisdiction of the
State for the purpose of the applicability of the Convention under Article 1 shall
be established. Therefore, the jurisdictional applicability of the Convention is
regardless of whether State authorities have acted ‘within’ or ‘outside’ the State’s
physical territory or exactly at the border-crossing points. The main defence of
the respondent State in this regard was that the events of the incidents had
happened outside the territory of Spain. In the Court’s assessment, both the
Chamber and the Grand Chamber levels, judges rejected the Spanish
Government’s view that the events had occurred outside Spain’s jurisdiction.
The Court considered it unnecessary to establish whether the border fences
866 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Judgment (3 October 2017), paras 49-51.
867 Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, Application no. 52207/99,
European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber Decision as to the admissibility (12 December 2001),
para. 70.
868 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09, European Court of Human Rights,
Grand Chamber Judgement (23 February 2012), para. 74.
869 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 55721/07, European Court of Human
Rights, Grand Chamber, Decision (7 July 2011).
870 Hassan v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 29750/09, European Court of Human Rights, Grand
Chamber, Decision (16 September 2014).
871 Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 27021/08, European Court of Human Rights,
Grand Chamber, Decision (7 July 2011).
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erected between Morocco and Spain were in Spain. In the Court’s view, from the
moment that the applicants climbed down any of the barriers, they were under
the ‘continuous and exclusive control’ of the Spanish authorities and thus, fell
under its jurisdiction.872 Therefore, in the Court’s conclusion, once the
applicants had climbed the first fence (only one of the three fences), they fell
under the ‘effective control’ of Spanish border authorities and thus under the
jurisdiction of the Government of Spain. As can be seen from this opinion,
deciding on the issue of State’s jurisdiction is a matter of facts, rather than a
question of law. Therefore, all we need to pay attention to is assessing the
moment from which the State’s authorities have ‘effective control’ over
individuals.
According to the literature available on the practices of transnational courts
such as the ECtHR, there are three models for assessing the jurisdiction of a
State with regard to the applicability of their human rights obligations.873 The
first criterion is the principle of the ‘territoriality of jurisdiction.’ The second one
is establishing ‘effective control’ over the subjects. The third model is assessing
the jurisdiction based on the ‘nature of human rights obligations,’ i.e. positive or
negative obligations.874 In the case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, in fact, all of these
three models apply in order to establish the jurisdiction of Spain with regard to
the expulsion of the applicants at the Melilla-Moroccan border crossing points.
On the alleged violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, Spain not only denied the
charges of summary expulsion, but also shortly after the events of this case, it
amended its relevant national law; the law that had made immediate expulsions
lawful – meaning ‘The Institutional Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Aliens
and their Social Integration.’875 According to the reports submitted by some
human right organisations and activists, the Spanish border authorities do not
document expulsions in any way, and these returns are administered without
872 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Grand Chamber, Decision (13 February 2020), paras 90 and 102-111.
873 With regard to the principles of extraterritorial applicability of human rights instruments, see Marko
Milanovic, ‘Extraterritoriality and Human Rights: Prospects and Challenges’, in Thomas Gammeltoft-
Hansen and Jens Vedsted-Hansen (eds), Human Rights and the Dark Side of Globalisation:
Transnational Law Enforcement and Migration Control (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 53-
77. Also, see Marko Milanovic, ‘The Spatial Dimension: Treaties and Territory’, in Christian J. Tams,
Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Andreas Zimmermann, and Athene E. Richford (eds), Research Handbook on
the Law of Treaties (Cheltenham; Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2014), pp. 184-221.
874 Marko Milanovic, ‘Extraterritoriality and Human Rights: Prospects and Challenges’, in Thomas
Gammeltoft-Hansen and Jens Vedsted-Hansen (eds), Human Rights and the Dark Side of
Globalisation: Transnational Law Enforcement and Migration Control (Oxford; New York: Routledge,
2017), pp. 53-77.
875 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Judgment (3 October 2017), para. 59.
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subjecting immigrants to any identification procedure, nor gathering any
information regarding their personal circumstances.876 In this regard, the legally
binding EU secondary legislation applicable to border control and expulsion of
aliens consists of the 2016 Schengen Borders Code877 and the 2008 EU Return
Directive.878 According to Article 13(1) of the 2016 Schengen Borders Code on
the topic of ‘border surveillance,’ the legislator admits that the main purpose of
EU border surveillance is to protect the EU and the Schengen area from ‘illegal
migrants’ and to prevent ‘unauthorised border crossings.’ This is a preventive
mechanism to counter cross-border criminality and to take measures against
persons, who have crossed the border ‘illegally.’879 The same provision holds
that whoever has crossed an EU external border illegally and who has no right
to stay on the territory of Member State concerned, shall be apprehended and
made subject to procedures respecting Directive 2008/115/EC (the ‘2008 EU
Return Directive’). Article 1 of this Directive determines the goals and objectives
of this legislation as a scale to set out common standards and procedures in all
Member States. The goal of the Directive is to return third-country nationals
staying illegally in the EU in accordance with fundamental rights, as general
principles of Community law, as well as in accordance with international law,
including refugee protection and human rights obligations.880
Moreover, Article 12(1) of the 2008 Return Directive subjects the return
decisions to some formal administrative procedures, according to which,
all return decisions and, if issued, all entry-ban decisions and other decisions on
removal shall be in writing and reasons of fact and law, as well as information
about available legal remedies. In the case of a return decision made against a
third-country national, there are detailed procedural guarantees predicted
further in Article 13(1) of the 2008 EU Return Directive. Referring to this Article,
the individual concerned shall be offered an effective remedy to appeal against
or seek review of decisions related to their return, as referred to in Article 12(1),
before a competent judicial or administrative authority or a competent body,
composed of members who are impartial and who enjoy safeguards of
independence.
876 Ibid, para. 64. Alao, see: N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European
Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Decision (13 February 2020), paras 81 and 82.
877 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a
Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, OJL 77, 23 March 2016,
pp. 1-52 (referred to as ‘the 2016 Schengen Borders Code’).
878 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on common standards and
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJL 348, 24
December 2008, pp. 98-107 (referred to as ‘the 2008 EU Return Directive’).
879 Ibid, paras 8, 9, and 12.
880 Ibid, Article 1.
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Article 13(2) of the 2008 EU Return Directive continues that the authority or
body mentioned in paragraph 1 shall have the power to review decisions related
to return, as referred to in Article 12(1), including the possibility of suspending
their enforcement, unless a temporary suspension is already applicable under
the national legislation. In addition, according to subparagraphs 3 and 4 of the
same Article, the third-country national concerned shall have the possibility to
obtain legal advice, legal representation, and wherever necessary, linguistic
assistance. Furthermore, Member States shall ensure that the necessary
linguistic and legal assistance and/or representation is available to the returnee
upon their request free of charge and in accordance with relevant national
legislation or rules regarding legal aid.881 Such free legal assistance and/or
representation is, however, subject to conditions, as set out in Articles 19-21
under Chapter II of the 2013 EU Asylum Procedures Directive.882
As explained in Chapter 4 on the matter of interpreting secondary sources of EU
law, we should refer to the jurisprudence of the CJEU.883 This Court, in the case
of Khaled Boudjlida v. Préfet des Pyrénées-Atlantiques (case C-249/13), on the
interpretation of the provisions of the 2008 EU Directive established that
returnees have a ‘right to be heard’ before a competent judicial or administrative
authority or a competent body composed of members who are impartial and
enjoy safeguards of independence.884 In this case, the CJEU ruled that the aliens
must have an opportunity to present their arguments against their removal from
the EU even though the 2008 EU Return Directive does not explicitly provide
returnees with a ‘right to be heard.’885 This decision was derived contextually
from other parts of EU law – most importantly Articles 41, 47, and 48 of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights.886 In this case, the CJEU interpreted that ‘the
right to be heard in the case of expulsion’ encompasses the following elements:
1. Guaranteeing to every person the opportunity to make known his or her
views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the
adoption of any decision affecting his or her interests adversely.887
2. Enabling the competent authority effectively to take into account all
relevant information to pay due attention to the observations submitted by
881 Ibid, Articles 10 and 12.
882 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for
granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), OJL 180, 29 June 2013, p. 60-95 (referred
to as ‘the 2013 EU Asylum Procedures Directive’).
883 In this regard, see Section 4.2 under Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
884 Case C‑249/13, Khaled Boudjlida v. Préfet des Pyrénées-Atlantiques, Judgement of the Court (Fifth
Chamber), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2431, 11 December 2014, paras 28-35.
885 Ibid, paras 28-36.
886 Ibid, paras 31 and 39.
887 Ibid, para. 36.
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the person concerned, and thus to give a detailed statement of reasons for
its decision.888
Thereafter, the ECtHR in the case of Khlaifia and Others v. Italy verified the
opinion of the CJEU and adhered to the practice of this Court as established in
the case of Khaled Boudjlida v. Préfet des Pyrénées-Atlantiques.889 In the case
of Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, the ECtHR employed the interpretation of the
CJEU on the right to be heard in the cases of summary expulsions. However, the
ECtHR put an exceptional condition on when the failure of a Member States to
comply with this right would result in annulment of the return decision. This
condition is that only if it were not because of this infringement, the outcome of
the procedure would have been different.890 Accordingly, the ECtHR has
recognised in Khlaifia and Others v. Italy that the right to be heard could be
subjected to restrictions, provided that these restrictions corresponded to the
objectives of general interests and did not involve, with regard to the objective
pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringed the
very substance of the right guaranteed.891
The ECtHR, in the case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain (Chamber Judgement of 2017),
has defined collective expulsion as, ‘any measure compelling aliens, as a group,
to leave a country, except where such a measure is taken on the basis of a
reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual
alien of the group.’892 This definition is based on the existing jurisprudence of
the Court, as provided in the 2014 case of Georgia v. Russia (I)893 and the 2016
case of Khlaifia and Others v. Italy.894 However, it is noticeable that the Court,
in the case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, gives the weight not only to the issuance
of the expulsion orders, but also to the execution of these orders, as they play a
determining role in deciding on the compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4
of the Convention.895
888 Ibid, paras 37-40.
889 Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, Application No. 16483/12, European Court of Human Rights, Grand
Chamber, Decision (15 December 2016), paras 42-45.
890 Ibid, paras 42-44.
891 Ibid, paras 44 and 45.
892 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Judgment (3 October 2017), para. 98.
893 Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber,
Judgment on merits (3 July 2014), para. 167.
894 Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, Application No. 16483/12, European Court of Human Rights, Grand
Chamber, Decision (15 December 2016), paras 237-239.
895 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Judgment (3 October 2017), para. 98. In this regard, also see Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No.
13255/07, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Judgment on merits (3 July 2014), para.
167.
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With regard to the practice of the mass or collective expulsion of immigrants,
the International Law Commission (ILC) issued the Draft Articles on the
Expulsion of Aliens, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2014,
additionally providing international law standards.896 Despite being a soft-law
amongst the sources of international law, this document plays an important role
in understanding the practice of mass expulsion by defining terms and
interpreting them, and through setting some standards at international level
based on the recognised norms and rules of international human rights law. The
ILC Draft Articles define the term ‘expulsion’ as, ‘a formal act or conduct
attributable to a State, by which an individual is compelled to leave the territory
of that State.’897 In addition, the term ‘alien’ is defined as, ‘an individual, who
does not have the nationality of the State, in whose territory that individual, is
present.’898 In other words, aliens are those non-nationals existing or residing
within the territory of the State regardless of the legality of their residency.
The ILC Draft Articles recognises the State’s right to expel aliens based on the
principle of State sovereignty. However, according to this document, the
expulsion of an alien must be based on a ‘ground, which is explicitly provided by
the law.’899 The decision about these expulsions must be taken in ‘good faith’ and
with respect for human dignity, and should be as reasonable as possible, in the
light of all the circumstances of the case and by considering all the available
relevant facts.900 This individual consideration of the case must also include
assessing the existence of any risk against the life and other basic and
fundamental human rights of individuals upon return, while complying with the
rules of international law and the obligations of the State under this field of
law.901
The ILC Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens has also regulated against the
practice of collective or mass expulsion by explicitly prohibiting it. According to
this document, the expulsion of members of a group is possible only and only
after the individual assessment of the case for each member of the group.902 As
mentioned above, the ILC Draft Articles corresponds and juxtaposes the right of
896 Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, adopted by the International Law Commission at its sixty-
sixth session in 2014, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report
covering the work of that session (A/69/10).
897 Ibid, Article 2(a).
898 Ibid, Article 2(b).
899 Ibid, Articles 4 and 5.
900 Ibid, Article 5(3).
901 Ibid, Articles 5(4), 6, 7, and their commentaries in Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, adopted
by the International Law Commission at its sixty-sixth session in 2014, and submitted to the General
Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/69/10).
902 Ibid, Article 9 and its commentary in the Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, adopted by the
International Law Commission at its sixty-sixth session in 2014, and submitted to the General Assembly
as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/69/10).
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States to expel non-nationals against the duty of State to respect for human
dignity and the basic and fundamental human rights of the aliens subjected to
expulsion. Therefore, all individuals, who are subjected to an expulsion decision,
shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person at all stages of the expulsion and return process. Now, we should
determine what the basic and fundamental human rights are for those aliens
subjected to an expulsion decision. These rights encompass a range of both
‘substantial and procedural human rights,’ which are all recognised in
international human rights law, including the prohibition of torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, respect for the right to life, the
right to a fair trial, and the right to an effective remedy in situations where these
rights are violated.
That is why, following his visit to Melilla and Madrid in 2015, to address the
issues of irregular migration and mass expulsion of aliens, Mr. Nils Muižnieks,
the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, admitted that
migration for sure is a very complex and multi-faceted issue, which requires a
swift and concrete response from the EU. However, the Commissioner
emphasised that this fact did not exempt individual European States from their
human rights obligations.903 In other words, although the European States have
the right to establish their own immigration and border management policies,
they should, simultaneously, be aware of their international and European
human rights responsibilities and uphold them, especially those normative
obligations established under the ECHR and the 1951 Refugee Convention.904
Regarding the practice of pushbacks of immigrants by EU States from the
external Schengen borders, the Commissioner asserted that, ‘pushbacks must
stop and should be replaced by a practice, which reconciles border control and
human rights.’ According to the Commissioner, this is not ‘mission impossible,’
considering the fact that migration flows in Melilla currently remain at a
manageable level.905
By referring to the facts of the case in N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, the Court at the
Chamber level pointed that the expulsion of applicants was in absence of any
prior administrative or judicial decisions, and at no stages of the removal (from
arrest to deportation) the applicants were given the chance to access any
administrative or judiciary procedures. Moreover, the absence of any
903 Third party intervention by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights under Article 36,
para. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Applications No. 8675/15 and No. 8697/15 N.D.
v. Spain and N.T. v. Spain. CoE Doc No. CommDH (2018)11, 22 March 2018, paras 11 and 12.
904 Ibid, para. 12.
905 Ibid, para. 11.
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registration or identification procedures by the Spanish border authorities
showed that the personal circumstances of the applicants had not been taken
individually into account.906
In the light of these circumstances, the Court at the Chamber instance
considered that the removal procedures, followed by the arrest of the applicants,
proved the collective nature of expulsions performed in this case; therefore, a
violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 of the ECHR was found. Even though the
Court at the Chamber level ruled on the violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4,
Judge Dedov of the Russian Federation in his partly dissenting opinion
criticised the Chamber’s judgement, in the following manner:
I have just one concern as regards this case and numerous other similar cases
examined by the Court, namely the fact that the Court, in a situation of unlawful
conduct or even violence, maintains (albeit not in all cases) the high standards it
requires of the authorities. I can imagine how shocked the Spanish border guards
must have been by this invasion, during which the applicants, together with
numerous other migrants, launched an assault on the border. We think that State
agents should remain calm and impartial in all circumstances because they are
trained to deal with any “standard” situation. But they are people like you and I who
have emotions; they also deserve our respect, and we should take that into
consideration. We should therefore ask ourselves who was in the more vulnerable
position in the present case.907 [Emphasis added.]
Thereafter, at the Grand Chamber level, the French, Italian, and Belgian
Governments joined the case by providing legal support for Spain, as third-party
interveners in the appeal instance. The reasoning forwarded and submitted by
these Governments could be summarised as the following:
1. Self-defence on the side of Spain and on behalf of the EU to
protect the safety and security of Europe:908 Spain has acted
completely legally in this case according to Article 51 of the UN Charter,
which articulates States’ inherent right of ‘individual or collective self-
defence’ if an armed attack occurs against a Member State. Accordingly,
‘nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
906 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Judgment (3 October 2017), para. 107
907 Ibid, The partly dissenting opinion of Judge Dedov annexed to the Judgement.
908 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Grand Chamber Decision (13 February 2020), paras 60 and 126.
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shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.’909
2. No expulsion, but prevention of illegal entry: The applicants could
have entered Spain lawfully. They could have submitted asylum
applications at the Spanish Embassy or at the Spanish Consulates located
in, for example, Morocco or in the transit countries through which they
had travelled. Alternatively, they could have applied for asylum at the
authorised border crossing point at Beni Enzar or could have secured
contracts to work in Spain and obtain work permits from their countries
of origin.910
3. Expulsion as the result of illegal conduct of the applicant: In the
Government’s opinion, there was no violation of the provisions of the
Convention, where the lack of an individual expulsion decision was
attributed to the ‘culpable conduct’ of the person concerned.911
With regard to the first and the second reasoning, the Government of Spain
asserted that, the whole idea behind constructing the three-layer fences at the
border between Morocco and Melilla was to comply with Article 13 of the 2016
Schengen Borders Code on border surveillance. According to this Article, the
main purpose of border surveillance at the EU external borders shall be to
‘prevent unauthorised border crossings, to counter cross-border criminality,
and to take measures against those who have managed to cross EU external
borders illegally.’ In addition, Article 13(1) of the same piece of legislation gives
a discretion to Member States to apprehend (meaning arrest and detain) those
who have crossed EU external borders illegally or those staying in the EU
territory with no legal grounds, and to expel them following the rules and
procedures of the 2008 EU Return Directive. On the merits of Article 4 of
Protocol No. 4, Spain referred to the Convention as a living instrument,
accepting that within the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, it had been established to
interpret the Convention in a dynamic and evolutionary manner to give a
practical and effective, and not just a theoretical or illusory effect to the
Convention.912
909 Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, Article 51.
910 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Grand Chamber, Decision (13 February 2020), paras 129-132.
911 Ibid, para. 134.
912 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Judgment of the third section of Chamber (3 October 2017), para. 69.
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On the other hand, the Government argued that the dynamic and evolutionary
interpretation should not create new rights, which have not been the initial
intent of legislators.913 Therefore, in their view, the intent of the creators of the
Convention was not to create a right to enter the territory of Member States
‘illegally’ by breaking the rules of European immigration law. In fact, according
to the Spanish Government, the applicants had a chance to apply for asylum in
the countries of transit. For example, they could have visited the Spanish
Consulate in Mauritania or could have lodged an asylum application at the
authorised border posts in Beni Ansar (a Moroccan border town adjacent to
Melilla). Alternatively, if not applying for asylum, the applicants could have
searched for a job in Spain directly from their countries of origin, then secured
a working contract, and consequently obtained a work permit to enter Spain
legally and reside lawfully under the protection of law.914
Therefore, based on the arguments of the Government of Spain, there is no such
a thing as a right to enter Europe without undergoing checks at the EU external
borders. Interpreting the Convention in this way, according to Spain and other
intervening States, is counter-intuitive, as not only it would be against the
security interests and safety of EU citizens, but it risks the safety and human
rights of immigrants by feeding huge monetary profit to international organised
criminals such as human smuggling and trafficking cartels. The representatives
of the Government of Spain, in the case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, used
interesting terminology, namely the ‘suction effect’ or the ‘reverse effect.’ These
expressions means that by allowing people to arrive in Europe through unlawful
channels and by breaking the border protection system, we are indirectly
causing the violation of human rights by creating a migratory crisis. This
situation is a humanitarian challenge with devastating consequences for
protecting the human rights of both illegal immigrants and European
residents.915
The Government even made a use of the primary sources of EU law in resting its
point. In this regard, Article 72 of the TFEU stipulates that, asylum and
immigration policies, as well as the border control policies of EU Member States
must not have a negative impact on the maintenance of ‘order’ and ‘the rule of
law,’ or should not compromise the ‘internal security of Europe.’ Therefore, the
Government believes that, if the ECtHR rules in favour of the applicants, it is
legitimising the illegal act of breaching the rules of EU on border protection and
EU immigration law. This will endanger the rule of law and the protection of
security in Europe by showing a green light to non-Europeans or third-country
913 Ibid, paras 69 and 73.
914 Ibid, paras 68-79.
915 Ibid, paras 68-79.
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nationals to invade the rule of law in Europe and to feel free to violate its
immigration and border-control law.
With regard to the third reasoning, the Spanish Government accepted that the
whole idea behind Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 was to prevent States from being
able to remove a group of aliens from their territories, without examining their
personal circumstances and therefore, without enabling them to submit their
arguments against the measures taken by the relevant authority.916 However, the
Court has found no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, where the lack of an
individual expulsion decision could be attributed to the faulty and reprehensible
conduct, i.e. the ‘culpable conduct,’ of the person concerned.917 The ‘culpable
conduct’ argument has been supported by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in the
earlier cases of Dzavit Berisha and Baljie Haljiti v. the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia918 and Dritsas and Others v. Italy.919
In the case of Berisha and Haljiti v. the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, the applicants themselves had submitted a joint asylum procedure
together; therefore, they received a single common decision on their joint
application. The ECtHR, in this case, ruled that the fact that the national
authorities had issued a single decision for both of the applicants as spouses was
a consequence of the applicants’ own conduct. The applicants had arrived
together in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, thereafter, submitted
one single asylum application together for both of them (and on the exact same
grounds), produced the same evidence to support their allegations, and finally,
lodged joint appeals before the Government Appeal Commission and the
Supreme Court of Macedonia. Hence, the authorities had no other choice other
than to evaluate the risks associated with expulsion for both of the applicants
jointly. In the light of these facts, the Court concluded that, the deportation of
the applicants did not fulfil an instance of collective expulsion within the ambit
of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 of the ECHR.920
916 Ibid, para. 99. Also see: Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09, European Court
of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Decision (23 February 2012), para. 177. In this regard, also see:
Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, Application No. 16643/09, European Court of Human Rights,
Judgement (21 October 2014), para. 210.
917 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Grand Chamber, Decision (13 February 2020), para. 134.
918 Dzavit Berisha and Baljie Haljiti v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application No.
18670/03, European Court of Human Rights, Partial Decision as to the Admissibility (16 June 2005).
919 Dritsas and Others v. Italy, Application No. 2344/02, European Court of Human Rights, Chamber
Decision on the Admissibility (1 February 2011).
920 Dzavit Berisha and Baljie Haljiti v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application No.
18670/03, European Court of Human Rights, Partial Decision as to the Admissibility (16 June 2005),
para. 2.
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Similarly, in the case of Dritsas and Others v. Italy, the applicants failed to
provide any identification papers, which the police and the Court had requested
on several occasions. Due to the lack of identity papers, the authorities were
unable to find the expulsion orders issued under the applicants’ names, and
hence, the ECtHR declared the application manifestly ill-founded and therefore,
inadmissible.921
At the Grand Chamber level addressing the case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, the
ECtHR judges agreed with the second and the third reasoning of the Spanish
Government, and accordingly found no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4
of the Convention. The restatement of the Court’s reasoning could be
summarised as the following:
1. First, Spanish law has afforded the applicants with several possible
means of seeking legal admission to the national territory, either by
applying for a visa or by applying for international protection, in
particular at the Beni Enzar border crossing point, but also at Spain’s
diplomatic and consular representations in their countries of origin or
countries of transit. However, the applicants have not resorted to those
available legal means.922
2. Second, the applicants had, in fact, placed themselves in jeopardy by
participating in the storming of the Melilla border fences in an en mass
manner arrival on 13 August 2014, taking advantage of the group’s large
number and by using force. Therefore, the collective expulsion is the
inevitable result of the applicants’ own ‘culpable act,’ and the Government
of Spain could not be held responsible for that.923
In addition to the final decision of the Court, two separate opinions were
attached to the judgement of the Grand Chamber in the case of N.D. and N.T. v.
Spain (2020). The first one was a concurring opinion, belonging to Judge
Pejchal of the Czech Republic, in which, while agreeing with the final decision
of the Court, he vigorously opposed the fact that the case was declared
admissible in the first place, and that it even had the chance to be addressed by
the ECtHR at the Grand Chamber level. In his words:
[C]onsiderable doubts remain for me as to whether the Grand Chamber should
have dealt with this case at all. In particular, I have doubts as to whether in this case
921 Dritsas and Others v. Italy, Application No. 2344/02, European Court of Human Rights, Chamber
Decision on the Admissibility (1 February 2011). Factsheet on Collective Expulsion of Aliens issued by
the Press Unit of the European Court of Human Rights, March 2020, p. 7.
922 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, European Court of Human Rights,
Grand Chamber Judgement (13 February 2020), paras 212-220.
923 Ibid, paras 206-208.
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it was fair to the community of free citizens living in the Council of Europe member
States for an international court to order a hearing on which it expended
considerable financial resources, entrusted to it by the High Contracting Parties for
the pursuit of justice.924
The second separate opinion belonged to Judge Koskelo of Finland. In her partly
dissenting opinion annexed to the ECtHR judgment in the case of N.D. and N.T.
v. Spain (the Grand Chamber Decision of 2020), Judge Koskelo asserted:
Although the mass influx of migrants and asylum-seekers […] has in recent years
become […], a dominant point of focus around Europe, these developments should
not detract from the fact that other issues and other interests are also relevant in
the context of the powers, which the States Parties must be able to exercise at their
borders. Important issues of national security, the protection of territorial
integrity and public order are at stake as well. I see no justification for
disregarding those matters in the legal analysis solely on the grounds that […] many
of the aliens turning up at the border may be persons wishing to claim international
protection. In my view, it amounts to a distortion of perspective to view the latter
scenario as the only one deserving attention and consideration, and to overlook the
legitimate need for States Parties to prevent and refuse […] the entry into their
jurisdiction of aliens aiming to cross their external borders with known hostile
intentions or posing known threats to national security.925 [Emphasis
added]
As it can be read clearly in the opinion of Judge Koskelo, the national security
concerns of European States must prevail over their human rights obligations
towards asylum seekers and the respect for the right to seek asylum. It seems
that Judge Koskelo does not agree with the ECtHR in not including explicitly the
national security concerns of the States in the Court’s assessment of the case
with regard to the alleged violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 of the
Convention. This opinion is very much in line with the approach of the
Government of Spain and other intervening States in their submissions to the
Court on the securitisation of immigration through conceptualising national
security as a ‘meta-right.’ As mentioned above, the Government of Spain
submitted that if the ECtHR ruled in favour of the applicants, this ruling would
legitimise the illegal act of breaching EU law on border control, which would
result in endangering the rule of law and the protection of national security in
Europe. Based on this line of argument, the right to security for the European
community is considered a ‘meta-right,’ to which the ECtHR supposedly had to
commit itself in its ruling. On theorising a ‘meta-right to security,’ Liora Lazarus
924 Ibid, para. 1. The concurring opinion of Judge Pejchal annexed to the ECtHR’s judgement in the case
of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain (2020).
925 Ibid, para. 25. The partly dissenting opinion of Judge Koskelo annexed to the judgment in the case of
N.D. and N.T. v. Spain (2020).
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has based her analysis of the ‘right to security as a human right’ on the idea of
the Hobbesian theory of ‘security as a meta-right.’926 In this regard, she argues
that the importance of security, in fact, led to the formation of the theory of
‘social contract’ and the need of human societies for an ‘absolute power of
sovereign’ and the formation of an indivisible government.927
In Hobbes’ opinion, in order to safeguard security for all the members of society,
we need a robust ‘sovereign power.’ This is how Hobbes has legitimised the
control of sovereign power over the destiny of human subjects in a society, a
sovereign power that he has called the ‘Common Power’ or the ‘Leviathan.’928 In
Hobbes’ words:
For the Laws of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, …) […], without the
terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturalle
Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants,
without the Sword, are but Words, and of not strength to secure a man at all.
Therefore, notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, […] if there be no Power erected,
or not great enough for our security, every man will and may lawfully rely on his
own strength and art, for caution against all other men.929
What we should keep in mind here with regard to Hobbes’ opinion on security
is that the English Civil War of the seventeenth century and the cruelties that
Hobbes witnessed himself first-hand had made him form such a staunch
opinion over the necessity of having a powerful, iron fist government – even if
this government tends to grow towards tyranny. Hobbes even further
exxagerrated the importance of security. To him, security and maintaining peace
and order in society is far more important than protecting individual freedoms
and liberties.930 He continued that liberties bring ‘civil disputes,’ which at the
end threatens ‘security’ and ‘stability’ in human societies.931 Therefore, to
Hobbes, there is an inherent conflict between protecting individual rights and
freedoms as opposed to safeguarding the security of sovereign power and public
order. In this regard, he strongly believed that the preference should definitely
go to the latter.
As opposed to Hobbes, John Locke – the English philosopher of a similar era as
Hobbes – believed that security should not prevail over liberties. In Locke’s
assertion, Hobbes’ conception of security was counter-intuitive, because to
926 Liora Lazarus, ‘The Right to Security’, in Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao, and Massimo Renzo (eds),
Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 423-441.
927 Ibid, p. 425.
928 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Minneapolis: First Avenue Editions, 2018), pp. 160-162.
929 Ibid, pp. 156 and 157.
930 Ibid, pp. 167-170, 172, and 173.
931 Ibid, pp. 173 and 174.
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Locke, the idea of prevailing the security of sovereign power over individual
freedoms and liberties would threaten the security of people itself. Locke was of
the opinion that all human beings are equal in the enjoyment of their natural
rights to life, liberty, security, and property, all of which he referred to as the
‘Properties of Men.’932 Hence, opposite to Hobbes, Locke regarded the absolute
power of sovereign to be the greatest danger and an obstacle to human security.
In the intellectual history of thoughts in the aftermath of Hobbes and Locke, Sir
William Blackstone at the end of the nineteenth century agreed with the idea
that the need for security is ‘intrinsic to human nature.’933 Like his predecessors,
Blackstone believed that security was the prize we earned by entering a social
and political community – agreeing with the Hobbesian theory of ‘social
contract’ – and hence, giving up on parts of our individual liberties and
freedoms.934 However, in addressing the concept of security, Blackstone uses the
language of ‘rights’ and employs the phrase of ‘the right to security.’ Blackstone’s
conception of the right to security is closer to Locke’s opinion on the parallel
position of security with enjoying one’s freedoms and liberties. In fact, to
Blackstone, the right to security is a ‘right to personal security,’ which regards
the State, as the responsibility holder, not the benefactor.935 To quote Blackstone
on this matter:
The principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those
absolute rights, which were vested in them by immutable laws of nature, but which
could not be preserved in peace, without the mutual assistance and intercourse of
social communities. The primary end of human laws is to maintain and regulate
these absolute rights of individuals. Such rights as are social and relative, result
from the formation of states and societies, so that to maintain them is clearly a
subsequent consideration. Therefore, the principal object of human laws should be
to explain, protect and enforce such rights as are absolute, which in themselves are
few and simple.936
Following Blackstone, the contemporary legal philosopher Henry Shue has
developed the discussion on the right to security as a ‘basic right.’ Basic rights,
in Shue’s definition, are ‘those rights, enjoying of which is a requirement for
enjoying every other rights.’937 According to Shue, the right to security is a ‘line
932 John Locke, ‘Two Treatises of Government’, in Peter Laslett (ed.), Cambridge Texts in the History of
Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 330-334.
933 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Saint Paul: West Publishing Company,
1897), p. 40.
934 Ibid, p. 38.
935 Ibid, pp. 38 and 39.
936 Ibid, p. 38.
937 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996), pp. 19 and 20.
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beneath which no one is allowed to sink,’ for the reason that this right provides
some ‘minimal protection against utter helplessness to those too weak to protect
themselves.’938
Notwithstanding the evolution of the concept of security as a right or a meta-
right, or as a basic right, what we should keep in mind here is that safeguarding
the national security of the EU Member States and the internal security of the
EU has become too heavily intertwined with external Schengen border control
and restricting immigration to the EU. In this regard, in order to control and
manage immigration, the Council of Europe Member States and the EU
countries have concentrated particularly on guarding frontiers. It seems that the
political philosophy of the EU with regard to the right to seek asylum is frozen
deeply in the seventeenth century ideas of Hobbes on the security of sovereign
power and its prevalence over individuals’ rights and freedoms. In this context,
the refusal of entry and expulsion without any individual assessment of asylum
claims have become a norm at the EU external borders as well as in the territory
of many EU Member States. As these practices are widespread, and in some
countries even systematic, it would be feasible to claim that these practices, also
known as ‘pushbacks’, are an integral part of EU and national-level policies,
rather than just merely some random, exceptional, or incidental actions. The
highest risk associated with these practices is violating the principle of non-
refoulement, as not only a customary norm of international law, but also as a
primary rule of EU law and the law of the Council of Europe.
The collective expulsion of immigrants together with other forms of pushbacks
at the EU external borders again rings the alarm that continuing with these
practices or similar might eventually lead to the point that we consider the very
basic and fundamental human rights of ‘others,’ such as the right to seek asylum,
irrelevant or absolutely unnecessary. Besides, the exclusion of asylum seekers
from the ‘Empire of Law’ is in breach of the principle of non-discrimination.
Here is where the fallacy of the ECtHR Grand Chamber decision in the case of
N.D. and N.T. v. Spain (2020) is exposed. The Court ruled that the Government
of Spain could not be held responsible for the en masse inflow of immigrants to
the border fences. The judges should be pose with this question that why they
chose to ignore the fact that the construction of life-threatening and hazardous
border infrastructures between Morocco and Melilla is a direct result of
discriminatory non-entrée policies of Spain and the EU. Are not these extremely
dangerous and inhuman border policies of the EU and its Member States in
direct violation of their non-refoulement and non-discrimination duties with
regard to the right to seek asylum?
938 Ibid, pp. 18 and 19.
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This premise brings me to the final discussion in my dissertation in the following
part (Subsection 6.3.2), in which I will show how the securitisation of
immigration in EU law and practice has made human beings ‘illegal.’ An
inevitable consequence of this process is again making the right to seek asylum
void and meaningless. Therefore, we need to take this right more seriously by
respecting the inviolable core of this right. That is why I consider the right to
seek asylum to be the same as the Arendtian idea of ‘the right to have rights.’
6.3.2. THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM AS THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS
As discussed in Chapter 3, the term ‘security’ is inherently a vague and
ambiguous concept denoting different meanings depending on the context
within which it is applied. Similarly, when it comes to the notion of ‘national
security,’ no definition has been offered in any statutes or constitutions; hence,
when this term is used in the context of immigration, one possibility is to agree
on its meaning as the safety and security of all citizens as a collective right.
Notwithstanding the importance of national security in the context of
immigration, this term has sometimes been used as a ‘façade’ or as an ‘excuse’
for violating the individual rights and not applying the responsibility of states
towards immigrants with regard to due diligence and due process of law as
established under the rule of law.
In the context of counterterrorism and its effects on immigrants’ basic and
fundamental human rights, we need to remember that tackling terrorism is no
longer a matter of one country; terrorism is, indeed, a universal threat. These
days, terrorism knows no boundaries – physical borders or sovereign territories.
Terrorists nowadays are active in the cyber World; they spread their ideologies
through online communications and interactions where physical State borders
provide no barrier to impede their activities. Therefore, the international
community should come together and collaborate on countering terrorism
without putting unnecessary pressure on physical borders or by violating the
very foundations upon which the human rights protection system is based –
such as the principle of non-refoulement.
It is entirely understandable from a social psychology point of view that
whenever a catastrophic incident such as the 9/11 attacks or the 2015-2016
chains of terrorist attacks occur and people get hurt, we naturally become
outraged and seek a scapegoat to blame.939 This kind of mentality and state of
mind affect our ability to think logically, which eventually may lead us to make
939 Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Tobias Kelly, ‘Introduction’, in Marie-Benedicte Dembour, Tobias
Kelly (eds), Are Human Rights for Migrants?: Critical Reflections on the Status of Irregular Migrants
in Europe and the United States (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 1-22, pp. 21 and 22.
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decisions based on hatred, bias, and prejudice. One example of this process of
thinking is the securitisation of immigration. In addition to the negative and
destructive implications that this phenomena has on the right to seek asylum, a
more fundamental effect of this speech-act process is that humans are thrown
outside the protection of the ‘Law’s Empire;’940 and therefore, their very legal
and social existence as human beings becomes nullified in the eyes of the law.
This claim is based on Hannah Arendt’s ground-breaking theory of ‘the right to
have rights.’941 In other words, according to Arendt, just being born as a human,
per se, is not enough to enjoy human rights. This is entirely the opposite of what
the preamble and Article 1 of the 1948 UDHR have respectively promised, as
follows:
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice
and peace in the world’.942 [Emphasis added] and,
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.’943 [Emphasis
added]
As an anthropologist specialised in immigration trying to understand Arendtian
idea of ‘the right to have rights,’ Shahram Khosravi has formulated that the gap
between the rights written on papers and the rights implemented in reality, is
attributable to the ‘abstractedness’ of the law. According to him, we can only be
sure that rights are available at an abstract level by including them in
international conventions and declarations, but they are ‘inaccessible’ in reality
for many of those who are truly in need of them such as asylum seekers and
other undocumented immigrants.944 Khosravi, in this regard, strongly agrees
with Hannah Arendt that the reason for the abstractedness of the law is that the
very existence, the manifestation, the realisation, and the materialisation of law
all depend on the modern system of ‘nation-states.’945
In this regard similarly, the contemporary cultural anthropologist Nasir Uddin
argues that the persecution of the Rohingya people in Myanmar and elsewhere
is not just, because they are non-citizens, but it is precisely because the
940 I have borrowed this phrase from the title of Dworkin’s book ‘Law’s Empire’ first published in 1986.
941 Hannah Arendt formulated this theory for the first time in an article published in the German
language in 1949, entitled ‘The Rights of Man: What are They?’. Later on, this essay became Chapter 9
in the book published in 1951 in the English language: Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism
(Orlando: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979), pp. 267-302.
942 Preamble of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
943 Ibid, Article 1.
944 Shahram Khosravi, ‘Illegal’ Traveller: An Auto-Ethnography of Borders (Basingstoke, Hampshire;
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 121.
945 Ibid, p. 122. In this regard, also see: Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Orlando:
Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979), pp. 267-302.
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exclusionary policy of the main framework of nation-states reduces this group
of people to a status lesser than that of human beings.946 Thereafter, Professor
Uddin by following the literature available within the field of comparative
genocide studies proposes using the notion of ‘sub-human’ (or ‘non-human’ or
‘de-human’) for theorising the failure of legal systems created by nation-states
to provide human rights to all human beings.947 The inevitable consequence of
this dependency is that in order for us to enjoy human rights – in reality – being
born as a human, per se, no longer suffices. Whereas in fact, the individual must
be attached or belong to a certain ‘political community’ known as the ‘nation-
state.’ The umbilical cord attaching a human being to a State is called
‘citizenship’ as if there is nothing more natural for human beings than belonging
to a nation-state. Perhaps that is why the technical term for the acquisition of
citizenship through application is naturalisation and reversely, the loss of
citizenship or losing of one’s nationality is denaturalisation.948 In this regard,
Professor Khosravi asserts:
Citizenship has become the nature [essence] of being human. Being outside the
realm of citizenship means being outside nature. In the condition of statelessness,
in the absence of citizenship, one becomes dehumanized (unnatural) and can be
exposed to necropolitics – violence and death. Throughout the twentieth century,
many nations and groups have been subjected to this dehumanization politics.949
On this basis, the problem with the lack of enjoyment of human rights by asylum
seekers, refugees, stateless people, and undocumented immigrants (all of whom
are categorised as ‘forced migrants’) is that either de jure, or de jure and de
facto, these people have lost their umbilical cord with a nation-state. Although
the phrase ‘the right to have rights’ was first introduced by Arendt in 1949, she
did not provide much of elaboration on the meaning or on the exact instances of
this phrase.950 However, she offered a sparse definition in the ninth chapter of
her most prominent scholarly work, meaning ‘The Origins of Totalitarianism,’
946 Nasir Uddin, The Rohingya: An Ethnography of ‘Subhuman’ Life (New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2020).
947 Ibid, pp. 1-26 and 135-194. Also, see: Nasir Uddin, ‘State of Stateless People: The Plight of Rohingya
Refugees in Bangladesh’, in Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann and Margaret Walton-Roberts (eds), The
Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2015), pp. 62-77.
948 Shahram Khosravi, ‘Illegal’ Traveller: An Auto-Ethnography of Borders (Basingstoke, Hampshire;
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 122. Also, see: Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, ‘Introduction:
The Human Right to Citizenship’, in Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann and Margaret Walton-Roberts (eds),
The Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2015), pp. 1-18.
949 Shahram Khosravi, ‘Illegal’ Traveller: An Auto-Ethnography of Borders (Basingstoke, Hampshire;
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 122.
950 Stephanie DeGooyer, Alastair Hunt, Lida Maxwell, and Samuel Moyn, The Right to Have Rights
(London; New York: Verso, 2018), p. 5.
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which was published first in 1951.951 By referring to this source, the mere fact of
being a human is not enough to enjoy human rights; whereas, the membership
of a ‘political community’ is necessary.952 According to Arendt, we become aware
of the existence and the importance of ‘the right to have rights’ only after a group
of people have lost their membership of an organised political community
because of the ‘new global political situation.’953 The real problem with this loss
of membership is not any lack of civilisation or the ruling of tyranny, but instead,
the problem lies deeply within the ‘new global political changes.’ These changes
include the fact that no places are left in the World ‘uncivilised’ – whether we
like it or not, we have really started to live in ‘One World.’954
In Arendt’s opinion, humans are not born equals; though, we become equals as
members of a community on the strength of our decision to guarantee mutually
equal rights to every member of that community. In this regard, Arendt
continues that our political lives rest on the assumption that we could create and
guarantee each other equality through organisation because we are able to act
together and to build a common World only if we are equals.955
The right to have rights, while certainly being Arendt’s critique of the
implementation of human rights, not only amplifies the insufficiency of
institutional and legal mechanisms in protecting human rights for all in reality,
but it also sheds light on the theoretical foundations of liberal democracies such
as ‘equality’ and ‘inherent dignity’ of all human beings.956 In Arendt’s words:
The incredible plight of an ever-growing group of innocent people was like a
practical demonstration of the totalitarian movements’ cynical claims that no such
thing as inalienable human rights existed and that the affirmations of the
democracies to the contrary were mere prejudice, hypocrisy, and cowardice in the
face of the cruel majesty of a new world.957
That is why, to me, the right to seek asylum could be possibly viewed as Arendt’s
notion of ‘the right to have rights.’958 While by using this phrase, Arendt meant
the right to have or to hold a citizenship, it is my firm conviction that without
the realisation of the right to seek asylum in the case of forced immigrants, no
enjoyment of other basic and fundamental human rights or even becoming a
951 The title of the ninth chapter of this book is ‘The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights
of Man’. In this regard, see: Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Orlando: Harcourt Brace
& Company, 1979), pp. 267-302.
952 Ibid, pp. 293-297.
953 Ibid, pp. 296 and 297.
954 Ibid, p. 297.
955 Ibid, p. 301.
956 Stephanie DeGooyer, Alastair Hunt, Lida Maxwell, and Samuel Moyn, The Right to Have Rights
(London; New York: Verso, 2018), p. 4.
957 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Orlando: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979), p. 269.
958 Ibid, pp. 267-302.
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citizen is imaginable. The right to seek asylum is, indeed, a pertinent and the
first step in establishing the citizenship link between an individual and a
nation-state, without which other legal rights attached to citizenship are
neither feasible in a legal or factual sense.
Continuing Arendt’s endeavour on understanding the foundations of human
rights especially the equality of human dignity, the contemporary philosopher
Seyla Benhabib borrowed Kant’s conception of natural law, asserting that, ‘since
we are born to [the] human species as free and rational agents, human dignity
and its equality could feasibly be claimed to be the “moral foundation” of human
rights.’959 However, in order to enjoy these rights, Benhabib agrees with Arendt
that we definitely need to belong to a political community.960 While this political
community as formulated by Arendt to be the membership of a nation-state in
the form of upholding full citizenship (the right to have rights),961 to Benhabib,
in contemporary World politics, we need to move beyond the notion of national
citizenship.962 According to the latter, in order to safeguard human rights for all
individuals, in addition to national institutions such as national citizenship,
international organisations are of utmost importance through the membership
in the World political community – known as the ‘cosmopolitan federalism.’963
What Benhabib means by ‘cosmopolitan federalism’ follows here:
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948, the
world has entered a phase in the evolution of global civil society, which is
characterized by a transition from international to cosmopolitan norms of justice.
Norms of international justice most commonly arise through treaty obligations and
bilateral or multilateral agreements among states and their representatives. They
regulate relations among states and other principals that are authorized to act as
the agents of states in multiple domains, ranging from trade and commerce to war
and security, the environment, and the media.964
Under the pretext of Benhabib’s version of cosmopolitanism, the power of the
democratic sovereigns or the modern democratic nation-states is legitimised not
only from their own national constitutions, but also from how much they are
959 Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), pp. 36-40.
960 Ibid, p. 58.
961 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Orlando: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979), pp.
296 and 297. Also, see: Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 50 and 51.
962 Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), pp. 67 and 68.
963 Ibid, pp. 176-179.
964 Seyla Benhabib, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of Cosmopolitan Norms’, in Robert Charles Post
(ed.), Seyla Benhabib: Another Cosmopolitanism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 13-
44, pp. 15 and 16.
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acting in accordance with universal human rights norms and standards.965 In
Benhabib’s words:
[The phrase] “[w]e, the people” [in modern democratic constitutions], refers to a
particular human community, circumscribed in space and time, sharing a
particular culture, history, and legacy; yet this people establishes itself as a
democratic body by acting in the name of the “universal”. The tension between
universal human rights claims, and particularistic cultural and national identities,
is constitutive of democratic legitimacy. Modern democracies act in the name of
universal principles, which are then circumscribed within a particular civic
community. This is the “Janus face of the modern nation”, in the words of Jürgen
Habermas (Habermas 1998, 115).966
While Benhabib’s version of cosmopolitanism may solve the question on the
moral foundations of human rights, this theory, however, does not fully dismiss
the problem with the normative foundations of human rights, especially for non-
nationals such as asylum seekers. In fact, Benhabib herself and some
commentators have testified to this problem. In their opinions, the principle of
‘territorial membership’ in the form of ‘residency’ or ‘getting access to the
territory’ of a State for claiming the right to seek asylum is still the underpinning
condition for representation in the World of ‘cosmopolitan federalism.’967 This
precondition makes those who do not have this territorial membership or
territorial accessibility fall outside the reach of human rights protection. This is
exactly the case for asylum seekers denied access to the EU, in spite of the fact
that international and EU law have bound States with regard to the right to seek
asylum.
To elaborate further on this point, I shall refer to Catherine Dauvergne’s
scholarly work addressing the effects of globalisation on various aspects of
immigration law.968 In her work, Dauvergne consciously and deliberately uses
the term ‘illegal,’ when describing undocumented immigrants including asylum
seekers.969 In this regard, she acknowledges that, ‘the term “illegal,” used as a
965 Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), p. 178.
966 Ibid, p. 44.
967 Ibid, pp. 213-221. In this regard, also see: Jeremy Waldron, ‘Cosmopolitan Norms’, in Robert Charles
Post (ed.), Seyla Benhabib: Another Cosmopolitanism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.
83-101, pp. 86, 86, 89, and 90. Also, see: Bonnie Honig, ‘Another Cosmopolitanism? Law and Politics
in the New Europe’, in Robert Charles Post (ed.), Seyla Benhabib: Another Cosmopolitanism (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 102-127, pp. 108-116. Also, see: Garrett Wallace Brown,
Grounding Cosmopolitanism: From Kant to the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2009), pp. 203-208.
968 In this regard, especially see chapter 4 of ‘Making Asylum Illegal.’ Catherine Dauvergne, Making
People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), pp. 50-68.
969 Ibid, pp. 4 and 50-68.
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definer adjective or as an identifier for a certain category of immigrants, while
being the most derogatory term in immigration law, is the most expressive one;
since the term, in itself, directly implicates the “law” and the “exclusionary
power” of the law.’ In continuation, she asserts that, ‘law creates, constructs, and
maintains “illegality,” and it has constantly helped Western states find a simple
and quick answer to the “xenophobic paranoia thrives” since the late twentieth
and the early twenty-first centuries.’970
In Dauvergne’s assertion, illegality and sovereignty have a reciprocal and
parallel relationship, in which one reinforces the other in the way that creating
the category of ‘others’ by law, as ‘illegals,’ is a significant indicator of the
existence of sovereign power and its iron-fisted control over the State territorial
borders.971 In return, when asylum seekers use the language of individual rights
or human rights to claim a legal space against the sovereign power, the process
of securitisation and the language of collective rights of the nation to security
and safety defeat the individual rights’ discourse, compromising the right to seek
asylum in particular.972
Based on these reasons, relying merely on the law and the language of law to
resolve the issue of ‘illegality’ would not resolve the problem, simply because law
is necessarily the arena and forum for creating and sustaining – or for producing
and reproducing – this ‘illegality.’ Without the law, which make people illegal,
illegal people would never exist. The law creates the category of ‘illegal’ people,
and then, it strives so hard to find solutions to deal with these people. Since
‘illegal’ people are exceptions to the ruling law, one possible solution offered by
the legal scholar and advocate of the Nazi regime Carl Schmitt was to make use
of the etymological sense of the term ‘exception’ to normalise keeping ‘illegals’
outside the realm of the law’s kingdom.973 In fact, in his conceptualisation of the
modern theory of constitutional State, Schmitt defined the ‘sovereign’ in an
970 Ibid, p. 4.
971 Ibid, p. 27.
972 Ibid. With regard to the discussion within the Canadian and Australian contexts on the flaws of
securitised immigration law in creating illegals which very much resembles the EU’s discourse on the
matter, see: Catherine Dauvergne, Humanitarianism, Identity, and Nation: Migration Laws of
Australia and Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005), pp. 81-128.
973 Carl Schmitt introduced the theory of ‘state of exception’ within constitutional legal theory in his 1921
essay entitled, ‘On Dictatorship’. Later on, these thoughts built the foundation for the Schmittian theory
of sovereignty in his work published in 1922, i.e. ‘Political Theology’. With regard to Schmitt’s ideas on
the state of exception, see: Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship: From the Origin of the Modern Concept of
Sovereignty to Proletarian Class Struggle, translated by Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Cambridge;
Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2014), pp. 79-111. For further examples on how some current
politicians, not only in Europe, but all around the World, are using the same Schmittian logic of state of
exception in response to catastrophic and challenging events, see: Timothy David Snyder, On Tyranny:
Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2017), p. 100. In this
regard, also see: Masha Gessen, Surviving Autocracy (New York: Riverhead Books, 2020), pp. 9-16.
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indispensable relation to the ‘state of exception,’ and characterised the power to
declare a ‘state of exception’ or as we call it today, a ‘state of emergency’ as the
constituting element of a sovereign’s ruling power.974
Under this scenario, protecting the public from the harms of ‘illegal’ people
creates a state of exception, under the premise that, these ‘illegals’ are creating
a ‘danger to national security,’ and there is therefore, a necessity for
safeguarding the public against them. At this point, the sovereign utilises all its
constitutional power to take control of the exceptional circumstances and to
transform the state of exception into a long lasting or even into a permanent
state of emergency. When a permanent state of emergency lasts for a longer
period, gradually and systematically, the state of exception moulds itself into the
norm and the exceptional rules become the normal ruling law,975 which would
then legitimise any violation of the basic and fundamental rights of those
deemed ‘illegal.’976
In the light of these arguments, the contemporary philosopher Giorgio Agamben
has unfolded Schmittian advocacy for the necessity of existence of tyranny, i.e.
a dictator, a totalitarian regime, or an authoritarian ruler, in declaring a state of
exception for maintaining national security, public order, and the safety of
nation during emergencies.977 Thereafter, Agamben has reflected on how Nazi
Germany benefited from the rationale behind the state of emergency and the
absolute power of the sovereign to decide on that, in order to legitimise the
creation of camps as a necessary space, created by and within law to deal with
the ‘problem of undesired illegals.’978
Similarly, in the context of critical studies, Mbembe has utilised the Schmittian
theory of ‘state of exception’ in his analysis of the European colonial powers in
974 Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship: From the Origin of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to Proletarian
Class Struggle, translated by Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Cambridge; Malden, Massachusetts:
Polity Press, 2014), pp. 148-179. In this regard, also see: Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters
on the Concept of Sovereignty, translated by George Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2005), pp. 19-79.
975 Ming-Sung Kuo, ‘From Institutional Sovereignty to Constitutional Mindset: Rethinking the
Domestication of the State of Exception in the Age of Normalization’, in Richard Albert and Yaniv Roznai
(eds), Constitutionalism Under Extreme Conditions: Law, Emergency, Exception (Cham, Switzerland:
Springer, 2020), pp. 21-39
976 Liora Lazarus and Benjamin J Goold, ‘Security and Human Rights: Finding a Language of Resilience
and Inclusion’, in Benjamin J Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds), Security and Human Rights (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2019), pp. 1-24.
977 Agamben has elaborated on Schmitt’s theory of ‘state of exception’ in the following scholarly work:
Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, translated by Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2005).
978 Ibid, pp. 3 and 4. For more detailed account in this regard, see: Giorgio Agamben, ‘Homo Sacer:
Sovereign Power and Bare Life’, translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen, in The Omnibus Homo Sacer
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2017), pp. 99-147.
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applying different rules and norms with regard to their subjects – whom they
called infamously ‘savages’ – in the colonial territories under their
sovereignty.979 In this regard, Mbembe concludes that colonies are the sites or
spaces ‘par excellence where controls and guarantees of judicial order can be
suspended – the zone where the violence of the state of exception is deemed to
operate in the service of “civilization”.’980 This discussion brings us back to the
colonial reading of the history of asylum and refugee law in Europe. As
elaborated in Chapter 2, the practice of asylum has always existed even long
before the creation of nation-states. However, the formation of nation-states
and the control of modern sovereign powers over almost every aspects of human
life resulted in the exclusion of those perceived as ‘undesirable others’ from the
rights deemed natural to humans. Some de-colonial research within the critical
migration studies has shown that the exclusion of a certain category of
immigrants is both longstanding and intentional.981 Hence, we need to take into
account these colonial histories in the analysis and criticism of EU law and
policies on immigration and asylum.
This chain of dependency between enjoying human rights and belonging to a
nation-state makes us question whether human rights – the right to seek asylum
included – truly emerge from our inherent and equal human dignity, or whether
perhaps they are just matter of our political choices. For all the reasons
formulated above, depending on law alone and the language of rights, as such,
is insufficient to realise the right to seek asylum. In addition to the inherent
incapability and inability of law to resolve the issue of illegality – as said above,
the law creates illegality – this approach limits us to the rigidity of a ‘legalistic
dogma.’982 This rigidity in legal thinking results in ignoring the political, social,
cultural, and civil contexts, within which human rights in general, and the right
to seek asylum in particular have been formulated through time and have found
meaning.983 Instead of understanding the formation of the right to seek asylum
from a strictly legalistic approach, we should consider the political processes
979 Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, translated by Steve Corcoran (Durham, North Carolina: Duke
University Press, 2019), pp. 76-78.
980 Ibid, p. 77.
981 Lucy Mayblin, ‘Colonialism, Decolonisation, and the Right to be Human: Britain and the 1951 Geneva
Convention on the Status of Refugees’ (2014) 27(3) Journal of Historical Sociology, pp. 423-441. Also,
see: Ulrike Krause, ‘Colonial Roots of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Effects on the Global Refugee
Regime’ (2021) 24 Journal of International Relations and Development, pp. 599-626.
982 Richard Ashby Wilson, ‘Tyrannosaurus Lex: The Anthropology of Human Rights and Transnational
Law’, in Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry (eds), The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law
between the Global and the Local (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 342-
369, pp. 360-363.
983 Ibid. In this regard, also see: Jean Grugel and Nicola Piper, Critical Perspectives on Global
Governance: Rights and Regulation in Governing Regimes (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 18-21.
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behind the creation of human rights. By understanding human rights as a ‘socio-
political process,’ which brings into existence, provides suitable conditions for
realisation and even dismisses rights through different social struggles, we
might be able to revive the right to seek asylum as a fundamental human right
and to give it a second life in the EU.
To unfold this socio-political process accordingly, the role of civil societies,
rights advocates, and NGOs is of pertinent importance.984 In this regard, we
could name some grassroots’ movements under the banners of ‘No one is illegal,’
‘No Human is Illegal,’ ‘Sanctuary City,’ ‘Sans-Papiers,’ etc., which started in
Germany, France, Canada, and the US, and then transferred to other parts of
the World as a global movement – similar to the ‘Me Too’ movement or
‘#MeToo’ against sexual abuse and harassment.985 These movements have
played a determining role in raising public awareness and intensifying political
debates on the negative impacts of current securitised immigration policies on
the lives of asylum seekers and their enjoyment of basic and fundamental
human rights. These movements have also mobilised grassroots initiatives to
provide sanctuary for undocumented immigrants.986 Perhaps, these movements
are the very first step in preventing asylum seekers from becoming the ‘illegals.’
These movements, in addition, have the power to provoke public debates and to
transform public opinion on what is, in fact, illegal: whether an asylum seeker
984 Jean Grugel and Nicola Piper, Critical Perspectives on Global Governance: Rights and Regulation in
Governing Regimes (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 18-21. In this regard, also see: Seyla Benhabib,
The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004),
pp. 220 and 221.
985 For the Canadian version of this movement, see: No One is Illegal, <www.nooneisillegal.org/>. For
the German version of this movement, see: Kein Mensch ist illegal, <www.kein-mensch-ist-
illegal.org/>. For the French version of this movement, see: No Border Network, ‘A Climax in the History
of French Immigration’, <www.noborder.org/without/france.html>. In this regard, also see: Jane
Freedman, ‘The French “Sans-Papiers” Movement: An Unfinished Struggle’, in Wendy A. Pojmann (ed.),
Migration and Activism in Europe since 1945 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 81-96. Also,
see: Ruben Andersson, Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2014), pp. 203, 258, and 268. Also, see: Simon
Behrman, ‘Freedom from Seizure’: Law and Asylum in Conflict (Doctoral Thesis, Birkbeck, University
of London, 2016), pp. 226-248. Also, see: Simon Behrman, Law and Asylum: Space, Subject, Resistance
(Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 131-191. Also, see: J.J. Mulligan Sepúlveda, No Human Is
Illegal: An Attorney on the Front Lines of the Immigration War (New York; London: Melville House
Publishing, 2019), pp. 47-53 and 55-62. For more information with regard to the anti-sexual abuse and
anti-harassment movement, the ‘Me Too,’ see the following recent brief published by the UN Women:
The UN Women, ‘#MeToo: Headlines from a Global Movement’, <www.unwomen.org/-
/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2020/brief-metoo-headlines-from-
a-global-movement-en.pdf?la=en&vs=3013>.
986 Elias Steinhilper, Migrant Protest: Interactive Dynamics in Precarious Mobilizations (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2021), pp. 11-14, 145-167. Also, see: Jane Freedman, ‘The French “Sans-
Papiers” Movement: An Unfinished Struggle’, in Wendy A. Pojmann (ed.), Migration and Activism in
Europe since 1945 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 81-96. Also, see: Simon Behrman, Law
and Asylum: Space, Subject, Resistance (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 186-191.
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as a human being in need of security is illegal, or if the actions of States in
violating the principle of non-refoulement are illegal.
For sure, here, I do not seek to belittle the role of States and official actors
including the judiciary on giving a real meaning to the right to seek asylum.
However, what I would like to convey is that in the current environment of
highly securitised immigration in the EU, and by considering the deference of
Europe’s human rights Courts (both the ECtHR and the CJEU) to this approach,
we cannot not expect much from the official actors to defend the right to seek
asylum. When asylum seekers are denied the right to seek asylum through
violating the principle of non-refoulement, by subjecting them to practices such
as collective expulsion or other forms of preventing access to the EU territory,
we could claim that this right is no longer being taken seriously. Formulating
the right to seek asylum as a right to have rights is perhaps the closest solution
available to think and act politically in the Europe of today.987 The modern-day
Europe that seems to have completely forgotten its own long and turbulent
history of war and displacement, closing its door on people coming from the
Global South – mainly the Middle Eastern and African asylum seekers.988 Acting
politically, similar to the ‘Sans-Papiers’ movement is the closest practical path
and tool to get undocumented immigrants in general, and asylum seekers
particularly, to gain recognition and a legal agency in realising their human
rights.989
As Dauvergne has rightfully observed, the morality of immigration discourses,
which we choose to base our politics on, greatly influences the way we create
‘others’ versus ‘us’ in our law.990 Some citizens of prosperous States might
consider their right to move around the World, and the right to remain in a
certain territory, as a given. That is why those seeking to enter, ‘could be labelled
“rorters” seeking to unjustly exploit the system or circumvent the (just) rules
that confine them to poorer states with fewer life chances.’991 However, the
privileged citizens of the developed World have completely ignored the fact that
987 Ayten Gündoğdu, Rightlessness in an Age of Rights: Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Struggles
of Migrants (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 187-202.
988 Liora Lazarus and Benjamin J Goold, ‘Security and Human Rights: Finding a Language of Resilience
and Inclusion’, in Benjamin J Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds), Security and Human Rights (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2019), pp. 1-24.
989 Ayten Gündoğdu, Rightlessness in an Age of Rights: Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Struggles
of Migrants (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 187-202.
990 Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 16 and 17.
991 Ibid, p. 17
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this right is merely an ‘accident of birth’ (what I would like to call the ‘lottery of
birth’),992 rather than a virtue earned.993
In the same vein, the indifference of the EU to the ever-growing neoliberal
populist movements sweeping across the European community has created a
comfortable place for racist, xenophobic, Islamophobia, and nativist rhetoric to
grow in Europe. Covering this ugly discriminatory rhetoric with the façade of
‘security’ is the most dangerous weapon against protecting the basic and
fundamental human rights of not only those seeking to enter, but also those
already living in the EU.994 The security narratives of the EU under the labels of
‘state of emergency,’ the ‘war against terror,’ or the ‘refugee crisis’ reminds us of
Schmitt enthusiastically advocating for the Nazi dictatorship to assume power
and strip certain ‘undesirable’ groups of people of their human rights – and even
their personhood and legal existence – all in the name of ‘security’ and
‘stability.’995 The essentially inseparable element of sovereign power in Schmitt’s
philosophy, which all dictatorships share, is the idea of having an ‘enemy’ who
threatens the very existence of the sovereign’s entity.996 This is exactly what the
992 In a blogpost for the Stories of Europe Series, I used the phrase ‘lottery of life’ in criticising Europe
basing its human rights policies on citizenship. For more information in this regard, see: Iida
Karjalainen and Bea Bergholm, ‘Castle in the Sky – Open Europe and the Realities of European
Exclusiveness’, <www.helsinki.fi/en/news/language-culture/castle-in-the-sky-open-europe-and-the-
realities-of-european-exclusiveness>.
993 Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 17. For further ethical discussions on the
link between birth and citizenship, see: Ayelet Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global
Inequality (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009).
994 For more information in this regard and on the narratives of the right wing and national populist
parties on securitising immigration in contemporary Europe, see:  Andreas M. Klein, ‘The End of
Solidarity? On the Development of Right-wing Populist Parties in Denmark and Sweden’, in Karsten
Grabow and Florian Hartleb (eds), Exposing the Demagogues: Right-wing and National Populist
Parties in Europe (Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 2013), pp. 105-131. Also, see: Magali Balent,
‘The French National Front from Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: Between Change and Continuity’, in
Karsten Grabow and Florian Hartleb (eds), Exposing the Demagogues: Right-wing and National
Populist Parties in Europe (Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 2013), pp. 161-186. Also, see: Paul
Lucardie and Gerrit Voerman, ‘Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands: A Political
Entrepreneur in the Polder’, in Karsten Grabow and Florian Hartleb (eds), Exposing the Demagogues:
Right-wing and National Populist Parties in Europe (Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 2013), pp.
187-203. On how the mass means of communication in the EU have been portraying immigrants as
threats to the security of EU since 2015-2016, see: Monika Kopytowska and Łukasz Grabowski,
‘European Security under Threat: Mediating the Crisis and Constructing the Other’, in Christian Karner
and Monika Kopytowska (eds), National Identity and Europe in Times of Crisis: Doing and Undoing
Europe (Bingley: Emerald Publishing Limited, 2017), pp. 83-112.
995 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, translated by George
Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 5-15. In this regard, also see the chapter
entitled ‘Dictatorship in Contemporary Law and Order: The State of Siege’ in the following book: Carl
Schmitt, Dictatorship: From the Origin of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to Proletarian Class
Struggle, translated by Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Cambridge; Malden, Massachusetts: Polity
Press, 2014), pp. 148-179.
996 Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship: From the Origin of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to Proletarian
Class Struggle, translated by Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Cambridge; Malden, Massachusetts:
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securitisation of immigration is all about; it is about portraying the ‘outsider’ or
‘others’ as ‘dangerous enemies’ who is constantly threatening the very existence
of the EU. It seems that maintaining the power of the EU is dependent on
framing immigrants as threats against the life and identity of EU and its citizens,
and that is how the EU is feeding the racist appetite of the segments of the
European community.
Ultimately, considering the right to seek asylum as the right to have rights – the
mother of all other human rights – the importance of taking this right seriously
becomes even more acute. The right to seek asylum is a guarantor of other basic
human rights such as the right to life and the right to personal security. Labelling
asylum seekers as ‘illegal immigrants,’ pushes them towards the ‘death of legal
personhood,’ as if these people do not ‘exist’ before the law.997
6.4. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I gave clear answers to the main research question of this
dissertation. The implications of the securitisation of immigration in the EU on
the right to seek asylum is that the two very essential and inviolable cores of this
right fall under attack. In other words, the securitisation of immigration in the
EU has led to laws, practices, and policies, which prevent asylum seekers from
even entering the EU, in the first place, to submit their claims for asylum.
Secondly, the securitisation of immigration in the EU has resulted in practices,
which endanger the position of the principle of non-refoulement as a customary
norm of international law. Of greater concern, however, is the development of
practices such as diplomatic assurances in torture-expulsion cases, which are in
direct conflict with the absolute and non-derogable nature of non-refoulement
to torture and other forms of ill-treatment.
Thereafter, I elaborated clearly on what the contribution of this research is to
the existing academic knowledge on studying the nexus between migration law
and security. In this regard, by applying a critical discourse analysis, while
combining the two fields of critical security studies and critical legal studies, I
exposed the negative effects of the official security narratives of the EU on
immigration upon the right to seek asylum as a fundamental human right.
Polity Press, 2014), pp. 148-179. For further analysis on the position of ‘enemy’ in the Schmittian theory
of State, see: Giorgio Agamben, ‘Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life’, translated by Daniel
Heller-Roazen, in The Omnibus Homo Sacer (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2017), pp.
93-121.
997 Kathryn Allinson, ‘The Right to be Recognised as a Person before the Law’, in Elspeth Guild, Stefanie
Grant, and C. A. Groenendijk (eds), Human Rights of Migrants in the 21st Century (Oxford; New York:
Routledge, 2018), pp. 16-20, p. 18. In this regard, also see: Alison Kesby, The Right to Have Rights:
Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 101-104.
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The findings of this research made me think what the next step should be in
realising the right to seek asylum in the EU. In this regard, the ongoing changes
that are being made to the EU immigration and asylum policies, and thereafter,
to EU law on the matter are of direct importance. Only time will tell; however,
deep reservations remain, because by looking closely at the language of the EU
New Pact of Migration and Asylum, the security concerns of the EU still
dominates the Pact in the form of external border control prevailing over the
language of protecting fundamental human rights. Only time will tell whether
the future EU legal system of asylum would prevent the loss of lives – something
extremely disturbing that we are witnessing at the external borders of the EU
these days.
As final words, I touched upon the practice of the collective expulsion of
immigrants by focusing on its prohibition, which is, in my opinion, a critical
precondition for the full realisation of the right to seek asylum. In addition to
protecting the right to seek asylum, other fundamental rights of asylum seekers,
such as the right to life, right to due process and a fair procedure of their asylum
claims, and the right to an effective remedy, are highly dependent on respecting
the prohibition of the collective expulsion of immigrants. Thereby, I illustrated
that safeguarding EU security, in practice, has detrimentally affected the
prohibition of the collective expulsion, and therefore the enjoyment of the right
to seek asylum and its derivative rights. One of the recent cases addressing this
practice under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 of the ECHR is the landmark case of
N.D. and N.T. v. Spain (2020), with a final decision that went in favour of the
respondent, the Government of Spain. At the Grand Chamber level, the ECtHR
judges agreed with the Government of Spain and other intervening States that,
considering the fact that Spanish law had offered several legal channels for
accessing the territory of Spain, the effort of applicants to enter Spain ‘illegally’
could not be justified neither tolerated. In addition, the Court agreed with the
respondent State and supporting intervening parties that, the Government of
Spain could not be held liable for the ‘culpable conduct’ of applicants in invading
and storming the border fence infrastructures built between Melilla and
Morocco. In the Grand Chamber’s opinion, a lack of individual decision in the
cases of applicants is attributable to the ‘culpable conduct’ of applicants in
causing a surprise effect by their large number.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Koskelo of Finland is of utmost relevance and
importance to this research. In her assertion, Judge Koskelo criticises the
ECtHR in not legitimising the refusal of entry and expulsion of aliens against
‘national security, the protection of territorial integrity, and public order’ of
Member States. In her opinion, States Parties all have the right and the rightful
power to prevent and refuse ‘the entry into their jurisdiction of aliens aiming to
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cross their external borders with known hostile intentions or posing known
threats to national security.’ What could be derived from the opinion of Judge
Koskelo and the arguments submitted by the respondent State is the recognition
of a right to collective security as a ‘meta-right,’ which would justify and
legitimise the violation of individual freedoms and human rights. This reading
of security is very much in line with the Hobbesian and Schmittian theories of
sovereign power and supremacy of this power in deciding on the fate of the
members of society even if that means declaring a state of emergency.
Hence, by referring to the critical analysis offered by several social and political
scientists (such as Khosravi, Arendt, Agamben, Benhabib, and Dauvergne) to
get closer to the real underlying ‘problem with human rights,’ these rights are
not only matters of legal dogmatic discourse. Instead, carefully and critically, we
should study and analyse all the political, social, cultural, and even economic
contexts, within which human rights are formed and dismantled – even if these
studies make us uncomfortable exposing the post-colonial mindset upon which
EU law has been constructed. Perhaps, this may help find new ways to give a
second life to the right to seek asylum in the EU. Indeed, by closing the doors of
the EU, we cannot guarantee that terrorists stay outside. What happens for sure,
instead, is that the right to seek asylum in the EU becomes meaningless and if
there is no effective right to seek asylum, there will be no effective right to enjoy
asylum, either. This leads to the violation of the human rights of those people,
who find themselves in the greatest need of protection, albeit there will always
be someone who may wish to abuse any system
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